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This study sets out to explore how people who took part in mass protests in Russia 
produce and negotiate accounts of their protest involvement in talk. Although there has 
been a proliferation of research on protest in Russia, especially after the first mass 
demonstration in December 2011, the existing literature tends to prioritise the role of 
structural and demographic factors in mobilising dissent. However, there has been little 
investigation into how protesters themselves account for protest involvement and how 
they make such factors relevant. In addition, no in-depth social psychological exploration 
of protesters’ views has been conducted in Russia to date. This thesis addresses these gaps 
by offering a detailed empirical investigation of autobiographical accounts produced by 
Russian protesters regarding the reasons and motives for taking part in active protest and 
the subjective interpretations of what being a protester means. 
Semi-structured interviews with 48 Russian participants were collected, 
transcribed and translated. The data were analysed within the framework of discursive 
social psychology (DP). The analysis focused on how particular descriptions were used 
by protesters in talk to justify and contest certain versions of reality, and on the social 
actions thereby accomplished.  
The analysis led to novel insights into how protesters in Russia construct the 
causes and motives of their dissent, negotiate problematic identity categories and manage 
issues revolving around accountability and blame. For example, the analysis illustrated 
the potentially problematic nature of defining protesters’ interests and objectives as 
‘political’. That is, when asked about their political attitudes, the interviewees actively 
justified these as not intentional. They mobilised various discursive resources to imply 
that they did not intend to become interested in politics and protest, but rather experienced 
situations that ‘naturally’ led to the acquisition of political interest. Similarly, when talking 
about motives for active protest participation, protesters tended to downplay explicitly 
political motivations. Instead, they portrayed their actions as a logical consequence of the 
deteriorating situation: some participants justified their involvement in terms of duty to 
defend their loved ones and the country in general, while others defended the 
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appropriateness of active resistance through invoking powerful negative emotions. Such 
accounts functioned to protect protesters from being seen as motivated by personal or 
economic concerns, and warranted active protest as the only available means to address 
the unjust state of affairs in the country. 
Furthermore, I have shown that identifying with the label of ‘opposition’ is 
problematic for protesters, with oppositional membership being either denied or delimited 
in a number of ways. For example, the analysis demonstrated how respondents 
accomplished denials by making claims about the activities and attributes associated with 
the category of ‘member of the opposition’ and by invoking the negative connotations of 
the very term ‘opposition’. The instances of self-ascription of opposition membership 
further illustrated the sensitive nature of the topic: affirmation accounts were often 
modified to delimit the extent and nature of membership, with it being portrayed as a 
logical consequence of a speaker’s views, rather than in terms of emotional or 
psychological basis, such as shared identity or desire to belong.   
Finally, my study focused on the arguments relating to the people who do not 
protest. Interestingly, I found that, despite routinely warranting rationality and necessity 
of active protest, respondents portrayed the passive members of the public as not 
blameworthy. The behaviour of non-protesters was justified through attributing it to 
various practical hindrances and to specific cultural/generational mindsets, thereby 
placing it outside of peoples’ control.  
Overall, my thesis contributes to the social psychological literature on protest, by 
providing a complementary model of contention through the prism of protesters’ own 
orientations. The study demonstrated that, for protesters in Russia, protest experiences 
appear to be closely linked with interpersonal and normative considerations, with dissent 
being manufactured as a necessary and inherently moral act aimed at protecting Russia 
and its people. The study thus illustrated the utility of putting people’s accounts at the 
forefront of the analysis and treating them as valuable in their own right. In adopting a 
novel methodological approach to exploring protest realities as products of interaction, 
this thesis created an opportunity for a better understanding of the complexities and 
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Я верую в отдельных людей, и вижу спасение в отдельных личностях, 
разбросанных по России там и сям, - интеллигенты они или мужики, -  
в них сила, хотя их и мало. 
 
I believe in certain people, and I see salvation in certain people, scattered 
across Russia here and there, - they might be intellectuals or simple peasants, -  
they have the power, despite being a minority. 
 







Перемен! Требуют наши сердца.  
Перемен! Требуют наши глаза.  
В нашем смехе и в наших слезах,  
И в пульсации вен.  
Перемен!  
Мы ждем перемен.  
 
Change! Our hearts demand it. 
Change! Our eyes demand it. 
It’s in our laugher and our tears, 
And in the very pulse of our veins. 
Change! 
We are waiting for the change. 
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This thesis began with a fascination with the Russian protest movement, a 
fascination inspired by people who, after decades of relative inaction, took to the streets 
of my country’s towns and cities to voice their indignation at the government and to 
demand change. Fascination led to questions about why and how such societal ‘awakening’ 
had become possible. While many scholars of Russia were (and still are) interested in 
discovering the underlying factors that caused large-scale mobilization, my primary 
interest was with how people themselves understood and explained what they were doing 
and why they were doing it. Thus, the main aim of this thesis became to explore the ways 
in which people who participated in protests in Russia produced and negotiated accounts 
of protest in talk. 
Popular protests are commonly understood as important vehicles for social change 
(Tarrow, 1998). They give opportunities for people to express their dissatisfaction and 
exercise civic power, and in so doing, change their own lives through changing the life of 
their country. Popular protest movements also offer access to the ‘politics of common 
people’ (Bowen, 1980), that is, they demonstrate views and understandings that have not 
yet become a part of the political reality, but which are already present and shared among 
the people who are prepared to defend and actively promote them. Drawing on this, 
Melucci (1996, p. 1) has famously described people’s protests as ‘prophets of the present’. 
What he meant was that, together with expressing the will of the people, protests signal 
deep societal transformations, by showing that the change demanded by those who protest 
is, in a way, already there — in the form of new meanings and norms that are being 
communicated, and are therefore already as ‘real’ as the notions against which people 
protest. Protests can thus be seen as ‘windows’ to society itself, and therefore present a 
worthy topic of investigation, in particular due to their ability to shed light on the very 
mechanics of social change.  
In Russia, too, protests and popular uprisings have played an important role in 
shaping society for centuries, with a number of profound social and political 
transformations accomplished through revolt. The most famous examples from the 
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modern era are, of course, the revolutions of 1917 that put an end to tsarist rule, and the 
events of the 1990s signifying the end of the Communist regime and transforming the 
country from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation. After the turbulent 1990s which 
saw the dissolution of communism, the country seemingly settled down, content with its 
new president Vladimir Putin and his promises to establish a strong democratic state, ruled 
by law and governed though viable political competition. These promises, however, 
turned into pipe dreams as early as 2004, with Putin’s re-election as president of the 
Russian Federation (Fish, 2005). After this, it became increasingly clear that the regime 
was taking a turn away from democracy and towards greater authoritarianism.  
Currently, the political situation in Russia is rather grim. Carefully constructed 
‘power vertical’ (vertikal’ vlasti, top-down system of governance) hinges essentially on 
one man, Putin himself, and political competition is all but non-existent (March, 2009). In 
2012, Putin was re-elected as president, reportedly with minimal falsifications, which is 
not surprising given that people simply had no options to choose from, because all truly 
oppositional candidates were banned from running for office. Indeed, Putin remained in 
power from 2000, mainly unchallenged, and supported by the people. That is, until late 
December 2011, when Russia and the world witnessed Putin’s regime being confronted 
with large-scale street demonstrations, with thousands of people questioning the results of 
the Parliamentary elections and accusing the government of illegitimacy. While the 
protesters were in the minority, the demonstrations of late 2011 and early 2012 were the 
largest since Perestroika in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Greene, 2014). So once again, 
Russia was in uproar. Between 2011 and 2013, numerous large-scale protest actions took 
place against the rising levels of state control, widespread corruption and nepotism, and 
infraction of democratic freedoms guaranteed by the constitution, such as the freedom of 
speech and gathering. At the same time, local civic initiatives started to develop across 
various cities, focused on issues of ecology, preservation of historical monuments, 
protection of local parks and forests and so on.  
Mass protests demonstrated that people in Russia were not as apathetic as they had 
often been portrayed. Importantly, protests challenged the predominant view of Russian 
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civil society as weak and dormant (Gel’man, 2013) and demonstrated that common people 
do care about what is going on in the country and are prepared to challenge the status quo.     
The unanticipated, and hence intriguing, nature of Russian protests and their 
unprecedented scale have brought them into the focus of scholarly attention; now, a 
substantial research bank on the topic exists. Much of this research focuses on structural 
factors and mechanisms that provoked mobilisation in Russia, and on the role that various 
demographic factors played in triggering protests. Considerably fewer studies have looked 
at the social psychological determinants of protest involvement, but none of these paid 
sufficient attention to participants’ own understandings and the details of meaning 
construction in talk. At the same time, sociological studies that did take note of what 
participants actually said tended to treat people’s accounts as straightforward descriptions 
of what ‘really’ happened or of what speakers ‘really’ felt and thought. Such studies are 
thus limited in their ability to explore the functional nature of language use; that is, the 
ways in which protesters manage various normative and interpersonal issues in interaction. 
However, awareness of such ways and the issues that protesters address thorough them is 
paramount if we, as researchers, are to comprehend people’s own stance on protest matters 
and help them in their struggle for positive social change.  
This situation demonstrates a lacuna in the literature, which occasions the need for 
more information and deeper understanding. My doctoral research attempts to address this 
need, by exploring protesters’ own understandings and considering the pragmatic nature 
of people’s descriptions. The study uses the qualitative approach of discursive psychology, 
which is particularly well placed to study the discursive construction of protest empirically 
and gain insight into the constitutive role of language in bringing protest matters and 
concerns to life. Such an approach also allows us to explore issues that are not necessarily 
mentioned in theory and in literature, but which can nonetheless be important to the 







Structure of the thesis 
 
In the first chapter of the thesis, I review the relevant literature, starting with a 
brief historical overview of the rise and fall of popular protest in Russia, and then 
sketching the timeline of 2011-2012 wave of protest. Next, I discuss three categories of 
studies of Russian protest: ‘systemic’ approach studies, which explore the role of 
‘objective’ factors, such as resources and political structures, in the mobilisation of 
dissent; ‘class’ approach studies, which explain protest as a result of the emerging middle 
class; and ‘psychological’ approach studies, which focus on various individual and 
intergroup factors as the driving force behind protest participation in Russia. I argue that 
while these studies certainly offer valuable insights, there is a notable lack of specific 
social psychological research on protest in Russia. I then give a review of the relevant 
approaches to the study of collective behaviour within social psychology, including 
cognitive and discursive research. I conclude the chapter by arguing that discursive 
research offers useful insights with regard to the construction of protest in various cultural 
contexts, but little attention has been paid to Russia, which creates a gap in the literature 
that my study can begin to fill in.   
Chapter 2 introduces the methodology of the study, in particular justifying the 
choice of discursive psychology as a general methodological framework, by comparing it 
with other discourse-oriented approaches. I subsequently address the method of data 
collection, discussing sampling strategies, the interview process and ethical considerations. 
I argue that qualitative interviews provide appropriate data for exploring how people 
construct and negotiate versions of protest reality in talk. I then describe the process of 
data analysis, and conclude the chapter with a discussion of methodological issues related 
to the use of interview data in discursive psychology and practices of translation.  
Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter, where I begin the analysis of the discursive 
construction of protest by exploring how protesters talk about their interests in politics. 
The chapter demonstrates that talking about one’s political views is a sensitive topic, by 
analysing various strategies that speakers use in order to justify their ‘turning political’; 
namely, the portrayal of political interest as fostered by others, presenting it as a result of 
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a problematic experience and positioning it as an outcome of learning about the political 
situation. The chapter also shows that interviewees are concerned with matters of intent, 
as they design their accounts to imply that they did not intend to become interested in 
politics in the first place. In the discussion, I relate these findings to the broader situation 
in Russia, specifically to the idea that in Russia, being interested in politics for no reason 
risks coming across as in some way deviant or at least suspicious. I argue that the design 
of speakers’ formulations is an interactional resource for dealing with such a risk.  
In order to develop a better understanding of people’s reasons for mobilisation, in 
Chapter 4 I focus on how protesters talk about their motives for becoming actively 
involved in protest. In the course of analysis, I identify two broad strategies of portraying 
active involvement as legitimate. The first strategy centres around the idea of protest as a 
duty, with speakers orienting to the obligational and instrumental role that protesting plays 
in improving the highly problematic state of affairs in the country. In the second strategy, 
protest involvement is portrayed as an expected outcome of negative emotional 
experiences that speakers had after witnessing the flaws of the system first-hand. Concerns 
with rationality and selflessness of behaviour appear to permeate both strategies, and the 
findings shed light on certain interpersonal issues related to talking about one’s active 
protest involvement in Russia. For example, I suggest that the depiction of protest 
participation as a rational and deliberate choice both attends to, and counters, the official 
media’s depiction of protesters as pliable people who were simply ‘brainwashed’ into 
action by political leaders.  
Ample research from social psychology shows that studying protesters’ ‘identity 
politics’, including subjective perception of belonging, is paramount for our 
understanding of contentious behaviour. In Chapter 5, then, I approach this idea 
empirically and examine how protesters manage their ‘oppositional’ belonging in talk. 
This chapter focuses on the particular strategies through which oppositional membership 
is accepted and rejected. The analysis shows that the negotiation of identity is a delicate 
business, and is closely linked to the construction of category-bound attributes of ‘the 
opposition’, including actions, motives and attitudes. In particular, it appears that 
affiliation with the label of opposition is problematic due to its political and 
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institutionalised connotations. However, analysis shows that rejecting oppositional 
affiliation is not an easy task either, and requires careful work in order to be accomplished. 
I suggest that such findings provide evidence of speakers being engaged in a certain 
discursive ‘struggle’ regarding their legitimacy as participants in the study. 
After exploring protesters’ constructions of their subjective attitudes, motives and 
identities, I conclude the empirical part in Chapter 6, by looking at the ways in which 
respondents approach the ‘puzzle’ of public inaction. The chapter investigates how the 
people who are actively involved in protest explain why other people are not involved, 
even though protest appears to be essential for addressing the situation in the country 
(hence, the ‘puzzle’). Analysis shows that speakers deal with the issue by accounting for 
non-participants’ behaviour in various ways, for example, by identifying practical 
obstacles to protesting and by portraying inaction as a direct and unavoidable consequence 
of living under the Soviet state. Furthermore, the analysis illustrates how interviewees 
manage issues of blame and responsibility, through reducing the deliberateness of protest-
related indifference and portraying inaction as reasonable behaviour given the 
circumstances of people’s lives. The findings of the chapter also suggest that speakers can 
negotiate the very idea of involvement, by claiming that people can be meaningfully 
involved in ways other than street protest; specifically, by doing work for the benefit of 
local communities and making personal choices to live in ethical ways.   
Chapter 7 brings together the main findings of the study, discussing them in 
relation to each other and to a broader context. I summarise the analyses and attempt to 
present a coherent story that emerges from it, arguing that one of the main functions of 
such a story is to justify being a protester in a cultural context where protest is not 
generally recognised as normative. I also discuss the contributions my study makes, 
focusing in particular on the advantage of using a discursive methodological lens to study 
the topic of protest in Russia. Subsequently, I provide some reflections, discussing how I, 
as a person and the researcher, might have influenced the work, how the work in turn 
changed me and how my study can be developed in future. I finish by reiterating the 
importance of studying how versions of protest reality are manufactured and negotiated 
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in talk in the ‘hybrid’ context of Russia (Robertson, 2011), where protesting is neither a 



































Chapter 1. Literature review 
 
The expansion of popular dissent over the last century has put the phenomenon of 
social movements in the spotlight of academic research. The beginning of the twenty-first 
century saw large waves of protest happening across the globe, from the Colour 
Revolutions in the countries of the former Soviet Union to the popular opposition against 
the government in Thailand, from the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street movement 
in the United States, to non-systemic opposition rallies in Russia. What unites these social 
movements is the attempt to challenge governmental elites and their ways, and to protests 
against the social inequality; as such, they have been described as ‘contentious politics’ 
(Tarrow, Tilly & McAdam, 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). It has been argued that 
contentious politics is the main tool for advancing societies in terms of democratic 
development (Melucci, 1996), with popular contention being a vital precondition for 
social change (Hornsey et al., 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When people take to the 
streets to voice their grievances, to whatever end, it subjectively affects them as well as 
bringing changes to their societies. The change, although it can be desired or needed, is 
often accompanied by periods of violence and instability; this is one of the reasons why 
public perceptions of protest are often ambivalent, ranging from open support to open 
hostility. The factor that influences perceptions to a great extent is the way the protesters 
are portrayed: the stories that are told about them by the media, local people or protesters 
themselves (Polletta, 2006). Such stories undeniably have an impact on the perceived 
legitimacy of protest, on how it is treated by the public, and on the practices and policies 
in relation to those who protest.  
Regarding the recent protests in Russia, there has been a variety of studies 
examining the reasons for popular protest mobilisation from various analytic standpoints, 
drawing both on large-scale survey research (Robertson, 2011; Rose, Mishler & Munro, 
2011; Gudkov, 2012a; Gudkov, Dubin & Zorkaya, 2011) and on ethnographic research 
based on interviewers and observations (Clément, 2013; 2015; Greene, 2014; Volkov, 
2012a; 2012b). However, there have been virtually no cases of application of dominant 
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socio-psychological theories to recent civil protests in Russia, nor have there been 
attempts to explore protest through a discursive-psychological lens.  
The ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the wave of protest which occurred in 2011-2012 is the 
focus of the majority of existing research (Cheskin & March, 2015). However, while 
sociological and political studies of protests in Russia offer many valuable insights, they 
tend to sketch a rather generic picture, in which little attention is paid to what protest 
means for people, or how it is experienced and perceived in relation to local socio-cultural 
context. Another potential issue with much of the existent research on Russian protest is 
that it can give an impression of protests arising solely from various objective factors (e.g 
state abuse of power, proliferation of economically stable middle class and so on). While 
some studies, predominantly from within Russia, pointed to the importance of 
psychological determinants for the 2011-2012 protests (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2013; 
Savchenko, 2012; Shestopal, 2012), those authors did not take into account contemporary 
research in social psychology. Similarly, in the Western academic world, the Russian 
context has not been examined, perhaps due to the proximity of protests and their more 
‘ordinary’ civil nature (in comparison to voluminous literature on political ‘revolutionary’ 
protests in Tunisia or Egypt). Moreover, very few psychological studies to date have 
addressed the question of how protesters themselves account for their actions and how in 
so doing they discursively shape their own image and that of the broader society. In what 
follows, I will review the literature on protest in Russia as well as discuss the relevant 
approaches to the study of collective behaviour within social psychology.   
 
1. Setting the scene: historical roots of popular protest in Russia 
 
Before I turn to the events that lie at the heart of this thesis — the mass protests of 
2011-2012 — I will give a brief overview of the main landmarks in the history of social 
uprisings in Russia. This short section will show that, contrary to the research envisioning 
Russian masses as inherently apolitical, submissive and anti-democratic (Ashwin, 1999; 
Colton & McFaul, 2002; Howard, 2003; Payin, 2007), the conflict between the state and 
its citizens in Russia in fact has a long and prolific history.  
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In tsarist Russia, mass protests were plentiful. The seventeenth century has even 
received the name Buntashny1 (Rebellious) due to an abundance of popular uprisings, 
among which Salt (1648), Copper (1662), and Archers’ (1682) riots were the most famous. 
Moreover, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the country was shaken by the four 
large-scale peasant rebellions, which are known as ‘the four Peasant Wars’ (see, for 
example, Orlov, Georgiev, Georgieva & Sivohina, 2004). While the leaders of those 
rebellions initially were able to mobilise large numbers of people, the uprisings were 
eventually suppressed by the government and in fact contributed to the consolidation of 
the tsarist regime in the 17th-18th century. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
famous Decembrist revolt took place. In contrast to the populist protests of the earlier 
centuries, the Decembrists were predominantly aristocrats who hoped to modernise Russia 
in the manner of Europe and bring about democratic reforms, such as abolition of serfdom. 
In 1825, a number of officers refused to swear allegiance to the new Tsar and organised a 
stand-off at Senate Square in Saint Petersburg. After failed negotiations, the protesters 
were dispersed by the Tsar’s loyal troops and the movement’s leaders were executed. The 
demise of the Decembrists brought about another wave of regime consolidation; however, 
it also became an important landmark for future opponents of an autocratic state, and in a 
way became a starting point for the anti-tsarist struggle that culminated in the Revolution 
of 1917 (Offord, 2014).  
So, while eventful, the story of popular opposition to the regime in pre-1917 
Russia is largely a narrative of unsuccessful and failed attempts to bring about a change. 
By contrast, contentious actions of the beginning of the twentieth century were more 
successful. Across the major cities of the Russian Empire, numerous labour strikes took 
place, with workers demanding not only economic, but political changes, such as the 
dissolution of the tsarist regime and introduction of democratic freedoms (Orlov et al., 
                         
1 The transliteration system I use throughout this thesis is the standard British one (it can be 
found, for example, in the Europe-Asia Studies journal guidelines). For the titles of some Russian 
publications, however, I follow the spelling used by the authors in the English version where it is 
available; thus, there may be slight difference between the spelling of a word in the text and in the 




2004). Peasants, too, rioted frequently and made pleas for both economic and political 
reforms. Importantly, the civil liberal opposition started to develop on the basis of district 
councils, with historians, lawyers, economists and publicists coming together to put 
forward demands for moderate political changes, such as the formation of a constitutional 
monarchy. At the same time, many members of the pro-democratic intelligentsia started 
to radicalise and unite into revolutionary political parties; in 1898, the Russian Social 
Democratic Labour Party was formed by Vladimir Lenin and his associates.  
The socio-political turmoil put Russia on the brink of a major historical state-
citizen conflict. First, the Revolution of 1905-1907 resulted in the creation of the State 
Duma (Parliament) and the oppositional Constitutional Democratic Party. Then, the two 
revolutions of 1917 — in February and October — brought an end to tsarism and 
established a new political regime. This is not the place to discuss the details of the events 
that took place, and whether it was indeed a ‘people’s movement’, but it has been argued 
that mass mobilisation of the common people — specifically the numerous members of 
agrarian movements and low-level labour unions — was the driving force behind the 
success of the October Revolution (Keep, 1976).  
The adoption of the new set of political ideals in now Soviet Russia — 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ — established a framework within which any form of 
organised opposition, political or civic, was not tolerated. The leaders of the Bolshevik 
Party were open in their intent to suppress dissenters: they portrayed suppression as a 
necessary measure in protecting the new Soviet states (Powell, 1972). Moreover, the 
Party’s directives had implications for the term oppozitsiya (opposition) itself. Schapiro 
(1972) has argued that the very use of the word ‘opposition’ by Lenin was intended to 
smear the Bolshevik’s political opponents as traitors, disloyal to Russia and its people. He 
also suggested that this negative association was maintained by both Joseph Stalin and 
Nikita Khrushchev, making distrust of any ‘oppositional’ actions into a characteristic 
feature of the Soviet mentality. While I do not argue that similar negative meanings of the 
label ‘opposition’ are still in play, it is important to keep in mind the troublesome historical 
connotations of it in the Russian context. 
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That is not to say, however, that there was no opposition in the Soviet Union. 
Scholars of Soviet dissent agree that during the first few decades of Soviet rule the protest 
was extremely limited, largely because the Communist Party had erected a formidable 
barrier that prevented people from engaging in organised protests. For instance, Stalin’s 
Great Purge of the late 1930s destroyed the majority of the organised political opposition 
(Saunders, 1974), and a comprehensive state censorship system prevented free 
distribution of virtually all sources of information (Orlov et al., 2004). Yet, the dissent 
blossomed again in the era of Khrushchev’s Thaw.  
The official narrative of de-Stalinisation in the 1960s encouraged a freer public 
debate in the mass media, among scholars, writers and other members of the intelligentsia. 
Oppositional political tendencies started to surface, both among the party members and 
among the more ordinary citizens (Powell, 1972; Skilling, 1972). Of course, the degree to 
which the opposition was able to express itself was still rather limited by the regime, with 
open dissent being harshly punished. For example, in 1966 writers Andrei Sinyavsky and 
Yuli Daniel were imprisoned for publishing anti-Soviet satirical works abroad. Another 
illustration is the famous case of 1968 demonstration against the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, where eight people came to Moscow’s Red Square, holding a 
Czechoslovak flag and banners with anti-invasion slogans. Out of eight protesters, six 
faced charges, including exile and incarceration in psychiatric institutions. In the late 
1960s, a number of human rights organisations were created, for instance the Initiative 
Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR and the Human Rights Committee, 
the latter founded on the initiative of the famous Soviet academician Andrei Sakharov. 
These organisations did not advocate the overthrow the regime, but argued instead for the 
observance of civic rights and democratic freedoms, for the government’s accountability 
to its people and against the exclusive privileges of bureaucratic officials (Saunders, 1974). 
Alongside overt dissent, more implicit forms of protest were developing in late 
socialism. Schapiro (1972) has noted that in Soviet Russia, the so-called ‘apolitical’ 
dissent was a particularly resilient form of popular opposition. Because of the dangers 
associated with street demonstrations, dissenters stayed largely hidden, expressing their 
dissatisfaction in the form of anonymous letters and collective petitions, and by collecting 
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and publishing samizdat (self-published) writings, most notably the Chronicle of Current 
Events, a magazine that documented cases of political prosecution and violation of human 
rights in the USSR (Hosking, 1990). Soviet citizens demonstrated their rejection of the 
government’s authority through private acts: by sharing samizdat uncensored materials 
with friends, by going to underground rock concerts and poetry readings and by gathering 
around the kitchen table to talk about the wrongs of the regime (Evans, 2006). 
While the years of Brezhnev zastoi (stagnation; 1964-1982) turned out to be more 
peaceful with regard to overt social protest than Khrushchev’s, it was in the 1970s-early 
1980s that the foundation for the popular uprising during perestroika was laid (Kozlov, 
2002; perestroika was a state policy of restructuring the economic and political system, 
offered by Leonid Brezhnev and actively promoted later by Mikhail Gorbachev). Tracing 
the development of social unrest in the USSR, Kozlov pointed out that under Brezhnev 
people became disillusioned with the socialist regime; by the end of it, communist ideals 
were ‘practically squeezed out of mass consciousness by the conformism, consumerism, 
and individualism’ (pp. 313-314). This situation resulted in many Soviet people living a 
‘double life’ (Boobbyer, 2000), where public and private spheres were divided. In the 
open, people conformed to the rules of the state, participating in its many rituals and 
procedures; their private opinions, however, often ran contrary to the official ideology. 
The decrease in protest activity therefore did not resemble the absence of protest moods; 
if anything, it was an indirect sign of the Soviet regime’s failure, as there was not much 
sense in actively protesting against the system that existed largely in name only.  
This argument echoes the one made by Yurchak (2005) in his brilliant examination 
of people’s life under late socialism. Yurchak suggested that the ideological practices of 
Brezhnev’s USSR were highly ritualised, meaning that the formal expression of support 
for communism was maintained, but it rarely resembled people’s true ideological devotion. 
He argued that under such paradoxical conditions, Soviet people did not see the value of 
taking a strong stance against the state. The tactic was to dissociate oneself from the 
system and focus instead on inner freedom, by interacting with svoi (ours), the inner circle 
of like-minded friends and family. Yurchak explained that, perhaps surprisingly, such 
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political detachment and ‘inner’ dissent in fact had a destabilising effect on the Soviet 
regime, through generating alternative meanings:  
 
various local milieus of svoi and their practices […] were actively engaged in 
and productive of a shifting socialist system. These milieus and practices 
demonstrate that the supposed spatial and temporal linearity and totality of late 
socialism became everywhere injected with new forms of diversity, plurality, and 
indeterminacy. (p. 157). 
 
So the paradox at the core of the late Soviet system, where the nominal socialist 
public sphere coexisted with the oppositional private sphere, contributed to the 
dismantling of the state from within, even in the absence of active mass dissent. The late 
Soviet years thus created a framework within which the radical restructuring of the 
country — Gorbachev’s perestroika — and the subsequent demise of the communist 
regime in the late 1980s and early 1990s became possible. 
In contrast to the Soviet leaders before him, Gorbachev did not oppose such civic 
and political mobilisation; indeed, he actively encouraged it by giving freedom to the 
informal organisations and refusing to use military forces to suppress the opposition 
(Kramer, 2009). One of the important consequences of Gorbachev’s reforms was the 
creation of numerous NGOs and the general rise of civil society (Evans, 2006; White, 
1993). While the NGOs were initially oriented towards cultural and leisure activities, by 
the end of the 1980s some became increasingly politicised and started to advocate radical 
democratic changes. At the same time, new political parties and movements started to 
appear, following the government’s repeal of the law that ensured the Communist Party’s 
leading role in society. Such opposition ‘awakening’ created favourable conditions for a 
political change. On the one hand, there was a growing rift between the various factions 
within the Soviet state. At the same time, the risks of engaging in overt contentious actions 
decreased dramatically, and people were becoming more willing to take to the streets to 
voice their discontent with the now largely unpopular Communist party (Sakwa, 2008). 
This situation culminated in the events of August 1991, when a large-scale civil 
mobilisation brought thousands of people to the streets of Moscow in an attempt to defend 
the Russian White House, the building which housed the government, against the coup 
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d’état forces. The coup failed, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the Communist 
party, Boris Yeltsin became the first President of the Russian Federation, and the Soviet 
Union ceased to exist. As for large-scale popular dissent in Russia, it seemed to go into a 
long period of hibernation (Rose, Mishler & Munro, 2006).   
 
Dissent in the post-Soviet era 
 
Examining the patterns of public dissent in the 1990s, Robertson (2011) suggested 
that although economic stagnation and the growing crisis of power, particularly in 
Yeltsin’s second term, resulted in a number of protests, there was no protest movement as 
such. Protesters’ demands were usually material in nature, and thus specific to a particular 
time, place and the group making them; the local nature of protests prevented people from 
developing the sense of solidarity and shared oppositional identity, needed for the 
formation of a broader social movement. To quote Robertson, ‘the collectives involved 
[in the protest cycle of 1990s] were local and based on a sense of identity embedded in 
the particular workplace or local community’ (p. 65).  
Transition of political power at the end of 1999 went smoothly: against the 
background of the ailing Yeltsin, the relatively young and decisive Vladimir Putin quickly 
won the support of both the political elites and the Russian public (Shevtsova, 2007b). In 
March 2000, Putin won the elections in the first round and became the new president of 
the Russian Federation.  
During Putin’s first 4-year term, only a handful of local economic protests took 
place. The sporadic nature of those protests, their localised character and the absence of 
an oppositional political agenda led some observers to suggest that political opposition in 
Russia was ‘a dying species’ (Gel’man, 2005). It has been argued that one of the main 
factors contributing to the low levels of protest activity during that time was the 
depoliticising effect of the Putin regime (Byzov, 2008; Gel’man, 2015; Petukhov, 2008; 
Shevtsova, 2013). For example, discussing state ideology under Putin, Makarychev 
(2008) observed that the government put a lot of effort into dissociating the sphere of 
politics from that of economics, religion and culture. In practical terms, that meant that 
17 
 
civil society underwent rapid depoliticisation, and its mobilising potential was severely 
hampered. Mass media was warned not to trespass into the domain of politics: one of its 
most ‘political’ channels, NTV, was drastically restructured and two other independent 
channels were shut down. Non-governmental organisations were similarly told to keep 
out of politics, and campaigns were launched against some internationally funded NGOs, 
accusing them of being the agents of harmful foreign influence. The official political 
sphere too witnessed a dramatic decline in the number of ‘worthy’ political opponents. 
March (2009) argued that during Putin’s presidency, the majority of both parliamentary 
and non-parliamentary oppositional parties in Russia became ‘parastatal’; that is, they 
were essentially controlled by the state and used to channel the opposition in directions 
convenient for the regime. In the State Duma, Putin’s United Russia party have had a clear 
majority presence since 2003, and Kremlin’s decision to abandon popular elections of 
regional governors in 2005 gave the president additional power to control political 
opponents at the local level. Makarychev (2008, p. 66) thus concluded that ‘the very idea 
of opposition under Putin was devoid of political content’. 
Among ordinary people, a lack of interest in politics became widespread; this 
attitude seemed to hold throughout the 2000s. Survey studies offer evidence here. 
According to research by Gudkov, Dubin and Zorkaya (2008), 60-75% of the respondents 
in late 2000s reported a lack of interest in politics. These numbers are consistent with 
VCIOM (2012) study, which found that 61% were not interested in the political life of the 
country. According to Gudkov et al. (2008), the main reasons for the lack of interest in 
politics among ‘lay’ people were the perceived inability to influence Russia’s political 
sphere (82%) and the resulting decline of responsibility for what was happening in the 
country/city/district (66%). Russians also tended to have little knowledge of how political 
systems work: Gudkov (2012a) argued that nearly half of his respondents had a rather 
vague idea of how the Parliament functions, with 39% saying they had absolutely no 
knowledge on the topic.  
Further studies into the nature of Putin’s ‘sovereign democracy’ have shown that 
depoliticisation of Russian society was accompanied by strong quasi-populist rhetoric. 
For instance, Casula (2013) highlighted that systemic populism ‘from above’ was a 
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notable feature of post-2000 state discourse, seeking to present Putin as the sole strong 
leader and defender of ‘the people’. Such discourse, Casula argued, contributed to creation 
of the symbolic rift in the society, with people splitting into supporters and opponents of 
‘Putin’s plan’, and to the portrayal of the anti-Putin opposition as unpatriotic extremists 
and the agents of the ‘fifth column’. Such propaganda drastically reduced the opposition’s 
chances of mobilising mass support, and placed it firmly on the outside of official politics. 
At the same time, Putin’s own tough rhetoric and his aggressive military actions against 
the separatist republic of Chechnya continued to earn popular support, which additionally 
contributed to the lessening of anti-government sentiment among the people (Colton & 
McFaul, 2003). 
Despite the seeming civic apathy among Russian citizens, early 2005 saw the first 
Putin-era instance of large-scale social mobilisation, when thousands of people across 
various cities in Russia came out to the streets to voice their dissatisfaction with the so-
called ‘monetisation’ law, which transformed a range of in-kind benefits into monetary 
compensations. Among other things, the law took away pensioners’ right to free public 
transport. This was crucial for bringing about protests, as it directly affected one of the 
most politically mobilised sections of Russian society, older people, who were politically 
socialised in the protest-rich Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras (Evans, 2012; Robertson, 
2011). The impact was not simply financial (for many, monetary compensation was only 
partial and did not cover transportation costs), but also symbolic, since the right to free 
transport carried special significance, because it was seen as an expression of state respect 
for pensioners. Another key group of people who were actively dissatisfied with the law 
were those who, under the new law, could no longer travel at no cost between 
jurisdictional regions, such as Moscow and the neighbouring town of Khimki. Robertson 
(2011) pointed out that the main reason for the quick popular mobilisation was a set of 
powerful economic grievances that directly impacted people’s lives; however, he also 
observed that while material deprivation was the driving force behind the demonstrations, 
some activists also used political slogans, calling for respect of political and civil rights.  
The 2005 l’gotniki (benefit holders) movement marked the beginning of a new 
protest cycle in Russia, and laid the preconditions for the mass mobilisation of 2011 
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(Greene, 2014). Importantly, while the anti-monetisation demonstrations of 2005 were 
predominantly economic, non-material demands became much more prevalent in the 
period of 2007-2009, with political protests against the national authorities being on the 
rise (Lankina & Savrasov, 2009). Other issues, such as the environment, city development 
and civil rights (such as the right to assembly, minority rights, etc.) too started coming 
into the focus of protesters’ attention.  
 A useful summary of the 2005-2011 mass protests, offered by Evans (2012), 
demonstrates the scope of the issues that mobilised popular support. It includes the already 
discussed protests by elderly people against monetisation in 2005; environmental protests 
against building an oil pipeline near Lake Baikal in 2006 and the 2008-2010 
environmental movement in defence of the Khimki forest near Moscow; a number of 
rallies organised by car owners in the Russia’s Far Eastern regions in 2008-2009 against 
a steep increase in the tariff on imported cars; a widely publicised 2009 strike against the 
closing of a factory by the workers of the town of Pikalevo; the resonant case of 2009-
2010 public protest against the construction of Gazprom’s (Russian natural gas monopoly) 
skyscraper in the centre of Saint Petersburg; and 2009-2010 Moscow protests against the 
demolition of a historical residential neighbourhood. As can be seen, protests did not 
decrease but in fact escalated under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008-2012). In their 
study, Smyth, Soboleva, Shimek and Sobolev (2015) proposed that the multitude of pre-
2011 protests could be divided into three major types. The first group included protests 
against various economic policies, such as worker’s strike in Pikalevo and the anti-
monetisation movement. The second group incorporated anti-government and anti-regime 
protests, such as Strategy-31 demonstrations, a series of civic protests in support of the 
right to freedom of assembly, which is guaranteed by Article 31 of the Russian 
Constitution (hence the name). Finally, the authors suggested calling the third group ‘local 
grievances protests’, including ecological protests, protests against the abuse of traffic 
laws by the Society of Blue Buckets and historic/cultural preservation movements. Evans 
(2012) and Smyth et al. (2015) agree that although in the majority of these protests the 
participants were quite cautious with advocating political reforms (see also Clément, 
Miryasova & Demidov, 2010; Magun, 2014), these various forms of protest provided 
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opportunities for consolidation of dissatisfied citizens and created favourable conditions 
under which the 2011-2012 wave of protest was able to happen.  
To summarise, the above review shows that social protest, in one form or another, 
has been a constant presence throughout Russian history. At the same time, however, it 
demonstrates that there is a complex set of tensions associated with protest behaviour in 
Russia. For instance, in historical context, dissent often took place in extremely adverse 
conditions of the tsarist and communist regimes; it was often brutally suppressed and 
unsuccessful in bringing about positive change. Overt expression of protest was thus 
associated with high risk and little potential benefit. This is not to suggest that such 
associations are similarly prevalent among contemporary Russians; however, they do 
present a historical background against which the post-Soviet protests were developing. 
Next, I move on from the historical overview to the examination of the 2011-2012 
protest timeline, and then to the discussion of the various scholarly approaches to the 
recent (2011-2012) wave of protests in Russia.  
 
Timeline of the 2011-2012 protests 
 
The consolidation of Putin’s regime from 2000 onward resulted in the construction 
of a semi-authoritarian state, in which increasingly anti-opposition state propaganda 
contributed to near extinction of official political opposition and to expansion of apolitical 
attitudes among the public (Robertson, 2011). The state actively undermined dissent in 
other ways too, by placing legal limits on democratic rights, such as the right to assemble, 
and narrowing possibilities for democracy-promotion groups and other nongovernmental 
organisations (Volkov, 2012b). Nonetheless, despite the state attempts to subdue political 
dissent, from 2005 there started to appear more and more public uprisings, first economic 
and then increasingly political in nature; those clearly demonstrated the growing 
dissatisfaction with the Putin/Medvedev regime.  
In September 2011, the then-prime minister Putin and then-president Medvedev 
made a political manoeuvre that came to be called a ‘castling move’ (rokirovka). During 
the United Russia congress, Medvedev announced that he would not run for the second 
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presidential term allowed by the Constitution, but instead would ‘recommend’ Putin to be 
the main presidential candidate. In turn, Putin suggested that Medvedev should become 
the prime minister after the elections of 2012 (Elder, 2011). As argued by de Vogel (2013), 
rokirovka laid the foundation for the December protest movement, by sparking anger and 
frustration with respect to United Russia and the leaders of the country among the people. 
In a way, the castling move was so damning because it confirmed what many had long 
suspected, namely that Medvedev was a political puppet, and that Putin had remained the 
de facto leader of Russia since 2000 (Lipman & Petrov, 2012).  
The final turning point was the Duma elections on the 4th December 2011. The 
Duma is the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, the legislative body of the 
country, whose members are elected for a five-year term. There has been evidence to 
suggest that previous legislative elections, both on federal and local levels, were grossly 
falsified (Gudkov, 2012b; Volkov, 2012b); yet, that falsification did not result in mass 
mobilisation (Myagkov, Ordeshook & Shakin, 2009). On December 5th, however, after it 
became clear that United Russia had once again won a majority of seats in the Duma, 
thousands of protesters went to the streets to show their indignation over results that they 
believed to be rigged. Some heard about falsifications through election-monitoring 
organisations, such as the Voice (Golos) and Citizen Observer (Grazhdanin Nablyudatel’), 
who reported the fraud (Volkov, 2012c); others witnessed falsifications first-hand while 
observing the elections. The practice of election observation in Russia existed before, but 
it tended to be carried out by professionals, such as political activists and journalists. In 
late 2011, however, and especially after the mass protests gained momentum in 2012, 
more unaffiliated, ‘lay’ observers started to appear. It was those people who started 
spreading the word about hundreds of witnessed election violations, such as ballot stuffing, 
‘merry-go-round’ multiple voting (karuseli) and election committee members tampering 
with the final result lists. For the first time in Russia, the evidence of fraud was openly 
shared on the Internet; social networking was used widely to mobilise sympathisers 
(Bennett, 2012; Koesel & Bunce, 2012; White, 2015).   
The first, smaller-scale, demonstrations were held in Moscow and Saint Petersburg 
immediately after the election day, on the 5th December. In Moscow, the demonstration 
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was pre-arranged by the activists of the Solidarity (Solidarnost’) movement who were 
joined, somewhat unexpectedly, by several thousand people, including old-time 
opposition leaders Boris Nemtsov (former Deputy Prime Minister of Russia) and Vladimir 
Ryzhkov, younger activists Alexei Navalny, Sergei Udaltsov and Evgeniya Chirikova, a 
number of prominent journalists as well as a large number of unaffiliated citizens. 
Protesters demanded the annulment of election results and resignation of Putin (Park, 
2014).  
Within a week, the word about protests had spread across many big Russian cities. 
A much larger demonstration took place on the 10th December, gathering between 50,000 
and 60,000 participants (Greene, 2014). In addition to the demands of earlier protests, the 
dissenters called for the release of political and economic prisoners (including Navalny 
and Udaltsov, who were arrested on the 5th of December) and the resignation of the 
infamous head of the Central election committee Vladimir Churov. In other major Russian 
cities, smaller but still relatively well-attended demonstrations took place. In Moscow, the 
core of oppositional activists formed the coordination group called the Protest Action 
Organising Committee (Orgkomitet protestnykh deistvii) (Greene, 2013). The Committee 
announced that the date for the next Moscow rally was set for the end of December. 
On the 24th December 2011, Moscow witnessed one of the largest protests of the 
Putin era. It was held at the Academician Sakharov Avenue in Moscow, with the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs counting 29,000 people, while the independent Novaya Gazeta 
newspaper estimated it to be around 100,000 and the organisers of the protest talked about 
120,000 (Novaya Gazeta, 2011). The makeup of protesters was similar to the earlier 
December demonstrations but larger, including liberals and nationalists, members of the 
feminist and LGBT movements, environmentalist and automobile activists; most 
importantly, however, it included a great number of people who were not affiliated with 
any movement and many of whom reportedly went to the streets for the first time (Volkov, 
2012b). Another major protest took place in Moscow and other cities on February 4th, 
amounting to some 100,000 people in the capital (Greene, 2014).  
On March 4th 2012, Vladimir Putin was elected as the president of the Russian 
Federation. While there were reports of electoral fraud by the observers, it was estimated 
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that Putin would have won over 50% support in any case (Magun, 2014). Technically, it 
was Putin’s third term; because of the earlier change in the Constitution that extended the 
term of the Russian presidency from four to six years, Putin could now legitimately serve 
for 12 more years, given that he would be elected for the fourth term as well. The protest 
the next day in Moscow brought an estimated 20,000 people, which was much smaller 
than the December protests; the subsequent protest against Putin’s presidency on the 10th 
March had a similar turnout (Park, 2014). 
A number of smaller local protests were recorded after that, until, on the 6th May, 
the infamous March of the Millions took place. The estimated number of the participants 
differed again, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs counting 8,000 people and various 
representatives of the opposition bringing this number up to 30 and even to 100 thousand 
(Park, 2014). A peaceful march from Kaluzhskaya Square to Bolotnaya Square became 
violent when protesters ran into the riot police cordon. In the ensuing clashes, both 
protesters and the police were injured (the former much more severely) and hundreds of 
people arrested (Fomina, 2012). Later, some 30 criminal cases were opened against the 
protesters who were accused of active involvement in mass riots. According to the 
independent media channel Dozhd’, several people received suspended sentences, but the 
majority of protesters arrested went to jail for up to four and a half years; a number of 
cases still continue in 2016 (Dozhd’, 2016).   
The last large-scale anti-government rally was held in Moscow in June 2012 
(Magun, 2014). According to the organisers, the demonstration brought together more 
than 100,000 people (Park, 2014), with police confirming up to 20,000 participants. The 
demonstration ended peacefully. After June, there was a number of notable, but much 
smaller protests, for example the late December 2012 demonstration on Sakharov Square 
in Moscow that ended in arrests of several oppositional leaders, including Navalny. 
Another event took place in January 2013: the so-called March Against the Scoundrels, 
where around 20,000 people protested against the Anti-Magnitsky law, a bill that banned 
the adoption of Russian children by citizens of the United States. On the 6th May 2013, a 
year after the controversial March of the Millions demonstration ended in riots and arrests, 
a commemoration rally was held in Moscow, with professionals estimating the numbers 
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to be somewhere between 20 and 30 thousand (Blinkin, 2013). After the speeches by the 
opposition leaders including Nemtsov, Navalny and the former Prime Minister of Russia 
Mikhail Kasyanov, the demonstration ended peacefully.   
It has been argued that no organised movement or political party had emerged from 
the 2011-2013 wave of protests (Gel’man, 2015; Magun, 2014). In October 2012, a 
Coordination Council of the Opposition was elected via the Internet, with more than 
80,000 people participating in the online voting (Sakwa, 2014). Forty-five elected 
members of the Council were spread between the four fractions: civic, left, liberal and 
nationalist. Some researchers noted that the role of this organisation was not clear from 
the beginning, and it did not manage to fulfil the expectations of protesters and produce 
an integrated political programme of the opposition movement (Sakwa, 2014; Savelyeva, 
2013). In October 2013 the Council was dissolved. 
To summarise, this section demonstrates that there were repeated displays of 
public contention during 2011-2012. While the protest events such as street 
demonstrations and rallies were often organised by long-standing political activists, the 
majority of the people who came to those events were politically unaffiliated and new to 
protest (Greene, 2013). This specific ‘grassroots’ nature of the 2011-2012 wave of 
contention posed an intriguing question for the researchers: why, in the absence of 
established protest organisations, with the lack of influential allies and with little previous 
experience of active civic engagement, did the large-scale popular mobilisation 
nonetheless took place? In the following section, I discuss various answers to this question 
presented in the literature. 
 
2. Perspectives on protest mobilisation in Russia 
 
As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, the majority of academic studies of 
the 2011-2012 protest cycle in Russia focus on the reasons for popular protest mobilisation. 
While it might have appeared to an uninformed observer that the mass protests of 
December 2011 were largely spontaneous responses to election fraud, the scholars of 
Russian contentious politics agree that these protests had causes that went beyond 
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electoral falsification (Gel’man, 2015; Jensen, 2013; Ross, 2015c). There is, however, 
little consensus in the literature regarding why December 2011 mobilised so many people, 
when previous electoral falsifications had not done so. The next three sections provide a 
review of the dominant arguments. Taking into consideration the sheer amount of research 
on Russian protest from various disciplines, especially from 2011 onward, I needed a way 
to organise the literature so that it provides comprehensive but at the same time focused 
background for my own research. Through comparing the studies on the basis of their 
reasoning, methods, and what they envisioned to be the main factor(s) for protest 
mobilisation, I identified three broad approaches. The first, ‘systemic’ approach, 
concentrates on the role of political structures and broad social issues within Russian 
society. Second, a ‘class’ approach is built around the idea of the emerging middle class 
as the main driving force behind the protests. The third, ‘psychological’ approach, strives 
to uncover individual and shared motives for protest participation, paying particular 
attention to the role of various grievances. The labels for approaches are my own; to the 
best of my knowledge, there have been no previous academic attempts to categorise the 
literature on the Russian protest.  
 
Systemic approach to protest 
 
One set of explanations as to how and why people became involved in mass 
protests in 2011-2012 focuses on the effect of broad systemic factors, such as state-citizen 
relations, structures and opportunities of the Putin regime and the nature of the Russian 
civil society. The systemic approach is adopted by a number of political scientists and 
historians, especially by the scholars who are interested in identifying mechanisms of 
protest across time and exploring its patterns in order to predict the development of 
contentious behaviour in the future. 
Among the first researchers to explore popular mobilisation in Russia through the 
prism of structural factors were Koesel and Bunce (2012). Arguing from the position of 
historical institutionalism, they suggested that in 2011, Russian civil society became ‘ripe’ 
for large-scale mobilisation as a consequence of earlier rounds of contestation with the 
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regime. In particular, three factors contributed to it: first, declining public support for 
Putin’s regime, exacerbated by the Putin-Medvedev rokirovka; second, the growing 
vulnerability of the regime, in the sense that it was failing to maintain its appearance of 
invincibility; and third, the decrease in the number of obstacles to overt contentious 
behaviour and consequent expansion of political opportunity structures (Tarrow, 1998). 
With regard to the third point, Koesel and Bunce noted that continuous large-scale protest 
became possible because earlier anti-regime protests were not suppressed in a violent way. 
In particular, mass rallies and marches were allowed, police did not use excessive force to 
suppress them, and on the whole relatively few people were arrested. Because of this, 
people felt less scared to take to the streets (especially the older generation who 
remembered the Soviet government response to open protest), which allowed non-
systemic opposition to mobilise large popular support.    
Similarly, Robertson (2011; 2013), one of the leading authorities on contentious 
behaviour in Russia, argued that in order to understand the causes of mass mobilisation, 
it is necessary to understand the broader context in which the protest cycle of 2011-2012 
took place. Robertson suggested that political protest in Russia takes place in what he 
called a ‘hybrid regime’: a regime that mixes elements of competition into a 
predominantly authoritarian framework of governance. As a result, hybrid regimes are 
neither authoritarian nor democratic; they occupy a political grey zone between the two 
extremes. Robertson proposed that Russian hybrid regime gave way to ‘hybrid protests’ 
combining democratic and authoritarian elements, with dissent being organised, open and 
often symbolic, and at the same time unstructured, spontaneous and direct.  
Robertson thus highlighted the difficulty of identifying straightforward causes for 
‘hybrid protests’. He disagreed with the observers who portrayed the 2011 demonstrations 
as the sign of final ‘awakening’ of the Russian civic society in response to state 
misconduct. Instead, Robertson observed that since election falsification is an often-seen 
reality of a hybrid regime, Russians were used to it and therefore it could not be the sole 
reason for mobilisation. Rather, citizens mobilised because they saw authority’s 
wrongdoings through the prism of a civil rights framework, which had been gradually 
developing alongside Putin’s political authoritarianism. Specifically, Robertson suggested 
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that the protests of the latter half of the 2000s prepared the ground for the mass protests 
of 2011-2012, in that they promoted the emergence of cohesive civic opposition to the 
state: ‘the experience of January [2005] consequently forged a new sense of solidarity and 
tolerance among different factions of the opposition and a new understanding of the need 
for unity in the face of the regime’ (2011, p. 184). The events of 2005 elevated prestige of 
symbolic dissent, and demonstrated that open street protest was a worthwhile form of 
political participation. At the same time, dwellers in the big cities like Moscow and Saint 
Petersburg, became accustomed to witnessing (and often participating in) demonstrations, 
which prompted large-scale popular mobilisation in December 2011. These three factors 
together — increased legitimacy of symbolic display of dissent, public solidarity over 
certain civil issues and the growing dissatisfaction with the general political situation in 
the country — were the reasons why so many people took to the streets in 2011. 
Nonetheless, Robertson warned against assuming that there was a political movement in 
Russia, simply because there was a number of large-scale protests calling for political 
reforms. On this point, he highlighted the importance of continuous empirical 
investigation: ‘even in the case of quite large-scale and widespread protests […] whether 
a protest wave constitutes a movement is an empirical question and cannot be simply 
assumed’ (p. 207).  
Addressing Robertson’s call for more empirical research, Volkov (2012a) drew on 
large sets of survey data and a number of in-depth interviews with protesters to examine 
the ‘infrastructure’ of 2011-2012 protests and identify the factors that influenced 
mobilisation. Discussing the set of ‘objective’ factors (I review his discussion of more 
‘subjective’ findings in ‘Psychological approach’ section) Volkov pointed to the role 
played by the economic recession that started in Russia in 2008 in providing the grounds 
for popular dissatisfaction. He also linked mobilisation to the instability of the political 
system, in particular to the rapid decline of the authority of the president Dmitry 
Medvedev and a series of pre-election scandals mainly connected to the Just Russia party. 
In addition, Volkov highlighted the role of the various organisations that helped to 
publicise and channel mass protests, such as The Workshop of Protest Actions, a civil 
organisation that brought together people who were willing to organise protest events, and 
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Citizen Observer, a project created by the Solidarity political party that aimed to record 
and control election falsifications.  
In turn, Gel’man (2015) discussed two more interrelated structural factors: the 
contradictory agenda of Medvedev’s presidency and a shift in the opposition’s political 
strategy. He suggested that while the course of ‘modernisation’, initiated during 
Medvedev’s presidency, was inefficient and flawed, it had put a number of legal and 
human rights issues on the political agenda and (perhaps unintentionally) promoted a more 
open dialogue between the public and the authorities. This allowed more room for civic 
initiatives, which resulted in the politicisation of Russian society and the creation of a 
number of independent protest movements, such as the Society of Blue Buckets 
(Obshchestvo sinikh vedyorok, the movement against the abuse of traffic laws by civil 
servants) and the Defenders of the Khimki forest (Dvizhenie v zashchitu Khimkinskogo 
lesa, local environmental movement). Rapid growth of civic movements coincided with 
the ‘coming of age’ of the younger leaders of the opposition such as Alexei Navalny and 
Evgeniya Chirikova. Representatives of the younger oppositional generation were adept 
at communicating with the public through social media and the Internet, and hence became 
more likely to win the support of the wider masses, compared with the older opposition 
leaders like Boris Nemtsov or Mikhail Kasyanov. In particular, younger oppositional 
activists were instrumental for uniting people around the populist notion of negative 
consensus against the authoritarian regime. Gel’man argued that in the late 2010s, non-
systemic opposition chose to abandon an abstract course on ‘democracy’ or ‘liberalisation’ 
and focused instead on concrete faults of the regime, such as widespread corruption and 
arbitrariness of law. Because of the great relevance of such issues, especially given the 
deteriorating economic situation due to the global financial crisis (Chaisty & Whitefield, 
2012), such a strategic shift provided solid grounds for the cooperation of various dissent 
groups in the demand for political change. Gel’man suggested that in December 2011 
these two factors reinforced each other: when Putin announced his return to the presidency, 
a large number of dissatisfied Russian citizens ‘naturally’ gravitated towards a 
considerably rejuvenated, populist and hence more attractive non-systemic opposition. 
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Further research by Russian protest scholars paid more attention to the role of such 
systemic factors as the state-society relations and the opposition’s strategic actions. For 
example, Greene (2013), in an attempt to answer why a viable mass protest movement 
emerged in 2011, suggested that it was mainly due to the non-systemic opposition’s ability 
to strengthen the ties between various protest groups. According to him, the opposition 
managed to put forward an idea that seemingly local grievances, be it the demolition of a 
park or the impossibility of starting a small business, stem from a universal injustice of 
state (mis)conduct. Such ‘bridging of frames’ (p. 50), Greene argued, was what had 
brought activists and people affected by it together in an attempt to make the regime 
change its ways. Evans (2012) put forward a similar idea in his study of mobilisation 
strategies used by the Defenders of the Khimki forest, a group opposing the construction 
of a highway through a forest near Moscow. He found that activists of the movement 
achieved wide public support by skilfully blending more abstract political principles, such 
as justice for everyone, with everyday concerns grounded in self-interest.  
In a related study, Greene (2014) developed this theory by adding another factor 
into it. He suggested that the pattern of collective behaviour in Russia depended not just 
on the rhetoric of the opposition, but also on the nature of interaction between the state 
and its citizens: people mobilised when the state intervened directly into their lives and, 
importantly, afflicted them as a group. Drawing on the analysis of three protest case 
studies — a human rights protest organised by the NGO Public Verdict (Obshchestvennyi 
Verdikt), housing rights protests in Moscow and protests by Russian motorists — Greene 
argued that in the first two cases the movements failed to mobilise enough people and 
press their demands because the state did not recognise protesters as a legitimate group. 
The motorists’ movement, however, was much more lengthy and successful because the 
state responded to them as a group, hence providing the tools for the protesters to 
consolidate into an integrated collective movement.  
In line with Greene’s earlier work, a study by White (2015) emphasised the role 
the dynamics between the state and the civil society played in the development of large-
scale protests. He suggested that participants of largely economic movements of the latter 
half of the 2000s became politicised when in the course of fighting they had to deal with 
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resistance from the authorities. White gives an example of protests in the city of 
Kaliningrad in 2010, where a number of large-scale demonstrations were triggered by 
increase in taxation. When the authorities failed to address the economic demands 
promptly, the campaign turned political and called for the dismissal of Kaliningrad’s 
governor as well as his perceived patron, Vladimir Putin. Therefore, White argued that by 
2011 the civil society was more likely to embrace political slogans, as a ‘collaborative 
civil-political society relationship’ (p. 319) was already in place. From its side, the 
opposition was prepared to capitalise on widespread public discontent and channel it 
against the authoritarian regime. Due to such interlacement, the borders between the 
political and the civil became blurred, enabling the non-systemic opposition movement to 
reach unprecedented popular support.  
Studies taking a systemic approach to popular protest mobilisation in Russia thus 
offer a number of fruitful academic insights into the process of emergence of the protest 
movement; they also highlight the importance of paying attention to wider cultural and 
socio-political contexts while attempting to understand Russian protest. However, these 
studies are limited in their ability to address the social dimension of mobilisation, because 
they largely see people as subjects to existing infrastructural powers rather than active 
agents creating the change. Greene (2014, p. 226) acknowledges this when he writes about 
the importance of understanding anti-authoritarian social movements ‘as a lived social 
experience rather than as an aggregation of macro-level conditions and structures’. The 
next section reviews studies that take a slightly more focused approach, in that they see a 
specific factor, social class belonging, as the main force behind mobilisation.  
 
Class approach to protest 
 
Many writers turned to demographic factors, particularly the role of class, in order 
to explain the 2011-2012 protest wave in Russia. Discussing the effect of class inequality 
on protest movement, Busygina and Filippov (2015) argued that it was the members of 
the affluent Russian middle class who were the main driving force behind protests, as they 
were prepared to take the risks associated with open dissent. On the other hand, poorer 
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citizens perceived protests as too costly and detrimental for the economic situation, and 
avoided becoming involved. Supporting this idea is a comprehensive survey-based review 
by de Vogel (2013), who demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of 2011-2012 
political protesters were identified as being from the ‘middle class’. Drawing on that, de 
Vogel suggested that people from the emergent urban middle class came to share certain 
grievances, among which were concerns with corruption and bribery among the 
authorities, growing poverty in a majority of the population and limitation of civil rights 
and democratic freedoms. The state’s inability to address these grievances led to 
escalation of tension, which resulted in large-scale protests across the country. 
Interestingly, de Vogel also provided evidence indicating that democratic concerns, 
although expressed more strongly by the members of the professional middle class, were 
not limited to it but shared across the population, thus countering the idea that only the 
members of the Russian middle class were politically aggrieved. Along similar lines, 
Dmitriev (2015) pointed to the increasingly cross-class nature of protest. He suggested 
that mainly ‘economic’ protesters from the working class and provinces teamed up with 
mainly ‘political’ protesters from the urban middle class in the quest for justice, creating 
the basis for large-scale social mobilisation. 
Gontmakher and Ross (2015) focused specifically on whether the protests of 2011-
2012 were a ‘revolt of the middle classes’. Exploring whether people who identify as the 
middle class would show greater levels of oppositional activity, they came to an 
interesting conclusion. While, indeed, support from the younger members of the middle 
class greatly assisted the protest movement, putting the middle class at the forefront of the 
anti-regime dissent, their survey-led analysis demonstrated that a large proportion of the 
middle class also supported a thesis that Russia needs a ‘strong hand’ to govern it and 
condemned protests. Gontmakher and Ross located the reason for such a paradox in the 
composition of the middle class in Russia. Specifically, drawing on earlier studies, they 
demonstrated that about 50% of the middle class in Russia are governmental employees 
who depend on the State for their livelihood and hence consistently give support to Putin’s 
United Russia party; moreover, these people tend to value certainty over reforms and fear 
the instability that mass-scale protest might bring (see also Makarenko, 2010). Therefore, 
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even though they are seen as ‘middle class’, these people do not in fact support anti-
governmental protest. This finding allowed Gontmakher and Ross to suggest that 
belonging to the middle class was not in itself the main reason why people took to the 
streets; rather, it depended on the more concrete factors, such as people’s reliance on the 
state and their consequential preference for stability vs reform.  
In a related study, Ross (2015b) offered survey data to reinforce the point that 
middle class support for protest was not ubiquitous. He demonstrated that the members of 
the middle class who were state-dependent exhibited strong support for the United Russia 
party and the Putin regime. Another anti-protest ‘middle class’ was comprised of the 
members of the military and security sectors. At the same time, members of the so-called 
‘creative’ professions, small business owners and entrepreneurs, who also can be termed 
‘middle class’, came to be largely dissatisfied with the self-enriching tactics of the regime. 
Without disputing the ‘class’ protest explanation, Ross thus demonstrated the importance 
of more detailed analysis of the various social groups that are often unproblematically 
included under the umbrella of the ‘middle class’. 
In a similar vein, while arguing that the middle class in Russia played an important 
role in protest mobilisation, Peregudov (2012) pointed to the two sets of obstacles to its 
mobilising power. First, the fact that the middle class in Russia was in the minority. Indeed, 
several major surveys suggested that no more than 20 percent of the population could be 
classified as middle class on the basis of education, occupation and material wellbeing 
(Remington, 2011). Second, Peregudov (2012) pointed to the issue of motivation: he 
argued that the composition of Russian middle class is such that its most influential part 
are members of the bureaucracy and public servants, who prioritise accumulation of 
personal wealth over democratic freedoms and are hence not very motivated to foster 
liberal changes. Such potential lack of incentive and minority character raised serious 
questions regarding the potential of the middle class to foster political change by 
mobilising and, most importantly, sustaining protests. Peregudov concluded his study with 
an interesting idea that the driving force behind protest could be the people who consider 
themselves to be middle class, but who do not necessarily ‘fit’ into its sociological 
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description; because of that, he suggested that future research needs to take into account 
people’s self-identifications. 
By conceptualising the protest wave in Russia as a conflict between various social 
classes, the studies reviewed above provide credible answers to the question of why 
popular protest started to gain momentum at the end of 2011. ‘Class’ approach studies 
also seem to be more attentive to the role of the people than ‘systemic’ approach research. 
However, the authors here envision people as a unified collective with shared grievances, 
which leaves the critical question of individual understandings unanswered. Indeed, it has 
been argued that in protest participants are guided by a ‘subjective sense of disadvantage’ 
that does not directly map onto material structures or wider ‘class’ grievances (van 
Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008, p. 505). Studies that conceptualise protest solely in 
terms of a class struggle hence run into danger of glossing over important nuances of 
protest behaviour, including people’s own interpretations of who they are and what they 
are fighting against. In contrast, the third group of authors, who zoom in on the psychology 
behind protest mobilisation, provide more room for the subjective discourse of protesters 
themselves.  
 
Psychological approach to protest 
 
Several scholars sought to explain Russian protests by focusing on psychological 
determinants of mobilisation. While it has been argued that the social psychology of 
protest might offer a distinctly fruitful avenue for the study of contentious behaviour in 
Russia (Agadullina, 2013; Agadullina & Lovakov, 2013), it is noteworthy that specifically 
social psychological research on the protest cycle of 2011-2012 to date remains limited. 
In-depth search among Russia’s largest academic psychology journals, including The 
Moscow University Psychology Herald (Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Seriya 14. 
Psikhologiya), The World of Psychology (Mir Psikhologii), Modern Research of Social 
Problems (Sovremennye Issledovaniya Sotsialnykh Problem) and Social Psychology and 
Society (Sotsial’naia Psikhologiia i Obshchestvo) yielded only a handful of works 
orienting towards the importance of the socio-psychological determinants of protests 
34 
 
(Agadullina, 2013; Agadullina & Lovakov, 2013; Savchenko, 2012). However, these are 
mostly theoretical studies and none of them makes use of contemporary socio-
psychological theories of collective action. Thus, in this section I also review the work by 
sociologists and political scientists who touched on psychological factors of mobilisation.  
Most recently, Hagemann and Kufenko (2016) used a statistical approach to 
identify key determinants of protests in Russia during 2011-2012. Part of their work is 
dedicated to the analysis of socio-psychological factors. The authors found evidence to 
suggest that people who took part in protests were motivated by a set of shared grievances, 
including the issues of inequality, economic injustices and dissatisfaction with the election 
results. Hagemann and Kufenko traced the development of these grievances to people’s 
concerns with the economy: in particular, they suggested that the growing income gap 
resulted in developments of personal grievances and the feeling of relative deprivation. 
Survey-based research by Volkov (2012c) supported this idea. Volkov pointed out that 
one of the main reasons why the protests of 2011 gathered strong popular support was the 
state’s failure to address a number of generic political and economic grievances that had 
been developing during Putin’s time in office. Unresolved, dissatisfaction built up and 
resulted in civic mass mobilisation. As part of a related study, Volkov (2012a) tried to go 
deeper into examination of subjective causes of protest. He found that personal emotions, 
such as uncertainty regarding economic prospects and indignation over state corruption, 
played an important role in transforming grievances into active protest. For many, 
negative emotions were strengthened during the December 2011 election observation (see 
also Berlyand & Stupakova, 2012). Volkov thus suggested that the subjective feeling of 
uncertainty was the most important psychological factor in the consolidation of the protest 
activity.  
Along similar lines, Shestopal (2012) investigated the psychological aspects of a 
‘protester mindset’ in Russia. He suggested that from 2010 onward Russian citizens en 
masse became more concerned with the issue of governmental accountability and became 
more familiar with liberal political framework. Positive attitudes to democracy and the 
perceived importance of state responsibility coincided with the rise of individualistic 
tendencies, resulting in a shared desire for a strong, wealthy and, importantly, democratic 
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state, where one would have opportunities for personal development. At the same time, 
the importance of stability, which was prominent in the mid-2000s, started to decline. 
Shestopal suggested that many members of the younger generations, who were ready to 
embrace a more open liberal state, experienced cognitive dissonance over the mismatch 
between Medvedev’s liberalisation rhetoric and what they had witnessed during the 
election cycle of 2011. Such dissonance resulted in the creation of ‘dissatisfied ethical 
identity’, which fostered large-scale demonstrations in pursuit of social and moral justice. 
Shestopal therefore proposed that the 2011-2012 collective movement was not triggered 
by some generic political issue people had with Putin and the state authorities, but rather 
by popular dismay over the state’s moral degradation. 
  A similar point was made by Selivanova and Goncharov (2013). Drawing on 
qualitative analyses of interviewers with the members of Saint Petersburg’s Election 
Observers movement, they came up with a moral ‘archetype’ of an active observer. 
Selivanova and Goncharov suggested that their respondents shared a heightened 
expectation regarding the responsibility of the authorities. Witnessing the breach of such 
expectations provoked feelings of moral indignation and betrayal, which in turn fostered 
the desire to express such feelings in open protest. The participants also reportedly shared 
self-perceptions as ‘citizens’, which for many entailed having an ethical obligation to 
actively fight for a desired political change. The nexus of personal ‘citizenry’ 
responsibility and moral indignation over witnessed misconduct provided the motivation 
for active protest involvement. Interestingly however, Selivanova and Goncharov did not 
find significant evidence of a similar shared identity among the activists of the broader 
movement for Fair Elections, who they interviewed in their pilot project, suggesting that 
no collective identity was formed.   
In contrast to the suggestion that collective identity was not formed in post-2011 
protests, Smyth et al. (2015, p. 52) argued that participation in 2011-2012 protests was 
‘built on a collective interpretation of political life, or common frame, which transformed 
shared grievances to political action’. Using factor analysis on their survey and focus 
group data regarding the motivations for taking part in street protests, Smyth and 
colleagues showed that anti-Putin protesters were driven by a number of distinct 
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grievances of a political and personal nature that, according to the researchers, formed a 
distinct protester identity. In terms of political grievances, the main factor identified was 
regime support, which was characterised by the two common grievances: disdain for the 
December 2011 electoral falsification and concern that the country was moving in the 
wrong political direction. Here, the core reported grievances were related to state 
corruption, inadequacy of the justice and electoral systems and the crisis of leadership. 
Corruption was named as the main problem in Russia. Smyth et al. specifically pointed 
out that corruption was considered as a political rather than economic grievance: as the 
authors wrote, ‘for most protest participants, economic concerns were subordinate to 
broader political concerns’ (p. 64). In terms of personal motivations, Smyth and 
colleagues observed a set of factors that included the need to defend one’s human rights 
and dignity, desire to contribute to Russia’s historic development and the need to fulfil 
one’s moral duty through an open expression of concern. Another factor that emerged was 
strong emotional investment in being active associated with commitment to fellow 
protesters, a set of traits that Smyth and colleagues called ‘civic duty’. According to the 
authors, it was a combination of shared political grievances and the ‘civic duty’ factors 
that motivated Russian citizens to join protests.      
Other researchers focused specifically on political perceptions of younger 
protesters (Savchenko, 2012; Zhelnina, 2013): they found that lack of trust in the 
government played an important role in mobilisation among the younger educated 
Russians. Furthermore, Zhelnina (2013) investigated a particular psychological aspect of 
youth protest activism: protesters’ own understanding of the nature of their dissent. After 
conducting a qualitative exploration of young people’s attitudes to politics and protest, 
Zhelnina found that many people conceptualised their activism in terms of civic, rather 
than political, activity. ‘Political’ was generally understood in the context of formal 
political activities and organisations and seen as an alien and overly-formal domain, even 
though many participants admitted being interested in the political situation in the country. 
The study stressed that many respondents actively avoided being seen as driven by 
‘political’ motives and portrayed their protest participation as a result of freedom of choice 
and as a self-fulfilment strategy. Zhelnina thus concluded that younger protesters in Russia 
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were not as ‘political’ as some researchers tended to suggest. Overall, her study 
demonstrated the importance of paying attention to people’s own self-categorisations 
through an empirical analysis of protesters’ talk. 
Elsewhere, Magun (2014) conducted discursive research into the various facets of 
protester self-categorisations and their potential role in the sudden mobilisation of the 
previously passive citizens in December 2011. Drawing on the analysis of two hundred 
short semi-structured interviews with protesters during demonstrations in Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg, Magun found two frequent self-categorisations. First, when protesters 
were directly asked whether they would consider themselves to be members of a particular 
social group or class, many replied that they would identify as part of the ‘middle’ or 
‘creative’ class. Second, in response to the same question and more spontaneously in the 
course of the interview, a sizable number of dissenters argued that they represented ‘the 
people’ (narod). Magun focused specifically on the latter label because of its somewhat 
contradictory nature: it objectively lays claim to being a majority, while those who 
protested were clearly a minority. Furthermore, ‘the people’ in Russia tends to have a 
strong reference to the less educated rural and predominantly working class population, 
but it was employed by those who were relatively well-off, urban and educated (based on 
the demographic information gathered). Discussing these contradictions, Magun 
suggested there was evidence of a shared collective protester identity in Russia that was 
predominantly ‘populist’ and functioned to mobilise as many people as possible. In 
particular, by calling themselves ‘the people’, protesters asserted their status as ‘ordinary’ 
common people, thereby erasing political divides between the heterogeneous social 
masses and sending a rhetorically persuasive message to the apolitical majority to join 
them in a struggle against the state. The inclusiveness and strategic power of such message, 
according to Magun, resulted in it being picked up by many, which led to proliferation of 
protests across Russia.   
Finally, a recent study by Clément (2015) provided an interesting addition to the 
psychological portrait of a ‘lay’ protester in Russia. The study adopted a somewhat unique 
micro-level approach to investigating how Russians who had no inclination towards 
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political activism might acquire motivation to become involved in collective action. 
Clément argued that traditional social-movement literature is limited in that it:  
 
postulates, rather than problematises, the existence of communities, networks and 
resources available for mobilisation, and a political culture that values active 
citizenship. The literature mainly focuses on organised, contentious endeavours 
and infrequently analyses the types of mobilisation that are the object of this paper: 
ones that involve people without previous experience in activism. (p. 212).   
 
The criticism about the lack of academic attention devoted to more ‘ordinary’ 
protesters is especially acute given that, in post-Soviet Russian society the conditions for 
organised political activism are still largely unfavourable. It has been noted that there are 
virtually no institutional structures of oppositional mobilisation such as real oppositional 
parties or organised movements in Russia (Bikbov, 2012). Hence, it is sensible to assume 
that the majority of protest participants in Russia have little personal experience of 
political activism and are likely not to be embedded in organised protest networks. 
Because of that, traditional mobilisation models that focus on the role of political activism 
and organisational enrolment might not be able to provide good explanations for 
contentious behaviour in Russia. In order to address these limitations, Clément focused 
on local practices of developing political attitudes among the people, using frame analysis 
inspired by Erving Goffman. In her work, she reported the results of two ethnographic 
case-studies: the housing self-management movement in the town of Astrakhan in 2009 
and the strike movement at the car plant near Saint Petersburg in 2008. While she did not 
directly analyse the protests of 2011-2012, Clément offered valuable insights into the 
psychological mechanisms of people’s mobilisation.  
In particular, her analysis of the two case studies suggested that popular 
mobilisation takes place when people develop a specific social outlook in the face of a 
tangible threat that directly impacts their personal lives. Exploring this further, Clément 
turned to the concept of ‘reframing’, which she describes as a process through which 
deeply rooted attitudes and patterns of behaviour are transformed. She suggested that 
popular mobilisation in the two observed movements resulted from a number of reframing 
processes. First, a certain structural change took place, specifically worsening of the living 
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conditions in the housing movement and growing inefficiency of the trade union in the 
car plant movement. Then, affected people started to discuss these issues in informal, 
emotionally charged conversations. Such conversations in turn produced and grounded 
the narratives of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, and contributed to the development of a sense of 
collective belonging and solidarity. In effect, previously apolitical and ‘ordinary’ citizens 
came to develop a sense of shared identity, characterised by an increased attachment and 
loyalty to the members of their own group — inhabitants of the house or plant workers — 
and growing distrust and anger towards the authorities opposing grassroots mobilisation. 
Consequently, individuals went through a shift of frames: from an apolitical frame to a 
new ‘activist’ frame, under which overt political mobilisation became common and 
accepted behaviour.  
To summarise, studies of psychological factors of mobilisation show that people’s 
perceptions, attitudes and identities have an impact on their protest behaviour. In particular, 
the research reviewed above points to the important role that moral and emotional 
indignation played in galvanising a previously passive Russian citizenry in December 
2011. However, there is certain ambiguity in the literature regarding the extent to which 
it is possible to identify the set of shared grievances and identities responsible for the 
2011-2012 protest cycle. As Chebankova (2015) notices, recent protests in Russia were 
characterised by epistemological uncertainty, value pluralism and the lack of political 
consensus, which in turn grounds the need for in-depth empirical investigation of the 
variety of subjective ideas and values around which the protest movement consolidated.  
Considering the growing evidence that psychological factors are important for 
popular mobilisation, the lack of academic interest from the discipline of social 
psychology in studying protest in Russia is somewhat remarkable. To the best of my 
knowledge, no major study of 2011-2012 protests so far has attempted to explore 
contentious events in Russia from the standpoint of contemporary socio-psychological 
theories of collective action. Yet, it has been argued that social psychology offers a unique 
perspective on protest due to its ability to bridge psychological and structural variables; 
its focus on individuals as social agents is essential with respect to questions about why 
some people become involved in protests while others do not, and why people mobilise at 
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certain times (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). These are precisely the questions 
that scholars of the Russian protest are eager to explore (Ross, 2015a). In other words, a 
social psychological framework might offer a number of invaluable insights and advance 
the knowledge on collective behaviour from the perspective of movement participants. 
Thus in the following four sections I will give a review of the relevant approaches to the 
study of collective behaviour within social psychology.  
 
3. The social psychology of protest 
 
Collective behaviour is a complex phenomenon that is used to describe a wide 
range of activities, and has been studied from a variety of different angles. Political 
scientists, historians and sociologists traditionally took an interest in the topic of collective 
behaviour. Many of them, however, tended to disregard the psychological side of such 
behaviour, focusing attention instead on structural bases, such as mobilisation of resources 
or availability of political opportunities (Hunt & Benford, 1993). Yet, some scholars 
maintained that symbolic ‘identity politics’ lie at the heart of contentious behaviour. 
Among the first advocates of attending to subjective meanings in research on protest, 
Melucci (1989) pointed to the problem of political reductionism — the danger of reducing 
all collective actions to their political goals — and proposed that exploration of the 
psychological dimensions of protest behaviour was a way to overcome it and create a more 
balanced understanding of popular dissent. Likewise, Gamson (1992) observed that the 
processes involved in collective action are essentially psychological in nature, and 
emphasised the need for political and cultural explanations of protest to be complemented 
by a social psychological analysis. Along similar lines, Klandermans (1997) suggested 
that since social movements are comprised of individuals, individual level of analysis is 
of paramount importance and cannot be ignored. 
The contemporary social psychology of contentious behaviour starts with the 
simple, but key assumption that people should be motivated to participate in social protest. 
Mobilisation has been thus described as ‘the most central process in contentious politics’ 
(Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 89). Indeed, it is safe to assume that protesting is not something 
41 
 
the majority of people do on a daily basis; contentious behaviour involves risks, and hence 
requires at least some reason to become involved.  
The traditional sociological view posits that mobilisation starts with some state of 
disadvantage, when people experience objective grievances and take to the streets to voice 
and amend them (Buechler, 2011). Later, however, scholars of protest observed that not 
all aggrieved people mobilise, and not all mobilised people seem to be aggrieved (Melucci, 
1996). This observation led to another suggestion: that it is not so much objective 
grievances as subjective senses of discontent that propel social protest. In other words, 
people become protesters when they develop an understanding that the situation they are 
in is unjust and must be changed. Contemporary social psychology follows this view and 
positions subjective grievances ‘at the heart of every protest’ (van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans, 2013, p. 888).  
Klandermans (1997), drawing inspiration from Henri Tajfel’s theory of intergroup 
relations (1978), suggested that subjective feelings of injustice arise from one of three 
main sources: perception of illegitimate inequality, suddenly imposed grievance, or 
perceived violation of moral principles. The first kind of grievance is experienced when 
two conditions are fulfilled. First, people should understand the situation as in some way 
disadvantaged; second and more importantly, they should see such disadvantage as unfair. 
The former without the latter — when disadvantage is perceived but accepted as normal 
— would not, according to Klandermans, facilitate collective action. For example, while 
some people in Russia can be dissatisfied with the political situation in the country, they 
might perceive it as something that is ‘normal’ or something they deserve, and thus abstain 
from involvement in active protest. On the other hand, those who are equally dissatisfied 
but perceive the situation as unfair would be more likely to become protesters.  
The second source — suddenly imposed grievance — draws on the idea of an 
unexpected threat or danger that unites people around the perceived feeling of victimhood. 
Klandermans cites the work of Walsh (1988), who studied protests in response to the 
Three Mile Island accident. Walsh suggested that partial nuclear meltdown created a 
powerful grievance cause that led people to become involved in anti-nuclear protests. 
With respect to the Russian context, a potential example is the mass protests of December 
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2011, that took place immediately after the Parliamentary elections, which were perceived 
to have been rigged.  
The third kind of grievance orients to the important role played by shared values 
in mobilising people to protest. When people share a value consensus, they become 
dissatisfied when the situation is perceived to violate such consensus. For instance, as 
people came to see the segregation between white and black people as unwarrantable, 
more and more protests started to take place in South Africa (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005). 
Moral indignation over violated principles can thus be a very powerful source of protest. 
Applying this idea to Russia, recall for example the argument made by Gontmakher and 
Ross (2015), that the emergence of the new middle class fostered the development and 
internalisation of democratic values, such as freedom of speech and political competition. 
Following this claim, recent anti-governmental protests in Russia can be seen as the 
protests of the middle class against the violation of democratic principles that people came 
to share and perceive as legitimate.  
It is important to remember that the social psychological framework suggests that 
all these grievances are not objectively given, in the sense that they exist for everyone in 
reality; rather, they are subjective perceptions. In addition, it has been argued that 
grievances are not the only factors behind protest involvement. Van Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans (2013) undertook a detailed review of studies exploring the reasons why 
people become protesters. Based on the review, they put forward five broad factors that 
predict protest participation: grievances, emotions, social embeddedness, efficacy and 
identity. The researchers also argued that while these components can analytically be 
discussed separately, in reality they are closely interwoven. Various models have been 
proposed in an attempt to synthesise these elements into a coherent and full picture of 
what is happening ‘on the ground’.  
One of the most recent attempts at comprehensive summary has been made by van 
Zomeren et al. (2008), who identified three broad socio-psychological perspectives on 
social protest. They argued that building on subjective determinants, social psychologists 
could view social protest through the lens of perceived injustice, perceived efficacy or 
social identity. The first approach builds on the theory of relative deprivation in exploring 
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subjective experiences of grievances. Research evidence within this perspective suggests 
that perceptions of injustice develop in an intergroup context, when people see themselves 
as representatives of deprived groups and experience subjective feelings of deprivation on 
behalf of such groups (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). 
In line with this proposition, Postmes, Branscombe, Spears and Young (1999) 
found experimental evidence suggesting that interpersonal disadvantage-related 
comparison is a much weaker predictor of collective action than intergroup comparison. 
Their study suggests that protesters are not the ones who are the most deprived personally, 
but those who see their group as the most discriminated against. To summarise, the relative 
deprivation approach predicts that subjective perception of collective injustice will 
mobilise people to take part in social protest.  
The concept of relevant deprivation as the main driving force of protest was 
criticised by the advocates of the resource mobilisation approach (Buechler, 2011). The 
latter theory drew attention to the fact that in the world, injustice is abundant, yet social 
protest is relatively scarce. In this regard, the dilemma was explained by reference to the 
scarcity of resources, in particular political institutions and social movement organisations 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977). In their seminal article, McCarthy and Zald challenged prior 
scholarly preoccupation with grievances and offered to focus instead on the interaction 
between resources, pre-existing socio-political structures and inherently rational and 
strategic entrepreneurial activities of people. It is worth noting that in its emphasis on 
structural factors and rationality, resource mobilisation theory also tried to avoid 
subjective dimensions of protest (Buechler, 2011). So in contrast to relative deprivation 
theory, which emphasised passionate mobilisation of discontent, resource mobilisation 
theory focused on rational mobilisation of resources. In social psychology, research 
structured around resource mobilisation theory constitutes the second broad perspective 
on social protest (van Zomeren et al., 2008).  
Van Zomeren and colleagues stated that social psychologists of this theoretical 
orientation initially encountered an issue: being concerned with structural predictors of 
protest, resource mobilisation theory drifted away from subjective considerations of 
individual protesters. This situation promoted the development of integrative theories that 
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strived to combine subjective and objective variables. For example, Klandermans (1984) 
integrated social psychological insights on individual decision-making with sociological 
expectancy value theory. His overall framework presents the willingness to participate in 
social protests as a function of subjective cost and benefits calculation. Klandermans 
applies this understanding to the case of the Industrial Workers’ Union failed campaign 
for shorter work hours that took place in the Netherlands in 1979. The data obtained 
through interviews and questionnaires with members of the Union suggested that in 
deciding whether to take part in a protest, people were guided by a rational choice between 
the perceived costs and benefits of participation. Even if the person agreed that the 
demands of the protest would relieve the grievance, they would not take part in it if they 
doubted the efficacy of participation. In other words, the main suggestion here is that 
people engage in social protest when they, first, believe it will bring about a change, and 
second, when they expect the benefits to outweigh the risks. The interplay between 
subjective expectancy and objective behaviour was of particular importance in 
Klandermans’s model: people do act on their subjective expectations, but while ‘these 
expectations need not be real, they are real in their consequences’ (p. 598). Following 
these insights, further research distinguished between individual and group efficacy, 
arguing that the latter was a much better predictor of collective action (Mummendey, 
Kessler, Klink & Mielke, 1999). In this regard, people who believed that their in-group 
was capable of resolving grievances through collective effort were shown to be more 
easily mobilised.  
The final theoretical perspective on collective behaviour outlined by van Zomeren 
et al. (2008) started to develop in the 1970s with the rise of Social Identity Theory (SIT; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Traditionally, social identity is defined as ‘part of an individual’s 
self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ 
(Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). This definition holds two important ideas. First, social identities are 
subjective perceptions: individuals should recognise that they belong to a given group. 
Second, social identities are important sources of pride and self-esteem. Because of the 
latter, SIT theorises that people will strive to enhance the positive image of the in-group 
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they strongly identify with. One way to win prestige is through social competition; that is, 
through undertaking collective action to fight another group (Tajfel, 1982). Hence, within 
the social identity approach, social protests are seen as direct expressions of disadvantaged 
social identity. In that sense, Klandermans’s (1997) idea mentioned above is correct only 
to an extent: social movements are indeed comprised of individuals, but individuals who 
act as representatives of collectives. Thus, SIT classifies protest as intergroup behaviour 
(Wright, 2001). 
The third approach thus claims that it is social identity that mobilises people to 
protest (Reicher, 2004). The argument itself is not new — it is rooted in the writings of 
sociologists who observed the importance of collective identity in protest participation. 
For example, Melucci (1989) has proposed that all conflicts are ultimately the conflicts of 
identity, and that the creation of shared identity is among the most important tasks for 
success of a movement. Social psychologists, however, have taken these insights further 
in developing and testing concrete models that predict social protest participation based 
on identification. Over the next two sections, I give an overview of models that treat 
identity as a product of psychological cognition. The section after that explores studies 
that treat identities as strategic projects accomplished in interaction.  
 
Explaining protest through social identification — the cognitive approach 
 
Within the social psychology of contention, two interconnected models have 
largely dominated the field: the dual pathway model of collective behaviour (Simon et al., 
1998) and the politicised collective identity model (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Both 
of these models build on the basic assumption that the more someone identifies with a 
group, the higher the chance that they will take part in social protest on behalf of the group. 
It is worth mentioning that identification here is seen as a cognitive process, measurable 
and varying in strength. The findings of statistical analyses led researchers to suggest that 
strong social identification is the most accurate predictor of protest, and it positively 
influences people’s willingness to become involved even if a more rationalist cost and 
benefits calculation advises against it (Klandermans, 2014). 
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In this regard, in their seminal study applying the social identity approach to 
research on collective action, Simon et al. (1998) proposed a dual pathway model of social 
protest participation. In line with SIT, they suggested that protest is best understood as a 
collective strategy underpinned by collective identification. Moreover, in line with 
expectancy-value models (Klandermans, 1984), they predicted that people would be more 
likely to protest if they could see the value of a protest either for their group (collective 
motive) or for themselves (reward motive), and that taking part in protest would elicit 
positive reactions from relevant others (social motive). Overall, the researchers 
hypothesised that to become involved in a protest people could take two different paths. 
They could either act on their subjective perceptions of costs and benefits of protest 
involvement (instrumental pathway), or act on the internalised collective identity (identity 
pathway). Importantly, they also suggested that strong collective identification would 
make the largest contribution to the willingness to become involved.  
Those hypotheses were tested in two different protest contexts: among the older 
people’s Grey Panthers movement in Germany and among the members of the gay 
movement in the United States. In both contexts, cost and benefit motives were found to 
be positively related to the willingness to participate. However, identification with the 
social movement was found to be a much more significant predictor of the willingness to 
become engaged in protest than cost/benefit perceptions. Importantly, Simon and 
colleagues drew attention to the levels of collective identification. They argued that 
identification with the concrete movement (Grey Panthers or gay movement) was a more 
salient factor of protest preparedness than identification with the broader social categories 
(older people or gay people). These findings show that specific activist identity 
overshadows both the more general collective membership, and the more instrumental 
reasoning. In the words of Simon et al., ‘if I know who I am, then I also know what to do, 
no matter what the consequences are’ (p. 656). The dual pathway model declares that 
strong identification with the movement in a sense ‘forces’ people to protest, diminishing 
the importance of efficacy perception; something that is less likely to happen if the person 
identifies with the broader social group alone.  
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Further studies found more experimental support for the identification pathway 
(de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Klandermans, Sabucedo & Rodriguez, 2004; Stürmer 
& Simon, 2004; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy & Jörger, 2003). For example, the paramount 
importance of identification with a group was shown in the context of student protests in 
Germany (Stürmer & Simon, 2009). The study demonstrated that students who were angry 
about their group predicament also had stronger ties with their social identity; together, 
the ‘hot’ emotion and high degree of group identification had a positive effect on their 
willingness to participate in protest. 
To summarise, the dual pathway model of social protest identified an important 
mobilisation mechanism that rests on the adoption of collective group identity. In an 
attempt to explain this mechanism in detail, Simon and his colleagues turned to the topic 
of politicisation. More specifically, they proposed that collective group identity has the 
power to overshadow rational cost and benefit considerations because it is, essentially, a 
politicised identity (Klandermans, 2014). That is, group members whose identity has been 
politicised have higher stakes (or at least subjectively feel they have higher stakes), and 
thus are more willing to become involved in the struggle for power (Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001). 
The second dominating theory, the Politicised Collective Identity model (PCI; 
Simon & Klandermans, 2001), is concerned with analysing specific components of 
activist identity. As is the case with the majority of theoretical concepts, the model 
distinguishes between the three components in theory, but in reality, they often overlap 
and inform each other. PCI thus functions as an ‘ideal’ theoretical framework that guides 
the understanding of the complex psychological processes involved in protest 
mobilisation (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). 
PCI model has the same starting point as Simon and his colleagues: that in protest, 
individuals act as members of social groups. Subsequently, this basic idea was developed 
by adding the social power dimension. It was suggested that as groups exist within the 
society, they are often embedded in broader power dynamics (van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans, 2007). As a consequence, groups often become involved in intergroup 
conflicts over establishing, changing or maintaining power structures (Klandermans, 
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2014). Based on this, the PCI model sees social protest as a form of such power struggle. 
With regard to the actors of this struggle, Simon and Klandermans (2001) suggested that 
typically, protest involves two parties in direct opposition (for example, Dutch farmers 
against the Ministry of Agriculture officials — see de Weerd & Klandermans, 1999), plus 
the public. This last actor is of major importance: the researchers argue that the 
oppositional parties will always battle for control, over favour and acceptance by the 
general public, which is the source of resources and potential new recruits. Because of 
this, the actions of antagonists are always contingent not only on the nature of the conflict 
itself, but also on the broader societal context. 
In establishing the steps of politicisation, scholars of PCI theory took into account 
the previous research on relative deprivation. Specifically, the realisation of collective 
discontent was suggested as the first milestone on the road to protest (Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001). With regard to this, it has been argued that certain kinds of 
deprivation are more powerful in engaging people: for instance, affective deprivation 
(dissatisfaction, moral indignation) is seen as having more influence than cognitive 
deprivation (Foster & Matheson, 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2008).  
Discussing the second milestone of politicisation, Simon and Klandermans (2001) 
observed that grievances are traditionally seen to be fuelled by emotions, most often by 
anger (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach, 2004) or contempt (Tausch, Becker, Spears 
& Christ, 2008). These emotions easily translate into blame, which is the necessary 
element in the construction of adversarial attributions, when the out-group enemy is 
blamed for the in-group’s predicament. Such attributions are at the heart of the second 
step of politicisation. Politicised identity theory posits that while the enemy can take 
various forms, be it a specific group, the government or ‘the system’, the blame must be 
directed outside, towards the out-group. To illustrate, in a historical analysis Glick (2002) 
demonstrated how German members of the Nazi party justified its atrocious treatment of 
Jewish people by blaming the latter for German woes. Similarly, in the context of 
Canadian foreign-trained immigrants, Grant (2008) found that migrants’ willingness to 
participate in a protest was contingent on the external attribution of blame for perceived 
systematic discrimination of non-Caucasian workers within Canadian society. By contrast, 
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when the blame is directed at the in-group, politicisation does not develop. Recent meta-
analysis undertaken by Smith and colleagues (2012) corroborated this proposition, and 
gathered additional support for the theory that self-blame leads to de-politicisation.  
With regard to the final step, Simon and Klandermans (2001) argued that a group 
that realised shared grievances and held external opponents responsible, would naturally 
demand some kind of corrective action. In the event that their demands were met, full 
politicisation of identity would not happen, and protest would die down. However, if the 
demands were refused, politicisation would continue to its highest point where the dyadic 
confrontation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ would be transformed into a broader power 
struggle involving the public. The researchers pointed out that at this third stage, society 
would be introduced to the power struggle and would be asked to take sides. A good 
example of this can be found in the research by Stott and Reicher (2011), who showed 
how the Tottenham riot of 2011 escalated from a peaceful protest by the friends and family 
of Mark Duggan when their demands were not met by the police. After that, protesters 
called upon the members of the wider public outside the black community, to express 
support against police brutality, and the protest became widespread.  
It is important to note that politicised identity is not supposed to be seen as 
qualitatively different from social identity. Simon and Klandermans (2001, p. 327) 
stressed that ‘in many respects, politicised collective identity is [therefore] intensified 
collective (social) identity with quantitatively stronger effects than its nonpoliticised 
counterpart’. Such understanding implies that individuals whose identity becomes fully 
politicised are much more likely to engage in active protest since they have a ‘clearer’ 
vision of grievances and a better understanding of who is to blame for it. Moreover, as 
they see themselves as part of a broader societal struggle, they are more convinced of the 
efficacy of their actions in bringing about social change.  
Dual pathway and politicised identity models have enjoyed much attention within 
the social psychology of contentious behaviour and continue to gain robust experimental 
support (Klandermans, 2014; Simon, 2011). However, these theories have been criticised 
for having a number of shortcomings. One such shortcomings is identified by 
Klandermans (2014). While having little objection to the theoretical concepts, he criticised 
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those theories for failing to take into account multiplicity of identity. He argued that if we 
followed SIT’s claim that people occupy numerous positions in the society and hence have 
numerous social identities, then we could safely assume that sometimes such identities 
would come into conflict. He illustrated his point by drawing on the study by Oegema and 
Klandermans (1994) who explored such a collision of social identifications in the context 
of the protest against deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. This protest 
included people who were, at the same time, supporters of the anti-deployment movement 
(social identity 1) and supporters of the Christian Democratic Party (social identity 2). The 
problem was that social identity 2 was associated with supporting the deployment, rather 
than opposing it, due to the Party itself being in favour of it. Consequently, people were 
faced with a dilemma. The researchers found that the way to resolve it for the majority of 
participants was to follow their friends. Klandermans (2014) argued that very few studies 
pay attention to such situations, although the variability of social identifications suggests 
that people face such situations frequently.  
Recently, some attempts to deal with the charge of omitting multiple identities 
from the research agenda have been made through developing the theory of politicised 
identity as dual identity (Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Dual identity is 
a special case of multiple identification that presumes the coexistence of strong 
superordinate level identity, such as nation, and strong subordinate level identity, such as 
class or gender (Klandermans, 2014). It was suggested that the interplay between these 
two levels results in the construction of identity that responds both to the specific 
grievances of the subgroup, and to the wider societal concerns. On the topic of the utility 
of such identification for protest behaviour, Simon and Ruhs (2008) suggested that dual 
identity is beneficial when it comes to mobilising the support of the public. Referring to 
the third step of the PCI model, the researchers observed that for the protests to be 
successful, protesters need to swing the public to their side. They hypothesised that in 
order to do so protesters would need to have membership in a more inclusive entity than 
their local in-group. At the same time, they would still need to be members of the 
aggrieved local community. Simon and Ruhs thus speculated that when dual identification 
— with the local community as well as with the broader social category — is present, it 
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will be positively related to politicisation and in turn will be a good predictor of 
willingness to become involved in protest. Indeed, their data demonstrated the importance 
of national and sub-national identification for Turkish migrants in Germany. Simon and 
Grabow (2010) found further evidence for the model of PCI as dual identity. In particular, 
they examined collective identification processes among Russian migrants in Germany. 
In line with the earlier research, they discovered that in making their political claims and 
mobilising for collective action, Russians who live in Germany reported strong ties with 
more local Russian identity and more inclusive German identity. The former functioned 
to give the sense of a close-knit aggrieved community, while the latter functioned to put 
such a community on the same level as other members of superordinate entity, entitling 
them to receive support from fellow citizens and be treated on the same democratic 
grounds as them. It was thus argued that when people develop dual identification they are 
more likely to become politicised and involved in social protest. In fact, there was an issue 
with such causative logic that the researchers themselves noted: the correlational nature 
of the study made it impossible to determine what came first, dual politicisation or 
politicisation. Nonetheless, Simon and Grabow (2010, p. 734) mentioned that they are 
‘confident’ in arguing that political behaviour was caused by the politicisation of identity 
which in turn was driven by the emergence of dual identification. This effectively makes 
dual identification the precondition of becoming a protester.  
Furthermore, both studies investigated the prediction that, since the local identity 
is nested within the more generic identity, it should follow its values and norms. Taken 
further, that would mean that the range of protest activities associated with the local 
identity would be limited by what they call the ‘superordinate normative frame’ stemming 
from the superordinate identity (Simon & Ruhs, 2008, p. 1355). In support of this 
suggestion, Simon and his team found that in both the Turkish and Russian contexts, the 
protesters with dual politicised identity were willing to act strictly within the democratic 
norms of the German identity. In other words, German identity imposed limits on the 
variety of protest forms available to the participants. The main suggestion here was that 
dual PCI leads to peaceful political mobilisation sanctioned by the norms of the higher 
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level membership. In that sense, politicisation was pronounced to be the opposite of 
radicalisation (see also Klandermans, 2014).     
Certainly, research on dual identification addresses some of the criticisms directed 
against the theories trying to explain protest mobilisation in terms of politicised identity. 
Exploring dual identities means looking at the variety of different forms and consequences 
of social membership in more detail, which in turn brings the theoretical research in closer 
contact with what is happening on the ground. Observing the complex interplay of 
identities also highlights the dynamic nature of activist politicisation. The exclusive focus 
on activist identification, however, also has been called into question. In particular, 
McGarty, Bliuc and colleagues (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, 
Bliuc, Thomas & Bongiorno, 2009; Musgrove & McGarty, 2008) have questioned the 
power of politicised identity theories to explain mass protests. 
 
Alternative framework for explaining protest — identity and opinion-based 
groups 
 
To elaborate, Simon, Klandermans and their associates focused on cultural 
contexts in which social movements (even broadly defined, such as ‘the gay movement’) 
were objectively given; that is, there often were protest organisations behind the 
movements. Under such circumstances, the existence of the movement itself provides the 
means for strong social identification, which acts as the driving force behind protest 
involvement (van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, the environment does not always 
provide such straightforward means for identification. For instance, there might simply be 
no clearly defined single movement behind protests, as in case of recent mass protests 
against authoritarian regimes. Yet, many people have joined such protests having no prior 
experience (McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith & Bliuc, 2014). It was argued that in more 
generic movements, such as anti-war protests or protests against the authoritarian regimes, 
the majority of participants could not be described as activists. In fact, they might actively 
reject such labelling: McGarty et al. (2009) observed that in large-scale social conflicts 
only a small fraction of people would be politicised and identify as political activists, 
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while for the majority of participants political aspects of resistance would be much less 
important. Rather, they would be just ‘ordinary’ people who took to the street. Bliuc and 
colleagues took this as evidence to suggest that models grounded in identification with a 
movement or with an activist identity are limited in their ability to explain mass protests 
or protests that are not directly associated with distinct movements (Bliuc et al., 2007). 
Empirically, their proposition was reinforced by identifying a weak statistical links: it was 
argued that social identification was, while significant, a statistically weak predictor of 
protest intentions (Musgrove & McGarty, 2008). 
Furthermore, McGarty and colleagues (2009) argued that there is little use in 
trying to explain mass mobilisation in terms of specific activist identities or broader social 
categories. With regard to the latter, McGarty et al. referred to the case of protests against 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Protest participants were from various socio-economic 
backgrounds, of different political convictions, and even from different nations; uniting 
them under the umbrella of a certain social category would be a very difficult and useless 
task. It is important to note here that these researchers were arguing against the idea of a 
single social category to unite protesters, but not against the idea of identification itself. 
Assuming that identification is the basis of mobilisation, Bliuc, McGarty and colleagues 
(Bliuc et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2009; Musgrove & McGarty, 2008) raised the question 
of the type of identification that has the potential to unite people and turn them into 
protesters. This led to the development of an alternative mobilisation approach based on 
opinion-based group membership. 
According to the researchers, opinion-based groups (OBGs) are groups of people 
who share similar beliefs, and are best understood in terms of being pro- or anti an issue 
or concept. To illustrate, what united people to protest against the invasion of Iraq was 
their treatment of the invasion as an illegitimate act; in other words, they shared the social 
identity based on opinion (McGarty et al., 2009). Social identification is thus still 
important, but it is seen to be structured around attitudes rather than more ‘categorical’ 
factors such as nationality, social class, memberships in concrete protest groups and so on. 
Bliuc et al. (2007) admitted that any group can be seen to involve some opinions, — for 
example, identifying as ‘Israeli’ in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might also 
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include sharing certain beliefs — however, not any group is opinion-based. To illustrate, 
being ‘pro-Israeli’ — that is defining one’s membership in terms of opinion — is different 
from being simply ‘Israeli’, where membership is defined based on ethnicity. ‘Israeli’ may 
imply certain beliefs shared with other Israelis, but this is not necessary in the abstract. 
On the contrary, ‘pro-Israeli’ presupposes at least minimal agreement with others who 
have the same views (Musgrove & McGarty, 2008).  
 More generally, Bliuc and colleagues (2007) argued for a new perspective on 
protest: in contrast to it being conceptualised as conflict between various social categories, 
they offer to view it as conflict between people with different opinions. This idea rests on 
the assumption that people can categorise themselves based on what they believe in or 
think, in the same way they can categorise themselves in terms of their gender or country 
of origin. It was proposed that studying collective behaviour through the prism of OBG 
membership theory provides a better ‘fit’ for the exploration of mass movements 
participation, where the majority of people would be reluctant to call themselves 
‘activists’.  
In explaining how OBGs come to be, Bliuc and colleagues suggested that as people 
come to share certain attitudes, such attitudes become a token of group membership (‘you 
have the same opinions as I do’) under which the shared social identity is formed. It is 
worth noting that such reasoning follows the lines of the social identity tradition, and that 
the OBG explanation is not qualitatively different from politicised collective identity 
approach. In fact, Bliuc et al. theorised that for some people, shared opinions would act as 
a basis for politicised identity and emerging activist self-categorisation, in the manner 
suggested by Simon and Klandermans (2001). The aim of the OBG approach is hence not 
to dismiss PCI theory altogether, but to upgrade it so it becomes a better predictor of 
collective action. 
With regard to one such improvement, it was suggested that studying the 
subjective contents of a category would provide more insights into why people mobilise 
(McGarty et al., 2009). For example, if we are interested in understanding the degree of 
willingness to participate in feminist protest for equality between men and women, it is 
more fruitful to look at identification with concrete contents of identity — opinions — 
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rather than the presence of identification with a broader category or movement. A person 
can identify strongly with ‘being a woman’ (broad social category), but ‘being a woman’ 
does not automatically presuppose being pro-equality. On the other hand, if the person 
identifies with ‘feminist movement’, there is another issue of not knowing what precisely 
it entails — depending on the content, it might or might not include issues of equality. 
Again, the willingness to join the protest might be lower. But if we know that a person 
strongly identifies with being ‘pro-equality’ (psychological group membership showing 
the content of identity), then this would be a much better predictor of her willingness to 
take part in a protest. 
To summarise, it was suggested that it is not the membership in a social category, 
as was predicted by PCI approach, but opinion-based group membership that drives 
collective action. Musgrove and McGarty (2008) proposed that opinion-based groups, 
being essentially psychological, are structured around a consensus about what the group 
should believe in, feel, and how its members should behave. They argued that people who 
identify strongly with an opinion group would be willing to act in line with such norms. 
In their study, they showed how people who identified as being either pro- or anti- The 
War on Terror (WoT) military actions showed different behavioural patterns. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, they found that people who opposed the WoT had stronger protest intentions 
and weaker offensive actions intentions, and people who supported WoT were less willing 
to protest but more willing to become involved in offensive actions. A more interesting 
finding from their study concerned the reasons why this was the case. Following the idea 
that the meaningful consensus within the group predicts action, Musgrove and McGarty 
investigated the psychological contents of being pro- or anti- WoT. They discovered that 
the collective emotional response was an important part of the identity content. In 
particular, for people in the ‘supporters’ group, being a supporter of WoT meant, among 
other things, being angry with terrorists for the attacks. On the other hand, people in the 
‘opponents’ group shared anger towards the government for their involvement in the WoT. 
Based on these findings, Musgrove and McGarty suggested that it was not simply the 
membership of the group, but the emotional consensus within the group, its psychological 
content, that mediated action orientation. In other words, people were willing to protest 
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against the government because protesting was perceived as a normative response to being 
angry at the government, which in turn was perceived as being a normative feeling of 
being an opponent of WoT. Based on their observations, Musgrove and McGatry proposed 
that the OBG approach should be used for studying how large-scale protests come to life, 
and how people form shared group identities based on norms. 
Further research by McGarty and colleagues (2014) built on this suggestion. 
Studying social psychological mechanisms of urbanised middle-class protests in Tunisia 
and Egypt, the researchers suggested that rapid growth of new social movements was 
occasioned by emerging social identities facilitated through independent social media, 
such as Al Jazeera and YouTube. McGarty et al. proposed that organised resistance relied 
on the construction of shared aggrieved group identity, within which consensual norms of 
behaviour were created. In other words, mass opposition emerged when people who had 
anti-government views started to see themselves as a coherent social group. The 
researchers explained that while some forms of resistance, such as struggles against 
foreign powers or movements advocating specific rights, can draw on pre-existing 
identities, in Tunisia and Egypt no such readily available identities existed. Because of 
this, new identities should have been formed around a positive consensus based on shared 
societal values. McGarty suggested that in anti-government protests, the opposition faces 
the ‘taint of illegitimacy that comes from attacking a national government […] which 
represents critics as being disloyal to the government’ (p. 729). Hence to unite a group in 
opposition to the government, shared beliefs should be contingent on the perceived 
illegitimacy of governmental actions. Moreover, it was proposed that opinion-based 
protester groups would strive to position themselves as opposing the government but loyal 
to the nation and the people. In so doing, the groups would draw on positive societal values, 
in pursuit of showing their ‘loyal’ part to the potential future protesters from the public. 
McGarty et al. proposed that in order to do that, the groups would have to present their 
values as the values of the people; in other words, to construct inclusive national identity 
and present their anti-governmental actions as benefiting the nation. This argument 
continues the reasoning of Simon and Klandermans (2001) who suggested that the battle 
for involving third parties would revolve around constructions of shared national identity.  
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The theories reviewed so far — the dual pathway model, politicised identity model, 
and opinion-based group membership model — converge on the idea that social 
identification is the key process of protest mobilisation. Depending on the context, such a 
process includes assuming available activist identities, collective movement memberships, 
or identities structured around shared opinions. Simplifying, the argument goes that when 
people have strong group identities, be it a group or opinion category, they become more 
susceptible to the group’s grievances and more willing to attribute blame to the out-group. 
This results in mobilisation and subsequent involvement in social protest. While 
theoretically this looks like a straightforward progression, it is worth remembering the 
issue mentioned above. The scholars of the identity approach to protest constantly stress 
that in reality, the processes are intertwined, messy and highly context-dependent. Due to 
the highly complex nature of these processes, Simon et al. (1998) suggested that more in-
depth methods would have an important contribution to the study of identity in protest. In 
particular, they emphasised the need to engage qualitative methods to learn about specific 
contents and meanings of social identities. This echoes the argument made by Stuart, 
Thomas, Donaghue and Russell (2013), that while the concept of identity has been central 
to the social psychological study of protest, little attention has been paid to the boundaries 
and normative nature of identities. They propose that qualitative research speaks to such 
needs in enabling the study of processes of active construction and negotiation of identity 
contents in situ. 
So while cognitive studies, inspired by the social identity approach, have largely 
dominated recent research on protest within social psychology and offered a range of 
fascinating ideas regarding the role of identity in protest participation, there are a number 
of criticisms touching upon their methodological constraints. One criticism concerns the 
nature of experimental design, which is the technique of choice for the majority of social 
psychologists looking at protest, and which does not allow the exploration of dynamic 
identity constructions. In particular, Reicher (2004) noticed that the controlled nature of 
experiments prevents one from exploring practices of self-categorisation. Experiments 
prescribe participants to identify with the categories a priori specified by the researcher. 
As such, the potential of self-categorisation is ignored: there is no space left for exploring 
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participants’ own versions of identity. This is a particularly potent issue for opinion-based 
group approach scholars, as they claim to study new emergent identities of social protests, 
but end up ‘exploring’ them within the limited range of categories offered to participants 
by the researchers themselves. For example, in the study by Bliuc et al. (2007), 
participants were asked to circle the statement either ‘in support of the government’ or ‘in 
support of the opposition’, and thus two opinion-based groups were identified. In a similar 
fashion, Musgrove and McGarty (2008, p. 41) established subjective membership of their 
participants by asking them to put a cross in a box titled either ‘supporter’ or ‘not a 
supporter’ of WoT. While these imposed limits are certainly useful for the sake of 
simplification and statistical analyses, questions can be raised about the ecological validity 
of such group boundaries. It can be argued that in real-life contexts people come to define 
their memberships and the contents of those of their own accord and potentially in less 
binary, more diverse ways (Reicher, 2004).  
At the same time, pursuit of quantification and finding a better statistical ‘fit’ 
replaces the spirit of exploration with the spirit of excavation. In other words, cognitive 
approaches imply that identifications are objectively present, and the aim of social 
psychologists is to identity the ‘right ones’. Moreover, the excessive focus on causation is 
in danger of being swayed into seeing social identities as unproblematically causing 
behaviours. Condemning such projections, Reicher (2004, p. 933) observed that within 
the classic social identity theory,  
 
social identity is intended as a concept that mediates between social context and 
the action of human subjects. It is not seen as a psychological reality that 
determines social reality. The social identity tradition is therefore fundamentally 
oriented toward variability and possibility in human social behaviour, rather than 
toward singularity and constraint.  
 
Similarly, Klandermans (1997, p. 2), commenting on the nature of social problems, 
stated that they ‘are not objectively given’; social situations are made into social problems 
by the people. Applying the same logic to protest identities, the task becomes that of 
exploring the variability and change in active identity production. In this regard, several 
researchers have stressed the need to study identity as a process within cultural 
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interactions rather than a given fact. Drury and Reicher (2000) highlighted that the 
meanings of social identities are constructed by people with respect to cultural norms. Van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007, p. 163) succinctly expressed a similar idea in 
saying that ‘identifying ourselves or others is a matter of meaning, and meaning always 
involves interaction: agreement and disagreement, convention and innovation, 
communication and negotiation’. 
With numerous claims of the importance of interaction and rhetoric for the study 
of protest, the lack of actual interaction-focused works is surprising. Few studies pay 
careful attention to the role of interactive intergroup processes. The main bulk of research 
here comes from Reicher and his associates (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Haslam & Reicher, 
2012; Reicher, 1984, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998a; 1998b). Even fewer studies are 
concerned with argumentation and identity rhetoric in protest (Hunt & Benford, 1993; 
Potter & Reicher, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In contrast to their more mainstream 
colleagues who envision identities as products of cognition that can be quantified and 
measured, researchers of the interaction approach conceptualise identities as discursive 
projects that people create and manage in talk.  
 
Discursive studies of protest 
 
It has been emphasised that social movement research is interdisciplinary in nature 
and benefits from being explored from a variety of methodological angles (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 2003; Klandermans, Kriesi & Tarrow 1988; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). 
In particular, there has been a call for more qualitative studies of protest (van Stekelenburg 
& Klandermans, 2013). For instance, Drury and Reicher (2000) argued that a number of 
socio-psychological models of protest have undeservedly treated social identities as static 
constructs that automatically presuppose contentious behaviour. They assert that only by 
taking into account specific contents of identity produced within the specific context of 
an event, can the model of protest have the potential to explain social change. Practical 
orientations here clearly outweigh theory implementation: ‘while the social identity model 
is of use … it is necessary to recognise how social categories are constructed and 
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reconstructed in the dynamics of intergroup interaction’ (Reicher, 1996, p. 115). In other 
words, there is a need to study the active practices of self-categorisation, together with 
exploring the meanings people discursively attribute to notions of protest and opposition. 
Following that need, Reicher and colleagues (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 
1984, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998a) set to develop a model of protest behaviour as both 
an outcome and further determinant of social identity. In particular, they argued that the 
link between identity and behaviour is underpinned by intergroup interactions that take 
place during the crowd event. Drury and Reicher (2000) thus challenged earlier views on 
crowd behaviour as irrational and dangerous (perhaps most famously expressed by Le 
Bon, 1896/1947). In contrast, they suggested that crowd events are not only rational, but 
are also instrumental for creating and developing new social meanings and identities. In 
advocating the need to address the matter of psychological changes that take place within 
social movement events, they focused on the changes happening to identity; specifically, 
on the transition from ‘disparate individual identities’ to ‘contextually specified common 
social identity’ (Drury & Reicher, 2000, p. 581).  
The conceptualisation of social identity they offered — as a ‘position in a set of 
social relations along with the actions that are possible and proper (legitimate) given such 
a position’ (p. 581), — is highly perceptive. It pays respect both to identity’s active and 
normative dimensions. Perhaps the most salient outcome of this definition is the 
suggestion that the relationships between actions and identities are essentially normative: 
certain actions are perceived and articulated as appropriate for certain identities (‘I am X, 
therefore I do Y’). Such a suggestion is made within the tenets of self-categorisation 
theory (Reicher, 1996), according to which social identification includes the process of 
self-categorisation, which results in conforming to beliefs and norms associated with the 
group one identifies with. Reicher and his team took this idea further to propose that such 
norms were themselves not objective, but the products of rhetoric (Reicher, Cassidy, 
Wolpert, Hopkins & Levine, 2006). 
Social identification and categorisation thus happen in action, and identities have 
the power to legitimise the behaviour. Drury and Reicher (2000) asserted that identity-
building always takes place within a specific context. They suggested that contexts are 
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frameworks of meaning, created by attitudes and actions of participating groups; such 
frameworks reciprocally inform each other and constantly re-categorise existing 
relationships.  
An example from the study by Reicher (1996) can help to illustrate this idea. The 
study set out to find an answer to what happened during the so-called ‘Battle of 
Westminster’, a conflict between student protesters and the police in 1988 in London. 
Reicher showed that dynamic identification played a significant role in the development 
of the conflict. Specifically, he argued that from the start the students viewed themselves 
as rightful protesters who acted well within the context of legitimacy: their actions were 
seen by them as an exercise of the democratic right to protest against perceived injustice 
towards them. Within such a subjective framework, their desire to get to the Parliament to 
express their views to MPs was seen as a right, while the presence of the police, on the 
other hand, was seen as an illegitimate obstacle to such a right. The police, however, 
operated within a different framework of meaning. For them, the protesters were seen to 
be a threat that warranted their presence on Westminster Bridge. Acting on this perception, 
the police tried to prevent the students from advancing their protest and crossing the bridge. 
In response, the protesters recategorised their actions from peaceful demonstration against 
students’ rights infringement to opposition to illegitimate actions of the police. Within this 
new context, Reicher explained, conflictual behaviour was deemed legitimate, and it 
became acceptable for the protesters to actively confront the police cordons. The 
consequence of such intergroup interaction was the spread of violent confrontation 
between the students and the police on Westminster Bridge. In other words, appropriation 
of confrontation depends on the process of discursive categorisation. Reicher’s study 
demonstrates how complex and dynamic the relationships between protest identification 
and contentious actions are. It shows how contextual categorisations aid constructions of 
new identities, within which new actions become possible.   
The production of categories and their power to justify protest actions was also 
evident in research by Potter and Reicher (1987). Looking at the media narratives 
surrounding the ‘St Paul riot’ of 1980, they used discourse analysis to show how a 
particular social category — that of a ‘community’ — was deployed to support various 
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versions of protest. In their analysis, Potter and Reicher focused on the details of content 
and active use of categories rather than the consequences of simply stating a membership. 
In so doing, they showed how drawing the boundaries around a single social category 
could be used to justify behaviour. In particular, they explored the media discourse that 
portrayed the police as being ‘outside the community’, thus couching conflict in 
intergroup terms, as between the police and the black community. Potter and Reicher drew 
attention to the functional and normative orientations of such categorisation. They argued 
that drawing a symbolic boundary between the police on one side and the community on 
the other allowed the speakers to attribute blame: the actions of the police were criticised 
on the grounds that ‘communities’ should not be attacked by the police who were 
supposed to protect them. Second, such categorisation presented the community as being 
under police attack, and thus legitimised the actions of protesters. Finally, alternative 
categorisations of protesters as ‘trouble-makers’ were downplayed on the basis that they 
were just protecting their own ‘community’. To summarise, while Potter and Reicher did 
not look at the dynamics of identification per se, their study once again drew attention to 
the importance of looking at identities as discursive projects that fulfil the variety of 
functions in talk. 
Most importantly, research by Reicher and his colleagues has promoted the 
interactional and interpretative model of the relationships between identity, context and 
action. The overall framework envisioned protests as social interactive encounters, where 
people develop identities, draw and redraw symbolic group boundaries, reinterpret the 
actions and attitudes of other groups and thus create new contexts. In contrast to the 
approaches that study social identification as the expression of underlying cognitive 
processes, there is certainly a different focus here: it is not so much on causation, or the 
nature of identities that mobilise people (activist, opinion-based, or other), but on how 
people themselves manage and negotiate identities in talk and how these affect protest 
behaviour. In a way, the discursive approach returns the sense of agency to people; within 
it, the agents of action are the people who build, dismantle and reshape identities in 
interaction. With regard to this, Reicher (2004, p. 941) in a radical way suggests that 
‘theories that presuppose certain categories and category relations as the basis of human 
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action are quite literally useless’. He went on to advocate the necessity to use the insights 
of social identity theory to address identity-context links: versatile and creative ways in 
which identities are constructed in contexts and construct contexts in turn. His image of 
social identities as projects is useful here. It offers a view of identities as manufactured by 
people to assist them in any given undertaking, be it justifying a protest or condemning it. 
According to Reicher, manufacturing happens in interaction through argumentation, 
‘something that involves a rhetorical dimension and is used strategically’ (p. 936). 
Following on from this point, further research focused specifically on the 
rhetorical strategies of protest (Bliuc, McGarty, Hartley & Muntele, 2012; Reicher et al., 
2006). Reicher and colleagues (2006) undertook a study of rhetorical mobilisation of 
social solidarity in Bulgaria during the Second World War. Researching public historical 
documents, they paid particular attention to the ways Bulgarians made arguments against 
the persecution and deportation of Bulgarian Jews in 1940-41. Reicher and his colleagues 
started with the premise that helping behaviour is akin to contentious behaviour in its 
intrinsic links with social identity boundaries: people are more likely to help and to protest 
on behalf of those who they perceive to be a part of their in-group. However, they also 
observed that shared membership alone is not sufficient to fully legitimise behaviour. 
Drawing on the earlier works by Reicher and Hopkins (2001a; 2001b) and Turner (1999), 
they proposed that contents of in-group identity are equally important. In particular, they 
suggested that mobilising attempts would be underpinned by references to the shared 
norms and values associated with the in-group. They hypothesised that with regard to 
rhetorical expressions, the ‘category boundaries’ arguments would work along the lines 
of ‘we save them because they are one of us’, while the ‘meanings of category membership’ 
arguments would postulate that ‘we help them because we are concerned with their 
wellbeing’ (p. 53). To explore their hypotheses, Reicher and colleagues looked at 
historical documents. They illustrated how advocates of protests against persecution 
constructed social identities in such a way as to tap into both rhetorical dimensions. First, 
Jewish people were presented as being a part of the Bulgarian nation (‘they are one of us’ 
argument); second, the documents often portrayed anti-Semitism as being outside of the 
norm for Bulgarians, while tolerance and humanity were advocated as the inherent 
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characteristics of Bulgarian identity (‘we are helping the nation because we are genuinely 
concerned’ argument).  
From the outset, the invocation of Bulgarian identity led to cognitive activation of 
norms associated with this identity and directed the actions (explanation in the spirit of 
more cognitive approach to  collective behaviour; see Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & 
Ruhs, 2008). Reicher and colleagues, however, offered a more nuanced analysis: they 
suggested that certain norms were constructed as essential part of being a Bulgarian. 
Moreover, such constructions had a practical function. Consequently, behaviour that 
contradicted such norms was actively delegitimised ‘as an assault on the nation’ (p. 62), 
while the behaviour that agreed with such norms was defended as being in the best interest 
of the nation.  
Reicher et al. observed that as arguments based on nationhood are powerful 
rhetorical tools, they have a great potential to mobilise large numbers of people. They also 
suggested, however, that national categories do not hold exclusive power to mobilise 
people. They proposed that other ‘banal’ categories, that is, categories that the majority of 
people are socialised into, can be used as well. For instance, calls for mobilisation can be 
centred around the notions of gender, or class membership such as working class people, 
or religious beliefs; it can be virtually any category as long as it makes intuitive sense to 
the members of the culture.    
While not refuting this idea, the evidence suggests that national categories are 
often present in talks on protests. For example, Bliuc et al. (2012) demonstrated how 
people attempted to construct and align themselves with the categories of Australian 
national identity. Specifically, they explored pro- and anti-riot arguments in response to 
the chain of protests against citizens of Middle Eastern Muslim backgrounds in Sydney, 
Australia. They focused on the post-riot phase in an attempt to understand the divisions of 
opinion and manufacturing of social identity categories among protest commentators in 
online forums. Bliuc and colleagues found that both supporters and opponents of protest 
attempted to construct new social identities through presenting their own beliefs as being 
characteristic of Australian national identity. They showed that for supporters of riots, 
identity was constructed as exclusive: being Australian meant having a white European 
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background, Christian faith, and indignation over gang violence, which was in turn 
attributed to Muslims. Here again, the function orientation of rhetoric was highlighted: 
Bliuc and colleagues explained that based on such categorisation, the actions of protest 
organisers were legitimised on the grounds of them being ‘true Aussies’. In contrast, those 
who opposed the riots advocated a more inclusive multicultural Australian identity, that 
was discursively associated with a different set of beliefs; those of tolerance and religious 
freedom. Within such a construct, the actions of protest organisers were condemned as 
being ‘anti-Australian’ in nature. Based on their findings, Bliuc et al. proposed that the 
power of rhetoric lies not simply in the construction of the membership, but in 
demonstrating commitment to the norms discursively associated with the membership. 
In summary, studies by Reicher, Bliuc and colleagues highlight the importance of 
norms in identity constructions. The researchers show that identities are not empty labels, 
but active tools as they are associated with relevant norms, which in turn solicit actions. 
The interplay between identities, norms and actions demonstrates that while normative 
constructions produced in interaction are the stuff of rhetoric, they have rather tangible 
consequences: people actively use such constructions to justify the need for action and 
(de)mobilise protests.  
In the same vein, Potter and Wetherell (1987) noted that the ways people 
discursively construct meanings of protest have large implications for how protest is 
understood, and, ultimately, for how it develops in action. In line with other scholars 
discussed above, they criticised the mainstream social psychological approach to protest 
for failing to include the study of discourse in its agenda, in particular with respect to 
social constructions of identity. Potter and Wetherell argued that practices of identification 
and categorisation are inseparable from linguistic practices, and the focus should be 
shifted from musings about the predictive power of different identities to the explorations 
of the various ways the self is constructed in context. Drawing on the work of Gergen 
(1985), they emphasised an important dimension to the discursive study of self: focusing 




To illustrate the importance of using qualitative discourse analysis for the study of 
intergroup conflict, Potter and Wetherell (1987) turned to the analyses of open-ended 
interviews with New Zealanders who talked about the protests surrounding the1981 
Springbok rugby tour. They demonstrated how different, sometimes contrasting, 
constructions of protesters’ identities were brought into play. They showed how three 
different identifications were used by the interviewees to account for the actions of the 
police and protesters during the demonstrations. Their main argument was that different 
identity constructions had different normative functions. For example, an ‘only human’ 
identity narrative functioned to legitimise the actions of the police. Within it, the police 
were portrayed as people who acted naturally in response to violence against them. As 
such, their own violent actions were rhetorically excused under the presumption that 
anyone would have acted the same under the circumstances. In a similar way, labelling 
protesters as either ‘genuine protester’ or ‘stirrer’/‘trouble-maker’, functioned to 
(de)legitimise their actions. On the whole, Potter and Wetherell suggested that in 
articulating a particular identity category, people become engaged in ‘typifying’ practices. 
The outcome of such practice is a social category that is immediately recognised by a 
member of the culture, and, due to its normative nature, on its own is enough to justify the 
behaviour. For instance, calling one a ‘stirrer’ prioritises a special motivation (for example, 
causing trouble) simultaneously removing other potential motivations for protest.  
As such, Potter and Wetherell added support to the idea that social identities are 
not simply determinants of protest mobilisation, but are powerful accounting devices that 
are used strategically to enforce the speaker’s position. They also pointed towards the 
exceptional flexibility of such devices, showing how different selves can be produced for 
different purposes within the same narrative, and flipped around in the next account.  
In a more recent attempt to systematically analyse dynamic discourses of protest, 
Stuart et al. (2013) also drew attention to the crucial role of rhetoric. They advocated 
applying qualitative analysis to the study of activists’ talk in order to explore practices of 
legitimisation and identity management as rhetorical responses to a hostile cultural context. 
More specifically, they employed thematic analysis to identify how the members of the 
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society — a radical activist organisation protesting against 
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whaling —  negotiated identity boundaries to establish a legitimate sense of self under the 
potential accusations of being too radical and violent in their behaviour. Through the 
analysis of interviews with members of the Society, the study found that the speakers 
attempted to distance themselves from such accusations through portraying themselves as 
‘pirates of passion’. Stuart et al. argued that in actively resisting being called ‘activists’ or 
‘protesters’, Sea Shepherds normalised their identity and disavowed the problematic 
‘radical’ label. Instead, they discursively linked the sense of who they were with being 
extremely passionate about protecting the ocean, in turn re-interpreting the meaning of 
their protest actions from being unreasonably violent (as they were accused in the media) 
to being understandably committed to defending the ocean at any cost. The researchers 
suggested that such constructions functioned as negations of criticism against the Society. 
They argued that the presence of alternative categorisations, that is, the ever-present 
danger for any protester to be defined as a troublemaker, was exactly what aided the 
discourses of the participants. In highlighting the need for constant negotiation of identity, 
Stuart and colleagues demonstrated the argumentative nature of identity talk (Billig, 1991). 
Their study illustrated the fruitfulness of analysing the details of talk in order to investigate 
social identity as a flexible resource for resisting labels and establishing one’s behaviour 




In this chapter, I have reviewed existing empirical and theoretical work on the 
protest cycle of 2011-2012 in Russia and offered an assessment of major frameworks for 
understanding protest in social psychology. I argued that while the literature review 
demonstrates a number of feasible analytic perspectives on Russian protests, with many 
insightful suggestions being made on the role of structural and psychological factors, the 
research to date has failed to directly address the individual perspective in terms of local 
meanings and understandings regarding protest mobilisation and protester identity, 
especially among the unaffiliated protesters. In other words, although we now have an 
impressive collection of scholarly explanations as to how and why Russians became 
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involved in popular protest in 2011-2012, there is little understanding as to how it is 
understood by protest participants themselves, or whether the mentioned structural, 
demographic and psychological factors in fact matter to them in the same way they matter 
to the academic observers. I suggested that social psychology can offer a valuable 
contribution to the study of protest in Russia, by directing attention to a significant but 
somehow overlooked variable — discursive interpretations of politically unaffiliated 
protesters. In my thesis I address this gap in the literature, by a closer examination of 
individual-level conversational data from Russian protest participants.  
I also argued that while the ideas generated by social psychological research on 
contentious behaviour are illuminating, there are two issues with it. First, there is the issue 
of focus. It has been argued that looking at different cultural contexts definitely enriches 
our understanding of protest practices (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995); but while 
researchers have paid attention to the protest practices of the Arab Spring, Western 
democracies and some countries of the former Soviet Bloc, to my knowledge there has 
been no social psychological research that centres on the recent Russian wave of protest. 
A potential reason for this is the nature of the approach itself — the social psychology of 
protest has been developing predominantly in the British and American contexts, and has 
only reached Russian social psychology recently (Melnikova & Kutkovaya, 2014). 
Popular protest in Russia, however, is the topic that can certainly appeal to social 
psychological researchers, not least due to the somewhat unique context: the uneasy 
protest history in general, the ‘hybrid’, semi-authoritarian nature of the regime (Robertson, 
2011), underdevelopment of the civil society (Chebankova, 2013), widespread anti-
oppositional governmental discourses, and yet, the evidence of strong popular 
mobilisation. Given these factors, it is all the more reason to pay attention to protesters’ 
meaning-making practices and their social functions. 
Second, there is a wider methodological issue with the psychological research 
rationale. The logic of positivism that underpins the majority of research within 
mainstream social psychology in Britain creates what Billig (1996, p. 6) has called ‘a party 
line’ that commands to translate human behaviour ‘into the statistically analysable fixity 
of numbers’. Social psychology of protest is not an exception. ‘Positivist’ environment 
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has encouraged researchers to focus on quantifiable measures of protest as ideal cognitive 
artefacts behind protest involvement (see Durrheim & Dixon, 2005, for similar criticism). 
Ironically, such an approach tends to gloss over the very fabric of subjectivity — people’s 
own understandings, the variability of meanings that protesters attribute to their actions, 
expressed through talk. This is not to say that mainstream research on protest has not 
pointed in this direction; on the contrary, the review demonstrated that many scholars 
emphasised the need to employ different — qualitative — methodologies to further 
explore the topic of protest (Klandermans, 1997; Reicher, 2004; van Zomeren, 2013). 
Nonetheless, only a handful of studies has taken such appeals seriously (Bliuc et al., 2012; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Reicher, 1996; Stuart et al., 2013; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). 
While these studies certainly overcome the issues associated with quantification and 
cognitivisation of collective behaviour, they tend to focus on the wider discourses, such 
as perceptions of the public/majority groups (Bliuc el al., 2012; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), 
and broad media discourses (Potter & Reicher, 1987; Reicher at al., 2006). Such focuses, 
being undoubtedly important for understanding the full picture, nonetheless largely 
exclude the voices of those who protest. Reicher (2004) pointed out that if we are to study 
social change through the lens of collective behaviour, we must focus on the arguments 
of the main entrepreneurs of such change, the protesters themselves. In the same vein, 
Billig (1987) suggested that while it is important to look at the argumentation from all 
parties involved in conflict, the ‘disagreeing’ side — protesters — is usually the most 
rhetorically rich and in greater need of examination, as they are the ones in greatest need 
of persuading the other parties.    
In turn, some discursive studies that did look closer at what the protesters were 
saying, such as Reicher (1996) and Stuart et al. (2013), did so within the generic 
frameworks of qualitative analysis, such as thematic analysis and critical discourse 
analysis. While such macro-level analyses elucidate broad discursive patterns, they do less 
in exploring the strategic use of talk. The authors might indeed have claimed to show 
conflicting rhetoric in play, but more often, their analyses illustrate a ‘slice’ of discourse 
in which people engage in legitimisation of their behaviour, while dynamism and 
variability of talk are less prioritised. In so doing, existing discursive research on protest 
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has failed to pay sufficient attention to the dynamic social functions of discourse. 
Moreover, macro-analytic perspectives are also at a greater risk of being prone to 
‘theoretical imperialism’ (Schegloff, 1997); that is, imposing analysts’ interpretations on 
the data and overlooking the understandings of the participants. Along these lines, Hunt 
and Benford (1993) criticised macro-level constructionist analyses of social protest 
movements, arguing that such research tends to unproblematically translate what is being 
said into scientific constructs and disregard the local functions of talk as a product of social 
interaction. It appears that micro-analytic perspectives can offer a way out of this. The 
next chapter will discuss this point in detail.  
Overall, the literature review has demonstrated a major lacuna in the literature: the 
absence of social-psychological qualitative exploration of the recent popular protest in 
Russia. I will therefore address this gap in my thesis, through exploring how particular 
versions of protest reality are manufactured and negotiated in conversation by protesters. 
As the research cited above has highlighted the general moral and normative orientation 
of anti-governmental protests in Russia, this study will pay special attention to normative 
and moral considerations of participants’ discourses, in order to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of this topic. 
My study has an overarching research question as well as four more specific 
research focuses. In broad terms, the study seeks to answer the question regarding how, 
within the interactional context of interviews, people who took part in the 2011-2012 
protests in Russia account for their protest involvement. The more specific research 
questions that directly map onto the four empirical chapters of the thesis are: 
 
 
1. How do protesters display their political interests and manage ‘being 
politically interested’ in talk about attitudinal change?  
2. How do protesters build up the accountability of being actively involved 




3. How do protesters manage ‘oppositional’ identities in talk, and whether 
indeed such identities are relevant? 
4. How do protesters address the accountability of others, especially the 
people who are not involved in active protest? 
 
 I argue that a discursive social psychological approach offers the best means to 
answer these research questions2, and in so doing fill the gaps in our understanding of 
discursive and social nature of the protest in Russia. The next chapter will outline the 
















                         
2 Kent and Potter (2014) pointed out that the discursive psychological approach radically 
transforms the standard principles of psychological research. Importantly, it departs from the dominant 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning that forces a researcher to formulate research questions (or 
hypotheses) first and then test them. In contrast, discursive psychology starts with data, and it is during 
the analysis that specific research questions begin to be formulated. Hence, it is important to keep in 
mind that while the overarching research question was driven mostly by the lacunae in the literature, 
the more specific research questions were strongly influenced by the data as well. They were 










Chapter 2. Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the methodological approach I have adopted in order to 
examine how protesters in Russia construct discursive versions of protest. In the first 
section, I provide background for my method of choice. Specifically, I argue that 
discursive psychological enquiry is a particularly appropriate methodological approach 
for studying how people actively construct and manage their accounts of protest 
mobilisation. After that, I turn to the practical side of the research. I address the empirical 
process of participant recruitment, data collection and ethical considerations in section 2 
and discuss the stages of data analysis in section 3. The kind of data I use in my research 
can be considered unusual for the chosen approach, which raises certain methodological 
issues: these are discussed in section 4. The chapter ends with a summary of the main 
methodological points. 
 
1. Analytic framework 
 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, the phenomenon of protest has been 
occupying an increasingly prominent position in psychology, with researchers trying to 
uncover the psychological processes behind contentious behaviour (van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans, 2013). Within the social psychology of protest, the key concern has been 
with identifying people’s cognitions and their causal effect on collective action. I have 
also pointed out that the greater part of current research on protest in social psychology is 
grounded in a realist perspective, with explanations being given in terms of psychological 
entities, such as personal attitudes, perceptions of injustice, emotions, identities and so on. 
However, an alternative, discursive, analytic ‘take’ on protest has recently been gaining 
ground, with more scholars advocating the need to pay more attention to language and the 
role it plays in constructing protest realities (Bliuc et al., 2012; Klandermans, 1997; Stuart 
et al., 2013). Crucially, this signifies a departure from the largely positivist assumptions 
of cognitivism, specifically departing from the idea that language is a neutral medium for 
thoughts and, as such, is a direct route to cognition. Rather, language constructions are 
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treated as topics of interest in their own right (Billig, 1991; McKinlay & McVittie, 2008; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). This type of research relies mainly 
on qualitative methodology and offers explanations in terms of the dynamics of social 
interaction, rather than in terms of psychological entities (Burr, 2015).  
As I mentioned above, this research project is concerned with detailed examination 
of how protesters in Russia construct and display their understanding of protest realities. 
Focus on subjective understandings and construction of meaning leans towards qualitative 
methodology ‘almost inevitably’ (Ashworth, 2015, p. 5). However, it is important to note 
that psychology currently offers a variety of methods for conducting qualitative enquiry 
and investigating the constitutive role of language, including thematic analysis (TA), 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) and various strands of discourse analysis 
(Smith, 2015; Willig, 2013). Such variability raises the issue of choosing the best 
methodological ‘fit’ for my study. Thus, over the following three sections I consider the 
said methods and make a case for the appropriateness of the micro-level discursive 
approach.  
 
TA and IPA 
 
TA is an analytic technique that aims at generating analytic ‘themes’ that emerge 
from the data; it treats these themes as reflecting a certain psychological reality of the 
participants (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It therefore employs qualitative data to establish a 
more accurate and in-depth picture of human psychology (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 
2006). TA has been described as a flexible method that is not tied to a specific 
epistemological or theoretical perspective and can thus be used to address a wide range of 
research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Clarke, Braun & Hayfield, 2015; Joffe, 2012). 
Importantly, however, Clarke et al. (2015, p. 228) have pointed out that research questions 
that relate to the action orientation of language ‘don’t fit well with TA’. According to 
these authors, TA is not primarily concerned with language as a form of social action, and 
hence does not provide the means for detailed exploration of language use. Similarly, 
Willig (2013) pointed out that while TA is a useful method for identifying common 
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threads of meaning within qualitative data, it is particularly well-suited for theorising 
subjective perceptions and social representations on the bases of identified themes, and 
less so for exploring interactive co-construction of meaning.  
IPA is an approach that centres around detailed examination of people’s personal 
experiences of objects and events (Eatough & Smith, 2008). Similarly to TA, IPA places 
great emphasis on the participants’ point of view and works mostly with themes that 
‘emerge’ from the data; however, the analytic focus of the IPA analysis has been described 
to be primarily on cognition (Smith, 1996; Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009). Specifically, 
Smith and Osborn (2015, p. 26) have commented that IPA ‘assumes a chain of connection 
between people’s talk and their thinking and emotional state […] and the researcher has 
to interpret people’s mental and emotional state from what they say’. IPA thus tends to 
take epistemological position of realism, in a way that it assumes, first, that ‘inner’ 
psychological subjective experiences do exist, and second, that these can be revealed by 
observing and interpreting how people talk about them. The language here is understood 
as a direct means for describing and communicating private psychological realities. While 
IPA recognises that direct access to such realities is impossible and the end product of the 
analysis is always a researcher’s interpretation, the majority of studies do not incorporate 
this idea into their research process and stay vague on the exact impact that the researcher 
has (Willig, 2013). In effect, IPA pays little attention to the context, both social and 
interactional, that gives rise to descriptions of particular experiences.  
Overall, both TA and IPA seem to ask different questions to what I am interested 
in: these approaches are more concerned with the nature of the phenomena under 
investigation rather than with the processes by which phenomena are actively ‘talked’ into 
being through discursive practices (Edwards, 1997). Hence neither TA nor IPA offers a 
suitable methodology to analyse the dynamic production of meaning in interaction. Such 
a research orientation would clearly require an approach that is concerned with the 
constitutive role of language and the primacy of interaction in the construction of social 
reality. Discursive approaches attend to such issues (McKinlay & McVittie, 2008; Potter 







Discourse-oriented approaches started to gain force in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, being described as ‘turn to language’ (Gergen, 1985; Kroger & Wood, 
1998; Parker, 2012). From the 1950s onwards, social scholars started to become interested 
in performative and constitutive functions of language use. Guided by the insights from 
the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and George Herbert Mead’s symbolic interactionism 
tradition, those scholars increasingly saw language as an ontologically primary 
phenomenon (Ashworth, 2015). They criticised the image of humans as self-contained 
‘monads’, with their psychological uniqueness being seen as ‘a treasure locked inside, like 
a pearl in its shell’ (Burkitt, 2008, p. 1). In contrast, they advocated the view that 
everything was social, and that people developed and managed themselves through 
normative and contextual social interactions.  
Within psychology too, the idea that language was much more than simply a 
‘window’ to cognition started to gain momentum with the publication of a paper by 
Kenneth Gergen in 1973 (Burr, 2015). In his seminal paper, Gergen suggested that all 
knowledge, including social psychological knowledge, is historically bound and that 
therefore any attempt to discover universal principles of human nature are doomed to fail. 
He thus proposed an alternative conceptualisation of psychology as a historical 
undertaking that studies the production of the social phenomena, by looking at interaction 
patterns across various temporal and cultural contexts. In the 1980s, a number of important 
works advocating a discourse-oriented approach to data were published, including Potter 
and Wetherell’s (1987) Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour. 
Potter and Wetherell argued that because people always function within a society, the 
psychological division between the individual and the social becomes redundant. Their 
work contained a wide-ranging critique of cognitive psychology and showcased the 
benefits of detailed analysis of interview transcripts. Consequently, the scholars within 
the discursive framework argued for the rejection of the duality of psychological reality 
on the one side, and the language that reflects it on the other. Similarly, the 
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conceptualisation of language as a pathway to cognition was actively disputed. Cognition 
itself thus became a fruitless pursuit, and the focus of attention shifted to the ways reality 
is constructed and performed in language (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). A different 
category of analysis was subsequently proposed: instead of mental psychological concepts, 
researchers started to focus on discursive activity (Edwards, 1997). 
While attention to discursive activity remains the distinct characteristic of 
discourse-oriented methodologies more broadly, understandings of discourse vary 
considerably between specific approaches. In particular, two distinct strands of discursive 
research have been defined, based on the conceptualisation of discourse and the research 
focus: macro-level discursive approaches that treat discourse as a set of historically 
produced normative meanings, and micro-level discursive approaches that zoom in on 
action-orientation of interactions (Danziger, 1997; McKinlay & McVittie, 2008). Willig 
(2013) proposed that the most used macro-level approach within psychology is 
Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA), while discursive psychology (DP) is the most 
prominent representative of the micro-level approach. It is important to note that macro 
and micro approaches are not necessarily seen as mutually exclusive: for example, 
Wetherell (1998, p. 405) has argued against the formation of ‘contrasting camps of 
discourse analysts’ in social psychology and asserted the need for an eclectic approach 
that attends both to the local situated nature of accounts and the broader social practices. 
Nonetheless, in recent years the divide between micro- and macro-level research has 




The Foucauldian version of discourse analysis is informed by the ideas of post-
structuralist philosophers, most notably Michel Foucault. In particular, FDA drew 
inspiration from Foucault’s argument that language (seen as discourse) and social reality 
are closely intertwined, with discourses simultaneously shaping reality and being in turn 
shaped by the current historical and cultural contexts (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 2014). Due to 
this, language is understood in its broad, ideological sense, and is seen to be inherently 
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tied up with the issues of power and inequality. People are thought to exercise relations of 
inequality by assuming ‘subject positions’ that are ‘on offer’ within a particular discourse 
(for example, doctor-patient in medical discourse, or parent-child in family discourse; 
Parker, 1998).  
So while FDA is undoubtedly concerned with language and its role in the 
construction of social and psychological reality, its focus is on explicating ‘ideological 
functions of language’ in constructing the fabric of society (Mayr, 2004; quoted in 
Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 105). FDA offers to investigate the matters of meaning 
through identifying discursive constructions used by research participants in a particular 
socio-historical context. In addition, FDA analysts attach great importance to ‘political’ 
research aims, such as exposure of the unequal power relations and giving voice to 
marginalised groups (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Torfing, 1999). Such commitments 
clearly presuppose going beyond language into the domain of extra-linguistic matters of 
institutionalised power relations (McKinlay & McVittie, 2008).  
On the surface, FDA methodology presents a fruitful opportunity for the study of 
how protest realities are constructed in Russia. Specifically, FDA’s attention to the 
interplay of power is appealing, as popular mass mobilisation is likely to be linked to the 
socio-political issues of power struggle, oppression and marginalisation. Nonetheless, 
FDA methodology poses a number of challenges for a project that wishes to study the 
interactional production of meaning.  
First, macro-level methodologies, such as FDA, have an exclusive focus on 
‘mapping the discursive environment’ (Willig, 2013, p. 155). As a result, they take a 
specific stance on the issue of agency: they conceptualise speakers as subject to discourse 
and present subjectivity as a product of discursive interplay. By endowing discourses with 
the power to shape people’s lives, advocates of FDA tend to minimise the extent of 
people’s personal choice and agency. Burr (2015, p. 143) argued that such an impersonal 
view problematises the very project of discourse analysis: “in order to understand society 
and social life, we must identify and laid bare the discourses that are currently ‘pulling 
our strings’. However, if this is the case, how is such a task possible? How can we stand 
outside of and regard the very structures that are producing us?” Hence there is an inherent 
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tension within FDA connected to the understanding of agency. Related criticism here 
comes from Schegloff (1997, p. 183), who accuses advocates of a macro-discursive 
approach of making discourse ‘subservient to contexts not of its participants’ making, but 
of its analysts’ insistence’. FDA thus offers little help in exploring people’s own 
orientations. 
Second, FDA is not designed to answer questions about the details of meaning 
production. Because FDA scholars see talk as a manifestation of discourse, it is 
characteristic for them to divert attention away from the detailed analysis of the contextual 
language use and focus instead on the nature of discursive constructions (Arribas-Ayllon 
& Walkerdine, 2008). As a result, what is actually said, done with, or accomplished by 
talk attracts considerably lesser importance. Some criticism was voiced against such a 
tendency. For instance, Widdicombe (1995) has illustrated how FDA’s preoccupation 
with making ‘grand’ but somewhat abstract claims about the workings of discourses 
resulted in the failure to notice the fine details of what the participants actually said. In 
effect, the subtle ways in which meaning was negotiated and communicated were glossed 
over, and the participant’s own practical concerns were left unexplored. In addition, it has 
been pointed out that the transition from the micro-level of language to the macro-level of 
discourse is a troublesome undertaking in itself, as it raises questions about the validity of 
claims that certain utterances are manifestations of certain discourse (Edwards, 1997). 
To summarise, a macro-level discursive approach, in particular FDA, seem to be 
preoccupied with ‘big’ questions about the relation between power, discourse and society. 
While FDA offers a way to interpret protest realities within the broad context of culture 
and ideology, it does not have the necessary analytic tools to answer the questions about 
language use and its functional and rhetorical nature. In contrast, micro-level approaches 
to discourse do focus on practical orientations of language, and treat discourse ‘as a social 
practice which can be studied as a real-world phenomenon rather than a theoretical 








The kind of micro-level discursive approach I would like to focus on in more detail 
here is discursive psychology (DP). The term was proposed by Derek Edwards and 
Jonathan Potter to designate a specific kind of discourse analysis dealing with 
psychological phenomena in talk, and to promote it as ‘a meta-theory and analytical 
approach’ (Edwards & Potter, 2000, p. 175). The broader discursive psychological 
approach has been developing in the UK since the 1980s (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), with 
DP becoming strongly established in the 1990s, in particular at Loughborough University 
in England (Edwards, 2012; Parker, 2012). This approach borrows extensively from the 
theory of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) and the social studies of science (Gilbert 
& Mulkay, 1984); it is also heavily influenced by conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992; 
Schegloff, 2007).  
One of the central features of DP is that it is driven by criticism of the mainstream 
cognitive treatment of psychological phenomena, and sets out to reconceptualise 
‘psychological topics as discourse practices’ (Edwards, 2005a, p. 260). Due to such 
objectives, DP is interested in how people discursively construct and display accounts 
related to various psychological issues. In other words, DP scholars are concerned with 
how psychological issues such as motivation, identification, intention and so on are 
actively produced and employed pragmatically by people as they interact with each other 
(Potter, 2004). Practices of human interaction thus comprise the starting point for the 
analysis (Potter, 2012b).  
In addition to the goal of re-evaluating traditional modes of psychological enquiry, 
Kent and Potter (2014) identified three guiding principles of DP. First, discourse is seen 
as action oriented. This means that by choosing specific words and arranging them in 
certain ways, people do not simply describe what they feel or think, but actively construct 
versions of reality. Talk is hence seen as fulfilling interactional and interpersonal functions, 
and the task of research becomes one of studying what people do with and through talk. 
Kent and Potter emphasised that focus on discursive practices makes DP into a highly 
empirical approach: in order to explore the action-orientation of talk, DP researchers 
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should stay in close contact with the data and attend to the fine detail of participants’ ways 
of speaking. 
Second, DP pays close attention to the situated nature of discursive actions. This 
includes being aware of various contexts in which accounts are produced, such as the 
sequential context (where the account is situated in the unfolding conversation), the 
institutional context (what kind of social situation facilitated account production) and the 
rhetorical context (what alternative versions does the account counter and what stakes 
does it manage). 
Third, within DP, discourse is understood as both constructed and constructive. It 
is constructed in the sense of being a product of people’s creative action: through the use 
of linguistic and paralinguistic devices, such as descriptions, metaphors, categories, 
intonation, pauses and so on, speakers assemble accounts and manufacture discourses. At 
the same time, when articulated, discourses give various reports of what happened, and 
thus themselves construct ‘facts’ of reality (see also Potter, 1996). Such an understanding 
borrows from a social constructionist idea of reality-in-the-making, a relativist standpoint 
that the world around us is predominantly constructed by text and talk (Burr, 2015). This 
last principle is particularly important as it highlights the essentially practical nature of 
talk. That is, the central awareness that people design their conversations strategically in 
order to accomplish specific interpersonal and interactional goals.  
These principles are incorporated into the Discursive Action Model (DAM), which 
was proposed by Edwards and Potter (2000) in an attempt to summarise the basic 
conceptual elements of DP in a coherent fashion. The model consists of three parts, 
namely action, fact/interest and accountability. The ‘action’ element relates to the above-
mentioned idea that talk is action-oriented and that the focus of DP enquiry should be on 
the activities carried out through talk rather than on talk as manifestation of cognition. In 
that light, the understanding of psychological phenomena such as attribution, 
remembering, attitudes and so on shifts from seeing these as ‘modes of being’ to seeing 
them as ‘modes of doing’.  
The basic premise of DP is that when people say things, they make certain 
inferences available. Such inferences are linked to the dilemmas of stake and interest, 
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which is the central theme of the second element of DAM. The theoretical point that 
Edwards and Potter made is that accounts are governed by the logic of negation; that is, 
accounts are constructed to counter potential alternative productions (Billig, 1991; 1996). 
The useful metaphor here is of talk as battle, encapsulated in a well-known rhetorical idea 
that ‘to speak is to fight’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 10). According to such a view, every 
participant’s utterance is a strategic ‘move’ in presenting their own version of events as 
factual and defending it from being undermined. A study by Edwards (1995) offers a good 
illustration of this, showing how couples in counselling sessions use descriptions to 
compete and assign blame through talk.  
The third element of DAM is ‘accountability’, which deals with issues of agency 
and normativity. DP rejects the already described macro-level approaches belief that 
people are mainly the subjects of discourses; instead, it emphasises the agentic character 
of accounts production. It is important to stress that DP scholars do not perceive the 
speaker as being in sovereign control of the talk. For example, Edwards (2012, p. 433) 
argued that ‘the things people do and say are done with regard to a normative framework 
of accountability’. This view draws inspiration from the ethnomethodological idea of the 
existence of shared normative tools that make social actions intelligible (Garfinkel, 1967). 
In accordance with it, DP encourages researchers to explore how speakers adhere to (or 
disobey) such rules in talk, how they actively work up accountability and display their 
sensitivity to the normative frameworks and wider socio-cultural representations (cf. 
Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). 
To summarise, DP emphasises the importance of the situated use of language and 
its role in production of various accountable versions of reality. Its methodology offers a 
practical route into studying how people construct and display their subjective realities. 
This was the main reason why I adopted this micro-level discursive approach. I believe 
that its theoretical and analytic principles fit particularly well with my research aim of 
exploring descriptions of ‘protesting’ in contemporary Russia, due to its focus on the 
detailed use of language in the active production of psychological phenomena, such as 
attitudes, motives and identity, in talk, and on exploring the matters of accountability. As 
discussed in the literature review, studies of Russian protest show that issues related to 
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contentious behaviour are of fundamental moral and normative nature. DP offers a 
practical way to study morality in participants’ own terms, as locally performed and 
negotiated in interaction, and to explore the potential stakes and interests protesters in 
Russia might have.  
While my analysis is not intended as a systematic exploration of the psychological 
thesaurus and does not focus on specific expressions of the psychological lexicon 
(Edwards & Potter, 2005), it attends to phenomena traditionally studied within psychology, 
such as attitudes, motives and identities. It is hence appropriate to call my methodology 
discursive psychology, rather than simply discourse analysis. In addition, my research 
shares the DP commitment to re-specification of psychological topics as discursive 
practices. I take a critical stance towards an exclusive focus on cognition within the social 
psychology of protest, and argue for the benefit of adopting various methodological lenses 
in the study of contentious behaviour. DP is one of such lenses, which can greatly enrich 
our understanding of protest in Russia and protest in hybrid regimes more generally. While 
DP research as yet has not looked at protest movements in detail (J. Potter, personal 
communication, May 14, 2014), there is no reason why it cannot do so. It has been 
suggested that DP ‘cuts across the fragmented sub-fields that have emerged within 
psychology’ (Edwards & Potter, 2000, p. 175). As such, the analytic framework of 
discursive psychology is highly befitting for this PhD study. 
In the second part of this chapter, I turn to the practical side of my research, and 
show how DP approach was realised in practice.  
 
2. Data collection 
 
The interview data and participants 
 
In order to examine constructions of protest behaviour in Russia, I collected 48 
informal semi-structured interviews with Russians who reportedly took part in anti-
governmental protests from 2011 onwards. The data collection process took place between 
July and September 2013. 25 male and 23 female Russian nationals were interviewed 
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during the course of data collection; all participants were over 18 years old, with the 
youngest being 20, and the oldest 61. Most of the interviews were conducted in person 
during my fieldwork in Russia, across the three Russian cities of Moscow, Saint 
Petersburg and Volgograd. The final three interviews were collected using Skype (Internet 
calling software) while I was in the UK, with one participant calling from Saint Petersburg, 
one from Moscow, and one from another smaller Russian city, Samara. Overall, the 
majority of the participants came from Moscow (23) and Saint Petersburg (16), with 8 
people coming from Volgograd and 1 from Samara. 
The decision to recruit people from different cities was motivated by practical 
concerns as well as by research interest in the potential variability of the data. First, not 
limiting research to one city increased the possibility of obtaining more participants. 
Second, I was interested in whether there would be a difference between the accounts 
given by protesters coming from the capital and those coming from provincial cities. The 
reason for such an interest stemmed from a notable dissimilarity of the protest 
environment: Russia’s nominal and ‘cultural’ capitals — Moscow and St Petersburg — 
were the centres of large-scale protests in 2011-2012, whereas in Volgograd and Samara, 
which are regional cities, considerably less public protest took place, with protesting likely 
to be perceived as more risky and reprehensible. I thus hypothesised that there might be 
patterns of construction characteristic to specific geographic areas. In retrospect, that 
hypothesis was not supported. An additional reason for taking into account the views of 
protesters from Russia’s smaller cities relates to the lack of such perspective in the 
literature: the majority of previous works on contentious behaviour in Russia predictably 
focus on protesters from Moscow and Saint Petersburg (Lobanova & Semenov, 2015). 
Hence, the data from a different context provide a valuable contribution to research. 
A typical interview lasted between 55 and 65 minutes, with the longest interviews 
taking 120 minutes to finish and the shortest taking 40 minutes. All conversations were in 
Russian. Every interview was recorded using a dictaphone, with audio recordings later 







The majority of the participants were recruited through social media (Facebook 
and its Russian-language analogue, VKontakte) and some through acquaintances.  
 In the case of social media, I posted a short advertisement on my personal page 
on the two above-mentioned websites. In the advertisement, I briefly described my study 
as exploring ‘attitudes to oppositional activity in Russia’, and said that I was looking for 
people ‘of broad liberal-democratic views’, who were ‘discontented with the official 
political regime to some degree’ and who had actively participated in anti-governmental 
protests. It is important to note that I did not specify the particular forms of active protest 
I was interested in. It has been argued that in contemporary Russia, partially due to its 
uneasy history of open dissent, civic activism takes a wide range of forms: together with 
participation in organised street demonstrations, it includes many other informal and semi-
informal practices (Chebankova, 2013). Limiting the respondents to only those, for 
example, who took part in organised street demonstrations, would risk overlooking the 
variability of such practices. In addition, what counts as ‘active protest’ was an interesting 
topic in itself, and keeping the wording of the advertisement less specific would allow the 
potential investigation of the meanings that protesters attached to that notion. 
Calling on people with ‘broad liberal-democratic views’ and those ‘discontented 
with the official political regime’ was part of the strategy to exclude people who held 
strong political views (or membership of a party) and took part in protests organised by 
the state (for an example of the latter, see Kal’k, 2012). This was in line with my study’s 
focus on unaffiliated, ‘ordinary’ protesters as opposed to professional political activists. 
It is important to emphasise here that I do not attach analytic or theoretical primacy to the 
‘ordinary’ category; that is, I do not use it to explain my findings. Neither do I argue that 
‘ordinary’ protesters comprise a distinct group that can be unproblematically compared to 
other protest communities. Rather, I employ this label for practical reasons: I find it to be 
a useful marker for denoting my sample, and to be a helpful reminder of my study’s 
concern with the people who are often overlooked in traditional psychological research 
that is centred around organised political activism.  
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In the advertisement, I asked the people who were interested to contact me via e-
mail. That advertisement was ‘shared’ (reposted on their web-pages) by a number of 
people, which also helped to generate more responses. Via e-mail, I answered their 
questions about the study, and, if people were happy to take part in it, organised the date 
and time for the interviews. Participants were recruited with the purpose of ensuring 
diversity (male/female, age diversity), although in a less ‘protesting’ context, such as 
Volgograd, convenience sampling was also used.  
In the case of personal introductions, I followed the logic of ‘snowball’ sampling, 
by asking people I knew in Russia to introduce me to their oppositionally-minded 
acquaintances, in turn asking the latter to introduce me to their acquaintances, and so on. 
This recruitment strategy was shown to be particularly useful for reaching the hidden and 
generally hard-to-reach populations (Atkinson & Flint, 2001; Faugier & Sargeant, 1997). 
Protesters in Russia can be seen as part of such populations for a number of reasons, 
including social stigmatisation of protest behaviour (Lanskoy & Suthers, 2013; White, 
2013) and a certain degree of suspicion towards official enquiries into protest behaviour 
(on numerous occasions I was asked whether I was a KGB/FBI/CIA spy, and not always 
humorously). The snowballing sampling was hence used as a ‘back-up’ strategy that was 
intended to partially overcome potential issues of trust, as referrals were made through 
acquaintances and friends rather than through more formal methods of identification. 
Personal introductions followed the same procedure as advertisements: prospective 
participants were given my e-mail and asked to contact me directly if they were interested.  
Interviewees were not paid for their participation. Lack of monetary reward was 
not discussed openly, but the fact that none of the interviewees asked for it suggests that 
it was not expected. In fact, it is likely that offering money for participation might have 
complicated the research situation: on various occasions, several participants have noted 
that taking money from a researcher from the UK would be not appropriate, as it would 
give indirect support to a state-promoted propaganda notion that people were paid to take 







The date, time and place for the interview were agreed upon via e-mail or, if 
participants were more comfortable with using it, mobile phone. All interviews were 
conducted individually, with only the interviewee and myself present. Conversations were 
held in appropriate public places, usually a park or a cafe, and, where possible, in a library 
room.  
Before the interview, participants were given the Information Sheet and Consent 
Form (see Appendixes A and B respectively), invited to read both forms and sign the latter. 
They were also encouraged to ask questions related to the study or the interview procedure. 
After the Consent Form was signed, I asked for the participant’s age and occupation. 
These were the only demographic details directly asked for; they were noted on the 
Consent Form and used for a general description of the sample. The interviewees were 
given a copy of the Information Sheet and Consent Form to keep. Once these matters were 
settled, I switched the dictaphone on and the interview began. In the majority of cases, the 
interview proceeded undisturbed; in some situations, however, the interviewee asked for 
a short break, usually in order to answer a phone call. On such occasions, I stopped the 
recording and resumed it when the participant was ready to continue.  
The interview process was guided by an interview schedule (see Appendix D). The 
interviews were therefore semi-structured in nature; however, I aimed to keep the 
conversations as open-ended as possible, to enable the interviewees to bring up the topics 
that were meaningful to them and speak spontaneously about their experiences and any 
events they understood as related to protest. In effect, some of the ‘standard’ pre-defined 
questions were worded differently, and some unique, specific to the context of a particular 
interview questions were asked. ‘Standard’ questions were as non-directive as possible; I 
also refrained from using technical terms and psychological jargon, in an attempt to avoid 
‘flooding’ the conversation with the research agenda (Potter & Hepburn, 2012). At the 
end of an interview a participant was always asked the question ‘Is there anything else 
you’d like to mention that we haven’t talked about?’ to give the interviewees another 
opportunity to comment on potentially overlooked but personally relevant issues.  
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After the interview had finished, the dictaphone was switched off and the 
Debriefing Sheet (see Appendix C) was given to the participant. If interviewees had more 
questions, we would spend some time talking off record about them. If any potentially 
interesting information was shared during these unrecorded conversations, I asked for 
permission to switch on the dictaphone and to record again.  
The interview questions were developed based on the literature on contentious 
behaviour and protest in Russia. They were primarily designed to elicit talk about the 
subjective experiences and understandings of protest. The interview schedule covered five 
main topics. First, I asked about respondents’ attitudes to politics and the political situation 
in Russia, as the literature seems to suggest that interest in politics is one of the 
prerequisites of becoming involved in anti-governmental protests. Second, I enquired 
about participants’ position vis-à-vis ‘the opposition’, this being the standard label used 
to describe anti-government protesters in Russia. Third, I asked questions related to the 
subjective importance and motives for protesting, based on my research interest in the 
topic of mobilisation. Fourth, interviewees were asked whether protesting was important 
to them as Russians, which was intended to tap into national identity and its potential 
importance for protest behaviour (see Reicher & Hopkins, 2001a). Finally, there was a set 
of questions related to other people’s attitudes to respondents’ contentious behaviour, 
based on the suggestion made by Simon and Klandermans (2001) that protesters would 
try to mobilise public support for protest. The interview schedule contained a separate 
question asking respondents to share their protest experiences (‘Can you tell me about 
your protest experience?’ and ‘What have you done?’) but it was rarely asked since the 
majority of participants talked about their experiences spontaneously or in response to 
other questions. Depending on the answer given to the question about one’s relation to the 
opposition (i.e. ‘part of the opposition’, ‘supporter of the opposition’ and so on), slightly 
different questions followed. Full details of the interview schedule are given in Appendix 
D.  
The initial interview schedule was slightly amended after the first few interviews, 
as one open-ended question continuously resulted in confusion, and some other more 
‘closed’ questions produced only brief answers. An example of the former was interview 
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question number 7, ‘Is what you are doing important for you as Russian?’ A number of 
participants pointed out that they did not understand it and that it was ‘too abstract’. I 
made that question more specific by asking participants whether their protest was in any 
way connected to their feelings of citizenship, such as responsibility or love for Russia, 
and whether they thought protest was a matter of national, and not simply personal, 
importance. An example of the latter was the first question on the interview schedule, 
‘Have you ever been involved in a political party or a social movement?’ This question 
overwhelmingly resulted in brief negative answers (‘no’, ‘no, never’, etc.). I hence made 
the decision to replace that question with ‘Please tell me a bit about yourself, in particular 
about your views on the political situation in Russia and how they have changed?’ 
Although somewhat cumbersome, this question successfully provided the needed impetus 
to start the interview, by facilitating extended answers. 
For Skype interviews, the process was similar. The information Sheet and Consent 
Form were sent to participants via Skype, and oral consent was obtained, granting 
permission to put the participant name on the printed version of the Consent Form. After 
that, I would make a voice call, and the interview would begin. I chose not to use a webcam, 
in order to minimise the potential connection issues that might arise when too much data 
is being uploaded. No participant asked to turn it on, either due to the similar connection 
issue or due to being more comfortable speaking without video. After the interview had 
finished, I would thank my participant and electronically send over a copy of the 
Debriefing Sheet. As with in-person interviews, we usually talked for a short time after 
the recording equipment was switched off. In the end, participants were thanked and 




My study was designed in accordance with the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) and the American Psychological Association (APA) codes of conduct. Ethical 
approval for the study was granted by the University of Edinburgh Psychology Ethics 
Committee in June 2013. In compliance with the ethics guidelines, all participants were 
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provided with an Information Sheet and a Consent Form before the start of the interview. 
Both forms were designed in English and translated into Russian by me. The Information 
Sheet included a general description of my study, an outline of the procedure aimed to 
familiarise respondents with the process of the interview and the subsequent data 
treatment, and the section on participants rights. An emphasis was made on the 
preservation of confidentiality and anonymity; for example, it was stated that no names 
would appear in the thesis or publications, and the only personal detail used would be 
gender, age and the city in which interview was taken. The Consent Form asked 
participants to write their first name and provide a signature, as a sign of their voluntary 
participation in the interview. In addition, I told participants that they should feel free not 
to answer questions and that they could withdraw from the study or ask to switch the 
recorder off at any point without the need to explain themselves. 
All participants were given both my and my supervisor’s e-mails, and were invited 
to contact me in case they had any issues with their involvement in the study or if they 
wished to withdraw their interview. After the interview, participants were thanked orally 
and given the Debriefing Sheet, in which they were once again thanked in writing for 
taking part in the study, and encouraged to contact me if they wished to know more about 
the study or its findings.     
Due to the sensitive nature of the topic of protest activism, especially given its 
perception as a ‘deviant’ activity, promoted by the semi-authoritarian Russian regime 
(Robertson, 2011), additional precautions needed to be taken. First, this minimised the 
possibility of being overheard. Where possible, I conducted interviews in private 
conference rooms at the Moscow and St Petersburg State libraries. In Volgograd, a 
number of interviews were recorded at the State Volgograd University interview room. In 
certain cases, when it was specifically requested by the participants and the safety of the 
researcher was carefully considered, the interviews took place in the privacy of 
participants’ homes. When public spaces like parks and cafes were used, I made sure that 
the interviewee and I sat at a distance from other people. Second, no additional 
information that might have disclosed participants’ identities (such as surname) was 
specifically asked for, although in certain cases participants insisted on providing it; then, 
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it was noted but still not included in the thesis. Hence necessary precautions were made 
to make the participant feel secure and comfortable and encourage them to talk freely.      
 
3. Data analysis 
 
It has been argued that most types of discourse analysis proceed through a constant 
interaction between a researcher and a text, with no standardised procedures for eliciting 
findings (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Willig, 2013). In advising scholars on how to do the 
actual analysis, Potter and Wetherell (1987, p. 168) gave only one ‘basic’ suggestion: 
‘analysis involves a lot of careful reading and rereading’. Importantly, they emphasised 
that ‘reading’ meant being concerned with what was actually said, rather than with what 
a person seemed to mean, or what she seemed to think. Similarly, Edwards and Potter 
(2000) suggested that accurate and detailed analysis of the actual data is the central 
analytic task for discursive psychologists. The need to stay closely engaged with the data 
meant that a big part of preliminary data analysis was devoted to creating accurate 
transcripts from the digital recordings. 
I started by repeatedly listening to the recordings of the interviews in the Russian 
language, paying attention both to the content of what was said and to paralinguistic 
aspects of talk, such as intonation, pauses and laughter. I used the Audacity programme 
(sound editing software) to store and play the files. A second step of the analysis was 
creating generic transcripts and identifying provisional features of analytic interest in the 
data. While some generic transcripts were created by me, others were done by a 
professional Russian transcriber in order to speed up the process of transcription. These 
transcripts were checked by me and refined where needed. Initial simplified version 
transcripts included all the spoken words of the interviewee and the interviewer (with 
some of the interviewer’s reactions, such as ‘mmhm’, being omitted) and some notable 
paralinguistic details, such as long pauses (not timed), emphasised words and prolonged 
laughter. Kent and Potter (2014, p. 306) pointed out that such ‘first-pass’ transcripts are 
useful in that they allow researchers to ‘sift through’ many hours of recordings and ‘get 
an overall feel’ of the data. In line with this, I read and re-read basic transcripts continually 
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in order to identify potential instances of interest and patterns, and grouped these together 
into broad collections of various conversational phenomena (essentially, this was the 
process of ‘coding’, but see Potter, 2004, on the issues with using this term). Collections 
were built around the actions that interviewees seemed to perform, such as, for example, 
‘responding to enquiries about political interest’, ‘constructing reasons for active protest 
involvement’ and ‘negotiating protest identities’. Although my main analytic focus in 
producing collections was on action orientation of talk, content was also important for 
weaving together a coherent analytic story, as certain actions tended to be related to certain 
topics identified in interview questions: for example, discursive action of building up 
accountability often occurred when interviewees were discussing why other people do not 
protest.  
The central part of the analysis was comprised of a more detailed examination of 
the various data collections. Selection of specific extracts was guided both by my 
theoretical interests stemming from the literature (focus on mobilisation, for example) and 
by empirical observations originating from reading and re-reading individual interviews. 
As an example of the latter, I observed that when the interviewees were asked about their 
interest in politics, they repeatedly denied having prior interest and provided various 
accounts of how they became interested. That seemed an interesting topic to explore, 
especially given that many social psychological models theorise that being a protester 
presupposes having political interest. In effect, analysis of such accounts formed the basis 
of the first empirical chapter.  
Since the more detailed analysis required specific attention to the more subtle 
aspects of interaction, I used the guidelines developed by Jefferson (2004b) to transform 
the selected basic transcripts into standard CA transcripts. The upgraded transcripts 
showed instances of overlap, intonation and emphasis, the speed of delivery and the 
duration of pauses (see Appendix E for the explanation of transcription symbols used). 
These were then translated into English by me. While I tried to keep the translation as 
literal as possible, certain modifications were sometimes needed, mostly concerning word 
order and idiomatic expressions. Because of the obvious ‘distance’ between Russian and 
English spelling it was impossible to accurately represent prolongation of sounds, so it 
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was omitted in the majority of translated transcripts. In section five below I discuss 
methodological issues raised by translation in more detail.   
When analysing the data, I usually went back and forth between the Russian and 
English versions of my CA transcripts. The analysis was mostly done on the Russian 
version, but since the write-up had to be done in English I found it helpful to keep both 
versions present at the same time. To save space, it was decided to include only the 
translated version of the extracts in the thesis; however, where needed I provided original 
Russian expressions and gave specific explanations.   
Following previous examples of DP research, my own analysis was guided by a 
number of principles, such as consideration of context, concern with fine details of talk 
and analytic attention to the variability of discursive devices (Edwards & Potter, 2000; 
Potter, 2004; Willig, 2013).  
First, it has been widely argued that DP analysis is underpinned by interest in talk 
as situated activity, that is, as taking part within certain discursive contexts (Edwards & 
Potter, 2000). The importance of context was nicely summarised by Potter (1996, p. 43), 
when he wrote that ‘the study of what an utterance means will not reach a satisfactory 
conclusion without some understanding of the occasion on which the utterance is used’. 
Taking account of context presupposes paying attention both to the ‘general’ context of 
interaction, the social and cultural situations it takes place in (for example, a situation of 
a research interview with a female protester in Russia) and to the ‘sequential’ context 
which is established by the participants through turn-taking in the course of an interaction 
(Sidnell, 2010). Hence, I maintained attention to the specifics of the situation in which, 
and for which, a given account is produced. In practical terms, I did it by analysing 
stretches of talk rather than isolated utterances, in order to keep track of sequential context; 
and by continually asking myself questions such as ‘what do participants treat as context 
here?’ (Edwards, 1997) and ‘how do I know that wider social contexts are relevant to the 
participants themselves? Do they display it in the data?’ (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; 
Schegloff, 2007). In so doing, I adhered to the principle of ‘ethnomethodological 
indifference’ (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970), an idea that any a priori assumption about the 
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relevance of contextual variables or theoretical concepts is of little use to the analysis 
unless it is oriented to by the participants in talk.  
Second, the analytic style of DP, being informed by the preciseness of 
conversation analysis, is characterised by fine-grained explication of talk. In this regard, 
Potter (2004, p. 616) argued that ‘attending to the specifics of what is said and how it is 
said is essential for producing high-quality analysis’. The analysts, therefore, need to 
inspect closely the detail of interaction, embracing the idea that any subtle detail can 
potentially be important for assisting the production of a concrete version of events 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). For my own analysis, this meant commitment to ‘circular’ 
close readings of the interviews and focusing in equal proportions on the gist of what was 
said and on the detailed features of how it was said, including hesitations, repairs, specific 
lexical choices and so on.  
Third, I made use of previous findings regarding the richness of discursive devices 
that can be used by participants to present their accounts as factual and trustworthy. 
Among these are vivid descriptions, lists, extreme case formulations, category 
entitlements, rhetorical formats, systemic vagueness and so on (Edwards & Potter, 2000). 
I will provide more explanations of these devices below, as we encounter them in 
empirical chapters. Here, it is important to notice that the analysis went beyond mere 
‘spotting’ of interesting devices, which was argued to be insufficient for a quality analysis 
(Antaki, Billig, Edwards & Potter, 2003); rather, I attempted to explore how various 
discursive devices assisted the accomplishment of specific interactional business at hand.  
Overall, while the data analysis relied inevitably on my own understanding of what 
was going on in the data, that understanding in turn relied on taking into account the 
context, variability and subtleties of construction and participants’ own orientations. I 
developed my analyses in close contact with the data, constantly striving to validate my 
analytic claims with detailed evidence. An additional validating ‘tool’ for my analytic 
work was keeping a dialogue with like-minded colleagues, in particular at the data 
sessions held by the SEDIT (Scottish Ethnomethodology, Discourse, Interactions and 




4. Methodological issues 
 
Discursive psychology and interview talk 
 
The data I am investigating in my doctoral research are accounts of personal 
protest involvement produced in response to interview questions. While qualitative 
interviewing has long been an established method in social psychological research and a 
method of choice for many discourse-oriented scholars (McKinlay & McVittie, 2008; 
Potter & Hepburn, 2012; Willig, 2013), it has been pointed out that discursive 
psychologists have a certain dislike for it. In particular, tracing developments within DP, 
Hepburn and Wiggins (2005) suggested that the recent move towards the study of 
naturalistic interaction in institutional settings was an attempt to overcome numerous 
‘endemic’ problems of interview-led research. Wiggins and Potter (2008, p. 75) were 
more radical in arguing that DP has ‘almost completely abandon[ed]’ open-ended research 
interviews as data-generating technique. Furthermore, Kent and Potter (2014, p. 305) 
wrote that ‘discursive psychologists prefer to analyse ‘naturalistic’ rather than ‘got-up’ 
materials’. They explained that such preference is grounded in DP’s objective on studying 
‘people living their lives […] instead of answering researcher’s questions’ (p. 305). The 
first methodological issue thus relates to the appropriateness of using interviews as the 
method of data collection in a discursive psychological study.   
Reluctance to use interview materials among DP scholars has been explained by 
invoking the close association between DP and conversation analysis, the approach that 
privileges naturally occurring interactions over pre-arranged and specifically produced 
ones (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). Subsequently, DP scholars too have expressed a certain 
preference for the data that were not facilitated by a researcher (Hepburn & Potter, 2007; 
Lester, 2014). Naturally occurring data are seen as preferable for several reasons. 
Highlighting the issues that interview materials potentially create for discursive 
psychological research, Potter and Hepburn (2005, p. 281) named five ‘contingent’ and 
four ‘necessary’ problems. With regard to the former, the authors mentioned not paying 
sufficient attention to the role of the interviewer, neglecting interactionally hearable 
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features (such as laugher, pauses and latches) in a transcript, making global observations 
detached from the data, omitting the details of the interview set-up and failing to consider 
interviews as interactions. As for the ‘necessary’ problems, Potter and Hepburn identified 
‘flooding’ the analysis with a social science agenda and categories, overlooking the 
significance and variability of footing (i.e. which position(s) the interviewee and 
interviewer are speaking from), not attending to the issue of interactional stakes and 
interests and treating cognitive talk as referring to inner psychological phenomena while 
overlooking its practical role. While ‘contingent’ issues can be more or less 
straightforwardly addressed by providing enough contextual information, transcribing 
interviews in detail and paying attention to the interactive production of the data while 
making analytic observations, ‘necessary’ issues are more complex in the way that they 
require special analytic awareness. Because of these difficulties, the authors proposed that 
interviews are ‘overused’ and more qualitative scholars should consider the use of 
naturalistic recordings.     
Nonetheless, I consider my preference for the interview method justifiable for a 
number of reasons. First, while this method might not be currently the method of choice 
for discursive psychology, as long as the interview is recognised as conversation in its 
own right, there seems to be no absolute objection to using it. As was acknowledged by 
Potter and Hepburn (2012), interview analysis, while being a highly challenging 
undertaking, provides unique opportunities for qualitative researchers. In particular, it 
allows for a more subtle understanding of how things are constructed in talk, and of the 
effect interpersonal factors and agendas might have on such constructions. Understanding 
the true potential of the interview method can also help to open up new methodological 
issues, for example how researchers ‘shape’ data and analyses. Similarly, Potter (2012b) 
pointed out that as long as the analyst exercises careful reflexive attention to the interview 
as a practice, and takes into account the profound role interviewers’ questions and 
reactions play in generating interviewee’s responses, open-ended interviews offer an 
effective means to studying psychological phenomena as participants’ concerns. In my 
study, I treat interviews as instances of social interaction, where the speakers — the 
interviewee and the interviewer — contribute to the production of certain versions of 
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reality (Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006). Embracing suggestions made by Rapley (2001), 
I recognise the interactional and social nature of the interview process and present the data 
so that it reflects the work done by both the interviewee and the interviewer.  
Second, a number of scholars have argued that issues of stake and interest, footing, 
‘flooding’ and so on are not limited to the interview context and are indeed present in all 
interactional settings; therefore, not using interviews does not reduce the burden of the 
analysis (Smith, Hollway & Mishler, 2005). Along similar lines, Speer (2002a) has 
criticised the distinction between natural and non-natural types of data as inherently 
problematic and unhelpful. She suggested that some researchers’ desire to avoid 
complications and biases associated with ‘contrived’ data indicates certain theoretical 
inconsistencies. Specifically, she argued convincingly that when discursive scholars insist 
that researcher-led methods are biased in some way, they treat the method as a resource 
to get to the data. Such an ontological separation between the method and the data seems 
to clash with the relativistic epistemological stance advocated by those scholars: it implies 
that the latter is the consequence of the former. In other words, it is theorised that the 
character of the resulting data is somehow pre-determined by the context of interview. 
However, it has been stated by both CA and DP researchers that it should not be decided 
in advance that a certain context would definitely have a certain impact; rather, what 
matters should be explored by studying participants’ orientations and practices (Atkinson 
& Heritage, 1984; Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 2000). Such inconsistency, 
according to Speer, illustrates the futility of any attempt to obtain pure, unbiased data.  
A related further point was made by Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995, p. 73), who 
argued that in order to agree with the claim that the interview situation is somehow 
obstructing the natural flow of conversation, ‘the relevance of talk as ‘interview talk’ (or 
any other kind of categorisation of the interaction) should be manifest in the data’. Speer 
& Hutchby (2003) offered examples of such circumstances, when interview settings were 
explicitly oriented to by the participants. If, on the other hand, participants make no 
comments about the format of the talk, recording devices, etc., then questions can be raised 
regarding the criticism of the interview as a ‘biased’ method. Indeed, in the original 
manifesto of DP, Edwards and Potter (2000, p. 28) argued that ‘discourse analysis deals 
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with naturally occurring talk and text, including interview transcripts understood in this 
way’ (my emphasis). So as long as participants seem to take the interview as just another 
type of conversation, why should we as analysts treat it differently? Thus in my study, 
unless the participants specifically pointed to the format of the talk as ‘interview’ (in 
which case it would be noted and discussed), I understand interviews as informal 
conversations. 
Finally, the choice of data collection is understandably guided by practical 
considerations. The interview method has been described as having a number of 
advantages (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). It allows the researcher to focus on a relatively 
standard range of related topics and explore them in detail. At the same time, interviews 
provide the opportunity for participants to talk at length about their own concerns and 
understandings. Also, as a directional method of enquiry, the interview technique permits 
the collection of a large corpus of data in the situation of limited time and money, which 
is especially important in the context of PhD research. In addition, there are situations 
when the use of interviews is necessary because it is difficult or impossible to obtain more 
‘naturalistic’ data (Silverman, 2004). In case of my study, it is reasonable to assume that 
spontaneous ‘mundane’ discussions of such a sensitive topic as active protest participation 
would be rare, and hence difficult to gain access to. Practically, then, interviews appear to 
be the most feasible method of data collection.  
There are hence three main arguments for the appropriateness of using 
conversational qualitative interviews to collect data for my study. First, I treat the 
interview situation as a ‘normal’ interaction (unless a respondent positions it otherwise), 
and pay attention to the active role of both interactants involved in it. Second, the interview 
is not ontologically dissimilar to ‘natural’ data, and does not pose specific insuperable 
problems. Relating back to the words of Kent and Potter (2014) cited above, interviews 
might as well be seen as a part of people living their lives. Third, using the interview is 
practical, especially in the context of the topic on which more publicly available 
discussions are unlikely to exist. Thus, the interview is a useful method of exposing 
protesters’ sense-making practices, and is capable of providing insights into the 
interactional and interpersonal issues people manage in their discourses. That being said, 
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I acknowledge that choosing the method of interview places certain limitations on my 
research (i.e. generalisability of findings); I will address these in Chapter 7. 
 
Dilemmas of translation 
 
An additional issue my study raises relates to translation. All the interviews were 
conducted in Russian and then translated into English for the purpose of research. 
Inevitably, the process of translation included choices about what words and expressions 
to use, and how best to express the original meanings communicated by the participants. 
Moreover, as Temple (1997) has pointed out, there are important considerations about 
historically specific concepts and certain idiomatic expressions and metaphors. She gave 
the example of a concept ‘being in a family’ in Polish, which is not identical to its English 
translation due to the history of expression in Poland. Nonetheless, there are practical 
limits as to how far researchers can engage with linguistic debates, especially if the aim 
of their work does not concern the issue of interpretation directly (Venuti, 1992). In my 
case, the limits were both temporal (I could not afford time and space to provide detailed 
information on word order, semantics, grammar differences and so on) and conceptual 
(due to the sensitive nature of the data, I did not wish to share the original recordings with 
external translators). I thus made the decision not to ask for professional translation 
services. Being a native Russian speaker who is fluent in English, I did all translations 
myself. I do not argue that my being the translator achieved a somewhat more ‘truthful’ 
and valid version of interpretation. Indeed, a number of researchers have pointed out that 
the ‘researcher as translator’ model might be problematic due to the socio-cultural 
positioning of the researcher and the associated insider/outsider issues (Gawlewicz, 2016; 
Wong & Poon, 2010). Recognising these limitations, I would nonetheless suggest that 
being both researcher and translator ‘in one’ was beneficial for the analysis, as it allowed 
me to pay close attention to the specificities of cultural meaning and capture fine details 
of talk which is paramount for micro-level discursive research (Temple & Young, 2004). 
Issues that the interpretation process poses for qualitative researchers have been 
discussed by others, often in terms of accuracy and correctness of translation. For instance, 
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Nurjannah, Mills, Park and Usher (2014) have offered practical advice on these matters 
in translation. In particular, they suggested that discussing the versions of translation 
among the research team or colleagues is highly beneficial for the validity of the analysis. 
Likewise, close constant attention to both the original and the translated versions during 
the analysis was positioned as essential. Furthermore, Nikander (2008) described a 
number of strategies to deal with the issues of presentation. While she suggested that more 
inclusive formats, such as the three-line format that includes the detailed information on 
original morphemes and grammatical workings is preferable, she also recognised that that 
requires considerable space and linguistic expertise, and might be more appropriate for 
the linguistically-oriented versions of conversation analysis rather than for other varieties 
of discursive research.  
In my thesis, I partially followed the above recommendations. When in doubt 
regarding the translation, I have discussed the issues with my second supervisor, a British 
scholar who is proficient in Russian. On several occasions, I have also sought advice from 
my Russian colleagues, without disclosing the particulars of my research for ethical 
reasons. I analysed the Russian and English transcripts simultaneously to increase the 
sensitivity and validity of the analysis. I was also more careful with making analytic claim 
based on English translation: I avoided relying too much on a single utterance, instead 
taking into account a combination of meaning, sequential placement and various 
discursive features. I did not use specific proofing procedures, such as back translation, 
because my concern was with the general meaning of people’s talk rather than with the 
accuracy of translation or closeness of lexical fit (Nurjannah et al., 2014; Su & Parham, 
2002). However, where it was essential, I made a note explaining specific subtleties of 
meaning or grammar. In terms of presentation, I decided to include only the English 
versions for the sake of space and clarity of the analysis. Although I work with micro-
level of discourse, my research is not linguistically oriented per se; nor do I possess the 
necessary linguistic expertise, being a social psychologist by training. Thus, I believe that 







My study therefore draws on the perspective of social constructionism and takes 
an analytic approach of discursive social psychology (Edwards & Potter, 2000). DP places 
an emphasis on how meanings are constructed in social interactions rather than on the 
creation of particular psychological models. Being highly empirical and grounded in the 
data, DP offers useful analytic tools for examining interactional negotiation and 
management of various interpersonal issues that might appear central to protest. The data 
consists of interactional semi-structured interviews conducted with protest participants 
across different locations in Russia. The analysis of the data relies on detailed interview 
transcripts; it is guided by the focus on the social functions of talk. The analytic process 
is informed by a number of considerations, such as the importance of context, concern 
with fine details of talk and analytic attention to the variability of discursive devices.  
In the next chapter, I offer first empirical analysis of the data: I use DP approach 
to explore the ways in which my respondents manage ‘being politically interested’, after 






















Chapter 3. ‘I am now interested’: how protesters account for being 
interested in politics 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore how people talk about their interest in politics 
and the political situation in Russia. In line with the call for a different methodological 
lens on protest discussed in the previous two chapters, my analyses here are informed by 
an acknowledgement that people can describe things in virtually limitless ways, and that 
such descriptions are interactional resources for sense-making (Edwards, 1997; Edwards 
& Potter, 2000). Accepting that accounts and descriptions do pragmatic work allows us to 
‘bracket off’ the questions of whether verbal accounts are evidence of certain mental states 
and individual cognitive processes (Potter & Edwards, 2013), and focus instead on fine-
grained features of how exactly people carry out such pragmatic work, and to what end 
they put it. In particular, this chapter examines some features of how accounts of becoming 
interested in politics are organised by protesters in interview talk. 
It can be argued that for ordinary people in Russia, admitting political interest 
might be more problematic than it initially appears. Greene (2012) argues that a decade of 
political stability and economic development, spanning from 2000 to 2010, was 
characterised by the decline of political awareness among the general public. Moreover, 
the tightening of governmental control over civil society and the media in response to the 
mass protests of 2011-2013 resulted in the narrowing of political opportunities, an 
increase of threats to the politically active and the appearance of discourses that portrayed 
political curiosity as deviant (Clément, 2013). Under such circumstances, it is likely that 
protesters face challenges not only in justifying their actions, but also in providing 
legitimate reasons as to why they became interested in the domain of the political in the 
first place. Following that, political interest is a topic worth examining. 
Another reason why it might be fruitful to explore how protesters talk about 
becoming interested in politics stems from the psychological theory of collective 
movement participation (Klandermans, 1997). Numerous scholars of social protest have 
observed that before actual protest involvement an individual should recognise that, first, 
the state of affairs is in some way unsatisfactory and, second, develop a certain worldview 
104 
 
that would make protesting into acceptable behaviour (Smith, Thomas & McGarty, 2014; 
Tilly & Tarrow, 2007; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Klandermans (1997) 
suggests that people who develop such a worldview become a part of ‘mobilisation 
potential’. This is a ‘reservoir’ of people who share a particular set of values and interests, 
who are sympathetic to given social movement goals, and who have better chances to be 
mobilised to take part in a protest (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987, p. 519). A similar idea 
has been proposed by McCarthy and Zald (1977) who have offered the notion of 
‘conscience adherents’. They propose that with respect to social movements, people in 
society may be categorised into non-adherents (impartial public), adherents (interested 
and sympathetic towards a social movement) and constituents (direct members of the 
movement). A social movement develops when people progress from non-adherents to 
adherents and, finally, to the constituents; an important idea here is that, in order to do 
that, people have to undergo certain changes in their beliefs and interests. What is evident 
from both of these models, then, is that the first vital step of becoming a protester has to 
do with acquiring an interest; however, little empirical attention has been paid to how 
protesters themselves experience that, and how they describe it in talk. 
With regard to the Russian context, some research has pointed to the difficulties 
in developing such ‘protester-like’ attitudes. For example, Clément et al. (2010) argue that 
the road from a layperson (obivatel) to an activist (aktivist) lies in overcoming conformist 
consciousness. They suggest that it is a difficult process, since ‘conformist consciousness 
and behaviour are inherently rational and pragmatic’ (p. 40). Clément et al. explain that 
in the context where it is easier and safer to compromise rather than protest, such as in 
Russia, people are not motivated to become interested in the political state of affairs in the 
country, nor do they spend time finding and joining opposition groups. This echoes the 
words of Greene (2011), who has called Russian society ‘aggressively immobile’. 
According to Greene, ‘immobile’ here means that lay Russian people are predominantly 
apolitical and passive; ‘aggressive’ means that such passivity is in fact an active 
behavioural strategy that people adhere to in an attempt to preserve political and social 
reality as it is. As such, the safest and most logical focus of interest is on one’s immediate 
surroundings of work and private life, away from the broader societal and political issues. 
105 
 
Greene claims that as a result, the values of political interest and awareness have been 
undermined in Russia, and being apolitical has become the key to the preservation of 
current political status quo. These arguments offer support to the idea that becoming 
interested in politics is not a straightforward accomplishment and that people who do 
become interested might have to account for it in some way. Yet again, little empirical 
research has focused on how people make sense of such experiences, through telling their 
own stories of how (and if at all) they formed political consciousness in the first place. 
This chapter intends to fulfil this gap and explore such stories. But rather than taking them 
as accounts of what ‘really’ happened — or of how the first step in the models I mentioned 
above ‘really’ occurs — I will analyse them as discursive constructions that are designed 




The following analysis relies on the data from the two data collections built around 
the topic of political interest. First, a set of extracts taken from the beginning of the 
interviews, where respondents answer a question that invites them to describe their 
political attitudes (a variation of ‘please tell me a bit about yourself: have you been 
interested in the socio-political situation in Russia and have your views changed’). Second, 
a collection of extracts in which respondents talk about their political attitudes without 
being directly prompted by the interviewer; these also usually come from the beginning 
of the interviews, but those that started with a different question (‘have you ever been 
involved in a political party or a social movement?’). Initial analysis revealed that 
discussions of political interest often revolve around the theme of attitudinal changes, with 
people specifying that they were not interested in the past and giving accounts of what 
had caused them to become interested. This is perhaps not surprising given that a part of 
the above-mentioned interview question — ‘have your views changed’ — explicitly 
orients to it. However, it is how exactly such ‘change’ sequences are organised that is of 
interest here. In addition, there is also some evidence that the interviewees address the 
topic of change in their political attitudes even if the question did not specifically solicit 
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it. The resulting analysis contains a mix of interviewer-driven and more spontaneous 
accounts of change; the presence of the latter is important as it suggests that accounting 
for becoming political is a part of participants’ own conversational agenda, rather than 
simply a result of the interviewer asking questions.  
To identify the concrete fragments for this chapter, I read through and listened to 
the collections several times, selected a number of patterned fragments, and translated and 
transcribed them in detail in accordance with CA conventions. Then I separated the 
extracts into the three groups, according to the particular ‘route’ to becoming interested in 
politics that the respondents recurrently describe: other-related, praxis-related and 
knowledge-related paths. The chapter is structured in line with these three constructions. 
 
1. ‘Thanks to my boyfriend’: portraying political interest as fostered 
by others 
 
I would like to start by examining some features of how the interviewees address 
the topic of political interest. As I mentioned in the introduction, initial analysis has 
revealed that speakers tend to discuss this topic with respect to a change in their interests 
and provide various explanations for such a change. One explanation that is repeatedly 
given is the influence of another person. For example, in the following extract the 
respondent implies that he became interested in politics because of the girl he loved. The 
account is produced in response to the question about whether P1 had been a member of 
a political party or taken part in a social movement. 
 














everything started when the girl who I loved very much 
aha 
got involved with politics (0.5) it was I guess the year 2005 
aha  
and she (2.2) well spent- just a lot- quite a lot of time at (0.2) the ‘Defence’ movement  







((some lines omitted – he discusses who they were exactly)) 
so um (.) and from that time I started to become interested in politics 
 
The first observation I would like to make is that while the interviewer does not 
ask about P1’s political interest explicitly, the speaker brings this topic up. Specifically, 
he implies that there has been an attitudinal change, from him being (presumably) not 
interested to becoming interested in politics. The idea of change is indirectly expressed in 
the first line, where P1 orients to a turning point (‘everything started when’); the object of 
change is made more explicit when he says ‘from that time I started to become interested 
in politics’ (line 7). These formulations make clear that P1 was not interested in politics 
initially, and that he became interested only after a certain point. 
Second, the change is constituted through a description of what caused it. Here, 
P1 explains that the change is related to another person’s interests and activities (‘the girl 
who I loved very much […] got involved with politics … [she] spent- just a lot- quite a 
lot of time at (0.2) the ‘Defence’ movement headquarters’, lines 1, 3, 5, 6) and that it 
happened at a specific point in time (‘it was I guess the year 2005’, line 3). These 
descriptions have the following inferential consequences: they indicate that political 
interest is an explainable matter (that is, P1 has a clear idea of when and why he came to 
be interested in politics); they imply that a change of attitude happened for a reason and 
did not just occur by itself; and finally, they suggest that P1 acquired political interest 
because he was influenced by another person. Formulating interest as the result of external 
influence plays down a potential assumption that P1 intended to become politically 
interested; this construction functions to diminish personal agency. 
The speaker minimises his personal involvement in other ways too. Recall how he 
starts his account, saying ‘everything started when’ (line 1). Two points are important here. 
First, ‘everything’ is a rather oblique reference to the phenomenon in question; note that 
it is not specified as ‘interest in politics’ until the end of the account (line 7). Second, the 
formulation does not portray any sense of human agency: it is designed to portray 
something happening as if by itself, regardless of P1. A similar design has been observed 
by Wooffitt (1992). He has demonstrated that people who claim to experience paranormal 
phenomena often avoid explicitly naming such phenomena and describe experiences as 
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something that happened to them. Wooffitt suggests that in so doing, speakers indicate 
that they did not have any prior knowledge of and interest in the phenomenon, and portray 
themselves as passive witnesses to ‘out-there’ events; in turn, this diminishes personal 
agency and establishes the objectivity of their experiences (for a concise summary, see 
Avery & Antaki, 1997). Coming back to extract 1, P1’s formulation can therefore be taken 
to suggest that he had no prior stake in becoming interested in politics, and that his interest 
is a ‘by-product’ of spending time with his politically-active girlfriend. 
So, by closely examining P1’s account we can identify two features of talking 
about political interest. First, political interest is talked about in relative terms, in that it is 
shown to be absent in the past and present in the future. Second, the change in attitude is 
explained through reference to another person, which implies that political interest was 
initiated externally. The design of the account ensures that the hearer can interpret P1’s 
interest as unintentional. It is also worth noticing that the interviewee brings up the topic 
of political interest even though the interviewer does not directly ask about it.  
The following extract demonstrates what happens when the interviewer explicitly 
addresses the topic of political interest, by asking whether the interviewee has been 
interested in the socio-political situation in Russia and how his views have changed3. 
There, the interviewee talks about being drawn into what he calls a ‘leftist get-together’ 
(levaya tusovka) because of his friend.  
 








I wasn’t interested (0.2) I didn’t do (.) anything but basically um (0.2) I was um  
like a rather unconventional person I mean like subcultures and stuff like that (0.8)  
((some lines omitted – he talks about types of recruiting, specifically via various networks)) 
                         
3 Interestingly, I have noticed that after the first ten interviews the first interview question changes 
from ‘can you tell me a bit about yourself, that is, have you ever been involved in a political party or a 
social movement’ to ‘can you tell me a bit about yourself, that is, have you been interested in a socio-
political situation in Russia and have your views changed’ (interview 6 is an exception, as there I ask 
why the interviewee started to become interested in politics). There are no field notes to support this, 
but it is possible that I have altered the first question because people were telling me about their political 















it’s just like I (.) did an art exhibition with one (.) girl who is now like um (.) my very close friend  
(0.2) and um (.) she was somehow connected to (.) the leftist get-together (.) I mean she um (0.8) 
was not just somehow connected she was its activist 
aha  
and so we started to socialise (.) gradually I became a part of the get-together and then like 
bam (.) um (0.8) after some time I realised that I’m like already um (.) like (.) an activist 
 
In this extract, the respondent tells a story of how he came to be interested in 
politics. What is immediately noticeable is that the story has similar features to that in 
extract 1: the interviewee orients to a change in political interest from past to present and 
makes a reference to a politically-interested other. However, P39’s account is somewhat 
more detailed: for example, he explicitly states that he was not interested in the past (‘I 
wasn’t interested (0.2) I didn’t do (.) anything’, line 1) and asserts a clearly contrasting 
attitude in the present. The latter is done by claiming membership in the ‘activist’ category, 
which implies being interested in politics (‘I realised that I’m like already um (.) like (.) 
an activist’, line 8). Because of these fine details and for the purpose of analysis, we can 
look at P39’s account as having three ‘sections’4: 1) referencing initial lack of interest; 2) 
describing the events that led to a change; 3) orienting to the presence of interest.  
I am specifically interested in the second (lines 3-7) and third ‘sections’ (line 8) 
here, because they give an insight into a certain interactional concern that the speaker 
deals with while addressing the topic of political interest. In line 3, P39 starts to describe 
the events that led to the change of his interest: he was ‘just’ doing an ‘art exhibition with 
one (.) girl’. The particle ‘just’ appears to suggest that P39 did not intentionally seek 
contact with the girl; it ‘just’ so happened that they were doing an exhibition together. 
Lack of personal intent is also displayed in line 7, where the interviewee describes how 
he and the girl ‘started to socialise’ (stali obshyat’sya) and he ‘gradually […] became a 
part of the get-together’. This formulation indicates that P39’s interaction with the girl 
was social in nature; ‘obshyat’sya’ signals neutrality and the lack of specific commitment, 
thereby reinforcing the inference that P39 became a member of the activist group not on 
                         
4 I use quotation marks for the word ‘section’ to make clear that this is a purely analytic construct for 
the ease of the analysis. 
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purpose but as a result of being influenced through a continuous social contact. 
Furthermore, the repair in lines 4-5 does delicate inferential work of managing the notion 
of personal agency. When P39 characterises the girl with respect to her political interests, 
he first says ‘she was somehow connected to (.) the leftist get-together’ (line 4), but then 
repairs it by saying ‘I mean she um (0.8) was not just somehow connected, she was its 
activist’ (lines 4-5). Before the repair, the description is vague and non-specific; it is 
similar to the formulation ‘everything started’ from extract 1 in that it withholds the 
particularities. As such, it can be seen as an example of a ‘not naming’ strategy: by not 
specifying that the girl was politically active at the outset, P39 makes a hearable inference 
that he either did not know that or that it is not important to him. The term ‘get-together’ 
(tusovka) substantiates this by displaying P39’s lack of interest. In theory, any informal 
assembly of people can be described as ‘tusovka’: using it rather than, say, the name of a 
party or an organisation, P39 implies that he does not care about the specific details of the 
girl’s affiliation. To bring these observations together, it seems that in describing the 
circumstances that resulted in his becoming an activist, the speaker has a practical task of 
warding off imputations of intent.  
An additional resource for accomplishing this task is seen in the third ‘section’, 
where the interviewee suggests that the change in his interests happened without his 
conscious control. Note how being an activist is portrayed by P39 as sudden and clearly 
unanticipated recognition, by using emphatic ‘bam’: ‘and then like bam (.) um (0.8) after 
some time I realised that I’m like already um (.) like an activist’ (lines 7-8). Here, P39’s 
activist belonging is a fact of reality that he is not aware of for some time. In turn, this 
implies that it was neither a deliberate act nor an important achievement, and happened of 
its own accord. 
So, the design of P39’s account clearly indicates that acquiring an interest was not 
intentional for him: he did not seek contact with the girl, he did not know or care that she 
was an activist, and he was not aware of being influenced by the girl and of becoming an 
activist himself. These impersonal claims are similar to the ones we have seen in extract 
1, which suggests that avoiding agency attributions is a relevant feature of both 
spontaneous and solicited stories about becoming political. 
111 
 
The following two extracts demonstrate another common feature of explanations 
that draw on the influence of another person: accounting for why the speakers were not 
interested in politics in the first place. The respondents — young women from Moscow 
— are asked whether they have been interested in the political situation in Russia and 
whether their views have changed. 
 



















on the whole I (.) was mainly not that interested in politics (.) well  
because- maybe because of the age maybe because (.) well like for some reason 
it’s not really common to be interested in politics here 
mmhm 
and um everything started um (.) on the fifth of December (.) eleventh year 
right then (.) there were elections it should have happened and um (.)  
it was obviously clear that well >everything will be rigged< and my girlfriend  
told me so (0.2) there will be a protest (.) let’s go  
((describes going to the protest and says that after that she became interested)) 
 


























it’s been roughly one and a half years since I’m really (.) like (.) interested  
and by and large I read watch and follow all that  
well (.) before I always thought that basically politics is not my department   
well (.) it’s like (0.5) nothing can be changed and it’s all so dirty and stuff 
so basically it all was (.) like too difficult (0.2)  
but thanks to my boyfriend who is like active (.) he was telling me stuff  
from time to time and I was like [aha aha 
                                                    [mmhm 
(0.2) so and then (.) when (.) ah↑ it happened when there were (0.4) elections (.) like  
on the fourth of December after which- 
in 2011? 
yes yes yes everything started um then 





The speakers do not only orient to why their attitudes have changed, but also give 
reasons for not being interested in politics in the past. The speaker in extract 3 says ‘I (.) 
was mainly not that interested in politics’ (line 1) and provides two possible explanations: 
being young (‘maybe because of the age’, line 2; at the moment of the interview the 
speaker is 22 years old, so here the reference to ‘age’ is likely to be heard as ‘young age’) 
and being a member of the Russian culture (‘maybe because (.) well like for some reason 
it’s not really common to be interested in politics here’, lines 2-3). Together, these 
explanations suggest that P42 was uninterested due to objective circumstances and not for 
subjective or personal reasons. This can be seen as a normalising strategy: through 
identifying practical obstacles to becoming interested, P42 makes her past attitude 
understandable and hence more warranted.  
An additional observation here is that the second explanation is softened with 
‘well’, ‘for some reason’ and ‘not really common’ (lines 2-3), resulting in a more qualified 
version of the statement. Despite somewhat weakening the claim, these softeners make it 
less susceptible to challenges and hence interactionally more robust (Edwards, 2000). It 
is worth remembering here that the interviewer is Russian herself and is expected to have 
similar knowledge to P42 of the Russian culture and norms. Because of this, she might 
challenge a more universalising statement. P42’s qualified description reduces the 
probability of such a challenge through adding a degree of uncertainty and making the 
claim more difficult to counter.  
In extract 4, the respondent similarly addresses the topic of the previous lack of 
interest. She explains that ‘before’ she ‘always thought that basically politics is not my 
department’ (line 3). In so doing, she uses temporal adverb ‘always’, which is an example 
of what Pomerantz (1986) has called ‘extreme case formulations’ (ECFs). P36 uses a 
number of other extreme case formulations, in listing details of her past belief in line 4 
(ECFs here are ‘nothing can be changed’ and ‘it’s all so dirty’) and in the upshot in line 5 
(‘it all was too difficult’). Extreme case formulations fulfil various functions in talk; for 
example, they defend formulations against challenges, help to strengthen and therefore 
justify claims and act as devices for normalising people’s actions (Edwards, 1994, 1995; 
113 
 
Hutchby, 1992). ECFs in the target data perform similar work: they help P36 to portray 
her past attitude as longstanding (she always had it) and exhaustively negative (as all the 
politics were dirty and difficult for her). This suggests that her belief could not have been 
easily dismissed and makes her past lack of interest convincing and justified.  
So both speakers design their explanations to reveal that their previous inattention 
to politics was a normal reaction under the circumstances. That such normalising 
explanations are being offered might suggest that lack of political interest is accountable 
matter for the participants. This raises an interesting point insofar as the speakers seem to 
feel the need to give an explanation both for being politically interested now and 
politically unconcerned in the past.  
In terms of addressing the change of political interest, extracts 3 and 4 show similar 
patterns to the two earlier extracts. First, both speakers indicate that there was a change in 
their attitudes. P42 says ‘I (.) was mainly not that interested in politics’ (3:1); the past 
tense here implies that her present attitude is different. P36 achieves a similar effect when 
she says ‘it’s been roughly one and a half years since I’m really (.) like (.) interested’ (4:1), 
which presupposes that her interest has developed.  
Second, interviewees point to other people in such a way as to imply that they were 
influenced by these people. P42 makes clear that it was her girlfriend who invited her to 
join the demonstration. Note the words the girlfriend is reported saying: ‘so (0.2) there 
will be a protest (.) let’s go’ (3:8). Here, the invitation is designed to be heard as a 
statement rather than a suggestion, as if the girlfriend had already assumed that P42 would 
join her. Due to such design, the fact of influence becomes more pronounced. As the 
interviewee later claims that she became interested in politics after that particular 
demonstration, the girlfriend is seen as indirectly soliciting this interest. In a more explicit 
way, P36 points to the impact from her boyfriend (‘but thanks to my boyfriend who is like 
active’, 4:6). She also implies that their conversations played a role in fostering her interest 
(‘he was telling me stuff from time to time and I was like [aha aha]’, 4:6-7).     
The third similarity to extracts 1 and 2 is the use of formulations that diminish 
personal agency and ‘not naming’ formulations. Both P42 and P36 use the expression 
‘everything started’ (3:5; 4:12); as I discussed in the analysis of extract 1 above, such 
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generic descriptions are resources for rejecting the inference that political interest was a 
product of interviewees’ intention or planning. The speaker in extract 4 produces two other 
oblique references, in line 6 (‘he was telling me stuff’) and in line 9 (‘it happened’), which 
strengthen the impression that P36 was not specifically focused on the political side of 
information and events. She also uses an exclamation (‘ah↑’, line 9) that conveys the 
suddenness of change and reduces her personal involvement in it.  
The final observation I would like to make in this section concerns the nature of 
the people that interviewees orient to. The speaker in extract 1 describes the other as ‘the 
girl who I loved very much’ (1:1). The speaker in extract 2 shows that the girl he met 
became his close friend (‘girl who is now like um (.) my very close friend ’, 2:3). Speakers 
in extract 3 and 4 similarly refer to people who are seen as being close to them: P42 talks 
about her ‘girlfriend’ (3:7) and P36 talks about her ‘boyfriend’ (4:6). In all four extracts, 
then, the others are portrayed as significant others, people we trust and listen to (see Potter, 
1996, for a discussion how the ‘friend’ category implies feelings of loyalty and support). 
Characterising these people as significant makes it more natural for respondents to share 
similar interests with them, which normalises the fact of being influenced. As such, these 
constructions protect speakers from the potentially problematic assumption that acquired 
interest is not authentic because it is ‘forced’ by others (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995, 
discuss this issue in the context of subcultural affiliation). Hence, interviewees use the 
design of their stories as a resource to allow the hearer to conclude that becoming 
politically interested was an (unintended) consequence of their friends and loved ones 
becoming politically active.  
In the next section I will look at another way in which my respondents address the 








2. ‘I remember a key moment’: becoming political after experiencing 
a problematic situation 
 
This section looks at how protesters explain their political attitudes in the context 
of experiencing some sort of injustice. In the following two extracts, the interviewees 
point to the change of attitude and give an account of the specific circumstances that 
occasioned it. Extract 5 is an example of a more spontaneous account: it is produced in 
reply to the question about how the interviewee became involved with a citizen initiative 
movement ‘Tiger’ (Tigr - tovarishestvo iniciativnih gragdan Rossii). In extract 6, the 
account of change is solicited by the interviewer, who asks whether the interviewee’s 
attitudes to the political situation in Russia have changed. While the protagonists are 
different — the speaker in extract 5 talks about himself and the interviewee in extract 6 
tells a story about his friend — the design of the two accounts is very similar, which 
justifies looking at the extracts together. 
 


































I remember that moment the key moment (.) so back then (.) I didn’t follow like politics  
I understood well that it’s nothing good in there 
mmhm 
well (.) and then I (.) was just watching (0.5) it was at the editorial office there was a TV  
and I was watching (.) this Putin’s Federal Assembly speech and I (0.2) for the first time 
I saw how he handles the numbers, how he manipulates them (.) and how much he basic-  
um (.) well basically how much he lies (.)  
mmhm 
he lied from the podium (.) just playing with numbers, playing with some facts (0.2)  
faking his work (.) at that I just felt I understood what he was doing (.)  
mmhm 
so (0.2) and it insulted me somewhat I don’t like when I’m lied to (.) 
mmhm mmhm 
moreover when (.) I’m lied to by the man I used to trust 
mmhm  








so (.) and I understood that (.) basically (0.2) Vova should not be (0.5) £ at the helm £ 
 
Extract 3.6: Protester 19, male, Saint Petersburg.  
The interviewee is recounting how he came to understand that legal mechanisms 







































my friend (0.5) good acquaintance, basically (.) he used to be a completely apolitical man 
mmhm 
he is very like (.) very clever he has three higher education degrees  
mmhm  
well he’s a believer (.) an orthodox and he was just walking um (0.5) ((his mobile rings)) 
um and he saw them cutting um trees at the um cemetery (.) it means like the cemetery  
was a building site (.) and because he’s a believer for him all these sacred places are very  
like important right↑ 
aha 
and he (.) basically (.) on his own he started (.) um writing to various authorities (.) but 
mmhm 
basically (.) because everything was bought and paid for, he was naturally turned down  
and they started to kick him around (.) police kicked him to- to like (.) local inspectors  
and to whatnot (.) they kicked him back to police, he found some d- deputy at some (0.8)  
local level (.) of some like legislative assembly who wrote all the necessary demands (.) 
but that was the end of it all because apart from writing demands they can’t do anything  
mmhm mmhm 
and so (.) and he himself became an active pr- protester although basically 
he was like (.) completely (.) apolitical 
 
Observe that both speakers employ the same three-part format as the speakers from 
the previous section. First, they point to the initial lack of political interest (‘back then (.) 
I didn’t follow like politics’, 5:1; ‘he used to be a completely apolitical man’, 6:1). Second, 
they describe the events that led to a change. Third, they finish with formulations that 
imply the presence of interest: P2 says ‘and I understood that (.) basically (0.2) Vova 
should not be (0.5) £ at the helm £’ (5:18) and P19 says ‘and he himself became an active 
pr- protester’ (6:18). P2’s formulation makes clear that he has acquired a specific political 
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stance against Putin and humorously suggests a certain familiarity with the world of 
politics, through using the short form of Putin’s name, ‘Vova’. P19’s formulation implies 
that his acquaintance became an activist, a status that presupposes having a degree of 
political interest. In addition, the speaker in extract 5 accounts for not being concerned 
with politics in the past. Similar to the interviewee from extract 4, he uses extreme case 
formulation ‘nothing’ to strengthen his claim that he was not interested because he thought 
that politics were absolutely worthless (‘I understood well that it’s nothing good in there’, 
line 2). Given such an attitude, his lack of concern is hearable as legitimate.   
While the general format of the accounts, both here and in section one, is similar, 
the events that led to a change are described in a notably different way. Here, respondents 
explain the change of perspective by recalling specific negative experiences they had. P2 
invokes a memory of seeing Vladimir Putin on TV and realising his lies. He orients to the 
importance of this experience by positioning it as ‘the key moment’ (line 1). P19 describes 
how his acquaintance failed to stop the demolition of the cemetery, a story which also 
substantiates the interviewee’s claim of his own disillusionment with the power of legal 
mechanisms in Russia. These experiences, due to their sequential positioning between the 
claims of no interest and assertions of interest, are hearable as responsible for bringing 
about attitudinal change.  
Let us explore how the speakers narrate their experiences in more detail. An 
important point to make is that these narratives seem to be designed in a particular way. 
In both extracts, the speakers formulate what they were doing before they experienced the 
situation that made them change their attitude to politics. P2 describes this as ‘I (.) was 
just watching […] and I (0.2) for the first time I saw’ (5:4-6) and P19 reports that his 
acquaintance ‘was just walking […] and he saw’ (6:5-6). There are therefore two parts to 
the telling: the part where the interviewees describe how they came to witness a situation 
(settings) and the part where they describe the situation itself.  
The actions formulated in the settings part — watching TV and walking — are 
discernibly neutral and mundane. This impression is reinforced by introducing them with 
‘just’, the particle that minimises the significance of actions (Lee, 1987). By using it, 
interviewees provide for the ordinary character of their actions and imply that their 
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witnessing was not preceded by a prior interest in the situation. In addition to ‘just’, the 
speakers display the lack of a pre-existing stake in other ways. For example, the speaker 
in extract 5 explains that he was at an office with a television when he saw Vladimir 
Putin’s Federal Assembly speech (‘it was at the editorial office there was a TV and I was 
watching’, lines 4-5). The emphasis on the place highlights the fact that P2 was 
(presumably) at work, a setting where he perhaps had less say in what to watch (in contrast 
to, for example, his home). This tentatively works up the impression that P2 simply 
happened to see the speech. In extract 6, the interviewee initially describes what his 
acquaintance saw as ‘them cutting um trees at the um cemetery’ (line 6). This is a neutral 
description that sets the scene but does not imply a wrongdoing. The significance of 
‘cutting trees’ — turning the cemetery into a ‘building site’ (line 7) — is explained later 
and is thus hearable as an afterthought. Organised in that way, the descriptions act as a 
resource for portraying the protagonist of the story as initially unsuspecting and having no 
predisposition to blame or accuse. It is noteworthy, then, that both speakers work towards 
the inference that the situation that brought about political interest was witnessed 
unintentionally, with little personal input.  
These observations echo the points made by Wooffitt (1992) in his study of people 
talking about paranormal experiences. He has noticed that paranormal experience tellings 
tend to follow a specific format, ‘I was just doing X … when Y’, where a fact of witnessing 
a paranormal phenomenon (the ‘Y’ component) is reported by the speakers together with 
descriptions of mundane things they were doing at the time it happened (the ‘X’ 
component). Wooffitt suggested that such format attends to a set of local interactional 
issues. In particular, it enables a speaker to appear normal and hence trustworthy in the 
face of the prevailing scepticism regarding witnessing anomalous events, by implying that 
she or he just happened to be a witness of something extraordinary with no prior interest 
or desire to see it. Following this argument, it might be suggested that the speakers in my 
interviews tackle a similar task: by attending to the unintentional character of witnessing, 
they warrant the lack of pre-existing stake.  
Why this task might be important for the speakers will become evident after the 
examination of the second, ‘Y’ part of experience telling. In this part, the interviewees 
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design their formulations so that the events that took place are seen as problematic and as 
a ‘trigger’ for turning political.  
In extract 5, the interviewee uses the practice of listing to index the situation he 
saw as a problem. In lines 6-7, he formulates a three-part list, introducing each item with 
‘how’: 1) ‘I saw how he handles the numbers’; 2) ‘how he manipulates them’; 3) ‘how 
much he basic- um (.) well basically how much he lies’. The three-part structure of lists 
has been described as an interactional resource for exemplifying common qualities and 
indexing general characteristics of things (Jefferson, 1990; Sacks, 1992, Fall 1971, lecture 
14). In extract 5, the three components strongly suggest that there is a problem with Putin’s 
conduct. This suggestion is reinforced through a further list of his wrongdoings (‘he lied 
from the podium (.) just playing with numbers, playing with some facts (0.2) faking his 
work’, lines 9-10). Furthermore, P2 makes clear that this problematic situation provoked 
a strong reaction from him (‘it insulted me’, line 12), thereby occasioning it as a ‘trigger’ 
for becoming attentive to politics and adopting an anti-Putin stance. His reaction is 
warranted, first, on the grounds of personal dislike (‘I don’t like when I’m lied to’, line 
12), and second, by mobilising the inferences of righteous anger over the betrayed trust 
(‘I’m lied to by the man I used to trust […] by the man who is entrusted with the whole 
country’, lines 14, 16).  
In extract 6, the situation is constructed as problematic on two levels. First, there 
is a personal level of the protagonist, for whom the demolition of the cemetery is shown 
to be an issue due to his religious beliefs (‘because he’s a believer for him all these sacred 
places are very like important’, lines 7-8). Note that this claim is made convincing by 
being worked up as a consensus between the interviewee, who requests it with ‘right↑’ 
(line 8) and the interviewer, who corroborates it with ‘aha’ (line 9). Second, P19 makes 
relevant a more generic issue, through describing how the protagonist was treated by the 
‘various authorities’. In lines 12-14, the account resembles a vicious circle where the 
authorities constantly shift responsibility to one another (police to inspectors and back to 
police). The problematic character of their actions is conveyed through the choice of 
words (‘kick(ed) around’ is used three times) and through explicit orientation to corruption 
(‘because everything was bought and paid for’, line 12). Indeed, P19 presents the situation 
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to be so bad that even when the protagonist finds a willing deputy, he still has no actual 
power to help (‘apart from writing demands they can’t do anything’, line 16). By 
highlighting the irresponsibility of the authorities, P19 makes the protagonist’s decision 
to take the matters into his own hands understandable and hence justified.  
To bring the above observations together, in the ‘X’ part, the speakers justify 
unintentional character of witnessing, and in the ‘Y’ part they portray the witnessed 
situation as problematic and triggering acquisition of political interest. In effect, the 
credibility of the second part (and, by implication, the acquisition of political interest 
itself) is substantiated by the first part: assertions of initial neutrality and lack of interest 
strengthen the ‘objectively’ problematic character of the witnessed situations, thus 
warranting the decisions to become politically involved.  
The following extract shows a variation on the ‘I was just doing X … when Y’ 
format. In common with extracts 5 and 6, it deals with arguments around becoming 
politically active through experiencing a problematic situation. The interviewee responds 
to the question ‘Have you been interested in political situation in Russia and have your 
views changed’.  
 




























I was absolutely passive towards all things um (0.2) finished uh (.) the university 
started to work (.) basically (.) when I managed to advance my career, well   
I was a CEO of um (.) a building firm 
mmhm 
delivered supplies for project units um basically I didn’t ca(re) I wasn’t married I had 
like (.) I had money everything friends parties basically well (.) I lived and enjoyed life 
mmhm 
um (0.8) and the f-first thing in my life that influenced me was I guess buying a car 
((some lines omitted – he discusses his second car which was a right-hand drive)) 
I began to drive and a couple of times I was um stopped by the police inspectors  
and they charged me with some driving offence 
mmhm 





















code maybe something has changed came home looked not really everything’s correct 
mmhm 
I mean I realised that I was conned (.) so I began (.) to read the highway code carefully 
became hooked on the law forum 
mmhm 
not just like reading but I began to grasp the rules quite well 
mmhm 
um and so (.) well the f-first thing >let’s say< that drove me to become involved  
with protest activity was basically (.) contact with the road police inspectors 
 
In a similar fashion to the analysis above, let us consider the design of P18’s 
account. The first thing to notice is that the interviewee answers the question about his 
political interests by building a case for being extremely passive in the past. He says ‘I 
was absolutely passive towards all things’ (line 1): given the question, ‘passive’ is 
hearable as ‘politically passive’, while the two extreme case formulations (‘absolutely’ 
and ‘all’) maximise the degree of indifference. See also how, similarly to the speakers in 
extracts 3, 4 and 5, P18 attends to past lack of interest by giving an account of his life 
before he had bought a car. He describes his success in work (lines 2-5) where he has 
achieved the rank of a ‘CEO of um (.) a building firm’ (line 3), and points to the benefits 
of his bachelor life (‘I had money everything friends parties’, line 6). Such descriptions 
convey the image of an active man about town who ‘lived and enjoyed life’ (line 6), 
thereby furnishing the impression that P18 did not have reasons to be interested in politics. 
Second, the interviewee ties his political awakening (‘the f-first thing in my life 
that influenced me’) to a specific event — ‘buying a car’ (line 8). This formulation 
provides a setting for the subsequent experience report. Another setting component, which 
is more intimately tied to the character of the experience, is in lines 9-10. There, P18 says 
‘I began to drive and a couple of times I was um stopped by the police inspectors and they 
charged me with some driving offence’. This description gives an insight into a specific 
aspect of driving that made an impact on P18 — contact with the road police. Importantly, 
however, this formulation is designedly vague and neutral. It gives only a general idea 
about how many times P18 was stopped (‘a couple of times’) and about the character of 
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offence (‘some driving offence’). In effect, P18 avoids giving the impression that being 
stopped and charged is something unfair or out of ordinary. 
 Third, the speaker describes his actual experience by using a two-part format 
similar to ‘I was doing X … when Y’. In particular, note how he reports his initial reaction 
to being stopped by the police by doing active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992). Here, P18 
includes a section which is hearable as a quoted speech, due to its being introduced with 
‘and I was like’ and a shift in intonation: ‘and I was like (.) bugger↑ it’s been like seven 
years since I’ve looked into the highway code maybe something has changed’ (lines 12-
13). In so doing, the interviewee shows that he made a ‘normal’ first assumption about 
what had taken place: his lack of attention to the rules resulted in genuine charges against 
him. This in turn presents the evidence of his initial trust in police actions and lack of 
suspicion. This part bears similarity to the first part of the format ‘at first I thought X … 
but then I realised Y’ discussed by Jefferson (2004a). Jefferson has noticed that the ‘X’ 
component presents an ordinary, expectable alternative to the event that is presented in 
the ‘Y’ part, and in so doing strengthens the impression that the realised Y event is non-
normative and problematic. In the target data, P18’s initial thought offsets the subsequent 
truth realisation: after determining that he was right (line 13) P18 becomes legitimately 
convinced that the charge is, in fact, an act of police deceit (line 15). Being deceived, 
especially by the police, is by itself commonsensically troublesome; however, P18 
rhetorically multiplies this effect by juxtaposing the description of reality with his first 
impression of it. Indeed, Jefferson has argued that the format ‘at first I thought … but then 
I realised’ is particularly effective to imply ‘that the wrong ‘first thought’ should have 
been right’ (p. 140), thereby displaying the in-principle correctness of X and the in-
principle wrongness of Y.  
As such, P18’s formulation of his experience has a similar function to the 
formulations of unintentional witnessing done by speakers in extracts 5 and 6: it builds up 
‘objectively’ problematic nature of the experience and warrants its status as a trigger for 
turning political. The fact that P18 was deceived by the police, the people he was inclined 
to trust initially, acts as a ‘natural’ trigger for change: it ‘drives’ him into action, such as 
reading ‘highway code more carefully’ (line 15), becoming ‘hooked on the law forum’ 
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(line 16) and, ultimately, becoming ‘involved with protest activity’ (lines 20-21). By using 
the expression ‘drove me’ that orients to the somewhat forced nature of change, P18 
reinforces his claim that the acquisition of political interest was an unintended product of 
experiencing a problematic situation.  
In the third section of the analysis, I will explore a final pattern for addressing the 
topic of political interest that is tied to acquisition of knowledge.  
 
3. ‘Because you already understand’: acquiring political interest as a 
result of learning 
 
In this section I am going to look at the collection of extracts in which interviewees 
address the topic of political interest with respect to learning and knowledge acquisition. 
The opening extract features a response to the question about what prompted the 
interviewee to become interested in politics and protest. There, the speaker makes an 
argument about developing his theoretical understanding of the current situation.  
 






























it was Navalny’s blog of course and then (.) step by step by step by step  
and um it’s been perhaps two years already (.) before this I was (.) rather apolitical  
mmhm 
and gradually it started to develop I became interested started reading here and there (.) 
um I mean now I don’t watch TV at all 
mmhm 
like I only watch 2x2 (0.2) like Nat- National Geographic channel 
mmhm 
that’s all yeah (.) Channel One and Russia 1 are both ((unintelligible)) 
mmhm 
so all (.) news is on the Internet and that’s why (.) now I watch them more and more and 
basically um (0.8) like I (.) don’t have reasons not to trust like Echo of Moscow website 
mmhm  




























                                           [ mmhm                                                mmhm 
um although my attitude to him is like (0.2) not fanatical (.) yeah↑ 
mmhm 
(0.5)  
something like that 
mmhm and was there a moment (.) well like you said when (0.2) or some situation (.)  
that forced you to start reading Navalny’s blog or um (.) something like that 
frankly I don’t remember (0.2) I mean there’s no click (.) like bang an- and I see the light 
mmhm mmhm so you didn’t [have that 
                                               [it was step by step by step 
mmhm mmhm 
then I started to draw parallels make connections and I understood- (.) well I began to 
understand and to get into it 
 
This account is formulated to describe a change in the interviewee’s political 
attitudes, from being ‘rather apolitical’ (line 2) to the point where P6 ‘became interested’ 
(line 4). It is worth noting that while the general structure of the account resembles the 
extracts analysed above — it has orientation to past/present contrasting attitudes and 
description of the circumstances in which the speaker developed an interest — it has two 
characteristic features that I would like to focus on. 
First, the interviewee orients to the source of influence which is markedly different 
from politically-interested relevant others and from personal contact with problematic 
situation. P6 says ‘it was Navalny’s blog of course’ (line 1), referring to the popular online 
site created by the Russian lawyer-turned-unofficial opposition leader Alexei Navalny. 
Following a blog presupposes reading and learning about certain events; through this 
‘setting’ formulation the interviewee indicates that the change in his political position is 
somehow connected to the acquisition of information. Note also that this source of 
information is not portrayed as accidental. By following the claim in line 1 with ‘of course’, 
P6 displays his awareness of its normatively prescribed character. It is not that he just 
happened to read the blog and become interested; rather, P6 recognises reading it as an 
expected ‘route’ to becoming interested in political matters. In addition, this formulation 
helps to portray the blog as a credible source of information. 
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The speaker also suggests that he uses other sources of information (‘started 
reading here and there’, line 5), and does credibility work around these. For example, P6 
denounces the role of information from the TV. He first claims that he does not ‘watch 
TV at all’ (line 5); however, ECF ‘at all’ makes this claim absolute and hence factually 
brittle (Edwards, 2000), so he softens it by making an exception and saying ‘I only watch 
2x2 (0.2) like Nat- National Geographic channel’ (line 7; 2x2 is a Russian entertainment 
TV channel). It is not clear what he says in line 10, but it is likely that he additionally 
denies the trustworthiness of news-related information, as he follows it with the claim that 
‘all the news is on the Internet’ (line 11). It is worth noting here that in Russia, the majority 
of the main TV channels are owned and controlled by the state, which often makes them 
into tools of propaganda rather than sources of reliable news (Pomerantsev, 2015). 
Because of this, disdain for TV is a culturally-shared notion, especially among protest-
minded people who tend to refer to it as the ‘zombie box’ (zomboyaschik). The 
interviewee’s claim of not taking information from TV can be seen to draw on such a 
notion, thus acting as a warrant for the reliability of his sources.   
Moreover, P6 constructs the Internet sources as trustworthy, by highlighting the 
absence of evidence to suggest otherwise. Conventionally, the reliability of the Internet 
sources can be rather questionable; by saying ‘I (.) don’t have reasons not to trust like 
Echo of Moscow website […] and their journalists’ (lines 12, 14) the interviewee attends 
to this issue and dispels it. Arguably, his formulation is weaker than saying ‘I do have 
reasons to trust’; however, being so, it enables the speaker to additionally highlight his 
caution in selecting the sources of information. His cautious and critical stance is further 
grounded in line 16, where he says ‘my attitude to [Navalny] is like (0.2) not fanatical’. It 
has the effect of portraying P6 as unbiased, thereby implying that he does not blindly 
believe everything he learns, even from Navalny’s blog. 
Another notable feature of the extract is the emphasis on the progressive character 
of learning. In particular, it is done via the expression ‘step by step by step by step’ in line 
1, and again in line 24 (‘it was step by step by step’); by using repetition P6 conveys the 
feeling of continuous progress towards his current state. He also explicitly says that the 
development took place ‘gradually’ (line 4). On a number of occasions, the speaker gives 
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the impression that his political stance is still in the making, by using such expressions as 
‘started to develop’ and ‘started reading’ (line 4), ‘watch them more and more’ (line 11) 
and ‘started to draw parallels’ (line 26). The repair in line 26, where ‘I understood’, an 
expression that indexes accomplished character of an action, is changed to ‘began to 
understand’, and expression that indexes the continuous character, further demonstrates 
P6’s sensitivity to maintaining the focus on a process rather than a fact of becoming 
political. 
Furthermore, the interviewee actively resists the impression that a particular 
occurrence made him interested. He does this, first, by dismissing the interviewer’s 
question about specific ‘moment’ or ‘some situation’ (lines 20-21) as unimportant 
(‘frankly I don’t remember’, line 22). Second, he explicitly rejects experiencing abrupt 
change when he says ‘there’s no click (.) like bang an- and I see the light’ (line 22). Note 
how this latter formulation is different from the realisation of political interest conveyed 
in extracts 2 and 4 (‘bam […] I’m like already um (.) like (.) an activist’, 2:8; ‘ah↑ it 
happened’, 4:9). In those extracts, we have seen how the speakers used such formulations 
to reduce the degree of subjective involvement; what P6 does here is the opposite in a way. 
His descriptions imply that he was aware of the gradual changes of his political position, 
in turn inviting inferences that he was more subjectively involved in becoming political. 
There are indeed some impersonal and oblique references in this extract, for instance ‘it 
started to develop’ (line 4) and ‘it was step by step’ (line 24), which do somewhat 
downplay P6’s intentions. However, it is also notable that he finishes his account with a 
formulation that testifies to his active involvement: whatever conclusions he comes to are 
portrayed as products of P6’s own analytic considerations, a result of his starting to ‘draw 
parallels make connections’ (line 26).    
Hence in extract 8, the interviewee portrays becoming politically interested as a 
result of gradually acquiring information from a variety of credible sources. The following 
two extracts give further examples of such a strategy; additionally, they demonstrate that 
the process of knowledge acquisition itself can become an accountable matter for the 
participants. The extracts are produced in response to the question ‘have you been 








































I’ve been studying political science for four years now 
mmhm 
I mean um (0.2) of course I started not because I was £ that much interested in politics £  
I started because I (0.2) liked the way the lecturer was presenting information about 
mmhm 
that academic subject, he said that it was (0.2) interesting (.) 
mmhm 
like you will be interacting with such and such and so on um (0.5) basically my views  
have changed drastically because when you start to learn all the tricks of the trade↑ (0.5)  
mmhm 
of this (0.2) area (.) you start to understand so much (0.5) and let’s say that  
while in the beginning I basically (0.2) didn’t care about what was going on in politics 
((some lines omitted – she describes how she was trying to convince her mother to vote 
for Dmitry Medvedev because she was advised to vote for him by her school teachers)) 
and now (.) well because you already understand your attitude is more critical somehow  
mmhm 
to all of it (.) that’s why (0.5) basically I am now interested in politics 
 
























I was completely (.) young green (.) it was during the second year of my Journalism 
degree (.) I wanted to work everywhere I wanted to learn as much as possible and so on 
mmhm 
and (.) by a twist of fate I got into the Echo of Moscow (.) Saint Petersburg branch (0.4)  
I’m not sure (.) if I need to £ mention it hhh £  
£ well hhh (0.2) mmhm 
but well (.) back then it was around (.) 8 years ago I (.) started (0.2) to understand what’s 
happening (.) in the city and consequently what’s happening in the country  
well (.) of course I wasn’t like (.) this small girl who didn’t know a thing about what was 














about what’s hap- what’s really happening (.) I mean (0.2) what’s not being written about  
what’s not being talked about um (.) what the civil servants talk about behind the scenes 
mmhm 
some (.) high-ranking officials um (.) businessmen (.) deputies (.)  
well I mean it all became closer to my heart  
 
As in all the extracts we have seen, the respondents here point to, and account for, 
the change in their interests. In extract 9, the interviewee constructs a temporal narrative 
of change by saying ‘while in the beginning I basically (0.2) didn’t care about what was 
going on in politics […] I am now interested in politics’ (lines 12, 15). The speaker in 
extract 10 uses the past tense to produce a self-description (‘I was completely (.) young 
green’, line 1). It presents her as naive and having insufficient knowledge of the socio-
political situation. Although this self-description is then modified by the speaker when she 
says ‘of course I wasn’t like (.) this small girl who didn’t know a thing about what was 
happening’ (lines 9-10), her understanding is still hearable as initially not being broad 
enough. The interviewee’s later claim, ‘it all became closer to my heart’ (line 16), suggests 
that with time P24 developed a deeper interest and concern with socio-political matters.  
Accounting for such attitudinal changes, both speakers produce setting 
components that display the relevance of their professional identities. P33 says ‘I’ve been 
studying political science for four years now’ (9:1), and P24 describes how, being a 
student of journalism (‘it was during the second year of my Journalism degree’, 10:1-2) 
she started to work at the radio station (‘I got into the Echo of Moscow 5  (.) Saint 
Petersburg branch’ (10:4). The setting formulations do two kinds of inferential work. First, 
they suggest that the speakers’ political interests (the topic occasioned by the interviewer’s 
question) are in some way related to the development of their professional identities, a 
student of politics (P33) and a student of journalism working at a radio station (P24). 
Furthermore, the formulations allow the speakers to discursively link the fact of change 
to the processes of learning and knowledge acquisition, by invoking student and 
professional categories. In particular, the speaker in extract 9 describes her newly acquired 
                         
5 The Echo of Moscow (Ekho Moskvy) is a Russian pro-liberal radio station. 
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political interest to be the result of increased understanding due to learning ‘all the tricks 
of the trade’ (line 9). Similarly, P24 reports that her understanding became better after she 
started working at the radio station: ‘I (.) started (0.2) to understand what’s happening (.) 
in the city and consequently what’s happening in the country’ (10:7-8). Importantly, she 
talks about learning information that is not available to ordinary people, ‘what’s not being 
written about what’s not being talked about’ (lines 12-13). Such information, she claims, 
is known only by the upper echelons of society who discuss it in private (line 15). Because 
P24 knows it, she is hearable as an insider, privy to big secrets. Such ‘in the know’ identity 
emphasises the degree of her understanding in contrast to how she was before she started 
working on the radio. Both speakers thus explain becoming political by positioning their 
interests as outcomes of learning, in the university (P33) and at work (P24).  
There is a related point. Note the inferential work that speakers do to imply that 
they did not start learning about politics because they intended to do so from the start. In 
extract 9, P33 attends to the assumption that she started to study political science because 
she was interested in politics in the first place. She does so by explicitly denying initial 
interest (‘I started not because I was £ that much interested in politics’, line 3) and putting 
forward an alternative reason (‘I started because I (0.2) liked the way the lecturer was 
presenting information about […] that academic subject’, lines 4, 6). In such a way, 
decision to study politics is displayed to be independent from political interest. The 
speaker in extract 10 builds up a similar inference by describing her coming to work at 
the radio as accidental, happening ‘by a twist of fate’ (line 4). This formulation functions 
to suggest that P24 did not intentionally seek employment that would make her 
knowledgeable about politics; rather, she just happened to be there and ‘got into’ it (line 
4). A further resource to display the lack of intention to work on this specific radio station 
is the three-part list the interviewee produces in line 2, ‘I wanted to work everywhere I 
wanted to learn as much as possible and so on’. The last item of the list — ‘and so on’ — 
is a so-called generalised list completer (Jefferson, 1990), which is often used to complete 
the list when speakers are having difficulty in locating a specific third item. P24’s 
completed list demonstrates her openness and lack of preference for work, and in so doing 
wards off the inference that it was her active choice to work on the Echo of Moscow radio 
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station. So, we can see how both speakers deny initial intentions of learning about politics. 
It is similar to what we have seen in section 2, where the speakers employ two-part designs 
to set up inferences of no initial interest.  
An additional observation has to do with the issue of credibility. In contrast to P6 
above, here the speakers do not explicitly defend the credibility of their sources; however, 
it can be argued that their setting formulations implicitly take care of it. Recall that P33 
acquires the knowledge that makes him more politically interested, from the university 
programme, which is, conventionally, a legitimate source. In the case of P42, referring to 
the radio station setting fulfils the function of justifying it. Through naming the radio 
station, the interviewee mobilises shared cultural knowledge associated with it. For 
supporters of protest in Russia (to which the interviewer has initially attributed herself), 
the Echo of Moscow radio is likely to be seen among the most reliable sources of 
information. In addition, her claim of getting to learn about ‘what’s really happening’ (line 
12) emphasises the truthfulness of her knowledge and in so doing, strengthens its 
credibility.   
Overall, the extracts analysed in this section address the topic of political interest 
in contexts of learning and acquiring knowledge, with the speakers explaining the 
transition from apolitical to politically concerned as a consequence of gathering 





The first empirical chapter employed a discursive psychological approach to 
explore how lay protesters address the topic of political interest in interview conversations. 
In contrast to conceptualising descriptions of attitudes as evidencing underlying 
psychological states, I analysed descriptions as resources for accomplishing various 
pragmatic tasks. 
The chapter has demonstrated that talking about political interest is not an 
unproblematic accomplishment for the interviewees. The basic analytic finding was that 
people gave specific reasons for becoming interested in politics, when they were asked 
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about it by the interviewer but also of their own accord. In so doing, they displayed their 
understanding that political interests and attitudes are matters that require accounting for. 
I have identified and examined three explanatory patterns: portraying political interest as 
fostered by others; presenting it as a result of a problematic experience; and positioning it 
as outcome of learning about the political situation. 
I have pointed to the three particularly intriguing interactional features that seem 
to appear across the accounts. First, the topic of political interest has been addressed with 
reference to attitudinal change, a transition from not being interested in the past to being 
interested in the present. Second, the interviewees mobilised various resources to imply 
that they did not intend to become interested in politics. Third, my findings suggested that 
the lack of political interest was also an accountable matter. 
With regard to the first feature, it is perhaps not surprising that the speakers’ 
accounts take story-like forms, as there is clearly something powerful in telling stories 
about change. Scholars of politics who study storytelling in protest, such as Davis (2002) 
and Polletta (2006), have been arguing that for people involved in social movements, 
stories, and in particular stories of change, are powerful resources for sense-making. 
Specifically, Polletta has argued that, while it is usual for protesters’ autobiographical 
accounts to be organised chronologically, such organisation does more than just telling 
the order of events: it makes the end-point of the story more meaningful and authentic. 
Sacks (1978) has made a similar observation in his study of organisation of a dirty joke. 
He noticed that the events there were organised in a temporal order, in what he has called 
‘the canonical form for narratives’ (p. 252). Such temporal ordering, Sacks suggested, 
does a particular job: it helps the speaker to portray the events that took place as believable 
and plausible. Taking these arguments into consideration, it can be proposed that the three-
part temporal sequencing (no interest in the past — events leading to change — interest 
in the present), noticeable in nearly all of the accounts in this chapter, is a resource to 
portray the interested attitude as more genuine. The implicit contrast between the attitudes 
provides for an inference that political interest is a product of dynamic development and 
hence is not simply a whim, in turn bringing it out as a ‘real thing’.  
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A related observation here is that the descriptions of the events leading to change 
— in particular those we saw in section 2 — can also be seen as contribute to warranting 
political interest as genuine. Recall how in extracts 5-7 speakers argued that they became 
interested in politics after experiencing unjust problematic situations. These formulations 
echo those identified by Hunt and Benford (1993), who, as part of their research on 
identity talk in social movements, have studied protesters’ stories of becoming politically 
aware. Hunt and Benford demonstrated that people often described becoming politically 
interested after recognising that some sort of injustice is taking place. The researchers 
called these narratives ‘atrocity tales’ and argued that through invoking anger and other 
feelings of injustice, such tales enabled speakers to justify becoming political, and 
presented their political awakening as authentic. In my data, the speakers we encountered 
in the second section did a similar kind of inferential work when they told stories of 
encountering problematic situations. While not necessarily describing ‘atrocities’, their 
accounts invited inferences of moral injustice, which were hearable as being responsible 
for bringing about attitudinal change. As such, the development of political interest was 
made more justified: the arguments were set to make the hearer (the interviewer) to come 
to the conclusion that becoming politically interested and even politically active was the 
only way to address the problematic situation.  
With regard to the second feature, my analytic findings can be related to the 
suggestion made by some of the scholars of protest, that the first step towards establishing 
protester identity lies in knowingly becoming interested in socio-political situation 
(Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). What my data demonstrate, 
however, is that speakers often try to ward off the inferences that they became interested 
intentionally. A range of conversational tactics was used to do so; for example, invoking 
the influence of relevant others (extracts 1-4), using ‘I was just doing X when Y’ designs 
(extracts 5-6) and rejecting having initial interest in learning about politics (extracts 9-10). 
Importantly, this does not mean that people truly became interested by chance. Rather, it 
suggests that there are certain interpersonal issues at play and people formulate denials of 
intent as ways of dealing with these. As Wooffitt (1992) has noted, diminishing of agency 
is a tool for dealing with potential scepticism about personal credibility: it helps to warrant 
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the objective nature of the experience (see also Avery & Antaki (1997), for extending this 
observation beyond the accounts of the paranormal). Building on this argument, it can be 
proposed that for people who are interested in politics in Russia, especially if they are not 
officially associated with the world of politics, there is a risk of being seen as in some way 
biased. Indeed, given some of the literature discussed in the introduction to this chapter, 
this issue seems to ‘fit’ with Russian cultural settings. As I have shown, many scholars 
have pointed out that the value of political interest has been undermined in Russia. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that public interest in politics has been the object of state 
regulation, with the government actively striving to turn people’s attention away from 
politics through propaganda (Shevtsova, 2013). In such an environment, interest in politics 
might risk being seen as suspicious and provoke questions regarding the motives of an 
interested person. But if it is implied that people came to be interested without intending 
to do so — be it because they were influenced by their friends, or because they accidentally 
came across a problematic situation, or because they started learning about politics as a 
consequence of their work/study — the risk of interest being seen as suspicious is 
significantly reduced. Establishing the lack of intention to become interested thus assists 
credibility to work, by playing down the potential charge of having a stake.    
Finally, with respect to the third feature, we have seen how the speakers designed 
their explanations so that their previous inattention to politics had been seen as an 
expectable attitude. This evidences that political interest on the whole is a sensitive topic 
to address for the participants, and demonstrates that being apolitical in Russia is not as 
unproblematic an attitude as some scholars have suggested. Indeed, by doing work of 
justifying both being political and being apolitical, respondents can be seen to manage a 
dilemma (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988). The dilemma 
might be associated with navigating the path between being seen as overly passive, and 
hence potentially ignorant — and too interested, and hence potentially invested and biased. 
These findings, then, demonstrate that protesters do not necessarily have agreeing and 
straightforward views about their attitudes, and that whether something is ‘normative’ or 
‘expected’ is a practical matter that is up for speakers, and not analysts, to establish. 
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To conclude, while the analysis shows that speakers facilitate a variety of 
inferences through their accounts, the main analytic message from this chapter is that 
talking about political interest is a sensitive business. With regard to this, it is helpful to 
remember the basic conversation analytic premise, that interactions are underpinned by 
culturally available sets of assumptions (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008; Sacks, 1992). The 
findings from this chapter make it possible to suggest that in Russia there are certain 
assumptions that make the topic of political interest sensitive and difficult to address 
straightforwardly. It would be interesting to explore whether similar considerations inform 
the accounts of more active participation. For this reason, the next chapter investigates the 
























Chapter 4. ‘And so I went’: instrumentality and emotion talk in 
formulating motives for active protest involvement 
 
The previous chapter explored the arguments around the acquisition of political 
attitudes and interests, paying close attention to the ways attitudinal change was 
accomplished in talk. This chapter is concerned with how protesters explain their active 
involvement in protest. In this way, my research focus goes one step further along the 
classic movement participation model (Oegema & Klandermans, 1994), and zooms in on 
the topic of action mobilisation. In particular, I explore how participants manufacture 
various causal explanations about their protesting behaviour through talk, and how in so 
doing accountability of active protest involvement is built up. 
The issue of accountability seems to be of particular importance when it comes to 
the topic of overt protest involvement. As discussed in the literature review, due to the 
specifics of culture and history, overt protest in Russia has not been seen as a legitimate 
form of political participation (Greene, 2014; Robertson, 2011). Moreover, the protests of 
2011-2012 have been actively condemned by the government propaganda as 
demonstrations of public disobedience (White, 2013) and depicted as a ‘hipster’ pastime 
of the privileged few (cosmopolitan, rich, Muscovites; Kal’k, 2012). It is thus reasonable 
to suggest that under such circumstances it is in the protesters’ best interest to present their 
behaviour as legitimate. Assuming this is so, it is important to examine motive accounts, 
since they show what arguments protesters themselves put forward as adequate grounds 
for protesting. These constructions are also potentially able to shed light on the specifics 
of mobilisation in a particular historical and cultural context.  
Researchers have enquired into the motives behind protest participation in Russia, 
attributing them to the variety of structural, demographic and psychological factors. For 
example, Greene (2012; 2013) proposed that the protests were triggered by the 
stratification of Russian society from 2008 onward, with more people becoming affluent 
and interested in political matters, and by the public perceptions of government 
illegitimacy, resulting from the events of September 2011, when the then-president 
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Medvedev appointed the then-prime minister Putin to be his successor, with himself 
settling for the prime minister post. Such scholars as Gudkov (2012b), Lipman (2012) and 
Shevtsova (2013) argued that the main motives for actively taking to the streets had to do 
with moral indignation over generic injustices of political and legal systems, as well as 
with the promotion of the narrative that ordinary people can make a change. Nonetheless, 
there has been little empirical research into how people themselves give explanations for 
their active involvement, and the functional nature of such constructions. The majority of 
academic explanations found in the literature rest on the assumptions of traditional social 
psychological understanding of protest, that something within (perception of grievances) 
or outside (instability of the political system) individuals more or less automatically impels 
them go and protest. By contrast, in line with the methodological focus of my study, I 
follow discourse-oriented researchers such as Edwards, Potter and their colleagues (Billig, 
1996; Edwards, 2005a; Edwards & Potter, 2000; Stokoe, 2012), in seeing motives as 
interactional resources for sense-making. According to this line of thought, in talking 
about their motives people discursively explain and justify their actions, rather than 
demonstrate internal cognitive states that condition such actions. In other words, I assume 
that motive talk is functional; as Mills (1940, p. 940) has famously pointed out, ‘the 




The extracts for this chapter were chosen mainly from a collection of accounts 
produced in response to a direct question ‘why did you go to the protest’ or, more often, 
an indirect variant of this question ‘why it was important for you to go/join the protest’. 
Two extracts (9 and 10) were taken from a collection of extracts in which respondents talk 
about their reasons for active protest involvement without being directly asked about it by 
the interviewer. The ten extracts presented below are broadly representative of the two 
ways in which respondents were accounting for their motive involvement. In these 
extracts, a range of protest types is discussed, from demonstrations against the election 
fraud to ecological protests. There were no strong analytic grounds for limiting the focus 
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solely to anti-state protests; in fact, focusing on a range of different protests made the 
analysis more robust, in the way that it was able to demonstrate how similar rhetorical 
strategies are used to explain taking part in different kinds of protests.  
In some extracts, I do not include the original interviewer’s questions, because the 
relevant descriptions were often given half way though the answer, and including the 
question would disturb the flow of the extract; furthermore, in such cases looking at the 
question would not add much to the analysis. Thus, omitting it was seen as a sensible 
strategy, especially given that it was not my objective to focus specifically on the question-
answer format.  
To identify concrete fragments for this chapter, I read through and listened to the 
collections several times, selected a number of patterned fragments, and translated and 
transcribed them in detail in accordance with CA conventions. Then, I separated the 
extracts into two groups, according to the bases for motives that the respondents 
recurrently refer to: I called them ‘instrumental’ and ‘emotional’ practices. The chapter is 
structured in line with these two strategies. 
 
1. ‘Who if not us’: justifying the instrumental and obligational nature 
of protesting 
 
I start the analysis by looking at a relatively short extract that shows how a speaker 
deals with the question about his motive for active protest involvement. The extract is 
taken from a conversation about the interviewee’s experience of being a participant in a 
number of anti-government demonstrations. The question in line 1 was asked after the 
interviewee had mentioned that he had received threats urging him to stop being actively 
involved; ‘despite this’ means ‘despite receiving threats’.  
 






why despite this it’s still important for you to do what you do (.) 













because first I live not just for myself (.) I have my family um (0.2) I have a child  
and I hope that I’ll have more than one  
and I hope that after all he’d live (.) in a better country 
in a somewhat different country from the one I live in  
(0.5)  
it’s for him that I’m making an effort  
 
The extract begins with P31 being asked to explain his continuous protest 
participation despite being pressured to stop. The question assumes that remaining 
actively involved in protest is a matter of personal importance (‘it’s still important for 
you’, line 1). In response, the interviewee seems to do two things.  
First, he implies that his reasons for protesting go beyond self-centred concerns. 
Specifically, in line 3 he says ‘I live not just for myself’. This claim enables P31 to adjust 
the focus of the conversation by focusing on a specific aspect of his protest involvement: 
it being about others rather than just about himself.  
Second, he introduces a specific category of such others — his family. He says ‘I 
have my family (0.2) I have a child’ (line 3). These descriptions are category-resonant, in 
that they invite the listener to see P31 as a resident in a certain category — as a ‘parent’ 
— without explicitly calling him so (Schegloff, 2007). In so doing, the interviewee 
discursively binds his motive for protest involvement to his role as a parent. The 
subsequent formulation regarding his hopes for a better country (lines 5-6) is thus heard 
in the context of ‘parent-child’ relational pair, as a logical parental desire to care for their 
children and ensure their children’s wellbeing (Stokoe, 2012). The implication here is that 
although it is P31 who ‘hopes’ (lines 4-5), this hope is made to be seen as a natural 
extension of his role as a parent. In effect, his motive appears accountable as a means of 
pursuing such a natural aim. The utterance in line 8 contributes towards this construction 
by emphasising P31’s intent to act for the benefit of his son. Active protest participation 
is thus manufactured as a logical behaviour and as instrument of fulfilling one’s duty as a 
parent. 
Overall, then, P31’s account draws on the power of categories to do the accounting 
work: through positioning himself as a parent, P31 legitimises his protest as an expression 
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of parental responsibility. In so doing, the motive is designed to be seen as if situated 
outside of P31 himself; his protest is seen as something that needs to be done, as a logical 
necessity.  
The speaker in the following extract similarly orients to the normative predicates 
of his role, in talking about his participation in the series of protests against the state’s 
economic policy, in particular against the law that introduced high taxes on right-hand 
drive cars in Russia. This extract is the second part of the response to the question about 
P2’s motive for joining those protests; it follows him discussing some positive aspects of 
Putin’s policies, such as free education and relative economic stability, and stating that his 
protest did not aim specifically at improving his own life. 
 




































when I was protesting with the drivers I helped them (.) I guess in fact  
I helped them quite a lot 
mmhm 
(0.2) I didn’t have a car and I’m not going to buy one now, right-hand drive, left-hand drive  
doesn’t matter I didn’t care a bit, it’s not an economic interest, it was simply a principle 
mmhm 
it was just (.) like an ideology  
mm 
for me like (.) it was um ideology like id- idea (0.5) like I said I’m a historian I know how  
like (.) the society develops, I know what has to be done what shouldn’t be done 
mmhm 
that’s it  
(0.8)  
it’s just I understand it and I understand that this is right and this is wrong 
mmhm 
like if this regime continues like this then it’d be like that and it’d become like (.) even worse 
aha aha 
 
Note how in line 1 the interviewee describes his protest in terms of helping a 
particular category of people, ‘the drivers’. Similarly to the first extract, this grounds an 
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understanding that the speaker’s actions were motivated by concerns about others, rather 
than oneself. This understanding is reinforced by formulations that explicitly discount 
personal interests. For example, the interviewee describes helping the drivers ‘quite a lot’ 
(line 2), while positioning himself outside of the category ‘driver’, as he says ‘I didn’t 
have a car and I’m not going to buy one now’ (line 4). Furthermore, P2 displays his lack 
of interest in the topic of cars overall (‘right-hand drive, left-hand drive doesn’t matter I 
didn’t care a bit’, lines 4-5). He also explicitly denies having ‘economic interest’ in line 5. 
Such non-investment formulations function to downplay the possibility of his active 
protest involvement being seen as motivated by his self-centred interests, warranting an 
essentially altruistic motivation instead.  
The interviewee’s selfless behaviour is portrayed as being driven by logic as well. 
Following the refutation of personal interests, P2 reports that he was guided by ‘a principle’ 
(line 5). In a chain of self-initiated repairs in lines 5-9, the speaker alters the formulations 
from ‘simply a principle’ (line 5), to ‘ideology’ (lines 7, 9), to ‘idea’ (line 9). Arguably, 
the lack of uptake from the interviewer in lines 6 and 8 may have contributed to the 
production of new terms; nonetheless, these terms are similar to the extent that they 
present P2 as acting upon a certain agenda, which suggests that his protest involvement 
was an informed choice. The subsequent account seems to be structured so as to justify 
the legitimacy of such a choice and simultaneously manage the normativity of the 
behaviour.  
In lines 9-10, P2 goes on to build up legitimacy of his motivation by invoking his 
identity as a ‘historian’ and pointing to the associated category predicates (‘I know how 
like (.) the society develops’). This construction works to highlight his expertise and 
knowledge, thereby implying that his protest behaviour was based on a sound 
understanding of the situation. Additionally, P2 seems to highlight the normative aspect 
of his position. In line 10, he claims that due to his occupation he knows ‘what has to be 
done what shouldn’t be done’. Modal verbs here underline the necessity of action and 
imply that P2 was simply obliged to act based on his knowledge, thereby portraying active 
protest involvement as imperative. The upshot in line 12 — ‘that’s it’ — nicely completes 
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the account by implying that P2 had no other reasons to take part in a protest other than 
his understanding that it should be done.  
Interestingly, however, the lack of uptake from the interviewer (pause in line 13) 
seems to be interpreted by P2 as a sign that his explanation is not sufficient in some way, 
and he produces a further account that contributes towards the normativity of protest 
involvement. In line 14, he reiterates the importance of his understanding (‘it’s just I 
understand it’) and of his ability to separate ‘right’ from ‘wrong’. In line 16 he points to 
the danger of letting the regime go unchallenged. With this, the protest is positioned as 
the imperative ‘right’ thing that would prevent the situation from getting worse, thus 
highlighting its instrumental nature. Hence in the second extract, the topic of protest is 
discussed in such a way as to account for the necessity of active protest involvement in 
the context of the duties one has.  
The final observation about the two extracts above is the vagueness of 
formulations. For instance, it is notable that neither speaker provides an explicit account 
of what they were set to achieve by becoming actively involved in protest: P31 said that 
he wished for a ‘better country […] somewhat different country’ for his child (1:5-6), and 
P2 argued that he was driven by an understanding that ‘if this regime continues like this 
then it’d be like that’ (2:16). Both formulations have an abstract quality to them; they can 
be seen as examples of systemic vagueness, the rhetorical technique for fact construction 
(Edwards & Potter, 2000). The oblique references provide just enough justification to 
show that behaviour was motivated by important concerns, but at the same time they do 
not offer any detailed information about the protest involvement. As such, these 
formulations are rhetorically ‘safe’ because they are difficult to rebut. 
Overall, the first two extracts illustrate how speakers construct the rationale for 
their protest actions through invoking categories. The analysis shows that speakers 
discount self-centred motivations and claim to be driven by an aspiration to help others 
and by responsibility concerns derived from their roles as a parent (P31) and historian 




The next two extracts demonstrate another pattern of explaining active protest 
involvement as rational and necessary, through using the rhetoric of argumentation (Billig, 
1996; Potter, 1996). Extract 3 is a part of the conversation between the interviewer and 
the male protester, about the latter’s involvement in a number of anti-government 
demonstrations in Moscow. The speaker in extract 4 is a female protester from Volgograd, 
who talks about her participation in an ecological protest in the town of Novohopersk, 
some 380 kilometres away from Volgograd, against the building of a nickel mining plant6. 
 
































why it’s important (0.2) for you to go to these demonstrations and protest? 
um (.) you know it’s important because I want that in this country 
mmhm 
um the laws to be obeyed (.) why↑ because if the laws would really work (.)  
would really be obeyed and they would be really adequate laws 
mmhm  
then um (.) let’s say (0.5) one option the consequent option let’s say (0.2)  
is that the citizens’ lives would become easier more convenient (.) 
mmhm  
comfortable and among other things that’d foster economic growth too   
mmhm 
because it’s a fact that (.) if the country’s laws don’t work um  
no investment (0.2) would flow inside the country 






                         
6 It was typical for the respondents from Volgograd to talk about their involvement in protests beyond 
anti-regime demonstrations, notably in ecological protests. This might be due to the fact that, compared 
to the capitals of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, in this regional city, large-scale street protest against 
the government has been less prevalent, while concerns with environmental pollution are traditionally 
strong due to the bad ecological situation in the region. 
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why do you support the protest there? 
I think it’s really an ecological concern after all (.)  
it’ll reach us sooner or later because Volgograd (.)  
well yes it’s situated within some hundred kilometres but (0.2)  
the wind plays a role here (.) the river plays a role (.) and so it’ll reach us 
mmhm 
and I understand that sooner or later it’ll reach here 
mmhm 
and reach my friends my (.) um parents and so on 
even if I decide to move as I plan but still (.) 
mmhm 
one shouldn’t do the thing that people often do here 
to make a mess somewhere and then leave like I don’t care any more 
mmhm 
 
In both extracts, the speakers begin answering the interviewer’s question by giving 
reasons for protesting. P25 explicitly states that the protest is important for him because 
he wants ‘the laws to be obeyed’ in Russia (3:4). P33 expresses the reason more implicitly, 
by referring to an ‘ecological concern’ (4:2), which in the context of the preceding talk is 
understood as the harmful environmental impact of nickel mining. In so doing, she implies 
that her understanding (‘I think’) of the concern is her motive for becoming involved. 
Hence in addressing the reasons, both speakers suggest that their actions are based on what 
Edwards (2008) called ‘intentional states’, on them ‘thinking’ and ‘wanting’ something. 
Edwards observed that intentional states often feature in the motive-related reports. He 
also suggested, however, that on their own, intentional state formulations do not 
automatically justify actions; just because someone wants to do something does not mean 
it should be done. Indeed, the extracts above evidence this argument: formulations of 




These descriptions take the form of the rhetoric of argumentation, that is, they 
warrant the motive by presenting it as a logical consequence of the external situation that 
exists independently from speakers (Antaki & Leudar, 1990; Edwards & Potter, 2000). 
The speaker in extract 3 uses the rhetoric of argumentation to show that his desire to 
uphold the law is sensible because it brings objective benefits. After asking a rhetorical 
question in line 4, he uses ‘if-then’ format to point to the generic benefit for the people of 
Russia: if such laws ‘would really work’ then ‘the citizens’ lives would become easier’ 
(lines 4, 8). Since ‘if-then’ format is particularly felicitous for bringing out logical 
connections between the parts of the argument (Edwards, 1997), it presents P25’s claim 
as rational and not requiring special accounting. In addition, the three-part list — ‘easier 
more convenient […] comfortable’ (lines 8, 10) — makes the claim of benefits more 
representative (Jefferson, 1990). Furthermore, P25 grounds the legitimacy of his reasons 
by invoking economic advantage (‘that’d foster economic growth too’, line 10). 
Describing this advantage as based on a ‘fact’ (lines 12-13) makes it look like a part of 
the ‘out there’ reality, the valid benefit worth fighting for. P25’s rhetoric, then, works to 
portray his protest motive as being in accordance with logic, and his protest actions as 
instrumental for achieving benefits for all. 
Similarly, in extract 4 the interviewee attends to the logical reasoning behind her 
understanding that Volgograd will be affected by the building of the mining plant. She 
states that ‘it’ll reach us’ (lines 3, 5), thereby portraying impact as a certainty rather than 
a possibility. She also acknowledges the distance between Volgograd and the plant site 
(‘yes it’s situated within some hundred kilometres’, line 4) and then points to the factors 
— ‘the wind plays a role here (.) the river plays a role’ (line 5) — that seem to ‘override’ 
the factor of distance. P33’s design therefore anticipates a potential objection to the 
facticity of her claim and undermines it, establishing harmful environmental impact as a 
fact of reality existing independently from her thoughts. She thus constructs a version of 
events that rhetorically works to display her worry and, in turn, her protest involvement 
as accountable. Overall, then, the design of the accounts can be seen as an interactional 
resource for manufacturing the validity of speakers’ motives and accomplishing 
accountability for their active protest involvement. 
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The last notable feature of extracts 3 and 4 is the display of the speakers’ 
consideration for others. By referring to the ‘citizens’ lives’ (3:8), P25 makes it clear that 
his end goal is to benefit the wider community, thus playing down the idea of personal 
advantage. P33 implies that the effect of the plant on the others (‘my friends my (.) um 
parents and so on’, 4:9) remains an important consideration for her even if she leaves 
Volgograd herself (line 10), thereby making the other-related motivation principal. At the 
same time, P33 attends to the moral basis of her reasons in line 12 (‘one shouldn’t do the 
thing’). In effect, her motivation is offered as a valid consequence of the normative duty 
to take responsibility for one’s actions, at the same time emphasising the selfless nature 
of her protesting. So both interviewees work up altruistic justifications for their active 
protest involvement: their actions are seen as virtuous as they bring benefits to others. The 
argument is extremely powerful in highlighting both the rationality and moral worth of 
one’s behaviour as it uses rhetorical appeal to general human progress (Jasper, 1992).  
In the final extract in this section, the motive for active protest involvement is 
formulated in such a way that protesting comes across as not only rational, but essentially 
natural. The extract comes from an interview with a male protester from Volgograd, who 
discusses the demonstration against the industrial development of the floodplains of the 
Volga and Akhtuba rivers. The protest was organised by a local volunteer group that the 
interviewee is a part of. The extract comes half way through the answer to the 
interviewer’s question about why the protest was important to go to.  
 


















so (.) it’s because well (.) we all live here and our children will live here and if we’re left  
with concrete and asphalt and the like (.) the desert (.) then nobody would benefit from that 
mmhm 
I mean basically if there’ll be a desert then nobody could live here at all 
(0.5) 
that’s it (.) we would need to move away from here 
mmhm mmhm 





























some economic satisfaction (.) or else we don’t have them (.)  
w-we don’t have any trade in the floodplain nothing I mean  
we don’t have our own personal interests there  
(0.5)  
so and (.) the only thing that directs us is common sense I guess 
mmhm 
and that’s why um (0.2) after all someone has to do it (.)  
if there is such- such urge such need that (.) the nature is dying and 
mmhm 
and the death (.) I mean the reason for this death is human himself  
then naturally it’s up to human to repair and restore all that 
to fix it mmhm 
yeah because who if not us (.) so that’s it 
 
P35’s account can be divided into three conceptual parts based on the actions that 
he performs through talk. First, the interviewee constructs a rationale for his actions. He 
begins by orienting to an ecological issue and portrays it as a significant threat to the whole 
community (‘we all live here’, line 1) and to the future generations (‘our children will live 
here’, line 1). He explains that there is a danger of the people being ‘left with concrete and 
asphalt and the like (.) the desert’ (line 2). In so doing, he suggests that there is an ‘out-
there’ objective issue that requires attention. The rational character of his narrative is 
assisted by the ‘if-then’ format. P35 uses this structure twice to point to the consequences 
of the ecological collapse. Specifically, the ‘if’ clause is used to portray the outcome of 
ignoring the issue of ecology (‘if we’re left with concrete and asphalt … the desert’, lines 
1-2; ‘if there’ll be a desert’, line 4), and the ‘then’ clause fleshes out the negative 
consequences. The description of the potential after-effects is worked up as a worsening 
progression, from ‘then nobody would benefit from that’ in line 2, to ‘nobody could live 
here at all’ in line 4, which justifies the need for protest through inviting the implications 
that not acting on the issue would have far-reaching consequences well beyond being 
simply unfavourable. This effect is reinforced by the use of extreme case formulations 
(Pomerantz, 1986), such as ‘nobody’ and ‘at all’ and by putting emphasis on ‘nobody’. 
As such, the rationale is spelt out in such a way as to account for why protest is necessary. 
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The descriptions present P35’s motivation as driven by objective logic of protecting the 
environment and the people. In that way, protesting becomes an instrument of preserving 
nature and, by implication, people’s lives.  
Second, the interviewee explicitly discounts other motives for his protest 
involvement. This is done through formulating a three-part list of things P35 and his 
volunteer group are not concerned with. The description in lines 9-11 comes across as a 
list because the speaker uses a refrain ‘we don’t have’: 1) ‘some economic satisfaction (.) 
or else we don’t have them’; 2) ‘we don’t have any trade in the floodplain nothing’; 3) 
‘we don’t have our own personal interests there’. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
lists are effective rhetorical resources for summarising general classes of things and 
making arguments sound more convincing (Edwards & Potter, 2000; Jefferson, 1990). 
Here the listing suggests that self-centred, gain-seeking motives are consistently irrelevant 
for P35 and his group, thereby supporting the general claim that they are indeed motivated 
by ecological concerns and wellbeing of the potentially affected community. The 
respondent hence actively denounces egoistic reasons for his protest involvement and 
establishes his behaviour as not just rational, but selfless and moral in nature.  
Third, the speaker portrays his actions as natural and imperative. The upshot in 
line 13 — ‘the only thing that directs us is common sense’ — is of interest here. Benwell 
(2012) pointed out that ‘common sense’ is not just a description, but a type of justification 
in its own right; that is, when claims are packaged as ‘commonsensical’ they are made to 
be perceived as intuitively correct. In the account above, the interviewee suggests that his 
involvement is underpinned solely by common sense. Formulated this way, it does not 
require additional evidence: P35’s actions are seen as natural on the grounds of being a 
part of shared commonalities of what is sensible (see also Billig, 1991; 1996). The speaker 
strengthens this effect by using a script formulation, a description that establishes actions 
as normative (Edwards, 1994; Sneijder & te Molder, 2005). Specifically, he suggests that 
‘if […] nature is dying’ (line 16), ‘then naturally it’s up to human to repair and restore all 
that’ (line 19). According to Edwards (1994), scripts normalise practices and imply that 
they do not require any special accounting. Indeed, this appears to be the function of P35’s 
formulation: by establishing helping nature when it is in need (especially given that ‘the 
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reason for this death is human himself ‘, line 18) as a script, his actions become seen as 
natural and not in need of any additional justification. The normalising work is supported 
by an explicit reference to the ‘naturalness’ of the expectation (line 19). In addition, the 
claim ‘someone has to do it’ (line 15) further highlights the normative nature of protesting, 
by portraying it as something that must be done, while rhetorical question ‘who if not us’ 
(line 21) suggests that apart from P35 and his volunteer group there is no one to take on 
this highly important task.  
Note also that P35 appears to make use of systematic vagueness (Edwards & Potter, 
2000), similarly to some of the interviewees discussed above. Together with defending 
against potential challenges, being vague enables P35 to establish the facticity of his 
claims. For example, using a passive construction to say that people might be ‘left with 
concrete and asphalt’ (lines 1-2) not only glosses over the particularities of the damage, 
but also downplays the agency of those responsible, depicting the damage as something 
that simply takes place. Furthermore, in line 16 the interviewee reports that ‘the nature is 
dying’; such reporting portrays the problem as a fact of nature rather than a consequence 
of someone’s actions. In line 18, the interviewee invokes a collective faceless ‘human’, 
who is described to be ‘the reason for this death’. This description, in line with P35’s 
instrumentality argument, suggests that arguing over who is to blame is not as important 
as addressing the issue of damage and preventing more damage from happening. 
Overall, by means of the explanations discussed above, P35 makes his protest 
involvement justifiable. His account appears to fulfil this justificatory function 
specifically because he portrays his behaviour as natural and motivated by a selfless 
objective to protect the people from an ecological disaster. 
To summarise, the analysis of the extracts in this section illustrates how active 
protest involvement is warranted on the basis of logical ‘out-there’ concerns and of having 
a duty to care for the others. The accounts share an emphasis on the instrumental nature 
of protest involvement. The speakers draw upon the notion that the state of affairs is such 
that it naturally requires attention, and active protest participation is implied to be a way 
of doing so. Protest involvement is also described as selfless behaviour, motivated by the 
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desire to benefit others, actively countering alternative explanations that the protesters are 
motivated personal or economic gain.  
 
2. ‘I felt such a resentment’: formulating emotional motives for protest 
participation 
 
This section explores the motive accounts that are structured around the emotional 
need to address an injustice. Emotion-centred arguments were particularly prevalent in the 
interviews with people who joined the protest movement after acting as election observers 
during the 2011 Parliamentary election. However, this section also contains extracts from 
other protest contexts, supporting my earlier argument that similar justifications can be 
produced regardless of the specific nature of protest.  
The first extract of this section follows the interviewee describing her reasons for 
taking part in the ‘For Fair Elections’ demonstration in December 2011. Earlier in the 
conversation the respondent mentioned that she worked as an election observer on the day 
before this demonstration.   
 




























why was it important to go out to protest? 
well (.) in a way it’s I guess a pro- this is pe- personal (.) I mean I was like humiliated  
offended the night before 
mmhm 
well the last night and I don’t know (.) I didn’t have enough sleep so  
I felt somewhat bad overall uh (.) and well I don’t know at the polling station  
everything was done wrongly basically (.) not like (.) uh not by law 
I mean sure they took the rigged votes out but in principle the results should’ve been annulled  
but of course nobody was there to do it (.) and we agreed to disagree 
mmhm 
uh but (.) well like I know that my friends felt bad and I felt that if I stay at home and  










uh because well like (.) we were again uh offended humiliated and we’re like ok fine 
mmhm  
at least to go out and (.) tell about this (.) and it’s not like I was there alone 
 
In response to the question, the interviewee starts building up towards the motive 
for protesting. Specifically, she produces a ‘well’-preface, followed by ‘in a way’ and ‘I 
guess’ (line 2), all of which seem to indicate that something sensitive is to follow 
(Schegloff & Lerner, 2009). As such, even before the explanation is given, the listener is 
alerted to the idea that it might be troublesome in some way. P10 continues by indicating 
that her motive is subjectively oriented (‘this is pe- personal’, line 2) and relates to her 
being ‘humiliated offended the night before’ (lines 2-3). In so doing, she presents her 
negative emotional state as the reason for joining the demonstration.  
In the remainder of the account, P10 does the work of warranting her emotional 
state, and the resulted protest involvement, as legitimate. This is done in a number of ways. 
First, the interviewee points out that she was physically unwell due to the lack of sleep, 
which resulted in her feeling ‘bad overall’ (lines 5-6). She thus makes available an 
understanding that her emotional state could have been partially dependent upon her 
physical state.  
Second, she produces a description of the ‘last night’ (line 5), the night before the 
demonstration took place. In particular, she recalls how ‘everything was done wrongly’ 
and ‘not by law’ (line 7), and that ‘nobody was there’ to correct it (line 9). Extreme case 
formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) here make the account more effective in portraying the 
totality of negligence and presenting the events at the polling station in highly negative 
light. Furthermore, she makes clear that she was not able to fulfil her duties as an observer 
and ensure the full compliance with the law: while the falsified votes were taken out, the 
results were not annulled (line 8), which resulted in unsatisfactory resolution of the 
conflict (‘we agreed to disagree’, line 9). Such portrayals are designed to provide 
legitimate basis for feeling humiliated and offended, by occasioning it as a response to the 
gross miscarriage of justice. In this way, legitimacy of emotional motive is closely bound 
up with descriptions of the situation that provoked the emotion; in other words, accounts 
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of ‘situation make emotions intelligibly present’ (Coulter, 1986, p. 123, emphasis in 
original).   
The third way in which P10 justifies her emotional state is by depicting it as shared 
between other people. Specifically, in line 11 she says ‘I know that my friends felt bad’; 
this knowledge claim evidences consensus with regard to the presence of negative feelings. 
Furthermore, her feeling of humiliation, although first positioned as personal (line 2), is 
portrayed as publicly shared by attributing it to others (‘we were again uh offended, 
humiliated’, line 14). The last line of the extract offers additional evidence that there were 
other people who joined the demonstration (‘it’s not like I was there alone’, line 16). 
Although P10 does not explicitly describe such people as ‘offended’, this understanding 
is likely due to the utterance being sequentially positioned immediately after the 
suggestion that people go out to voice their offence. Orientations to others thus function 
to imply that the emotions felt by the speakers are reasonable because they were felt by 
others in the same situation. 
Finally, note how the interviewee constructs her protest involvement as normative 
by depicting non-involvement as morally wrong. In lines 11-12, she claims that staying at 
home and doing more ‘ordinary’ things would be ‘wrong in relation to oneself’. The 
suggestion here is that ignoring one’s emotions — which is equal to closing one’s eyes to 
the fact of humiliation (‘and we’re like ok fine’, line 14) — is morally deficient and should 
not be done. In contrast, acting upon one’s negative emotions is implied to be ‘the right 
thing to do’, and is thus accounted for. 
Overall, then, extract 6 shows how active protest involvement can be explained in 
terms of a negative emotional state. It seems that one of the big concerns of such a strategy 
is with justifying the legitimacy of emotion. The above analysis demonstrated a number 
of tactics through which the emotional motive was presented as appropriate under the 
circumstances. The next two extracts show a further way of ‘emotional’ accounting for 
protest involvement, by drawing upon the notion of direct witnessing. In extracts 7 and 8, 
the interviewees discuss their reasons for participating in the first large-scale protest that 
took place immediately after the election day, on 5th December 2011, in Saint Petersburg 
and in Moscow, respectively. Both extracts are taken from the middle of the interviewees’ 
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responses to the question about why it was important for them to join the demonstrations. 
Some lines in extract 7 are omitted to save space. 
 

















































the result for United Russia in Saint Petersburg at least was such  
that (.) there was no doubt that it was a falsification 
mmhm  
and (.) across the whole country um the reported voting turnout was beyond all reason  
although I saw that in Saint Petersburg very few people actually came to vote (0.2)  
I spend the whole night in that poll- polling station (.) the central one for Saint Petersburg 
mmhm  
um (.) and I saw how well (.) how United Russia (0.2) was so to speak collecting the votes  
there were very few votes (.) after that all us observers were kicked out of the polling station  
and in the morning those numbers appeared 
mm mmhm  
that completely struck me with their like (0.5) um how should I put it um (0.2) shamelessness  
mmhm mmhm 
and so (.) I worked that day (.) I should have gone to protest again as a journalist (.)  
but I would have gone anyway  
mmhm 
so I went to the ((place)) and for the first time I saw that there were so many people  
((some lines omitted – she talks about being illegitimately detained by the police)) 
for the first time people (.) went not, um, because some oppositional leaders called on them  
mmhm 
but because (.) um people were really sick of it 
mmhm 
and they went of their own accord (.) people who never protested before like myself (.)  
and so (0.2) I went  
 






I was an observer and let me tell you (.) if people look with their own eyes at how  































if you take part in these elections (.) particularly if you have experience  
then it’s impossible for you not to notice all these falsifications 
mmhm  
(.) and when I saw it with my own eyes it’s- it’s a very- I felt such a resentment (0.2)  
just a simple human resentment like how’s that (0.2) you are the teachers after all (.)  
I don’t know like what if I like (.) went to my own school↑ 
mmhm 
and you do such things↑  
(1.5)  
so it was (.) a real resentment 
mmhm 
(1) 
and do you think [then-                mmhm 
                            [and so I went 
 
Extracts 7 and 8 share three properties. First, both respondents describe the state 
of affairs as problematic and wrong. In extract 7, the respondent states that the election 
result ‘was no doubt […] a falsification’ (line 2) and that ‘reported voting turnout was 
beyond all reason’ (line 4). In extract 8, the interviewee claims that ‘all this is rigged’ (line 
2) and refers to ‘all these falsifications’ (line 4). Thus, both speakers indicate that the state 
of events is highly problematic due to the degree of falsification.  
Notably, the veracity of claims of problematic situations is warranted by the 
entitlement of a specific category membership, that of a ‘witness’. In extract 7, the speaker 
positions herself as a witness by establishing her access to the witnessed scene (Potter, 
1996). In particular, she describes being present at the polling station for ‘the whole night’ 
(line 6), which implies that she was able to observe directly what was going on. P5 
strengthens her witness status by orienting to concrete experiences of ‘seeing’ via using 
an active construction ‘I saw’: in line 5 she describes seeing poor turnout in Saint 
Petersburg and in lines 8-9 she claims to have seen the process of collecting the votes, 
implying that United Russia was committing a fraud (‘was so to speak collecting the 
votes’). Similarly, in extract 8, the interviewee occasions her identity as a witness. She 
first does so directly, by saying ‘I was an observer’ (line 1), and then implies it in a more 
indirect way, by displaying her knowledge of the situation. For example, she says ‘there 
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are different ways to do it’ (line 2), which comes across as information that would be 
acquired through experience. She also claims to have seen falsifications ‘with [her] own 
eyes’ (line 6), thereby making clear that she was in direct proximity to the scene. The 
rhetorical advantage of being seen as a witness is that witnesses’ versions of the story are 
perceived as trusted (Potter & Edwards, 1990; Potter, 1996). For P5 and P12, claiming 
membership in a witness category entitles them to know what ‘really’ happened, in turn 
making their reports about election falsifications and other transgressions of law (for 
example, that ‘observers were kicked out of the polling station’, 7:9) to be seen as accurate 
and truthful. So in both cases, the speakers use an occasioned social identity of a witness 
as a resource for warranting the veracity of their claims that the situations were indeed 
highly problematic.   
Second, respondents give accounts of their subjective negative feelings. The 
speaker in extract 7 describes herself as being ‘completely struck’ with the ‘shamelessness’ 
of misconduct (line 12). The term ‘shamelessness’ (bespardonnost’) here implies that 
falsifications were carried out intentionally and without remorse. This implication 
exacerbates the situation by condemning misconduct as morally wrong (Jasper, 2008). In 
extract 8, P12 says that she ‘felt such a resentment’ (line 6); she repeats, and thereby 
stresses this feeling in lines 7 and 12. Vocal emphases in extract 7 and emphatic 
expressions ‘such a’ and ‘real’ in extract 8 convey the extent of emotional indignation and 
make speakers’ reports more believable (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008).  
It is important to note that negative emotions are displayed to be contingent on the 
witnessed misconduct and fraud. P5 orients to ‘those numbers’ that ‘appeared’ in the 
morning (7:10) as the basis for her strong indignation. Because of the preceding claim that 
the elections were unfair, the ‘numbers’ here are perceived as ‘falsified numbers’. In that 
way, her moral indignation over them is seen as reasonable. In extract 8 too, P12 
introduces her resentment as the product of her observation: ‘when I saw it with my own 
eyes it’s- it’s a very- I felt such a resentment’ (line 6). Witness entitlement assists these 
formulations as well. In his discussion of witness entitlement, based on the analysis of an 
upset car wreck witness, Sacks (1992) suggested that having a direct experience 
normatively entitles one to the feelings such experience generates. In case of the two 
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speakers above, witnessing seems to fulfil a similar normative function: it makes negative 
emotions seem more ‘natural’, and therefore more accountable, precisely because they are 
portrayed as an outcome of a first-hand experience of large-scale fraud. Moreover, the 
speaker in extract 8 makes available an understanding that witnessing normatively 
prescribes seeing falsifications and, by implication, being affected, through using an ‘if-
then’ construction in the beginning of her account. She says ‘if people look with their own 
eyes […] then it’s impossible for you not to notice’ (8:1, 4). This conditional formulation 
works to imply that for a witness being affected is normal and, in fact, impossible to avoid. 
By constructing such law-like connections between witnessing misconduct and feeling 
bad, the speakers confirm the validity of their own negative emotions.  
In addition, validity of emotions is additionally justified through the constructed 
‘sharedness’ of this sentiment. In extract 7, the interviewee describes how after going to 
place of the demonstration, she ‘saw that there were so many people’ (line 17). Later on, 
she claims that the people came because they ‘were really sick of it’ (line 20); ‘it’ in this 
context clearly refers to falsifications. Orientation to other people serves as a normalising 
device, making P5 one of many who felt indignation and acted on that feeling. As such, 
her negative emotional experience is displayed as applicable to anyone, and hence 
legitimate. In extract 8, although the emotional state is portrayed as personal (‘I felt such 
a resentment’, line 6), it is then reformulated as ‘just a simple human resentment’ in line 
7. ‘Just’ plays down the exclusiveness of the feeling and indexes it as natural, in a sense 
that it involves little effort to feel it (Lee, 1987). ‘Simple human’ in turn orients to a 
collective level of identity (as a human, and not just an observer); in effect, it normalises 
and endorses P12’s reaction, in a similar way that adverbs such as ‘obviously’ or ‘naturally’ 
do (Edwards, 1997). In so doing, her emotional reaction is offered not merely as her own, 
personal worry, but as public concern, something that others are likely to be affected by 
in a similar way. In addition, the intelligibility of P12’s emotional state depends in part on 
the category of people who are shown to be responsible for carrying out the falsifications: 
‘the teachers’. Based on category-bound features, a teacher is someone who is expected 
to be the moral example for the pupils. The speaker activates this relational pairing 
(teacher-pupil) by asking rhetorical questions in lines 8 and 10, ‘what if I like (.) went to 
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my own school↑ […] and you do such things↑’. Such questions make a point (cf. Billig, 
1996) that the respondent’s resentment for the teachers is understandable given that they 
failed to fulfil their moral obligations.  
Third, the negative emotions that speakers claimed to have experienced are shown 
to motivate their protest involvement. This is done through the use of the causal 
connective ‘and so’. P5 uses it in lines 14-15 of extract 7, to draw a connection between 
her realisation of deception, strong emotional reaction and the decision to take to the 
streets, not as a part of her work but of her own accord. She uses it again in line 23, ‘and 
so (0.2) I went’, as a closing particle. P12 puts it to the same end in extract 8, in linking 
her feeling of resentment to the act of joining the protest (‘so it was (.) a real resentment 
[…] and so I went’, 8:12, 16). In addition, in extract 7 negative emotions are described as 
the main motive for joining the protest for other people, by contrasting two different 
reasons: ‘people (.) went not, um, because some oppositional leaders called on them […] 
but because (.) um people were really sick of it’ (lines 18, 20). 
The central analytic point that can be done on the basis of the above observations 
is that the stepwise design of the accounts is a resource for establishing the rationality of 
indignation, in turn warranting accountability of active protest involvement. Witness 
category entitlement is put to work on several levels, accounting both for the veracity of 
the ‘troublesome situation’ reports and for the legitimacy of feeling moral indignation. In 
effect, causal links between the event (falsified election), emotional reaction (indignation) 
and action (protest) are established, and active protest involvement motivated by emotion 
is constructed as rational and sensible behaviour.   
Overall, the rhetorical pattern of extracts 6, 7 and 8 is similar in that the motive is 
built around presenting election observation as ‘naturally’ causing certain negative 
emotions. As the three extracts account essentially for the same type of protest (against 
election fraud), one might wonder whether such strategy is fruitful only under certain 
circumstances, for example in case of witnessing state misconduct directly. The data 
suggest that this is not the case. The last two extract in this section evidence this by 
showing how references to emotions can be used as explanations for being involved in 
different kinds of protest. Extract 9 follows the discussion of the then-recent protest 
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against the controversial ‘guilty’ verdict for political activist Alexei Navalny and his 
brother, in which the interviewee reportedly participated. The interviewee has just 
mentioned that it was important for her to support this demonstration, and starts to explain 
why.  
 
















































there was a live broadcast of the verdict for Navalny and I- 
mmhm 
I saw it and emotionally it jolted me so much 
mmhm 
it just knocked me out well m-me (.) personally I was struck by the fact of (.) this humiliation  
mm 
because they intentionally publicly broadcast it (.) perform this demonstratively 
mmhm 
demonstra- well I mean they show who’s in the driver’s seat (.)  
like we will humiliate you sit and fear us further  
mmhm  
and for me £ it’s again like a red flag for a bull £ (0.2) and on the one hand there’s a feeling  
of personal powerlessness (.) like I’ll pop out to the streets alone and then what↑ 
mmhm 
yeah I mean I (.) wo- won’t free anyone and I don’t want to risk myself  
mmhm 
on the one hand I’m not sure what to do  
mmhm mmhm 
but at the same time I (0.5) have a categorical inner protest that (.) because of this disrespect 
that they show during that (.) pseudo-court to those two people (.)  
and furthermore that’s a signal to us (.) to myself  
mmhm 
disrespect for all of us  
 
P13 begins by mentioning a specific incident, a TV broadcast of the Navalny trial, 
in a rather neutral manner: ‘there was a live broadcast of the verdict for Navalny’ (line 1). 
In line 3, the speaker establishes a link between this event and her emotional state. In 
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particular, she presents it as provoking quite an array of emotional reactions (‘I saw it and’, 
line 3), with P13 being ‘emotionally … jolted … so much’ (line 3), ‘knocked … out’ (line 
5) and ‘struck’ (line 5). These terms, especially because they are accentuated, display a 
strong sense of shock, implying that the feelings were unexpected but powerful. Note how 
the speaker described the actual reason for her emotions: ‘I was struck by the fact of (.) 
this humiliation’ (line 5). With this, the neutral ‘broadcast’ from line 1 is reformulated as 
‘humiliation’, which depicts the event as problematic; being positioned as a ‘fact’, it also 
comes across as an accurate perception. In that sense, her actions — taking part in the 
protest against the guilty verdict — are seen as defending people who are perceived to be 
treated badly. Reporting her emotional reaction as triggered by a problematic situation 
thus allows P13 to display the sensible nature of her actions, thus providing the first layer 
of defence for her motive account. 
The second layer of defence is worked up in lines 7-12, where the interviewee 
occasions intentional nature of humiliation. She does it through emphasising that the trial 
was broadcast ‘intentionally, publicly … demonstratively’ (line 7) in order to ‘show who’s 
in the driver’s seat’ (line 9), thus suggesting that the broadcast had a hidden objective to 
intimidate people into submission. P13 does not specify who ‘they’ in lines 7 and 9 are, 
but the likely candidates are the authorities or perhaps even the state. The verb ‘perform’ 
in line 7 is interesting too, as it implies that the court was simply a performance, an 
exaggerated display of power rather than an actual act of fair judgement, which contributes 
to idea of a hidden agenda. Furthermore, the utterance in line 10, designed to be heard as 
reported speech attributed to ‘them’, displays ‘their’ obvious desire to intimidate the 
viewers. Through these formulation, P13 builds a case for treating the authorities as 
deliberately committing an immoral act of humiliating its citizens. In so doing, she 
highlights a particularly reprehensible aspect of the problematic situation, which 
contributes to the appropriateness of her emotional outburst. Indeed, deliberateness of 
misconduct has been shown to be a powerful resource for establishing accountability of 
one’s own claims and conduct (Drew, 1998), and the speaker in extract 9 uses it to advance 




The causal link between the speaker’s feelings and the situation is reinforced in 
line 19, where P13 explicitly states that her ‘categorical inner protest’ was ‘because of this 
disrespect’. She upgrades the severity of disrespect by constructing it as relevant on a 
broader scale, not just as mistreatment of Navalny brothers (line 20), but as ‘a signal to us 
(.) to myself […] disrespect for all of us’ (lines 21, 23). Inclusiveness of this formulation 
provides for the understanding that even though the trial was, strictly speaking, about two 
people, it had a much wider significance. In so doing, P13 offers additional inferences 
about the character of the broadcast trial: that it was the type of incident which could easily 
provoke a strong emotional response in the broader public including herself and foster the 
desire to actively protest against it.   
Overall, then, the analysis shows how different parts of the account function to 
warrant the appropriateness of emotional motive for active protest involvement. While the 
speaker does not make much use of witness entitlement, the general strategy of 
formulating motive is similar to the first three extracts in this section: the interviewee 
portrays herself as provoked into action by a particularly troublesome situation, 
specifically, by the negative feelings such situation generated. Through constructing such 
causal links, P13 is able to demonstrate that her feelings are essentially rational, which 
contributes to accountability of her protest involvement. 
Before moving to the final extract, I would like to make one tentative suggestion 
concerning the work done by P13 in lines 12-17. There, she uses a metaphor — ‘like a red 
flag for a bull’ — to describe how she felt. Figurative formulations such as this hold certain 
rhetorical power because they ‘compress’ a variety of meanings into a succinct and 
intuitively intelligible expression (Drew & Holt, 1988; Edwards, 2005b). However, 
formulaic phrases can also be risky because of that, since the speaker does not have much 
control over the facets of meaning. To illustrate, P13’s metaphor can be understood to 
show that she was enraged and provoked, but it also can be taken to imply that her 
behaviour was instinctual and without much rational thinking. Within the current 
conversational context the second implication is damaging, as it can be the basis for 
accusations of irrationality (Edwards, 1997). In that sense, it is possible to suggest that the 
comparison of the two attitudes (‘on the one hand […] but at the same time’, lines 12, 19) 
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and avowal of unsureness (‘on the one hand I’m not sure what to do’, line 17) are resources 
for displaying the thoughtful and sensible nature of her actions. Built into these accounts 
is the implication that P13 did not act instinctively or on a whim, but took time to 
contemplate her options and made an informed decision to act on her ‘categorical inner 
protest’ (line 19). As such, the passage can be seen as adding to the overarching rationality 
of the argument, especially given that it appears after the metaphor that could imply 
irrationality. 
The final extract in this chapter comes from a protester who discusses her 
participation in the ‘Moscow for Everyone’ demonstration, aimed against racism and 
xenophobia. The interviewee continues the discussion by focusing on the motive for her 
involvement.  
 






































I went because (0.5) well when they try to unite like (.) the country based on hatred  
well it’s unacceptable for me 
mmhm 
I don’t want to become (.) hateful myself nor live in fear for myself for friends for anyone  
(.) well I don’t understand why it’s needed 
mmhm mmhm 
I mean I understand why they need it (.) hh £ I don’t understand why I need it £ 
aha 
and so when (0.5) well (.) I feel such a resentment (.) I was always quite a patriot  
like yes (.) we do have some objective problems but still  
and I feel very resentful that for the past two years it’s basically taken from me  
mmhm 
because I can’t be proud of the country where it’s allowed to (.) um  
to kick gay people on the streets without any problem and it’s um (.) also allowed  
to kill children from the Caucasus without any problem and that’s the norm 
mmhm  
and the other way around (.) when maybe ethnic diasporas ethnic mafias are allowed to exist  




There are three features of this extract that I would like to discuss. First, P42 makes 
clear that her motive for protesting stems from her perception of the state of affairs in 
Russia as problematic (line 1). Specifically, she suggests that the state of affairs is 
unacceptable, undesired and nonsensical. She repeatedly describes the situation as 
‘unacceptable’, first with regard to an attempt to make hatred into a uniting principle (line 
2) and then with regard to dubious societal standards (line 18). Another reason for protest 
is given in line 4, where P42 claims that she does not want to ‘become (.) hateful’ and 
‘live in fear’. These disinclinations are formulated in such a way that their intelligibility 
does not require additional explanation; conventionally, these are things that people would 
not want. In so doing, P42 strengthens the depiction of the situation in Russia as 
problematic. Finally, the speaker characterises the situation as nonsensical by displaying 
her lack of understanding (‘I don’t understand why it’s needed’, line 5; ‘I don’t understand 
why I need it’, line 7). By attending to various facets of what is wrong with the situation, 
the interviewee makes the situation appear consistently bad, which makes her desire to 
address it (by joining the demonstration) more convincing.  
Second, similarly to the speaker in extract 9, the interviewee here constructs 
misconduct as intentional. In line 1, she argues that ‘they try to unite like (.) the country 
based on hatred’; this formulation implies that ‘they’ are making an effort and are 
therefore aware of what they are doing. A similar effect is achieved when P42 orients to 
her understanding that whoever promotes the idea of hatred needs it (line 7). In effect, the 
problematic state of affairs is seen to be a result of conscious planning, and by implication, 
is more condemnable because it is an expression of malicious intent. Note again that who 
‘they’ are is left unspecified. Such ‘not naming’ strategy (Wooffitt, 1992) might be seen 
as another example of systematic vagueness. Vagueness is advantageous because it 
enables the interviewees in extracts 9 and 10 to insist that problematic actions are being 
done deliberately, but it also defends them from dealing with potential challenges of 
giving specific details. In other words, lack of specificity makes the accounts difficult to 
probe while preserving their ability to capture the essence of certain moral issues (Potter 
& Edwards, 1990).  
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Third, the speaker in extract 10 invokes a negative subjective feeling of resentment 
(line 9) and justifies it in several ways. In particular, P42 describes herself as being ‘always 
quite a patriot’ (line 9). This description is effective in two ways. First, it presents P42 is 
a positive light, as someone who cares for her country. Second, ‘always’ implies that being 
a patriot is a deep-rooted part of the speaker’s personality. This second implication works 
to make her resentfulness understandable: because being a patriot is an integral part of 
who P42 is, losing it (‘it’s basically taken from me’, line 11) is seen as a serious issue. 
The rhetoric of identity dissolution, not being able to be ‘who one is’, has strong 
argumentative power (Billig, 1996); it assists P42 in depicting her feeling of resentment 
as expected, given that she cannot be a patriot any more. Furthermore, resentment is 
justified on the grounds of her inability to feel proud for Russia (line 13). Explaining this 
inability, the interviewee makes a list of issues in Russia, such as the existence of 
uncontrolled mafia (line 17) and open hostility towards gay people and members of ethnic 
minorities (line 14-15). The actions she orients to are conventionally seen as troubling, 
because they violate basic human rights and compassion (in particular ‘kill[ing] children 
from the Caucasus’, line 15). P42 portrays the situation as even more grim, by positioning 
these behaviours as unquestionable ‘norms’ of Russian society. Such a state of affairs is 
decidedly not something to be proud of, and as such provides a contextual justification for 
the interviewee feeling very resentful.  
On the basis on these three observations, an already familiar strategy of accounting 
emerges: P42’s emotional indignation is portrayed as a rational reaction to an injustice 
‘out there’. Constructed wrongness of the state of affairs functions to warrant the 
righteousness of P42’s feelings, in turn bolstering the reasonableness of her protest 
involvement.  
Overall, in contrast to the strategy described in the first section, the extracts above 
demonstrate a different motive orientation: the power of feeling rather than logic, 
emphasis on witnessing and moral indignation rather than on instrumental necessity. 
However, emotional motive accounts are not just flat reports of what one felt; in them, 
emotion talk is an integral part of rational accountability (Edwards, 1997). That is, the 
emotional states are described so as to demonstrate their solid rational foundation. In their 
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descriptions, interviewees draw upon the idea that certain states of affairs are problematic 
and witnessing them ‘naturally’ inflicts negative feelings. In turn, such feelings are 




This chapter explored the construction of a motive for active protest involvement 
as an interactional accomplishment. Specifically, it investigated how protesters formulate 
‘instrumental’ and ‘emotion’ arguments in talk about active protest participation.  
Confirming the suggestion made in the introduction, the analysis demonstrated 
that the interviewees generally talked in ways that justified their active protest 
involvement as legitimate. I identified two main strategies of accounting, which I called 
‘instrumental’ and ‘emotional’. In the first strategy, motives were formulated with respect 
to the obligational and instrumental nature of protesting. Speakers portrayed the state of 
affairs around them as highly problematic and thus as requiring attention, and protest was 
implied to be the natural way to address it. Protest involvement was also described as 
selfless and moral behaviour, motivated by the desire to help others. In the second strategy, 
motives were structured around negative emotional experiences that speakers claimed to 
have. This involved orienting to specific flaws of the system and portraying them as 
legitimately provoking moral shock. In both strategies, interviewees used various 
discursive devices to make their claims convincing, such as category entitlement, ‘if-then’ 
formulations and systematic vagueness.  
Although the two argumentative strategies were conceptualised as distinct, there 
was an important commonality. Across the extracts, the motives and behaviours they led 
to were characterised as inherently rational. Even in invoking emotional bases of 
mobilisation, speakers attended to its rationality, by manufacturing moral outrage as a 
logical response to transgressions of justice. This finding is in line with some previous 
discursive research. For example, Nepstad and Smith (2001) found similar constructions 
of rational emotions in their study of activists in the Central American peace movement. 
Their respondents too depicted protest as motivated by deep moral indignation, which in 
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turn was shown to arise as a result of witnessing unjust conduct and lies of the government 
in Central America. Furthermore, Young (2001) and Warren (2010) found similar 
constructions in the reports of activists belonging to slavery abolition movement and 
antiracist movement, respectively. This evidence suggests that scholars of protest need to 
reconsider the existent divisions between emotions and rationality, and focus instead on 
the various ways in which emotion and logic can be discursively interlaced.       
My analysis, however, goes beyond reproducing the findings of other studies on 
protest, and provides additional insights about the nature of protest in Russia. The idea of 
cultural vocabularies of motive is helpful here. In his classic work on motive imputation, 
Mills (1940) argued that motives were the explanations that people deemed appropriate 
for specific contexts. For Mills, this was precisely the reason why certain motives were 
verbalised more often than others, and why certain features were shared across different 
explanations. He called such patterns ‘working vocabulary’ of motive, and suggested that 
they could act as illustrations of a typical motive, for a given action, in a given context. 
Similarly to the majority of DP researchers, Mills was not concerned with whether such 
motives were ‘true’ or ‘false’; rather, he offered to see typical motives as ‘windows’ to 
the social order of a specific society. Articulated, motive was seen as producing a norm, 
with which the motive-giver urged his counterpart to agree (cf. Billig, 1991; 1996). In that 
way, Mills argued, motives were tools of social influence.  
Following these ideas, it can be suggested that in their interviews, my respondents 
were building such working vocabularies of motive. The two types of motivational 
accounts identified in this chapter can thus be understood as strategies that participants 
think particularly effective for addressing the situation at hand, i.e. providing legitimate 
explanations as to why it was important for them to become actively involved in protests 
in Russia (according to the interviewer’s question). As such, analytic findings can tell us 
something important about the social order in Russia. In particular, they suggest that it is 
important for protesters to convince their listeners that their active protest involvement 
was a rational choice, and consider it as moral and altruistic act. Why might this be? It 
can be suggested that this tactic addresses specific normative concerns. To understand 
which ones, we need to look closely at the discourses associated with protest in Russia.  
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It has been noted that stories of active protest involvement in Russia are told within 
largely unsympathetic cultural assumptions, which are often actively promoted by the 
official media: that protesters are careless, unpatriotic, West-paid city-dwellers who ‘rock 
the boat’ of stability in seeking personal economic gains and favours (Clément, 2013; 
Sakwa, 2015). Another, but equally disparaging, discourse is of protesters as people who 
are simply brainwashed into protesting by the evil protest leaders obsessed with personal 
power. As an illustration, being on state TV, Vladimir Putin has famously described 
protesters as ‘bandarlogs’, comparing them to Rudyard Kipling’s foolish monkeys who 
were hypnotised by the powerful python Kaa (White, 2013; naturally, Putin did not care 
to specify who Kaa might be). It is possible that argumentative strategies that I identified 
in my analysis are ways of implicitly attending to, and dealing with, such negative 
portrayals. For example, through downplaying the importance of self-centred and gain-
seeking motives, the protesters can be seen inoculating themselves against the stereotype 
that they are paid for taking part in protest. In particular, claims of having a ‘duty’ to 
protest in order to help others counter the often-articulated idea that people who went to 
the streets were only concerned about themselves (Aron, 2013). Most importantly, 
depiction of protest involvement as a rational choice attends to, and counters, the 
‘brainwashed’ image, establishing protesters as active agents in their own right. So one 
potential answer to why rationality in motivational accounts appears to be a paramount 
concern is because protesters operate in the context where protest participation is often 
presented as not normative and problematic. My analysis hence offers evidence that 
respondents are sensitive to negative depictions of them circulating in society, and resist 
these through talk. As such, working vocabularies of motive are joint productions that are 
attuned to both conversational issues at hand and to the broader societal issues, and might 
be used to alter socio-political perceptions within the society. 
At a more theoretical level, my analysis also makes several contributions to the 
research on social psychology of protest, in particular to the dual pathway model of protest 
mobilisation (van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008). To briefly reiterate 
from the literature review chapter, in his classic work on protest Klandermans (1997) 
observed that people often get upset or angry over certain situations, but these emotions 
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do not result in active protest engagement. He suggested that this is because people 
perceive themselves as having little efficacy: as they see themselves powerless to make a 
change, going to the streets loses its significance, and people remain uninvolved. Such 
explanation prioritises efficacy over emotion. In turn, van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) 
proposed that emotion mobilisation does not need to be seen in such close proximity to 
efficacy, and, in fact, might constitute a distinct pathway to protest mobilisation. Based 
on this idea, van Zomeren et al. developed their dual pathway model, which presupposes 
two separate pathways to protest engagement: ‘efficacy pathway’ reflecting problem-
based coping, and ‘anger pathway’ reflecting emotion-focused coping. While my analysis 
certainly did not set out to ‘test’ this model, the findings offer an intriguing possibility to 
relate to it. A word of caution here is that from the position of the classic dual pathway 
model, people’s accounts are seen as linguistic expressions of inner cognitive states, while 
discursive psychology rejects this view and respecifies cognitive states as functional 
interactive resources (Edwards, 1997). And yet, cognitive and discursive approaches do 
not need to be incompatible: as was rightly observed by Benford (1993, p. 209), ‘structural 
and interpretative approaches may be complimentary rather than contradictory’. In this 
way, my analysis can fruitfully contribute to cognitive models by furnishing them with 
specific meanings and showing how they might play out in situ rather than in theory, thus 
facilitating a better understanding of protest mobilisation (cf. Simon et al., 1998). With 
these considerations in mind, I would like to discuss two contributions. 
First, I suggest that the arguments explored in the first section of this chapter can 
be useful for furnishing efficacy pathway, while the arguments in the second section can 
be fruitfully related to anger pathway. Efficacy pathway is linked to instrumental 
treatment of problematic situations. In theory, it is assumed that people who follow the 
efficacy route to mobilisation perceive the state of affairs around them as unsatisfactory 
and attempt to remedy it by joining protest. In that way, there is a clear causal relation 
between cognition and behaviour: people’s perceptions prompt them into action. What my 
analysis can add to this theoretical conceptualisation is an illustration of various ways in 
which the link between the situation and action mobilisation can be constructed in talk. 
For example, the analysis suggests that situations are strategically described as 
167 
 
unsatisfactory or even dangerous, so that acting upon them is seen as logical (as in extract 
4). Arguments that draw on duty and common sense appear to be consistently used for 
this (extract 5). These can be accompanied by the invocation of social identities that 
normatively predispose one to act, such as ‘historian’ in extract 2. Importantly, social 
categories can be invoked implicitly, as in extract 1, where P31 implies that his duty as a 
parent is to improve the situation so that his child can live in a better country. My data 
thus show that causal links between situations and protest mobilisation are indeed salient, 
but not in a given objective sense: rather, causality is an achievement, something that is 
actively manufactured by protesters in talk.   
The second contribution concerns the anger pathway. Van Zomeren’s model 
proposes that protest mobilisation is condition by group-based anger resulting from 
appraising the group situation as unfair. Furthermore, the politicised collective identity 
model also stresses the importance of anger for transforming collective identities and 
facilitating social actions (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2009). I would 
like to argue, however, that the focus does not need to be on anger alone. Indeed, van 
Zomeren and colleagues themselves at one point suggested that in theory any emotion can 
be equally important. While it has been argued that anger is an action-oriented emotion 
(Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993) and is thus efficient for engaging people, 
orientations to anger as a motive for active protest involvement were very rarely used 
among my interviewees. Instead, as the analysis demonstrates, the emphasis was made on 
feeling ‘resentful’ (extracts 8 and 10), emotionally ‘struck’ (extracts 7 and 9) and 
‘offended’ (extract 6). These emotional descriptions construct and sustain a sense of moral 
shock, which is a helpful resource for accounting for initial mobilisation (Jasper, 2008). 
This is perhaps because from a rhetorical vantage point the word ‘anger’ has properties 
that can be detrimental to certain motive-related arguments. For example, being ‘angry’ 
relates easily to the feeling of being victimised and helpless (Warner, 1986). Such 
implications can be damaging to the justifications of protest as instrumental for improving 
the state of affairs, because they contradict the claim of efficacy. In addition, Warner 
pointed out that anger had been traditionally seen as a self-centred emotion. As my 
analysis shows, the significant characteristic of both instrumental and emotional 
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argumentation is their other-related orientation; referring to ‘anger’ as an explanatory 
emotion would be unproductive for such constructions. Finally, anger often appears to be 
directly linked to aggression and aggressive behaviour, which is generally frowned upon 
in modern societies (Jasper, 2014). In terms of accountability of protest involvement, 
being seen as aggressive is certainly an implication to avoid in Russia, especially given 
that after the infamous May 2012 Bolotnaya Square protest, the state propaganda started 
to capitalise on the image of aggressive protesters as a threat to the police and the public 
(Fomina, 2012; Greene, 2012). Indeed, some of my participants explicitly commented on 
this connotation of the term ‘angry’ and resisted it. For example, consider this extract that 
shows the reaction of one of the participants to the interviewer’s suggestion that protesters 
can be characterised as ‘angry’: 
 












it’s just (0.5) I heard the description angry citizens somewhere 
yeah but (0.2) well I don’t really like the term angry  
mmhm 
because I (0.2) I don’t feel any anger (0.5) I mean there’s no (.)  
nothing (0.2) there is no aggression in my protesting 
 
Overall, then, an important contribution of my analysis to the broader socio-
psychological literature on protest concerns the fact that there are subtleties in both 
instrumental and emotional mobilisation pathways, which can easily be overlooked. Such 
subtleties are not examined in detail within cognitive models that strive to come up with 
generic explanations of behaviour. Applying findings from a more micro-level approach 
can enrich such models (respecifying them to a degree, Edwards & Potter, 2005) and 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the role of efficacy and emotions in protest 
mobilisation.   
So far, the empirical chapters in this thesis have focused on the arguments that can 
be seen to attend to the ‘entry points’ of social protest: explanations of becoming 
politically interested and of becoming an active participant in protest. The next chapter 
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builds upon these analyses and turns to the topic of protester identity, exploring what it 
means for protesters to be a part of the opposition movement, and the meanings of ‘the 


































Chapter 5. ‘It’s a very broad concept’: negotiating oppositional 
identity and belonging 
 
So far in this thesis, I have analysed a variety of arguments relating to the 
acquisition of political interest, and explored interactional construction of motives for 
becoming actively involved in protest. This chapter extends the analysis further, by 
focusing on another element traditionally associated with protest mobilisation — identity. 
In particular, my analysis is concerned with interactional negotiation of oppositional 
belonging and with the meanings that protesters attach to the category of ‘opposition’ 
itself. 
In the literature and the media, the label of ‘opposition’ is often used 
unproblematically, as an umbrella term to describe protesters (Artem’ev, 2011; 
“Opposition takes to the streets”, 2013). However, some observers have warned against 
using this label in such a way. For example, Lobanova and Semenov (2015) argued that 
the groups and individuals who took part in demonstrations are too heterogeneous to be 
called ‘the opposition’. Similarly, Gel’man (2015) suggested that being labelled as 
‘political opposition’ might be problematic for some protesters in Russia, especially for 
those who consider themselves civic, and not political, activists. Likewise, in an edited 
collection that explored local social movements in Russia, Clément and colleagues (2013) 
maintained that calling the protest movement in Russia ‘oppositional’ has the risk of 
casting it as predominantly political, which is not always the case. Indeed, the authors 
found that out of the six protest case studies they explored, not one had characterised itself 
as ‘political’.  
Along with ‘the opposition’, academic literature contains other labels that are used 
to describe protesters in Russia. For example, Greene (2012; 2013) used the term ‘ordinary 
activists’ to denote participants who are not politicians or professional protest 
campaigners. He also referred to protesters as ‘hipsters’7 (2013, p. 48), ‘twenty-something, 
young, cosmopolitan urbanites’ who, he argued, constituted the most representative 
                         
7 It is interesting to mention that in my data respondents actively resisted the label of ‘hipster’, 
referring to its depreciatory connotations (the extracts are not shown in this thesis). 
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community in the 2011-2012 wave of protests. Gel’man (2015) favoured the description 
‘civil activist’, although he suggested that in 2011 civil activists became aligned with the 
more politicised opposition, which effectively portrayed them as the part of ‘the 
opposition’. In addition, some studies seem to solve the labelling issue by characterising 
protesters based on their occupational and demographic characteristics. For instance, 
Robertson (2013) referred to his participants in terms of their occupation, age and gender. 
Gontmakher and Ross (2015) conceptualised oppositional belonging in terms of class and 
used the label of ‘middle class citizens’. Furthermore, in a comprehensive overview, 
Volkov (2012a) used a variety of labels to describe protesters, such as ‘politician’, 
‘journalist’, ‘poet’ and, most frequently, ‘civil activist’.  
Overall then, there appears to be a general lack of agreement on how to label 
protest participants and, indeed, on how they label themselves. Very little is known about 
how protesters themselves understand the term ‘opposition’, whether this label is relevant 
for them and, if so, where they would like to be seen in relation to ‘the opposition’. While 
the researchers agree that ‘lay’, unaffiliated protesters comprise the largest proportion of 
the ‘opposition’ and hence should be an important object of investigation (Robertson, 
2011; Volkov, 2012b), their views and arguments rarely constitute the topic of interest in 
itself. I argue that such inattentiveness limits our understanding of the Russian protest by 
omitting the voices of protesters and automatically including them into, or excluding them 
from, ‘the opposition’. Importantly, the neglect of protesters’ accounts prevents us from 
learning what the protest culture means to its (supposed) members (cf. Widdicombe & 
Wooffitt, 1995). Arguing for the need to explore protesters’ accounts, I do not intend to 
come up with one ‘true’ meaning of the opposition or its contents. Rather, I would like to 
show that the matters of oppositional belonging might be not as relevant to protesters as 
they are to the researchers of protest; and if they are, that there are multiple ways that 
belonging can be negotiated. In other words, the aim of this chapter is to explore how the 
phenomenon of ‘the opposition’ is brought to life by protesters, in their own terms. 
Two additional considerations suggest that paying closer attention to people’s own 
self-categorisations is important. First, research from the social psychology demonstrates 
that exploration of ‘identity politics’ is paramount for our understanding of contentious 
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behaviour. The concept of identity is central to social-psychological research on collective 
action (Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Klandermans, 1997). More specifically, studies within 
the framework of the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) show that subjective 
belonging has the potential to mobilise people to protest and sustain it. In their seminal 
paper, Simon et al. (1998) suggested that even though protest actions are performed by 
individuals, protesters act on behalf of relevant social groups. Be it identification with a 
specific collective movement, or a more broad opinion group, such as being ‘pro’ or 
‘against’ something (cf. Bliuc et al., 2007), social psychologists agree that group 
membership is a highly significant factor, and deserves extensive attention both as 
quantitative (as statistical predictor) and qualitative (as subjective understanding of 
belonging) phenomenon. This means that asking questions regarding whom protesters 
identify with, and how they perceive themselves, is important, as it sheds light on the very 
mechanics of protest behaviour. 
Second, it is well known that different categories have different connotations, and 
that labels are discursively not neutral. For example, calling a person a ‘terrorist’ or a 
‘freedom fighter’ has important and contrasting practical consequences (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). Ample research from the tradition of conversation and discourse 
analyses (Edwards & Potter, 2000) and membership categorisation analysis (Stokoe, 
2012) demonstrates the practical value of paying close attention to labels that people use 
to describe themselves and others. This research demonstrates that labels are strategically 
used to justify actions; such justifications are particularly important in the context of 
contentious struggles. Indeed, a number of researchers have explored how multiple, and 
often competing, social identities are constructed by various protest groups. For example, 
Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2004), in their rhetorical analysis of British Muslim 
activists’ identities showed how, in talk, the activists attended to issues of territorial 
integrity in warranting their collective identity as ummah, meaning the global Islamic 
community, and, in so doing, affirmed the struggle for their political rights and interests 
as legitimate. These authors also demonstrated how the opponents of such struggle 
undermined the protesters’ collective identity and their actions through prioritising the 
understanding of ummah as the global community of people across the globe, regardless 
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of their religion. Similarly, Bassiouney (2012) focused on the relationship between 
language and identity, in examining how the identities of the protesters from the Tahrir 
Square in Egypt were discursively negotiated in the media. She showed how the 
supporters of the revolution warranted their identities as rightful protesters and ‘true 
Egyptians’ and at the same time resisted the harmful labels of careless ‘rebels’ and 
foreign-sponsored ‘false Egyptians’. With regard to the more ‘conventional’ oppositional 
identifications, Stuart et al. (2013) showed that the identity of a ‘protester’ can be resisted, 
by discounting it as too moderate and disempowering. Exploring the identities of the 
activists of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, a radical organisation fighting against 
whaling, Stuart and colleagues found that its members rejected the identity of ‘protesters’ 
in favour of more paradoxical labels, such as ‘noncriminal pirates’ and ‘gentle terrorists’. 
Stuart and colleagues proposed that asserting such seemingly absurd identities helped the 
Sea Shepherds to emphasise the uniqueness of their organisation. Furthermore, Bobel 
(2007) argued that the category of an ‘activist’, being discursively associated with a 
romanticised image of a tireless and selfless individual, could entail damaging 
consequences for those who unproblematically accepted it. Based on his interviews with 
protesters in the US, Bobel showed that such idealised discursive images were the reason 
why the identity of an ‘activist’ was actively rejected even by the core social movement 
members.  
This brief review demonstrates that categorising oneself and others is far more 
than just simple communication of one’s thoughts; rather, it is an important strategic 
achievement. Categorisation does things: identity categories can be flexibly used by 
protesters to accomplish a variety of actions, for example, to justify a group’s protest 
behaviour or to refute negative cultural perceptions. Such ‘category work’ cannot be 
studied theoretically; it requires fine-grained analysis of participants’ accounts. Although 
more and more scholars embrace such discursive-oriented stance in their analyses of the 
protests in the West and the countries of the Arab Spring (Al-Saleh, 2015; Smith, Thomas 
& McGarty, 2015; Polletta, 2006), there are still very few studies that look at the 
conversational categorisation done by protesters in Russia. This chapter thus addresses the 
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gaps in the previous research and extends the previous analyses by focusing on the 




The majority of extracts in this chapter come from the collection of interviewer-
solicited accounts of oppositional belonging, produced in response to the various 
questions concerning the opposition. Because the interviews were semi-structured, a range 
of questions was employed to elicit interviewees’ accounts. For example, I asked the 
respondents about their oppositional membership directly, using such questions as ‘are 
you a part of the opposition?’, ‘would you consider yourself a part of the opposition?’ and 
‘what is your relation to the opposition?’ I also asked questions about the meaning of the 
opposition, such as ‘what is opposition for you?’ and ‘what do you mean by opposition?’ 
Even though the latter questions do not ask interviewees to comment on their own 
oppositional belonging, a number of respondents did so; these accounts were thus also 
included in the chapter (extracts 2, 3, 9 and 13). One account (separated for analytic 
convenience into two extracts, 11 and 14) has been taken from a collection of extracts in 
which discussions of the opposition appeared spontaneously within the flow of the 
interviewees’ talk, without being prompted by the interviewer. In the chosen instance of 
spontaneous ‘opposition belonging’ talk, the original question is not included, as it is on 
a different topic and sequentially rather removed from the account under investigation. 
Specific extracts were chosen based on the results of initial analysis, which 
revealed a variety of patterns of affirming and resisting oppositional membership. Certain 
patterns appeared to be more pronounced than others; that is, they occurred repeatedly 
across the extracts. The extracts that best exemplified such patterns were noted and 
selected for more detailed analysis. They were translated and transcribed in accordance 
with CA conventions. I then separated the extracts into four groups, according to the 
particular means through which oppositional identities were affirmed/resisted: accepting 
the opposition by claiming possession of criterial attributes, accepting but delimiting 
oppositional membership by describing specific features associated with that membership, 
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rejecting the opposition on the grounds of not possessing the ‘right’ attitudes and motives, 
and rejecting opposition as the wrong word. This chapter examines these four strategies 
in turn, starting with the practice of affirming oppositional membership through invoking 
criterial attributes.  
 
1. ‘The opposition are those who are not satisfied’: accomplishing 
oppositional membership by claiming possession of criterial attributes 
 
In this section, I explore how protesters affirm their oppositional affiliation on the 
basis of determining what ‘the opposition’ generally is. In the following two extracts, the 
interviewees are asked about being part of the opposition, and about their understanding 
of the word ‘opposition’, respectively. In the first extract, the question is asked towards 
the end of a long narrative about the interviewee’s dissatisfaction with the political 
situation in Russia.  
 


















are you a part of the opposition or?  
(0.5)  
what is your relation to the opposition? 
(0.6) 
well (0.2) the opposition are (.) those- those who are not satisfied with (.)  
ºpolitical (.) regimesº therefore yes 
mmhm [you are part of the opposition 
            [I am the opposition yes 
 










and opposition (.) what’s this word for you (.) what do you mean by opposition? 
well (.) basically the opposition- (0.2) well if we treat it as a neutral word 
mmhm  
























who have (.) um (0.8) contrary (0.6) um views (0.6) so to speak to that (.) elite 
mmhm  
and (0.2) the regime who is currently at the helm 
mmhm 
therefore if like today the communists were- the Communist Party was in power 
mmhm 
I would also be .hh the opposition yeah  
mmhm mmhm 
because (.) my views don’t match their views completely 
 
There appear to be two parts in the accounts above. In the first part, a definition of 
opposition is being constructed. In extract 1, this is done by characterising the opposition 
as ‘those who are not satisfied with (.) political (.) ºregimesº’ (lines 5-6). In so doing, P1 
links an attitude to a category, constructing a category-tied predicate (Stokoe, 2012). Since 
categories are inference-rich (Sacks, 1992), they can be associated with a range of 
category predicates, such as activities, motives, expectations, rights and obligations and 
so on. In the extract above, ‘the opposition’ is associated with dissatisfaction with the 
regime: this attitude is thus constructed as criterial. In extract 2, the speaker draws on the 
interviewer’s question in producing a definition: the question in line 1 occasions 
opposition as a ‘word’ (line 1) and enquires about its meaning, therefore offering a good 
opportunity for definition-giving. P13 uses it and describes the opposition as a ‘group of 
people […] who have (.) um (0.8) contrary (0.6) um views […] to that (.) elite’ (lines 4, 
6). Such a definition similarly orients to a concrete category-tied feature — the sense of 
disagreement with the ruling regime. Note that P13 also attends to the credibility of the 
definition produced. In line 2, she starts a description — ‘basically the opposition- (0.2)’ 
— but then stops and formulates a condition (‘well if we treat it as a neutral word’). This 
design works to present the upcoming definition as impartial, based on the nature of the 
word itself rather than on anything else, like P13’s own understanding. In that way, the 
respondent removes the subjective dimension occasioned in the interviewer’s question 
(‘what’s this word for you (.) what do you mean’, line 1, my emphasis), hence building up 
the definition as objectively credible.  
178 
 
In the second part of their accounts, speakers warrant their membership in the 
category of opposition. Both of them use connective ‘therefore’ (1:6; 2:10) to imply a link 
between the definition and the subsequent claim of membership. Specifically, in extract 1 
the interviewee says ‘therefore yes […] I am the opposition yes’ (lines 6, 8). With this, his 
membership in the category of the opposition is made relevant on the basis of sharing an 
attitude. Recall that within the interactional context, P1’s own dissatisfaction with the 
government in Russia has already been made clear, and is a part of the shared knowledge 
between him and the interviewer before the question in line 1 is asked. P1 thus does not 
need to explicitly state that he too is dissatisfied in order to make his claim work. His 
oppositional affiliation is accounted for on the grounds of his possessing a criterial attitude.  
The interviewee in the second extract occasions her oppositional membership in a 
more implicit way, by describing a hypothetical scenario using an ‘if-then’ formulation. 
In particular, P13 says ‘if like today the communists were- the Communist Party was in 
power’ (line 10), ‘[then] I would also be .hh the opposition’ (line 12). Note how the ‘then’ 
part implicitly asserts the fact of belonging: the emphasis on ‘also’ suggests that P13 is 
already in opposition. It can be inferred that, similar to the communists, ‘the regime who 
is currently at the helm’ (line 8) does not match her views either; she attends to this 
inference in line 14 in stating that her views ‘don’t match’ the views of the ruling 
government. In so doing, P13 confirms the possession of the attitude presented as criterial 
for the opposition earlier, thereby justifying her claim of oppositional belonging.  
So while the interviewees accept the membership in the category of opposition, 
they do so in a rather indirect, but neat way. Note, for example, that in case of P1, 
indication of membership could have come after the first interviewer’s question, which 
directly invites the interviewee to accept or reject it (‘are you a’, 1:1). P1, however, avoids 
providing an upfront categorisation of himself. Instead, after the second more open-ended 
question, he develops a definition of the category and then makes a membership claim. 
The second interviewee does a similar thing: she delivers her implicit affiliation statement 
after she has produced a definition. The advantage of such design is in its ability to 
highlight the logic of identity ascription — through depicting one as ‘fitting’ the definition 
— thereby justifying claims of membership.  
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A final point here is that both speakers orient to the delicacy of the topic. This is 
done, first, by prefacing the answers with ‘well’ (1:5; 2:2); as mentioned before, such 
design has been shown to be a powerful rhetorical device for producing the topic of talk 
as sensitive (Schegloff & Lerner, 2009). Second, there are several pauses and hesitations 
in both extracts, which tend to accompany conversations about sensitive topics (Sidnell, 
2010); most notably in extract 1 where the answer is delayed (lines 2 and 4). In the case 
of the second speaker, her ‘analogical’ if-then description is rather indirect, and thus might 
be seen as a way to make the topic discernibly ‘delicate’ (Lerner, 2013).  
The next extract shows similar delicacy orientations and demonstrates a variation 
of what appears to be the same strategy of warranting oppositional membership. 
 










































and what’s opposition for you? 
(0.8)  
for you personally, how do you understand this word? 
(1.2) 
well it’s a rather (.) for me for some reason it’s a very broad concept 
mmhm  
because I consider myself um (0.8) a part of this concept .hh 
mmhm  
although I don’t do (0.2) anything particularly active 
mmhm  
I think these are people who (.) um at this particular historical moment (.) in Russia 
the opposition- (.) um (0.2) people who consider themselves opposition are those  
who want um (.) some change and reforms 
mmhm  
um (0.2) political, reforms  
mmhm  
of various um (.) systems, such as education (0.2) electoral system 
mmhm  
medical (.) judicial system I mean (.) nearly all parts of our life here need a change 









I’m interested in what’s going on here and here are my friends, family (.) 
mmhm  
I don’t plan to move but I’d really want a change 
 
Similarly to the speaker in extract 2, the interviewee here answers the question 
about her understanding of the opposition. She does it in such a way as to construct and 
justify her oppositional identity. However, instead of formulating a ‘neutral’ definition 
first and then confirming her membership on the basis of this, P3 makes an identity claim 
upfront. She does it by stating that for her the opposition is ‘a very broad concept’ (line 5) 
and that she considers herself to be ‘a part of this concept’ (line 7).  
The claim of oppositional belonging is then justified in two ways.  
First, using the strategy we saw above, P3 does it through displaying possession 
of a criterial attitude. In line 11-13, she offers a definition of the kind of people who would 
call themselves the opposition. This in turn enables her to tie the desire for ‘some change 
and reforms’ to being ‘the opposition’ and occasion it as a criterial attribute. She then 
indicates that her own attitude matches this, by suggesting that ‘nearly all parts of our life 
here need a change’ (line 19). Although she does not explicitly present this as her view, 
this can be inferred from the reference to ‘our life here’. Furthermore, she formulates a 
more explicit account of her position in line 22, saying ‘I’d really want a change’. The 
accentuated modalising term ‘really’ contributes to making this claim more convincing, 
by characterising it as sincere (Pomerantz, 1986). In effect, the authenticity of P3’s 
oppositional affiliation is warranted on the basis of her having the desire for change, which 
is presented as the criterion for being the opposition. 
Second, P3 justifies her affiliation through attending to potential challenges. In 
line 9, the speaker makes clear that her relative lack of action does not affect her 
oppositional belonging, thus preempting a likely challenge to her identity claim. It can be 
conventionally expected from people who call themselves ‘the opposition’ to be active. 
P3, however, is able to avoid dealing with such a claim on the grounds of her subjective 
understanding of the opposition being broad (‘for me [...] it’s a very broad concept’, line 
5). In other words, because she has already grounded her subjective understanding of the 
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opposition, P3 does not need to ‘fit’ into any ‘conventional’ understanding. In addition, 
‘considering’ oneself to be something is different from ‘being’ this something: the 
interviewee’s formulation here comes across as a subjective preference rather than a 
factual claim. While subjectivity is often seen as a threat to the reliability of accounts, it 
can also make an account stronger, as personal feelings and thoughts are private matters 
that are difficult to challenge (Edwards, 2007; Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002). The display 
of subjectivity therefore defends P3 from a potential charge of being too passive to be 
called the opposition and warrants her authenticity as a member of this category.  
Overall, then, this extract demonstrates how the strategy of claiming possession of 
a criterial attribute can blend in with subjectivity work, and how both of these can be used 
by speakers to deal with issues of accountability. The last observation I would like to make 
is that, in a similar way to the extracts above, the topic of opposition is occasioned by P3 
as sensitive through some features of the account. Most notably, the interviewee shows 
resistance to the questions by keeping silent in places where a response would be expected 
from her, after the interviewer’s questions in lines 2 and 4. In addition, the affirmation of 
category affiliation is done in an indirect manner, as affiliation with the ‘concept’ (line 7) 
rather than, say, with ‘the opposition’ itself. 
To summarise, this section has explored how protesters can assert their 
oppositional identity through claiming attributes that have been shown to be constitutive 
of the category ‘opposition’. This descriptive strategy works by ensuring that membership 
belonging is seen as ‘natural’, provided that the way one feels is displayed as isomorphic 
to the way the opposition feels. However, the analysis has also indicated that the claims 
of membership are muted in several ways. This observation suggests that there is 








2. ‘Yes (.) to some extent’: warranting oppositional affiliation by 
delimiting membership 
 
Another pattern of accomplishing oppositional membership is through specifying 
the nature or partial extent of one’s oppositional involvement. The following two extracts 
provide an illustration. 
 












would you call yourself an oppositioner? 
well .hh (.) how should I put it (.) yes of course (0.2) but (.) a systemic one for now 
‘cos like we of course did some (.) funny protest actions like hanging banners 
mmhm 
drawing graffiti (0.2) it was good if you look for them I guess some are still around 
 




















would you call yourself a part of the opposition? 
(0.5) 
myself part of the opposition? 
aha mmhm 
well (.) yes (.) to some extent (.) when I take part in some (.) activities 
mmhm mmhm 
but now (0.2) I hardly do anything 
mmhm 
that’s it (.)  
 
Both interviewees start by confirming their oppositional membership: P32 says 
‘yes of course’ (4:2) and P26 too says ‘yes’ (5:5). Note that although the participants 
affirm the membership, this is not immediate or direct. P32’s answer is hesitant: it is 
prefaced with ‘well’, ‘how should I put it’ and some laughter (4:2). In extract 5, there is a 
delay in responding (pause in line 2), repetition of the question (‘myself part of the 
opposition?’ line 3), and hesitation (‘well (.)’, line 5). So while affiliation with the 
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opposition is confirmed, there are features suggesting that oppositional identity is in some 
way problematic. 
Moreover, the speakers immediately modify their affirmations of membership. 
P32 does this through specifying the nature of his opposition (‘yes of course (0.2) but a 
systemic one for now’, 4:2). The speaker in extract 5 suggests that he can only be called 
opposition ‘to some extent’ (line 5). Respondents also specify the grounds on which they 
claim their membership, through describing activities conventionally associated with the 
opposition — protesting (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). For example, in extract 4, the 
interviewee accounts for being a member of the ‘systemic opposition’ by explaining ‘‘cos 
like we of course did some (.) funny protest actions like hanging banners […] drawing 
graffiti’ (lines 3, 5). Similarly, P26 in extract 5 specifies circumstances in which he can 
be called a part of the opposition (‘when I take part in some (.) activities’, line 5). Through 
these formulations, speakers make their oppositional belonging contingent upon specific 
adversarial actions: by claiming to have engaged in protest, they achieve and delimit their 
membership. 
So while these accounts also rely on invoking a criterial attribute — both speakers 
display their understanding of protesting as attributed to the category of ‘opposition’ — 
their design is notably different from the extracts I analysed in the first section. The first 
strategy has the general pattern ‘opposition-related question — definition (opposition has 
a criterial attribute) — affirmation (I have criterial attribute, therefore yes)’, while this 
strategy follows the pattern ‘opposition-related question — affirmation, delimiting (yes, 
but/when attribute) — (implied as criterial attribute)’. In other words, the idea of criterial 
attribute is mobilised in a different way. 
Another distinct feature of this second strategy is lowering commitment to the 
category of opposition. Note how the descriptions of the speaker’s oppositional activities 
are muted. For instance, protest activities are described as ‘funny’ in extract 4, and 
therefore not serious or effective. Moreover, the example of the actions P32 gives can 
imply a lesser commitment, since ‘hanging banners’ and ‘drawing graffiti’ (4:3, 5) are 
inferred to be a ‘softer’ variety of protest actions than, say, joining a street demonstration. 
Furthermore, it is implied that oppositional membership is less relevant now than it was 
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in the past. The speaker in extract 4 expresses it through using past tense when he talks 
about his protest participation (‘we of course did’, line 3; ‘it was good’, line 5). P26, too, 
minimises his current protest involvement (‘but now (0.2) I hardly do anything’, 5:7) in 
implicit contrast to the past. These formulations lower interviewees’ current commitment 
to the category of opposition and suggest there are problems in affirming oppositional 
identity which are managed by specifying grounds for membership and playing down 
commitment.  
The next extract similarly demonstrates the elements of delimiting when the 
interviewee engages in the delicate business of negotiating her oppositional membership; 
however, the ‘attribution talk’ there is solicited by the interviewer who asks what makes 
the speaker a part of the opposition.  
 








































would you call yourself a part of the opposition? 
(0.4) 
at the moment yes  
mmhm and what’s this (.) in you that makes you a part of the opposition? 
(0.4)  
um well I don’t agree with the agenda (.) that’s currently adopted um by the government  
and (0.2) well this alone already (.) makes me the opposition  
mmhm mmhm 
having said that I (.) I’m against um this radical opposition (.) that undoubtedly exists  
and in large quantities um (.) I think that basically (.) all my opposition is just  
in that I think that I can like (.) influence  
mmhm 
life of my country and my city (.) in that I want to make a choice myself and not to have   
it made for me (.) yeah and in that (.) I want something that the government doesn’t allow  
mmhm mmhm 
that’s why I don’t agree with what’s happening now (.) with that utter unaccountability  
yeah (.) and (0.5) thi- already this makes me the opposition which is rather strange 
aha aha 
I believe these are normal like human (.) wants but at the moment I guess  
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20  I belong to the opposition but of (0.5) of moderately-active kind let’s say    
 
In line 2, P42 affirms opposition category affiliation; however, the way it is 
delivered attenuates the affirmation. First, ‘yes’ is prefaced with ‘at the moment’, which 
limits the applicability of her claim by depicting membership as temporary. Second, the 
answer is given after a pause. Hesitations and tentativeness after the category-related 
question have been noted in a number of extracts above, and seem to be resources for 
demonstrating the delicate nature of the topic. In the case of P42, it is perhaps her tentative 
acceptance that solicits the interviewer’s probe about the basis of her affiliation (‘what’s 
this (.) in you that makes you a part of the opposition?’ line 4). 
There are three notable features of the interviewee’s response to that probe. 
First, P42 further delimits her membership by orienting to the temporary character 
of the situation. For example, she says ‘I don’t agree with the agenda (.) that’s currently 
adopted’ (line 6), ‘I don’t agree with what’s happening now’ (line 16), ‘at the moment I 
guess I belong’ (line 19, emphases added). Constructed in that way, her claims provide a 
further way to furnish her initial assertion of oppositional membership as valid ‘at the 
moment’ (line 3). P42 thus grounds the understanding that her oppositional belonging is 
circumstantial.  
Second, the interviewee orients to a set of subjective attitudes and positions them 
as criterial for the opposition. Specifically, she reports that disagreeing with the 
government ‘already (.) makes me the opposition’ (line 7). This formulation creates the 
impression that P42’s status as opposition is inevitable given her attitude; it thus constructs 
a link between P42’s attitude and the category of opposition, displaying the former as the 
category-bound feature. Plus, the expression ‘makes me’ (delaet menya) can be heard to 
suggest that her disagreement in some way ‘forces’ P42 to be the opposition, which 
contributes to the ‘criterial’ status of this attitude. 
Third, the respondent reduces her commitment to the category of opposition. She 
does it by making clear that she does not support (hence belong to) the ‘radical opposition’ 
(line 9), thereby making her protest appear moderate (‘of moderately-active kind’, line 
20). Furthermore, she restricts the extent of her opposition — ‘all my opposition is just’ 
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(line 10) — to a concrete set of desires. Such desires are depicted as normal through the 
interactional resource of a three-part list in lines 10-14, which includes: 1) ‘in that I think 
that I can like (.) influence […] the life of my country and my city’; 2) ‘in that I want to 
make a choice myself and not to have it made for me’; 3) ‘in that (.) I want something that 
the government doesn’t allow’. The first item emphasises the state of belonging (my 
country and my city): the implication here is that citizens should be able to participate in 
the life of the country. The second item similarly attends to citizenry rights of free choice. 
The final item assigns the blame to the government for not letting P42 realise her ordinary 
citizenry desires. As such, the list explains the inevitability of the opposition, given that 
the government does not fulfil its obligations (‘that’s why I don’t agree’, line 16). But 
what the list also seems to achieve is recasting P42’s disagreement from being a criterial 
attribute of ‘opposition’ category to being an attribute of ‘ordinary citizen’ category. 
Display of surprise in line 17 (‘already this makes me the opposition which is rather 
strange’) contributes to producing this effect, by questioning the link between the category 
of opposition and the attribute of disagreement. Finally, disagreement is described as 
‘normal like human (.) wants’ (line 19), reinforcing the idea that P42’s oppositional 
commitment is in no way special.  
Taken as a whole, then, P42’s account has the effect of suggesting that her 
oppositional belonging is temporary since it is contingent upon the situation in the country. 
In a way, opposition itself seems to be made into a predicate of being a citizen of a country 
whose government is utterly unaccountable (line 16). ,  
To summarise, this section has explored another strategy of establishing affiliation 
with the opposition category. The analysis demonstrates that assuming oppositional 
identity is not an unproblematic action for the interviewees, and the above strategy is a 
resource for dealing with it, by delimiting their membership, specifying grounds for it and 
playing down oppositional commitment.  
Over the next two sections, I investigate further ways in which participants manage 





3. ‘We don’t have the real power to be the opposition’: rejecting 
oppositional affiliation through not possessing ‘right’ attributes 
 
In my analysis, I have identified a number of ways through which protesters 
display the inappropriateness of oppositional identity. In this section, I summarise one 
such strategy, which consists in invoking and denying the possession of category-bound 
activities and motives. In the following extract, the speaker demonstrates resistance to 
opposition through denying active protest involvement.  
 
































would you call yourself a part of the opposition? 
um (0.4) I guess for me it’s di- (1) it’s difficult  
mmhm 
because I can- can’t call myself a part of the opposition directly (.)  
because basically I (.) have been at a demonstration only twice  
one is when there was (.) they circled they surrounded us in the white ring 
mmhm mmhm 
and the second (.) first time when I went out back then in spring  
I mean I don’t (.) participate like, I didn’t go to elections as an observer 
mmhm  
I don’t participate actively so to speak and I don’t go to the majority of the events  
connected to it (.) but nonetheless if we’re talking about- if (0.2) we are  
to distinguish between (.) the opposition and those who are for the government 
mmhm 
then of course I count myself as the opposition 
 
In the beginning of the extract, the interviewer probes for the interviewee’s self-
identification as opposition, asking whether she would call herself so. P40’s response sets 
up an indirect rejection: first, she assesses such definition as ‘difficult’ (line 2), hence 
signalling to the interviewer that the answer would probably be a ‘no’. Second, she 
accounts for such assessment, saying ‘I can- can’t call myself a part of the opposition 
directly’ (line 4), which formulates explicit denial of opposition self-identification. The 
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term ‘can’t’ implies impossibility for something to be done and suggests that P40 is not 
fully accountable for the rejection. To say that someone ‘cannot’ do something is different 
from saying they ‘would not’ or ‘don’t want’ to; the former presupposes that the rejection 
is not due to the desire of a speaker as such. Modal verbs like ‘cannot’ are often used that 
way, to downplay the agency of a speaker through implying that some external factors 
normatively forbid them from saying or doing something (Sneijder & te Molder, 2005). 
In case of P40, the design of her claim thus warrants the rejection as a logical thing (cf. 
Edwards, 1997). Note, however, that the denial is attenuated: in saying that she is not 
‘directly’ the opposition, the interviewee implies that she might be described as opposition 
in some other way. Indeed, further in the account she does categorise herself as opposition, 
but under certain conditions.  
In terms of affiliation rejection, P40’s explanatory account manufactures and 
rejects the opposition as a category with normatively-bound activities. Specifically, P40’s 
first argument for not being the opposition is ‘I (.) have been at a demonstration only twice’ 
(line 5). ‘Only twice’ implies that P40’s protest experience is not enough to qualify as the 
opposition. Furthermore, she describes other instances of not participating: ‘I didn’t go to 
elections as an observer’ (line 9), ‘I don’t go to the majority of the events’ (line 11), ‘I 
don’t participate actively’ (line 11). Such descriptions are category-resonant (Stokoe, 
2012), in that they make available an inference that certain activities — such as going to 
the majority of demonstrations and being an election observer — are linked to the category 
of opposition. In denying doing these activities on her part, P40 shows that she does not 
posses the ‘right’ attributes, thereby warranting her rejection as category-based. 
An additional observation here concerns the type of category-bound actions P40 
rejects. ‘Going to a protest’ is an action which is observable and easy to measure (‘[I] have 
been at a demonstration only twice’, line 5). Such factual nature makes P40’s claims more 
likely to pass unchallenged by the interviewer. P40 additionally reinforces the facticity of 
her minimal protest involvement by locating specific details for both of her protests: the 
time of her first (or second, which is unclear as the interviewee says ‘and the second (.) 
first time’, line 8) protest, happening ‘back then in spring’ (line 8), and a memorable aspect 
of another where she was ‘surrounded’ (line 6).   
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Therefore, through the features of her description, P40 implies inadequacy for 
claiming oppositional belonging, based on the ‘fact’ that she is not active enough to 
qualify as a member of the opposition. 
Another important observation is that P40 also affirms her membership through 
formulating alternative understanding of the opposition. She does this by providing a 
conditional account in lines 12-15: ‘if (0.2) we are to distinguish between (.) the opposition 
and those who are for the government […] then of course I count myself as the opposition’. 
With this, the interviewee attends to a different category-bound aspect of the opposition, 
adversarial attitude. ‘Of course’ gives the impression that counting herself as opposition 
is obvious under such circumstances thus strengthening her claim. In this way, P40 
manages her identity as opposition in a limited sense, which accommodates her initial 
rejection of ‘direct’ oppositional membership. 
A similar strategy is employed in the next two extracts. Extract 8 comes from an 
interview with a protester who, on several occasions prior to the question in line 1, has 
suggested that he would not like to be seen as a representative of the opposition: the 
question is thus asked in negative form. The speaker in extract 9 answers the question 
‘what’s opposition for you?’; the extract follows his saying that the word opposition has 
several meanings.  
 






















you wouldn’t call yourself a part of the opposition? 
(0.5) 
I wouldn’t call myself so [yeah  
                                         [aha 
well I think that (.) to call oneself a part of the opposition  
means um (.) to actively take some actions (.) 
for example? 
well for one thing (.) to go out to the streets (.) [protesting 
                                                                           [aha aha 
















or maybe (.) even perhaps more precisely is just to be a member of some organisation 
mmhm  
public (.) underground (.) parliamentary or not 
mmhm 
that’s it (.) I’m not a member of these 
 
































am I the opposition?  
mmhm 
for example I mean (.) rather I’m a civic activist yeah  
because the opposition in a narrow sense of the word 
mmhm 
after all it’s something political (.) political movement party group that fights for power 
mmhm aha 
I’m not a member of any like party group that fights for power  
aha aha 
so um (0.5) in that sense £ what sort of opposition am I? £ I- (.) 
aha  
I’m prepared to support the opposition (.) to support like vote for them or something 
mmhm 
but myself- (.) and on the other hand in a broad sense how it’s understood in the media  
(.) written about, then yes (.) I am the opposition because I’m against the current regime  
 
In these extracts, the speakers reject oppositional affiliation. P23 explicitly 
confirms (‘yeah’) the supposition made by the interviewer, that he ‘wouldn’t call [him]self’ 
a part of the opposition (8:3). P30 achieves the same effect by implying that he has 
membership in a different category when in line 3 he says ‘rather I’m a civic activist’. 
Establishing alternative group belonging in itself reinforces the claim to non-membership; 
furthermore, ‘rather’ presupposes a contrast, and it is inferred that being a ‘civic activist’ 
rejects being ‘the opposition’. Notably, another rejection is produced in an indirect way 
too, through a questioning upshot accompanied by a smiley voice, ‘so um (0.5) in that 
sense £ what sort of opposition am I? £’ (line 10). The question is treated as rhetorical and 
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as a rejection of oppositional membership: it is followed by the interviewer’s ‘aha’ in line 
11, a display of ‘catching’ the implied suggestion that P30 is not the opposition. 
Next, speakers provide accounts for rejecting the oppositional belonging. This is 
done, first, by describing explicitly what it means to call oneself a part of the opposition. 
P23 claims that ‘to call oneself a part of the opposition means um (.) to actively take some 
actions’ (8:5-6) and gives two examples at the request of the interviewer. These are: ‘to 
go out to the streets (.) [protesting’ (line 8), and ‘to be a member of some organisation’ 
(line 12). The speaker thus indicates that being active and belonging to an organisation 
are seen as expected from someone who identifies as opposition, manufacturing these 
features as category-bound. Protesting is characterised as ‘the simplest’ (line 10) and 
organisational belonging as ‘even perhaps more precisely’ (line 12). It is thus implied that 
there is some variability or flexibility in the activities associated with category 
membership. Similarly, in extract 9, P30 says ‘the opposition […] it’s something political 
(.) political movement party group that fights for power’ (lines 1, 6), thereby constructing 
the opposition as an institutionalised collective of people motivated by the desire to seize 
power. He also implies that there is an alternative, broader meaning, by producing a 
definition of opposition ‘in a narrow sense of the word’ (line 4). So, speakers claim that 
engaging in activities related to protest and affiliation with a relevant organisation are 
criterial for labelling oneself as the opposition. Moreover, these are produced as 
definitional, and hence ‘objective’ or factual descriptions, of what is necessary for calling 
oneself a member. 
These descriptions are followed by an explicit claim that speakers do not possess 
the features they previously defined as criterial. Specifically, P23 and P30 deny being 
members of oppositional organisations (‘I’m not a member of these’, 8:16; ‘I’m not a 
member of any like party group that fights for power’, 9:8). In so doing, interviewees 
contest the appropriateness of oppositional self-categorisation, on the grounds of not 
protesting or doing things previously defined as central for being a part of the opposition. 
Note how the claim in extract 8 is strengthened though the upshot’s design: first through 
the use of ‘that’s it’ which additionally establishes the reason as sufficient. Second, 
sequentially the upshot comes after the utterance that encompasses the variety of potential 
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affiliations, ‘public (.) underground (.) parliamentary or not’ (line 14), and as such implies 
that, since P23 is not a member of any organisation, he cannot in any way be linked to the 
opposition.  
It is also worth noting how the interviewee in extract 9 subsequently modifies his 
rejection account to produce circumstances in which he might be seen as being part of the 
opposition. Similarly to the speaker in extract 7, P30 asserts his oppositional identity on 
the grounds of taking an anti-government stance. He first displays his support for (rather 
than membership of) the opposition, by emphasising that he is ‘prepared to support the 
opposition’, and producing a list ‘to support like to vote for them or something’ (line 12). 
He then constructs the grounds on which he can claim membership, ‘in a broad sense […] 
I am the opposition because I’m against the current regime’ (lines 14-15). Arguably, the 
claims of partial membership address the potential challenge for the interviewees 
regarding the basis for volunteering to participate in the interview, which I will discuss at 
the end of this chapter.   
Overall, then, the design of the extracts above closely resembles the one we 
observed in the first section, where definitions of the opposition were formulated in order 
to confirm one’s membership. Here a different use of this strategy can be seen, with 
definitions being used for justifying the rejection of oppositional belonging, drawing upon 
non-possession of category-bound features. At the same time, speakers in extracts 7 and 
9 assert partial opposition-related membership, exemplified through their anti-government 
stances. The important point here is that such memberships are themselves presented as 
conditional, valid only in certain contexts. 
In the extract below, a variation of the same strategy of rejecting oppositional 
membership can be observed. The interviewee there warrants his rejection of the 
membership category through different means: not by rejecting involvement in activities 
that could be characterised as ‘oppositional’, but by denying that these activities were 
motivated by ‘oppositional’ concerns. The question in line 1 is asked after the speaker has 
categorically refuted being the opposition but pointed to a number of protests he had 






























and still you wouldn’t call yourself opposition on that grounds? 
well we can’t (.) to start with (.) we don’t have real power to be the opposition yeah↑ 
mmhm mmhm 
so (.) and second, after all our goal our aim is ecology 
mm 
I mean we (.) don’t fight for some rights of like, everyone on earth 
mmhm [so it’s something-  
            [like all the humiliated and insulted yeah  
but we have a clear objective (.) we deal with ecology  




In this extract, P35 is asked a question that is designed in such a way as to suggest 
that P35’s earlier rejection of opposition affiliation is unwarranted in some way. First, the 
question in line 1 features an orientation to ‘that grounds’, which within the conversational 
context refers to the preceding evidence of P35’s protest involvement. Second, ‘still you 
wouldn’t call yourself’ can be heard as displaying surprise or even disbelief over the fact 
that P35 still resists being called the opposition even though he took part in protests. What 
the interviewer’s question does, then, is implicitly to establish a certain activity as 
category-bound (opposition-going to protests), and to challenge P35’s rejection of 
oppositional membership as adequate. 
In response to this challenge, P35 does two things. First, he formulates an explicit 
denial, saying ‘we can’t’ (line 2), with plural pronoun most probably referring to his 
ecological protest group. The form of denial is identical to that of P40 from the extract 7 
above, and implies that some objective factors normatively prevent P35 and his group 
from calling themselves the opposition. Next, P35 lists two reasons for not calling himself 
‘opposition’. The first reason concerns not having ‘real power to be the opposition’ (line 
2). Here, the listener can infer that ‘power’ is the ‘right’ attribute of oppositional belonging, 
and because P35 does not have it he is legitimately not one of them. The second reason 
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has to do with having ‘ecology’ as ‘our goal our aim’ (line 4). ‘After all’ implies that this 
is the ultimate and most powerful argument for not being the opposition. 
This argument is expanded following the lack of uptake by the interviewer in line 
5, by producing a description of what P35 and his group do not do: ‘we (.) don’t fight for 
some rights’ (line 6). This claim is strengthened by using extreme case formulations to 
describe whose rights they do not fight for (‘everyone on earth […] all the humiliated and 
insulted’, lines 6, 8). These terms simultaneously portray such goals as unrealistic and 
members of the opposition, people who do have such unreasonable objectives, as 
misguided. ‘We’, by contrast, are described as having a ‘clear objective’ (line 9) and a 
specific (‘that’s it’) and realistic goal (‘ecology of the Volga-Akhtuba region’, line 10). In 
so doing, the interviewee displays the non-possession of the motives that are likely to be 
seen as criterial for the opposition, in particular the tireless struggle for the ‘rights’ of 
people in need (cf. Bobel, 2007). P35 thus counters the suggestion of the interviewer, that 
his protest involvement alone can be enough to categorise him as the opposition. So, in 
this especially accountable context, where it is implied that his actions can form adequate 
grounds for his belonging, P35 justifies his claims by mobilising and rejecting category-
bound motives and undermining opposition category membership at the same time.  
In the last two extracts of this section, speakers similarly warrant not calling 
themselves members of the opposition by claiming incompatible motives. Extract 11 is 
the second part of the interviewee’s answer to the question about how the respondent’s 
attitudes to politics have changed, and is thus an example of a more spontaneous 
‘opposition belonging’ talk. The speaker in extract 12 replies to the question ‘what is your 
relation to the opposition?’; the extract picks up after some unrelated chatter about noises 
outside the room. Note that Alexei Navalny is the de facto leader of the opposition and 
Boris Nemtsov is one of the oppositional leaders who was still alive at the time of the 
interview. 
 
Extract 5.11: Protester 4, male, Moscow  
 




























I mean I have- I went- (0.5) going back to that question about the protest (.)  
I didn’t protest because of my political position not because I’m pro some Navalny or  
(0.5) Nemtsov god forbid yeah hhhh I think that many people, those who judge  
and criticise us from the outside they make a mistake when they say oh here go  
the followers of Navalny, look at them traitors, look, who they support 
but people who go out are in fact all different, and they don’t come for Navalny 
they are not the followers of Navalny, they are not the opposition 
mmhm  
they are the society, active part of the society who um (.) at the very least,  
want to draw attention (.) to certain problems and at best they want to change um  
the state of affairs 
 










































I can’t call myself (.) the opposition (.)  
mmhm 
as such (.) maybe I am the opposition but in a broader sense 
aha 
but with those people I can’t um relate to them in any way 
((some lines omitted – we discuss loud noise outside the room)) 
so (0.2) I still can’t find someone who (.) um well whom to follow 
mmhm 
it seems to be Navalny for now but um 
mmhm 
when I went to Manegnaya Square I didn’t go there for Navalny 
mmhm 
although (.) well sure five years (.) of colony is too much but I went in particular  
(.) against the system that basically can put anyone on trial for something 
mmhm 
and after the Manegnaya um two criminal cases were set up 
one of them was for stickers that young people stuck to windows 
mmhm 
since I also had the sticker (.) and I stuck it to my bag but theoretically  














and then theoretically um (.) the detectives could find like (.) some video 
of me sticking it and I would be put to prison for five years 
mmhm just like the others yeah 
and (.) there wouldn’t be a way to explain it so I went to protest against that 
 
The beginnings of the extracts feature explicit denials of category self-ascription. 
In extract 11, the speaker says ‘I don’t want to call myself opposition’ (line 12) and in 
extract 12, the respondent claims that she ‘can’t call myself (.) the opposition’ (line 1). 
Speakers also make relevant their involvement in protest. P4 says ‘I went’ (11:14) and 
orients to the previous question about the motive for his active protest involvement. P5 
makes it clear that she ‘went to Manegnaya Square’ (12:10). The speakers then deny 
certain grounds for protesting by using formulations ‘I didn’t protest because’ (11:15) and 
‘I didn’t go there for’ (12:10). More specifically, in extract 11 the interviewee denies being 
motivated by political beliefs, such as his ‘political position’ or support for oppositional 
leaders (lines 15-16). Similarly, P5 in extract 12 rejects the idea that she joined the protest 
because of her support for Navalny (‘I didn’t go there for Navalny’, line 10). These 
formulations mobilise the said motives as category-bound, conventionally attributed to 
people who consider themselves to be a part of the opposition. Through explicitly rejecting 
them, the interviewees undermine their category membership.  
Through sequential positioning, respondents contrast these ‘oppositional’ motives 
with other reasons for going to protest. In extract 11, this is the desire ‘to draw attention 
(.) to certain problems and at best […] to change um the state of affairs’ (lines 23-24). In 
extract 12, the interviewee claims that she wanted to show her opposition to a system ‘that 
basically can put anyone on trial for something’ (line 13).  
Note that interviewees enhance the credibility of their accounts in two ways. First, 
this is done by highlighting the unlikeliness of the suggestion that they were motivated by 
‘oppositional’ concerns. In extract 11, the speaker portrays the idea that he is motivated 
by his political beliefs as laughable and unthinkable. This is done by using ironic ‘god 
forbid’ (ne dai bog) in line 16, an expression often used to suggest that someone would 
never do something; and by accompanying his turn with a spate of laughter. In extract 12, 
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the interviewee points out that she is still undecided as to whom to support (‘I still can’t 
find someone who (.) um well whom to follow’, line 6). By evidencing her uncertainty, 
P5 implies that she does not have enough commitment to support Navalny even though 
she understands that his sentence is unfair (‘sure five years (.) of colony is too much’, line 
12), thereby sustaining motive denial.  
Second, the speakers strengthen the plausibility of alternative, ‘non-oppositional’ 
motives they claim to have. In extract 11, P4 defends his motive against other people’s 
expectations to the contrary. To make his claim convincing, he undermines the opinions 
of those who see protesters in a solely ‘political’ terms, by presenting them as outsiders 
who are not aware of the true state of affairs. In particular, in line 17 he describes such 
people as mistaken (‘they make a mistake’) and portrays them as outsiders who lack the 
true knowledge of protesters’ objectives (‘criticise us from the outside’). Furthermore, P4 
uses reported speech to depict such people in a negative light. As noted by Stokoe and 
Edwards (2007), reporting words of others invites inferences about these others, based on 
the way direct speech is presented. The reported account here works to characterise the 
people as inclined to mock (‘oh here go […] look at them […] look’) and insult the 
protesters, calling them ‘traitors’ (lines 17-18). It is also inferred that they lack sensitivity, 
as they seem to ‘lump’ all protesters together as the ‘followers of Navalny’, while P4 
stresses that ‘people who go out are in fact all different’ (line 19). ‘In fact’ displays such 
motivation as the real one, contrasted with the wrongness of the people who think 
otherwise. Invocation of difference presents a further warrant for disregarding 
oppositional affiliation, by claiming that there can be no uniform motive. Lastly, in the 
final upshot the opposition and ‘oppositional’ motives are rejected through a three-part 
list: ‘they don’t come for Navalny they are not the followers of Navalny, they are not the 
opposition’ (lines 19-20). Alternative categorisation of protesters as ‘the society, active 
part of the society’ (line 22), similarly to ‘citizen’ identity claimed in line 12, enables the 
interviewee to highlight the civic side of the protest and implicitly contrast it with, and 
distance it from, the political ‘opposition’.  
The speaker in extract 10 makes her alternative motive more convincing with a 
story that points to the flaws of the system, by highlighting the asymmetry between the 
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actions and the penalty (‘two criminal cases were set up […] for stickers’, lines 15-16). 
By addressing the possibility of P5 herself being put in prison (lines 18-22), the story 
implies that anyone is theoretically under threat of being unfairly prosecuted, thereby 
reinforcing the rationality of protesting against it. The speaker finishes her account with 
an emphatic ‘so I went to protest against that’ a claim (line 24), which establishes the 
boundaries of her specific motive and implicitly contrasts it with other potential motives.  
Both speakers, then, can be seen as carefully attending to the justification of the 
denials of oppositional membership. Two-part formulations, where their subjective 
motives are contrasted with ‘oppositional’ motives, rhetorically strengthen rejections of 
categorical self-ascription.   
In summary, the analysis in this section has shown how oppositional affiliation 
can be denied by contrasting different attributes and motives for protesting, and claiming 
that speakers lack the ‘right’ ones to legitimately belong to the opposition. In addition, the 
speakers in this section further evidence the delicate character of the topic of opposition, 
through producing indirect rejections (extracts 7 and 9) and reducing their agency by 
formulating normative denials (‘I can’t’, extracts 7 and 10). Delicacy thus seems to be a 
feature that is shared both by the speakers who reject opposition belonging and by the 
speakers who affirm it. 
 
4. ‘I don’t like to use this word’: rejecting affiliation by establishing 
‘opposition’ as a wrong word 
 
The next strategy of denying oppositional membership is through describing the 
term ‘opposition’ itself as inappropriate in some way. Consider the following extract, 
where the interviewee is asked what opposition means for him.  
 


































































well I don’t know (0.2) I mean there are like many (0.5) let’s say dimensions sides  
mmhm 
and meanings to this word (.) if= 
=well for you personally (.) if you were asked to explain what do you mean by opposition 
(0.3)  
basically I don’t like to use this word  
mmhm 
because in a way it has um (.) specific connotations  
mmhm 
that is, opposition is usually used to designate either parliamentary opposition  
aha 
or no- non-parliamentary opposition I mean (.) um both of them are already well (0.2) 
so to speak (0.2) um discredited (.) by the current political situation 
do you mean in Russia?= 
=yeah=  
=here in particular? aha 
well and in other countries too, in many I don’t know um (0.5) take Germany for example  
there Die Linke is the opposition but I wouldn’t want to join Die Linke in Germany 
mmhm 
I mean it’s not just Russian situation (.) so I (.) I just don’t use this word because I don’t- 
I don’t want to associate myself with like (.) with some Navalny (.) 
with Solidarity or (.) I mean the Russian Solidarity political movement 
aha 
or with I don’t know, something else (.) so I can say that I’m like (.) in opposition in  
the sense of being in opposition to something 
aha 
Put- to Putin I’m obviously in opposition 
mmhm mmhm 
 
The interviewer’s question in line 1, ‘what’s opposition for you?’, invites some 
kind of definition (‘what is opposition’) and implies that this may be personal or unique 
to the speaker (‘for you’). Given that P39 was recruited because of his supposed 
involvement in oppositional activities, it is natural to assume that ‘opposition’ does mean 
something to him. The interviewee’s response, however, implies that the question is 
somehow problematic.  
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For example, there is a noticeable delay before the answer is produced (line 2), 
after which the speaker displays a lack of understanding (‘well I don’t know’, line 3). P39 
accounts for the difficulty in describing the meaning of opposition by characterising it as 
having diverse meanings. This is done though a three-part list: ‘there are like many (0.5) 
let’s say dimensions sides […] and meanings to this word’ (lines 3-5). The three 
components (‘dimensions sides […]  meanings’) indicate that trying to offer a definition 
of the opposition is difficult, as no univocal meaning can be specified. The interviewer 
treats these displays of difficulty by reformulating the question to ‘well for you personally 
(.) if you were asked to explain what do you mean by opposition’ (line 6). 
In response, the interviewee works up the rejection account by mobilising the issue 
of negative connotations with a direct assessment: ‘I don’t like to use this word’ because 
‘it has um (.) specific connotations’ (lines 8, 10). The claim of specific connotations has 
two parts to it. At first, P39 makes a reference to a conventional understanding of the 
opposition (‘opposition is usually used to designate’, line 12) as a group of people who 
constitute ‘parliamentary opposition […] or no- non-parliamentary opposition’ (lines 12, 
14). These two categories can potentially encompass any oppositional group, suggesting 
that the account is applicable to any opposition. Then, the interviewee problematises the 
status of such generic opposition, claiming that ‘both of them are […] discredited (.) by 
the current political situation’ (lines 14-15). This enables P39 to discount the term 
‘opposition’ on the grounds that it is used to designate something that is dysfunctional.  
The rejection is reinforced through the evidence of the deficiency of opposition in 
various national contexts. For example, when he is asked whether the opposition is 
discredited in Russia ‘in particular’ (line 18), P39 refers to the Left Party in Germany 
which he ‘wouldn’t want to join’ (line 20). In the upshot in line 22, he states that ‘it’s not 
just Russian situation’. This claim functions to present the issue with opposition as general 
and pervasive, and further underscores the futility of the term. 
Subsequently, by drawing on the understanding of the opposition as a word with 
negative connotations, P39 explicitly rejects his membership in the category of opposition. 
This is done in the form of subjective mental state avowal (Edwards & Potter, 2005), not 
wanting, by producing a three-part list of the things P39 does not want: 1) ‘I don’t want 
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to associate myself with like (.) with some Navalny’, line 23; 2) ‘with Solidarity or (.) I 
mean the Russian Solidarity political movement’, line 24; 3) ‘or with I don’t know, 
something else’, line 26. Listing here enables P39 to position himself outside of the 
political groups that can be seen as the opposition. Navalny is the leader of the Russian 
non-systemic opposition, and the Russian Solidarity is a democratic movement founded 
by the members of the liberal non-parliamentary opposition: both are clearly linked to the 
opposition as a political force. The third item, generalised list completer (Jefferson, 1990), 
establishes a more general association and finishes the list. As such, the appropriateness 
of oppositional identity is resisted on the basis of P39’s desire to distance himself from 
negative ‘political’ connotations that affiliation with the opposition entail.  
Note also that similarly to some of the speakers above, P39 then offers an 
alternative understanding of himself as being ‘in opposition’ in the second upshot in line 
26. His account features the term opposition but respecifies it, from a group category 
(being the opposition) to an attitude (‘being in opposition to something’, line 27, emphasis 
added). ‘Something’ is then specified as opposition to the then-Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin (line 29). By saying that his stance against Putin is ‘obviously’ the case, 
the interviewee depicts this attitude as common knowledge and a taken-for-granted fact 
that does not require further explanation. 
Finally, there are further instances of occasioning the topic of opposition as 
delicate throughout the extract. For example, in line 10, the interviewee produces a 
tentative account for his dislike, saying that he does not like the word because ‘in a way 
it has um (.) specific connotations’. Furthermore, lines 14-15 feature a lot of hesitation, 
with pauses and hmms: ‘opposition I mean (.) um both of them are already well (0.2) so 
to speak (0.2) um discredited (.)’. Finally, the account is attenuated with ‘I don’t knows’, 
in lines 3, 19 and 26. Such multiple hesitations and ‘delicacy’ instances help to 
manufacture the topic of opposition as a sensitive matter (Lerner, 2013).  
So overall, the interviewee denies his oppositional belonging by characterising 
‘opposition’ as a word and rejecting its relevance to him on grounds related to its status 
as a word with problematic (political) connotations. A similar strategy can be seen in the 
last two extracts of this chapter, extracts 14 and 15 below, although there the 
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characterisations are not produced in direct response to a question. In extract 14, the 
speaker spontaneously starts talking about the opposition as a word in response to the 
question about his attitudes to politics (it is the first part of the extract 11 above). In extract 
15, it is the interviewer who prioritises the understanding of ‘opposition’ as a word. 
 




























I don’t like the word opposition because (0.5) 
sure I’d like to hear about that mmhm 
um well  
(1)  
what does it mean opposition (.) it means like being always against something 
mmhm  
well no (.) I think that what we have is not the opposition but (.) broader I mean not the 
opposition as some specific political force that is (.) in opposition to the current regime  
mmhm 
when they (.) become the regime they stop being opposition, I mean they of course want  
to become the regime yeah but the people who st- (.) I mean (.)  
I don’t want to call myself opposition I guess I’m an active citizen 
aha 
 
























personally (.) do you call your- (.) like, use the word (0.2) oppo[sition to-   
                                                                                                      [but I- (.) I don’t use it 
mmhm mmhm (.) and why? 
(1.5) 
um:: 
I mean for those movements like Bolotnaya Square, people at Bolotnaya Square here too- 
well (.) it’s like I don’t want to put my head on the block either 
aha aha 
hh why would I need (0.5) why would I voluntarily stick myself to (.) um  
bad definitions so to speak (.) [to the definition of politics 
                                                [you mean like-                       aha 
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12 P34 no (.) we’re civic activists (.) we’re outside of politics 
 
In extract 14, the interviewee spontaneously describes ‘opposition’ as a word and 
provides a negative assessment of it (‘I don’t like the word’, line 1). In extract 15, it is the 
interviewer who repairs the initial formulation of the question, ‘do you call your-‘, to ‘use 
the word opposition to-’ (line 1). It is interesting to note here that the initial question, 
which is hearable as ‘do you call yourself opposition’, is amended to treat ‘opposition’ as 
a word that may be used to describe oneself. The interviewee rejects the term (‘but I- (.) I 
don’t use it’, line 2) before the interviewer has finished the question. Therefore in this 
extract, the literal understanding of the opposition is a joint production.  
Here, as in extract 13 above, participants subsequently produce an account of why 
the word is inappropriate or problematic. In extract 14, the speaker undermines the 
opposition with reference to its literal meaning, as ‘being always against something’ (line 
5). By using the extreme case adverb ‘always’, P4 emphasises the rigidity of the term’s 
negative connotations. Furthermore, ‘what we have’ (line 7) is claimed not to be the 
opposition and this is warranted through contrasting it with what opposition is 
conventionally. That is, P39 implies that the opposition (should) mean ‘some specific 
political force’ (line 8), motivated by a desire to become the regime themselves (‘they of 
course want to become the regime’, lines 10-11). However, the respondent claims that 
‘what we have’ is ‘broader’ (line 7), which in turn means that the word ‘opposition’ is the 
wrong one, based on its conventional understandings.  
In extract 15, the interviewer solicits an explanation of why the interviewee does 
not use the term (line 3). Note that this question produces no immediate answer; rather, 
there is a long silence in line 4 and some prolonged humming in line 5, both of which can 
be taken as displays of the topic being delicate. The interviewer also seems to treat it as 
problematic, using an ‘I mean’-prefaced utterance in an attempt to encourage a response 
from the interviewee (Maynard, 2013). When the response is finally formulated, P34 
rejects the word ‘opposition’ on the grounds of it being an example of ‘bad definitions’ 
(line 10). More specifically, P34 uses the idiomatic expression ‘I don’t want to put my 
head on the block either’ (line 15). The idiom suggests that identifying with the opposition 
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can put the reputation of a person at risk. Furthermore, the negative connotations of the 
term ‘opposition’ are highlighted in rhetorical question in line 9 (‘why would I need (0.5) 
why would I voluntarily stick myself’), which implies that there is no good reason to 
affiliate with something that has harmful, specifically political (‘to the definition of 
politics’, line 10), associations.  
Therefore, in these extracts the speakers undermine the appropriateness of 
‘opposition’ on the grounds of it not being an accurate label, due to its negative (or even 
incorrect) connotations and association with discredited political groups.  
A final point is that, having dismissed the term opposition, speakers offer 
alternative self-descriptions. In extract 14, the speaker says ‘I don’t want to call myself 
opposition I guess I’m an active citizen’ (line 12), and in extract 15 the speaker says ‘we’re 
civic activists’ (line 12). Several points are worth making here. First, these claims treat 
opposition as a category label rather than simply a word. Second, the labels mobilise 
identity as ‘citizens’ and thereby suggest that interviewees’ activities are related to this 
category membership. Third, speakers imply that this category is distinct from 
involvement with (formal) politics. The last point is stated explicitly in extract 15, when 
P34 says ‘we’re outside of politics’ (line 12). Here it is important to recall that there was 
an orientation towards similar ‘civic’ identities in the previously discussed extracts, where 
interviewees identified themselves as ‘civic activist’ (9:3) and ‘active citizen’ (11:12). 
Such self-categorisations underline the social, rather than political, nature of the 
interviewees’ involvement; I consider why this might be important, in the discussion. 
To summarise, extracts 13-15 demonstrate a number of devices for rejecting the 
opposition as a word, such as by orienting to this word’s multiple meanings and treating 
it as having negative political connotations. In the following discussion I will show how 
this strategy, along with the other three strategies identified above, can be understood as 









In this chapter, I have focused on protesters’ responses to the questions that invited 
them to describe their understanding of opposition and to characterise themselves in 
relation to it. My primary objective was to show that membership and non-membership in 
oppositional categories is accomplished through talk, rather than a stable and 
automatically assumed property of a person. Through my analysis, I demonstrated that a 
certain shared identity does not necessarily become relevant when people start protesting, 
as is sometimes implied in traditional experimental social psychological analyses of 
protest behaviour. Rather, oppositional belonging was shown to be a highly negotiable 
matter, with some protesters actively working up entitlements to it and others forcefully 
disregarding its relevance. 
I identified a range of strategies that participants used to manage their oppositional 
affiliation. Two acceptance strategies were aimed at accomplishing oppositional 
membership, through acknowledging the possession of the features that were portrayed as 
criterial (strategy 1), and through delimiting oppositional membership by specifying the 
nature of one’s oppositional involvement (strategy 2). Next, two rejection strategies were 
mobilised to deny the appropriateness of opposition identity, on the grounds of not 
possessing opposition-bound characteristics (strategy 3), and by pointing to problematic 
semantics and undermining the use of opposition as a word (strategy 4).  
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that management of oppositional 
identity is contingent upon the social construction of categories and their inferences, 
showing that both the speakers who confirmed oppositional belonging and those who 
negated it displayed sensitivity to the inferences that invocation of categories entails. As 
I mentioned above, categories are conventionally associated with particular activities and 
other features (Sacks, 1992), which are likely to be expected from the people who claim 
membership in a category. The interviewees displayed awareness of such inferences and 
managed them through the design of their accounts.  
Specifically, the label of opposition was depicted as particularly problematic due 
to its political and institutionalised inferences. This was especially evident in the rejection 
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strategies. The patterns of rejection lent support to the idea that resistance of categorical 
identity of opposition was designed to address issues that stem from the implied 
association between the opposition and politics. Speakers who employed the third strategy 
invoked and discredited politics-related motivation, namely support for oppositional 
leaders such as Navalny (extracts 11, 12). They also depicted opposition as essentially 
institutionalised identity, by aligning it with ‘official’ political parties and groups (extracts 
8, 9) and associating it with ‘real power’ (extract 10). Furthermore, negative connotations 
of the word ‘opposition’ were designed to be heard as political connotations by the 
speakers in the fourth strategy (extracts 13, 14 and 15). Such formulations were designed 
to portray the opposition as in some way compromised by its close proximity to the realm 
of politics, thereby accounting for the rejection of oppositional affiliation. In addition, the 
alternative categories with which speakers claimed affiliation were characterised as civic 
(‘civic activist’, extracts 9, 15), rather than political.   
 Acceptance accounts, too, displayed active management of the opposition 
category and its inferences. For example, speakers using the first strategy affirmed their 
oppositional belonging through claiming possession of attributes which were positioned 
as criterial, in disagreement with the government (extracts 1, 2) and showing a desire for 
change (extract 3). In so doing, respondents manufactured the opposition as a community 
of people with shared opinions and not, say, as a specific political organisation or 
movement. Speakers whom we encountered in the second section similarly displayed their 
understanding of the opposition as a group based primarily on shared dissatisfaction 
(extract 6). Moreover, respondents worked to reduce their commitment to the category of 
opposition, in particular by downplaying the extent of their protesting behaviour (extracts 
4, 5), which might suggest that speakers were concerned with positioning themselves as 
perhaps more ‘ordinary’ people rather than political activists (cf. Bobel, 2007).      
These observations make it clear that the label of ‘opposition’ is certainly not 
neutral, and that it perhaps has certain political connotations that protesters strive to avoid. 
Indeed, this is in line with other research, which similarly found that more ‘ordinary’ 
protesters in Russia tended to distance themselves from ‘professional’ protesters and 
activists (for example, Zhelnina, 2013; Smyth et al., 2015). This brings us back to the 
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larger problem of potential negative inferences associated with being labelled ‘political’ 
in Russia, mentioned in the previous chapters. The analysis from this chapter adds 
credibility the idea that in the Russian context, there appears to be a rift between civil 
society and organised political entities, with belonging to the latter being displayed as far 
less desirable and to be avoided, even for people who wish to challenge the status quo 
(Daucé, 2012). 
Another important observation to discuss is that, regardless of specific strategy, 
respondents across the extracts oriented to the topic of opposition as delicate, through 
pauses, hesitations, indirect acceptances/rejections and so on. These features raise an 
interesting consideration with regard to oppositional identity. Namely, it seems that 
rejecting, as well as accepting, oppositional affiliations is a highly accountable matter.  
First, observations suggest that rejection of opposition entailed a certain 
interactional problem for speakers, and claiming alternative category membership or 
rejecting the meaningfulness of the descriptive term were ways to address it. Recall here 
that participants have been selected to take part in the study because of their active 
involvement in ‘oppositional’ or protest activities. This, then, provided grounds for 
making the assumption that they were indeed members of a related category (protesters, 
or members of the opposition). It would therefore become an accountable matter if they 
did not acknowledge or enforce such category membership, especially given that they 
reported activities conventionally related to that category. In other words, since 
oppositional affiliation was rejected, the interviewees might be left with an interactional 
problem: if they are not associated with the opposition, then why do they protest? The 
speakers appeared to be sensitive to this possibility, as rejections were not presented in 
straightforward ways but treated as delicate business. In addition, claims of alternative 
memberships can also be seen as related to this interactional issue. Claiming membership 
in alternative categories, such as being in opposition (extract 13), being an ‘active citizen’ 
(extracts 11, 14) and ‘civic activist’ (extracts 9, 15) and formulating specific 
circumstances when one can be seen as part of the opposition (extracts 7, 9, 12) seem to 
take care of the potential ‘who are you then?’ identity issue, because of the potential to 
explain protest behaviour without being seen as the ‘opposition’.  
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Second, the data indicated that assertions of oppositional belonging were similarly 
organised in ‘delicate’ ways, on the basis of an already-produced definition (extracts 1, 2), 
through identifying with a ‘concept’ rather than a ‘group’ (extract 3) and by 
simultaneously downplaying the degree of oppositional commitment (extracts 4, 5, 6). It 
can be argued that claiming oppositional belonging in this way, through specifying the 
nature and extent of affiliation, reduced the risk of unwanted inferences that might follow 
the more unconditional acceptances. At this point, it is difficult to speculate which 
inferences in particular were resisted, since, in contrast to the rejection strategies, speakers 
here did not explicitly attend to these. Based on extract 6, where the interviewee contrasted 
her personal ‘moderate’ opposition with a ‘radical’ one, it can be hypothesised that 
accepting the membership of the opposition could entail the problem of appearing as too 
extreme in some way. 
As such, then, analytic findings allude to a potential dilemma of identification. 
Respondents were recruited as people who took part in protests, and therefore can be 
expected to relate to the opposition in some sense, based on their contentious actions. 
Rejecting such an assumption is likely to present an issue. But, at the same time, 
‘opposition’ might be too extreme or ‘political’ a category (see discussion above), and 
asserting it directly would present a problem too. There is hence a dilemma which is 
addressed and resolved in a number of ways, specifically, by accepting opposition based 
on a concrete (attitudinal) understanding, reducing the commitment to the category and 
claiming membership in alternative categories that justify protest involvement.  
Finally, I would like to point briefly to a potential implication of my analysis for 
the social psychological theory of protest behaviour, in particular for the theory of 
opinion-based group memberships. This theory was put forward by Bliuc, McGarty and 
colleagues (Bliuc et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2009; McGarty et al., 2014; Musgrove & 
McGarty, 2008), who have suggested that instead of understanding collective identity in 
terms of belonging to broader categories or institutions, it can be seen in terms of shared 
opinion. This alternative framework suggests that in generic collective movements, such 
as popular protests against authoritarian regimes, where there is no clearly defined 
collective or organisation to affiliate with, protest participants will tend to affiliate with 
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each other on the basis of shared attitudes; specifically, being pro- or against something. 
My analysis offers support to this suggestion, by demonstrating that negotiation of 
oppositional identity is closely related to portraying the opposition as a community of 
people with shared opinions. In my data, dissatisfaction with the government was 
constructed as the principle attribute of the category of opposition by the speakers who 
asserted it; moreover, similar attitudes have been portrayed as legitimate grounds for being 
seen as opposition even by the speakers who rejected belonging to the opposition in the 
first place. My findings are hence in line with the idea that in broader protest movements, 
shared attitudinal memberships (being against the current regime) might be more salient 
than strictly group memberships (being a part of ‘the opposition’).  
To summarise, I have illustrated how accepting and rejecting opposition is 
informed by interactional issues of accountability and normative assumptions about labels 
and category memberships. The analysis contributes to the understanding of protest in 
Russia, by providing insight into how the oppositional culture is experienced and 
interpreted by protesters, and how its various meanings are constructed and used to 
negotiate oppositional belonging. This chapter shows that discursively, the category of 
‘opposition’ is certainly not neutral; in particular, it appears to have negative (specifically 
political) connotations, which are resisted by participants. Therefore, the tendency in the 
media to gloss over protesters as belonging to ‘the opposition’ does neither them nor the 
protest justice. In addition, my analysis reinforces the arguments against seeing identity 
as a decontextualised and unproblematic expression of the speakers’ psychological reality 
and affirms the importance of recognising identity as participants’ project. In the next 
chapter, I continue to investigate protesters’ descriptions, but broaden the focus to some 
extent. That is, while the previous three chapters centred around the accounts in which 
protesters described themselves, the next chapter explores how protesters describe others, 













Chapter 6. ‘They’re just people’: explaining inaction in talk about 
others 
 
In the previous chapters, I have focused on how protesters describe their political 
attitudes, explain their motives for joining active protest and negotiate oppositional 
identities. This chapter shifts the focus from talking about oneself to talking about others, 
specifically, those others who are not involved in protest.  
Protesters do not exist in a social vacuum; most studies of protest stress the 
paramount importance of societal contexts, public discourses and culture for the 
advancement of dissenting movements (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; Tilly & Tarrow, 
2007). In social psychology, the concept of social embeddedness has been developed in 
an attempt to explain how people become protesters and sustain their protest participation 
through societal interactions. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) argued that the 
decision to join a protest is produced within social networks (‘embedded’ in them), and is 
facilitated by various network components, such as who people can reach, what kind of 
social and personal relationships they develop with others in the network and whether they 
can establish shared systems of meaning. Interactions in networks allow individual 
grievances and personal identifications to become collective and thus strengthen the 
movement. As the networks grow, they become more and more engaged in struggles to 
win the sympathy of not yet affiliated parties from the public. This suggests that protesters 
are likely to address in certain ways the topic of non-protesters and their behaviour.  
Specifically, social embeddedness theory assumes that in an attempt to win 
societal support, protesters will try to affiliate with the wider public by emphasising shared 
goals and actively disaffiliate from those they perceive as enemies; for instance, an 
authority (Klandermans, Van der Toorn & Van Stekelenburg, 2008). It is argued that in 
so, doing protesters are motivated by a cognitive need to construct collective identity, 
since ‘only by virtue of their membership in this more inclusive group or community are 
they entitled to societal support for their claims’ (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 326). 
While these hypotheses seem to be supported by experimental and survey studies, there 
212 
 
remains the question of whether (and how) such attempts would be made, were the 
protesters free to tell their personal stories and provide extended rationales, rather than 
answer a structured questionnaire. It thus seems desirable to explore protesters’ own 
orientations to others and their behaviour in talk.  
Another reason for exploring this topic is that research on protest in Russia 
demonstrates great variability in protesters’ descriptions of the public. For example, 
Clément et al. (2010) discussed how in interviews Russian protesters contrasted ‘laymen’ 
with ‘activists’ and displayed their respect for the latter, and disdain for the former; the 
authors suggested that such a contrast enabled the speakers to separate their ‘activist’ in-
group from the out-group. However, Clément and colleagues also mentioned that many 
interviewed activists called themselves ‘former laymen’ and professed their understanding 
of those who were still passive. Specifically, activists explained such passivity as a 
consequence of being caught up in layman thinking and behaviour patterns. Similarly, 
Volkov (2012b) offered fragments from the interviews with activists who took part in 
various demonstrations in Moscow, which showed that protesters blamed those who were 
passive or openly supportive of Putin’s administration, for their lack of protest 
involvement. However, Volkov’s data also demonstrated some interesting examples of 
activists criticising people for their inaction yet at the same time indexing such behaviour 
as understandable, through making references to external factors such as living in the 
provinces and having little access to independent media. It thus appears that talking about 
others, and their inaction in particular, is not an unproblematic topic for protesters, which 
begs further exploration. 
Indeed, there is an analytic rationale for investigating if and how interviewees 
address the topic of public inaction in my own data. In the previous empirical chapters of 
this thesis, we saw how protest was constructed as a normative expectation and a rational 
choice that even ordinary and previously apolitical people should make given the 
deteriorating state of affairs in Russia. However, if protest is paramount, why then does 
the public at large remain uninvolved? It is important to remember that my interviews 
were conducted in July-September 2013, when the protest wave had already started to 
decline considerably (Magun, 2014); furthermore, even at the peak of protest in 2011-
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2012 the number of people involved remained low in comparison with overall population 
(Greene, 2014). So in a way, my participants can be expected to deal with a dilemma 
(‘protest is important — but people do not protest’) or at least to have a certain ‘puzzle’ 
of public inaction to address and explain. Preliminary analysis showed that interviewees 
indeed attend to such puzzles through explaining public inaction, both when probed by 
the interviewer and of their own accord. Specifically, I was struck by an interesting detail 
of such explanations: when talking about the uninvolved public, my interviewees, while 
not actively denying the inference that such lack of involvement is potentially problematic, 
designed their accounts in such a way that non-participation appeared expected and 
justified. Analytically, it was somewhat surprising: because protest involvement was 
constructed as rational and expected earlier, I expected that those who remained 
uninvolved would be criticised, or that their behaviour would be indexed as unreasonable, 
making blamings and complaints about those who were uninvolved justified. However, 
this chapter demonstrates the opposite tendency, through exploring patterns of accounting 




Informed by the theory, my interview plan included questions on the relationships 
between protesters and others. Specifically, I asked such questions as ‘Do you think that 
protesters are different from the rest of the Russians?’, ‘Why do you think not many people 
in Russia protest?’ and ‘Do you think it is important to tell other people, to involve them?’ 
Most of the time, however, my respondents would address the topic of others before such 
questions were asked, either in the process of answering other questions or to initiate a 
different discussion on their own. As interviewer, I would typically follow such addresses 
by probing them further and asking for explanations. To identify specific extracts for this 
chapter, I first focused on such probe-answer sequences. I selected a number of fragments 
with similar explanatory patterns, translated and transcribed them in detail in accordance 
with CA conventions.  
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 I also read through the interviews in order to single out the sections where the 
interviewees invoke others in some way and offer explanatory accounts for their behaviour 
without being probed. Extracts 4, 5, 10-14 in this chapter are examples of such 
spontaneous accounts; these were selected as representative examples of identified 
accounting strategies. I noticed that unsolicited accounts of public behaviour were often 
produced while doing trouble telling; while I could not include extended sequences and 
initial questions due to space limit, where applicable I provided summaries of the 
preceding ‘issue’ talk. Those extracts would begin where interviewees started orienting to 
reasons for the behaviour of other people. The resulting mix of interviewer-driven and 
spontaneous accounts shows that providing explanations for public behaviour is a part of 
the speakers’ own conversational business, rather than the sole result of the interviewer’s 
intervention.  
After the collection was built, I separated the extracts into three groups, according 
to the explanatory logic of the accounts. The first group was comprised of extracts that 
explained inaction through identifying obstacles that prevent people from becoming 
engaged in protest. Extracts in the second group portrayed lack of protest as a typical 
Russian/Soviet trait. The third group contained extracts in which speakers managed the 
issue of inaction by orienting to other meaningful ways of involvement. The chapter 
proceeds by analysing these three groups of extracts in turn. 
 
 
1. ‘It’s difficult life circumstances’: accounting for inaction by 
attributing it to obstacles 
 
In this section, I explore how protesters explain the inaction of other people 
through identifying situational obstacles on the way to protesting. In the following extract, 
the interviewee is invited to explain his description of people as ‘inert’, something that he 
talked about earlier in the conversation when he contrasted the minority of active 

































you say inert (.) so these are the people who don’t (0.8) won’t start anything on their own? 
yes I don’t (.) mean this in some bad sense 
aha aha  
they’re just people who live and (0.2) well yeah they don’t do anything (.)  
they’re (0.2) maybe they’re sympathetic (.) to the opposition, maybe not 
mmhm 
maybe they simply don’t realise 
mmhm  
um (.) that everything is bad  
(0.5)  
maybe they don’t even go to vote 
mmhm 
so it’s like that  
 
In this extract, the interviewer’s probe makes available an inference that ‘inert’ 
people are deficient in some way, by characterising them as lacking action (‘people who 
don’t’) and initiative (‘won’t start anything on their own’) in line 1. The interviewee 
displays his awareness of such negative inference and wards it off by saying that he does 
not ‘mean [inert] in some bad sense’ (line 2). P23 also downgrades the significance of this 
label (‘inert’) through stating that ‘they’re just people who live’ (line 4). In so doing, the 
interviewee starts to make clear that lack of action is not necessarily a bad trait.  
This point is developed further by portraying inaction as an expression of general 
lack of awareness rather than a conscious choice. While P23 admits people’s passivity 
(‘well yeah they don’t do anything’, line 4), he follows it with various suggestions that are 
hearable as explanations for the behaviour. The suggestions are offered through listing at 
lines 5-9. The first items on the list — ‘maybe they’re sympathetic (.) to the opposition, 
maybe not’ (line 5) — imply that inaction is not a result of concrete personal attitudes, 
since people can be sympathetic and yet still remain uninvolved. The next item — ‘maybe 
they simply don’t realise […] that everything is bad’ (lines 7, 9) — grounds the idea that 
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people might be passive not because they support what is happening, but because they do 
not realise that something problematic is taking place. In particular, it is demonstrated by 
the use of ‘simply’, which suggests that people’s behaviour is not underpinned by a 
specific logic but stems from the lack of awareness. Perhaps due to lack of uptake in line 
10, the interviewee formulates another reason, ‘maybe they don’t even go to vote’ (line 
9); ‘even’ here appears to emphasise the degree of detachment from politics and thereby 
implies that people are not interested in political matters in general and do not simply 
ignore active protest. P23 thus makes clear that inaction is not an informed choice, but a 
logical outcome of various factors that prevent people from realising the unfortunate state 
of affairs (‘that everything is bad’, line 9). Given such lack of awareness, people are seen 
as not having a strong inclination to protest, which in turn portrays their inaction as 
understandable and less blameworthy.  
Two ideas can therefore be taken from the analysis of this extract. First, the 
interviewee seems to be sensitive to the negative inferences regarding the non-protesters 
that the interviewer’s probe entails, and works to downplay them. Second, he does so by 
describing a number of obstacles to taking action, such as lack of political interest and 
lack of awareness. 
In extracts 2 and 3 below, respondents discuss people who remain uninvolved in 
protest, and similarly work to imply that those people’s inattention to protest is reasonable 
given the circumstances. In extract 3, the question in line 1 is asked towards the end of a 
long narrative about the interviewee’s concern that people in Russia avoid active protest 
because they think that it will not achieve anything.  
 














and other people (.) people you talked about who’re like (0.2) 
not interested where do you think it’s coming from (0.2) why is that? 
(0.8) 
people are not interested (.) [after all they see 
                                             [well in fact there is- (0.2) 








































so um (0.2) people might work so much (.) [and work so hard 
                                                                      [mmhm 
so it’s just like (.) lack of time 
mm stuff like that (.) and peop- people might have again  
some personal (0.4) business that requires a lot of their like- um  
(.) well because of which they cannot go anywhere 
mmhm 
like (.) react to something (0.4) well it’s all quite complicated actually 
because (0.5) obj- objectively one should have enough time to (.) 
mmhm 
to do something 
  






























and why (.) in your opinion (.) why’s this feeling that nothing depends on me? 
well I guess it’s fostered in some way yeah (.) because in the media  
mmhm 
well not in all the media but in printed media in particular in specific regions  
it’s promoted and other regions are on their own, left to live their own lives (.)  
and well our economic conditions are also not good everywhere  
and many people are running between jobs (.) children like (.) family 
mmhm  
and so on and so on yeah (.) and already there’s some um (.)  
people start having this impression that £ my hut is on the edge8 yeah £ hh 
aha aha 
somewhere in the Novaya Gazeta like (.) in the latest issue there was an article  
about a teach- well about um (0.2) a year ago a village teacher Farber  
was sentenced [to eight years in prison 
                         
8 This idiom, ‘my hut is on the edge’ (moya hata s krayu), can be roughly translated into English as 

















                        [aha yes yes I heard about that 
ok you’re familiar with that yeah (.) so the article mentioned other teachers (.)  
who basically didn’t support the innocence plea and it explained why yeah 
because they are pressured (.) headmasters are pressured  
mmhm mmhm 
and everyone is scared and so on (.) and someone works two and a half jobs and 
just physically has no time to do anything else (.) like to protest on the streets 
 
In the beginning of both extracts, the interviewees are probed about the origin of 
the attitudes they have suggested other people had, the attitudes that prevented those 
people from taking part in protests: P14 is asked ‘the people […] who’re like (0.2) not 
interested where do you think it’s coming from (0.2) why is that?’ (2:1-2) and P27 is asked 
‘why’s this feeling that nothing depends on me?’ (3:1). Note how the interviewer’s probes 
can be seen to index the attitudes as problematic. First, why-interrogatives by themselves 
imply that the object of enquiry needs an explanation, and in so doing orient to a possibility 
that it is in some way inappropriate or unwarranted (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). Second, 
in extract 2, being uninterested can be seen as problematic behaviour as the interviewer 
— in her further probe in line 4 — sets it against the awareness of misconduct. She says 
‘people are not interested (.) [after all they see’; this formulation implies that people should 
be interested, given what they observe. Although what, exactly, these people ‘see’ is left 
implicit, it is plausible to assume that the interviewer refers to some misconduct or 
improper state of affairs. Portraying someone as knowledgeable but inactive is a powerful 
device for problematising the behaviour (Watson, 1978), and the interviewer in extract 2 
uses it to put forward the idea that having a ‘not interested’ attitude is problematic and 
potentially blameworthy. In extract 3, while the interviewer does not explicitly index the 
feeling that ‘nothing depends on me’ (line 1) as problematic, it is inferable from the 
previous conversation, where P27 repeatedly expressed her regrets over such attitude 
causing protests to die out across Russia.  
Thus in both extracts, the suggestion that there is something problematic about 
being uninterested and hence uninvolved in protest is made ‘live’ in the interactional 
context. Similarly to extract 1, here the interviewees address this suggestion and counter 
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it, by portraying such attitudes and inaction as accountable. Accountability is worked up 
in two ways. 
First, the design of the accounts in itself provides a stronger basis for 
accountability: note that the interviewees do not limit their answers to a particular 
explanation, but produce lists of reasons why people might be not involved. Listing is a 
practice that gives an opportunity to strengthen and amplify the message that is put across 
(Atkinson, 1984; Jefferson, 1990), and in this case, there are many factors that can prevent 
people from protesting, rather than their being simply uninterested or unenthusiastic.  
Second, the interviewees reduce the deliberateness of non-involvement through 
identifying three practical obstacles for becoming involved, such as fear, and lack of 
knowledge and time. In the beginning of her answer in extract 3, P27 openly suggests that 
discouragement is ‘fostered’ (line 2) and ‘promoted’ (line 5), by ‘the media’ in ‘specific 
regions’ (line 4). In so doing, she orients to an external factor that influences people’s 
attitudes. In the case of P14, the first item on his list of reasons — ‘people might (.) not 
see’ (2:6) — directly addresses, and dismisses, the idea that people intentionally ignore 
the situation. Here, lack of interest is portrayed as a consequence of lack of knowledge, a 
suggestion that works to diminish non-participants’ culpability and present their inaction 
as accountable.  
Another obstacle both interviewees orient to is fear. P14 does it by stating that 
‘people might (.) see but be afraid’ (2:8), which suggests that a strong emotion can 
‘overrule’ action, with people being aware but too scared to act. Reference to fear is 
particularly robust here, as in Russia, due to the governmental crackdown on the 
opposition movement from the beginning of 2012, being imprisoned or attacked by the 
police during a demonstration is a distinct possibility (Lanskoy & Suthers, 2013; Petrov, 
Lipman & Hale, 2014). The infamous Bolotnaya Square case is just one example of how 
mainly peaceful protesters were subjected to harsh criminal sanctions. Hence not 
protesting on the basis of being scared, even despite the potential awareness of misdeeds, 
is seen as understandable through such reference to reality. The speaker in the third extract 
similarly warrants fear as a legitimate reason, when she explains why some teachers did 
not support another teacher who was unjustly prosecuted (for details of the Farber case 
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see, for example, Krainova, 2013). While the lack of support is clearly problematic, 
especially coming from fellow teachers in the context of a highly contested trial, the 
interviewee accounts for it in lines 18-20, saying ‘they are pressured (.) headmasters are 
pressured […] and everyone is scared and so on’. This claim takes agency away from the 
teachers — they were forced — and portrays fear as a powerful practical obstacle to 
becoming involved, being felt by ‘everyone’.  
Lack of time is yet another obstacle that is indexed as important. Both respondents 
make clear that people might have responsibilities that require time and effort, and this 
renders protesting unfeasible. In particular, in extract 2 the interviewee suggests that non-
interest is not a matter of personal choice but a consequence of focus on work (‘people 
might work so much (.) [and work so hard’, line 12). Note that the interviewee 
corroborates this explanation, by suggesting that it is ‘just like (.) lack of time’ (line 14). 
‘Just’ here appears to minimise the significance of non-protesting by restricting the reason 
for it to something that is both objective and outside of people’s control (Lee, 1987). In 
lines 16-19, P14 takes his argument further by pointing to ‘some personal (0.4) business’ 
as the reason why some people ‘cannot go anywhere […] like (.) react to something’. By 
using modal verb ‘cannot’, P14 highlights the normative impossibility of behaviour; 
normativity is further built up in lines 20-22, where the interviewee portrays time as an 
‘objective’ condition to taking action. Shortage of such a resource due to work or personal 
commitments is thus seen as legitimate obstacle to protesting.  
The interviewee from extract 3 makes a similar argument when she claims that, 
since economic conditions are not stable, people end up ‘running between jobs (.) children 
like (.) family’ (line 7). In the original Russian, she uses the word ‘krutit’sya’, which 
literally means ‘spin’ and conveys the image of people being constantly pressed for time. 
With this, the speaker implies that the lack of concern (‘my hut is on the edge’, line 10) 
does not happen by choice but because of objective responsibilities people have to attend 
to. The role of time is highlighted further in lines 20-21, where P27 states that ‘someone 
works two and a half jobs and just physically has no time to do anything else’. This further 
contributes to the suggestion that protesting is practically impossibly due to the lack of 
time, a factor which is not directly related to internal motivation to take action or not. 
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Hence, both speakers orient to the pressures of time and responsibility, diverting the blame 
away from non-protesters while presenting them as hardworking and caring people. 
To summarise, in the extracts above interviewees account for inaction of other 
people by identifying a number of obstacles and presenting such obstacles as objective 
and not dependant on personal wishes. Similar strategies can be seen in extracts 4 and 5 
below, although the descriptions of obstacles are not produced in direct response to a 
question. In extract 4, the speaker spontaneously turns to the topic of public inaction after 
complaining about generally low protest numbers. In extract 5, the interviewee suggested 
that Moscow mass protests are not representative of the country as a whole, and claimed 
that people in the regions/provinces are much more passive. 
 






























you know how it is now (.) in large cities even there it’s difficult yeah↑ 
aha 
so many people they (.) are preoccupied with earning money  
and basically well (.) all their thoughts are about that 
(1.8) 
I understand that somewhere in provinces or somewhere like that  
where nearly everyone is busy with earning money and it’s just really  
nothing else matters to them  
(0.5)  
well it’s like this Maslow pyramid something like that 
mmhm  
that only from certain level of life there appears (.) longing for um (.) higher needs 
mmhm  
this like (.) need for rights  
 






it’s understandable that um (1.8) well it’s difficult life circumstances  

















on finding- well on surviving basically 
mmhm 
well generally speaking in order to survive (.)  
of course you don’t care about like (.) it’s like Maslow pyramid 
mmhm  
um (.) and you don’t care about stuff like that (.) about some cultural  
or the like (0.2) some civilisational (0.8) matters 
 
One observation to make here is that, in contrast to the first three extracts of this 
chapter, even though the interviewer does not solicit an explanation of the public 
behaviour, speakers account for the inaction of their own accord. Interviewees formulate 
their explanations so that people’s protest inaction is seen as reasonable.  
First, this is achieved by positioning people who do not protest within an 
environment that dictates only the basic priorities. P15 in extract 4 states that ‘even [in 
large cities] it’s difficult’ (line 1). Note how the factuality of this claim is warranted by 
presenting it as a part of shared knowledge (‘you know how it is now’) and by requesting 
collaborative agreement from the interviewer (‘yeah↑’), which she provides in line 2 
(‘aha’). In implicit contrast to ‘large cities’, the speaker then orients to the situation ‘in 
provinces or somewhere like that’ (line 6), which in effect is seen as being even worse. 
P15 states that in the regions ‘nearly everyone is busy with earning money’ (line 7). The 
extreme case formulation ‘nearly everyone’ is qualified and therefore especially 
rhetorically robust for stressing the predominant role the economic factor plays in the life 
of the people outside of the capitals (Edwards, 2000). Having no other concerns but 
economic ones (‘nothing else matters to them’, line 8) is thus seen as understandable 
within an environment which itself is constructed as the main obstacle to becoming 
involved with political protest.  
Similarly, P11 in extract 5 describes the passivity of the people as ‘understandable’ 
(line 1). In justifying this claim, he orients to ‘difficult life circumstances’ (line 1), which 
is unpacked as ‘rat races’ (line 2); this expression grounds the idea that people are engaged 
in fierce competition for resources. Furthermore, P11 suggests that one’s sole focus (‘you 
spend all your time’, line 2) is on ‘surviving basically’ (line 3). Note also that this is a 
223 
 
repair of the earlier ‘on finding-’. The accentuated word ‘surviving’ (vyzhit’) has more 
pronounced connotations of struggling against extreme hardship, which places an 
emphasis on physical needs and implies that people have no time to attend to anything 
else.  
Second, speakers reduce the culpability of the non-involved public by drawing on 
the rhetoric of argument (Edwards & Potter, 2000), that is, by constructing logical 
rationale behind the indifference. In so doing, both respondents mobilise a psychological 
concept, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) and use it to describe a process 
through which people acquire interest in the matters of ‘higher order’. In extract 4, the 
interviewee explains that ‘only from certain level of life there appears (.) longing for um 
(.) higher needs’ (line 12); invocation of a psychological concept (‘it’s like this Maslow 
pyramid’, line 10) makes this explanation discernibly scientific’ and hence convincing. In 
extract 5, the speaker similarly appeals to science by invoking Maslow’s theory (‘it’s like 
Maslow pyramid’, line 6). He additionally justifies indifference to protest as a ‘natural’ 
attitude for people who are simply trying to ‘survive’ (line 5), by asserting that ‘of course 
[one does not] care about […] some cultural or the like (0.2) some civilisational (0.8) 
matters’ (lines 6, 8-9). The use of ‘you’ similarly adds veracity to the account, by acting 
as a subtle inclusive device that can be seen as referring to the listener as a member of 
‘anybody’, thereby suggesting that anybody in such a situation would not care, and 
contributing to the interviewee’s claim that people’s behaviour is understandable (Sacks, 
1992, Vol. 1, p. 166).  
Both interviewees, then, display the recognition of the normatively prescribed 
character of people’s actions under harsh circumstances. The implication here is that by 
not taking part in rights-oriented protests, people in fact behave in ways that are expected 
and appropriate to their environment. In effect, their non-participation behaviour is 
accounted for on the grounds of logic and common sense.   
This section thus demonstrates how protesters can explain the behaviour of non-
protesters by orienting to a variety of external reasons and obstacles and positioning these 
as responsible for people’s inaction. Such constructions reduce the deliberateness of non-




2. ‘Traumatised generations’: accounting for inaction by portraying it 
as characteristic of Russian/Soviet people 
 
Another frequently observed strategy of accounting for the behaviour of those who 
are not involved in protest is by making references to historical and cultural circumstances 
that foster passivity and indifference. For example, in the following two extracts the 
interviewees legitimise other people’s lack of interest by invoking Russian history.  
Extract 6 starts with the interviewee expressing his feelings over an incident with his 
neighbour who refused to support P1’s initiative about a local community council, saying 
that she did not want to ‘meddle’ with politics. In extract 7, the interviewee has talked 
about her family who are not interested in joining the protest, and is asked by the 
interviewer to comment on it further. 
 




























£ damn £ hhh  
(0.8)  
I felt so sad  
huh (0.2) and why do you think this is? (.) maybe it happens oft- 
they’re poor deceived people um (0.5) they were first deceived um (.)  
they were first deceived by (.) communists 
mmhm 
who started killing them (.) then they were deceived by (.) well there were  
many who deceived them (.) then they were deceived by Yeltsin, all of them  
mmhm 
who was like (0.2) solving problems with the parliament using tanks 
mmhm  












































so you say like people they are not even interested for example  
your mum (.) my mum (.) why do you think this is (.) where does it come from? 
well (.) um yeah I think (.) for me as £ someone who is interested in psychology £ 
mmhm  
of course um there’s- (.) there is like a great sadness in it↑ 
mmhm 
because I think in our country (.) it’s whole generations are traumatised so much 
mmhm mmhm 
um (0.2) it’s just where- wherever you look (.) so it’s not even surprising 
((some lines omitted – she says country needs therapy to help people realise their rights)) 
of course I feel sad watching (.) how (0.8) people themselves continue to allow this  
mmhm 
to be humiliated to be treated like that to live with this and somehow put up with this    
mmhm mmhm 
and (.) the way I explain it (.) I explain it because (.) it’s just here one after another we have 
traumatised generations which (0.2) were crushed (0.5) starting with like um (0.2) with what  
took place after um (0.2) with Stalin to begin with yeah (.) and those terrible terrible things 
mmhm 
 
In both extracts, the interviewer solicits explanations about the behaviour of other 
people in a way that can imply that such behaviour is problematic. First, in both extracts 
YL makes people’s attitudes accountable with direct why-interrogatives, a design that is 
frequently used for orienting to potential accountability issues (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). 
Indeed, in the above extracts the interviewees appear to treat YL’s questions in this way, 
as offering puzzles for them to explain. In extract 6, the ‘why do you think this is?’ at line 
4 is quite unspecific and can be taken to be about why P1 is sad; however, the interviewee 
clearly treats it as an enquiry about why people reject politics by formulating the upshot 
in line 13 (‘so that’s why’). In extract 7, the interviewer says that ‘people they are not even 
interested’ (line 1); stressing the fact of indifference can be seen as implying that such 
behaviour is puzzling, especially considering that they are the family, specifically mothers 
(line 2), a category that is expected to care for and support their children. The interviewee 
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treats this as something requiring an explanation and she explicitly positions her account 
as such (‘the way I explain it (.) I explain it because’, line 14). 
Formulating explanations for other people’s behaviour, interviewees portray the 
attitudes in question — being uninterested/disappointed in politics — as habitual ways of 
thinking, typical for Russian people as a collective. In extract 6, this is done by shifting 
the focus from a particular person, a neighbour who refused to support P1’s protest 
initiative, to a much broader ‘they’ (‘they’re poor deceived people’, line 5; ‘all of them 
are disappointed with politics’, line 13). This shift enables P1 to portray the lack of 
political initiative as a commonplace characteristic. In extract 7, it is arguably the 
interviewer who first alludes to the idea that the lack of interest is commonplace, when 
she uses collective ‘people’ (line 1) and implies that it affects her own family too (‘your 
mum (.) my mum’). P13 develops this idea by stating that ‘whole generations’ (line 7) are 
affected with the same mind set, allowing themselves ‘to be humiliated’ and continuing 
to ‘somehow put up with this’ (line 12).  
The mind set is described as a direct result of being subjected to consistent and 
widespread mistreatment by political agents. In extract 6, the speaker shows it by stating 
that people were ‘deceived’ numerous times: ‘they were first deceived’ (lines 5-6), ‘then 
they were deceived’ (line 8), ‘there were many who deceived them’ (lines 8-9). The 
technique of listing here enables P1 to portray deceit as a recurrent ‘fact’ of Russia’s 
history. Likewise, in extract 7 the interviewee conveys the feeling of unfairness as 
consistent, when she says that generations of people were traumatised ‘here one after 
another’ (line 14). Furthermore, she uses an extreme case adverb to stress the prevalence 
of it (‘it’s just where- wherever you look’, line 9). Note that both speakers attribute 
responsibility for unfair treatment to a particular agent, namely people in (political) power, 
such as ‘communists’ and ‘Yeltsin’ (6:6, 9) and ‘Stalin’ (7:16). Governments are expected 
to have a certain responsibility for their subjects; ‘killing’ (6:8) and ‘crushing’ (7:15) them 
is thus seen as gross misconduct. Reinforcing this image is the feeling of sadness that the 
respondents convey, P1 by explicitly saying that he is ‘so sad’ (6:3) and describing people 
as ‘poor’ (6:5) and P13 by stating that ‘there is like a great sadness in it’ (7:5) and 
portraying her feeling of sadness as expectable (‘of course I feel sad’, 7:10). In effect, 
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people appear as helpless victims of state transgressions, which makes their apathetic 
attitude more convincing. 
Finally, P1 and P13 establish a causal link between past negative experience and 
the present lack of action, thereby justifying indifference as the expected reaction. This is 
achieved by using the conjunction ‘so’: P1 says ‘so that’s why (.) all of them are 
disappointed with politics’ (6:13) and P13 says ‘so [being not interested] it’s not even 
surprising’ (7:9). By means of their accounts, then, interviewees make public lack of 
interest and disappointment in political protest intelligible and hence justified. In 
comparison to the accounts presented in the first section, here the explanations are linked 
to the historical development of the country overall and depict inaction as a predictable 
result of such development. 
Extracts 8 and 9 are further examples of history-related accounts, where matters 
of participation and non-participation are discussed in terms of being raised in a particular 
‘Soviet’ culture. There, interviewees are invited by the interviewer to discuss why certain 
people stay away from active protest. In extract 8, in the previous talk the interviewee had 
reported seeing very few middle-aged people at demonstrations. 
 
























and what about middle-aged people for example (.)  
what do you think for them (.) are they (0.5) not interested um? 
um (.) well why not? they are interested it’s just um (.) it’s some um (0.5)  
they’re still (.) let’s say a Soviet generation (.) well (0.2) they were brought up differently 
mmhm 
well basically it’s difficult to explain but (.) it’s like well (.) um us (0.5) 
we’re basically the first post-Soviet generation who um (1.2) well (.)  
we don’t see (0.2) the point in (.) sitting in kitchens as it was during the Soviet rule 
mmhm 
and like um (.) to express our protest through that 





































can we talk about the people who don’t (0.8) I mean who see all this but (0.2)  
well (.) I’m certain that they surely see (.) but somehow they- 
they see but (.) um you know (.) the whole point I guess is in upbringing  
aha 
um (.) let’s say we have little youth now (0.2) it’s well (.) any statistics would say so 
mmhm mmhm  
predominantly now we have people who (.) were born and lived (.) 
for quite a long time in (.) the Soviet Union  
mmhm mmhm 
so (.) I think this is the main reason um (0.2) why Moscow didn’t get that million 
aha aha 
so um (.) it’s because of (.) um well let’s say Soviet government brought people up in a way  
that (0.2) here you have the general secretary who thinks for you, who gives you jobs like um 
(0.5) gives medicine schools and so on that’s it (.) you don’t have to worry about anything  
mmhm mmhm 
 
An interesting feature of these two accounts is how the category of ‘Soviet’ is 
introduced as an explanatory construct for people’s protest inaction. 
First, interviewees shift the topic from people’s subjective interest/awareness to 
matters of their upbringing. In extract 8, this is done in response to the interviewer’s probe, 
which implies that middle-aged people are not interested in joining protests (‘are they 
(0.5) not interested um?’, line 2). In line 3, P43 uses a rhetorical question (‘well why not?’) 
to imply that there is no good reason to accept lack of interest as a valid explanation (Billig, 
1996), and then explicitly affirms the presence of interest (‘they are interested’, line 3). In 
so doing, the speaker discounts personal interest as a significant factor. In turn, he offers 
a competing explanation, saying that ‘they were brought up differently’ (line 4). The 
speaker in extract 9 does a similar thing. While he agrees with the interviewer in line 3 
that people might ‘see’ (presumably) the unfortunate state of affairs, note how he 
immediately refocuses attention from the subject of personal awareness to that of nurture, 
saying that ‘the whole point I guess is in upbringing’. In so doing, he dismisses the causal 
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link between seeing and acting, embedded in the interviewer’s turn at lines 1-2; ‘the whole 
point’ additionally grounds ‘upbringing’ as the dominant factor.   
Having discounted the importance of personal factors, speakers portray non-
participation as a consequence of certain category membership. P43 emphasises that 
middle-aged people are ‘still (.) let’s say a Soviet generation’ (8:4); in a similar manner, 
P25 makes relevant the category of Soviet people through suggesting that the majority of 
people in Russia were born and raised in the Soviet Union (9:7-8). So both interviewees 
can be seen to utilise the reference to Soviet times and its people — the proverbial ‘Soviet 
man’ (Rose et al., 2011) or ‘Homo Soveticus’ (Boobbyer, 2000) — which, to members of 
Russian culture at least, is conventionally bound to a set of anti-protest dispositions, such 
as reluctance to criticise the regime openly, as in Soviet times when it entailed rather 
serious consequences (see chapter 1 for details). Suggesting that many non-protesters are 
essentially ‘Soviet’ and thus share ‘Soviet’ dispositions is a way to implicitly display their 
non-protesting behaviour as normal and hence accountable.  
Explicitly, such category-bound attributes are worked up by giving examples of 
Soviet people’s mentality. In extract 8, P43 makes a comparison between the ‘Soviet’ and 
‘post-Soviet’ generations, and states that the latter ‘don’t see (0.2) the point in (.) sitting 
in kitchens as it was during the Soviet rule […] and like um (.) to express our protest 
through that’ (lines 8-10). The described activity — ‘sitting in kitchens’ — is one of the 
archetypal ‘political’ activities for ordinary people in the Soviet Union, when political 
debates usually took place in the safety of one’s flat among friends and family; it is also a 
private activity and is therefore not easy to observe. In describing it, the interviewee 
reinforces the image of middle-aged people being led by a different set of values, making 
his explanation more convincing. In extract 9, the interviewee explicitly characterises 
Soviet upbringing as the reason why the majority of people did not join active protests 
(‘this is the main reason um (0.2) why Moscow didn’t get that million’, line 10). 
Furthermore, P25 uses reported speech to demonstrate the sort of attitude that he suggests 
was ingrained in people in Soviet times. In particular, in lines 13-14 he depicts people as 
reliant on the state in virtually every aspect of their lives, including jobs (‘who gives you 
jobs’), social benefits such as ‘medicine schools and so on’ and even judgement (‘the 
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general secretary who thinks for you’). The implication here is that being conditioned to 
rely on the state, people ‘naturally’ feel less willing (or even able) to challenge the 
government that is perceived as the main ‘provider’.  
In effect, both accounts warrant inaction as a characteristic trait of the members of 
Soviet culture, a matter-of-course outcome of mentality that developed under specific 
historical circumstances of living in the Soviet Union.  
The speaker in the final extract in this section also makes a number of references 
to the ‘Soviet’ mind set, although there the characterisations are not produced in direct 
response to the interviewer’s probe. The interviewee talks about being involved in a 
protest against unfair distribution of manufacturing orders for the factory he used to work 
at. He recalls how, while he was determined to organise a demonstration, the CEO and 
the factory’s labour union members became ‘scared’ of expressing their dissatisfaction 
and refused to participate. The reproduced fragment is the last part of this story, where he 
offers explanations for such behaviour.  
 
































our people (.) as it were (.) they don’t stand up for each other 
mmhm  
well maybe somewhere there’ll be a passing row (.) or if it’s like completely-  
um (.) if they’re driven completely to the edge then maybe they’d rouse 
aha 
knowing this (.) what employers do? (.) they take (.) the lion’s share of profit for themselves 
mmhm 
and um (.) to the people they leave ten to twelve thousand roubles salary (.) is he alive? 
(.) well it’s the same as slaves you know? 
mmhm mmhm  
is he not dead? is he still alive? well it seems he’s alive (.) it’s general level  
and what do you expect? (.) it’s just the general level it’s like this  
mmhm mmhm 
















































yachts and so on, billions (.) where on earth do they put it (0.2) difficult to imagine 
yeah 
but (.) we allow them to do this  
mmhm 
just (.) just um because we have not yet (.) formed as a society unfortunately 
mmhm  
so (0.2) or it’s that lengthy Soviet (.) period when (0.8) things were thought for us  
mmhm  
everything was decided for us, for us um (.) excuse my language (.) let’s say (.) 
all our bottoms were wiped for us 
mmhm 
everything (.) all sweat was cleaned um (.) let’s say we were fussed over  
mmhm 
we um (.) actually (.) we didn’t appreciate it yeah↑ 
mmhm mmhm 
but it truly was like that (.) I mean for us everything was decided (.) like 
kindergarten? everything will be done (.) a flat? there’ll be a flat for you  
mmhm 
you just (.) do like this work like this and then you’ll have a flat and a kindergarten  
and um (.) all the rest  
mmhm 
and that (.) led to people (.) stop fighting for their rights  
 
The interviewee begins by producing a claim that Russian people ‘don’t stand up 
for each other’ (line 1). With this, P28 presents the lack of mutual support to be a 
disposition that is characteristic of Russians as a nation. He reinforces this claim by 
‘softening’ it (Edwards, 2000). That is, he makes it less absolute by citing a potential 
counter example: ‘maybe somewhere there’ll be a passing row’ (line 3). Note, however, 
how this description denigrates potential action by presenting it as short-lived (‘passing’) 
and trivial (‘row’). Moreover, the interviewee makes a reference to the involuntary nature 
of such actions, suggesting that they happen because people are ‘driven completely to the 
edge’ (line 4). The descriptive term ‘rouse’ (vstrepenut’sya; line 4) aids such 
understanding by implying that people act only under extreme pressure.  
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Asserting the lack of protest as inherent together with certain ‘facts’ from the 
preceding story — for example, P28 insists that because of the inaction of the factory’s 
labour union the demonstration was called off — can give an impression that P28 blames 
Russian people for their lack of protest involvement. However, he actively directs the 
blame away from the people who do not protest and makes a complaint about the 
employers instead. Employers’ behaviour is constructed as ‘complainable about’ in 
various ways. First, through a direct report of their unfair actions, such as taking ‘the lion’s 
share of profit for themselves’ (line 6), giving minimal salary to their employees (line 8) 
and treating them ‘the same as slaves’ (line 9). Second, P28 uses direct speech in lines 11-
12 to make the complaint more factual. Direct speech was shown to have critical functions, 
serving to implicitly condemn those to whom it is attributed (Benwell, 2012; Stokoe & 
Edwards, 2007): attributing discernibly cynical and mendacious remarks to employers 
enables P28 to indicate that they are at fault. Finally, employers’ behaviour is indexed as 
problematic through a telling juxtaposition of the two standards of living: the low standard 
of the people that their employers present as the norm (‘and what do you expect? (.) it’s 
just the general level’, line 12) as opposed to the ‘billionaire status’ of the employers (line 
14). By making clear that it is the employers who are at fault, the interviewee diverts the 
blame away from the people who do not protest.  
Although allocation of blame enables P28 to present ordinary workers as not 
blameworthy, the following claim — ‘but (.) we allow them to do this’ — can again be 
perceived as a potential accusation. Note, however, how it is immediately followed by an 
explanatory account that makes clear that people’s passivity is not a product of their free 
will but a consequence of their collective Soviet dispositions. 
This is achieved in two ways. First, the interviewee displays an active stance as 
unattainable. In line 20, he suggests that people stay passive ‘just um because we have not 
yet (.) formed as a society’, and thus makes the readiness to protest into a criterial feature 
of the ‘society’, a stage that Russia has reportedly not yet reached. This claim normalises 
passivity as the only available option for Russians.  
Second, P28 describes the Soviet regime as having a causal role in the 
development of the passive attitude. In line 22, he formulates the second explanatory 
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account — ‘or it’s that lengthy Soviet (.) period’ (line 22) — through which the behaviour 
of the people is tied to the category of ‘Soviet’. The second explanatory account takes the 
form of a three-part list, through which P28 displays the totality of ‘care’ the Soviet state 
provided for its people: 1. ‘things were thought for us’ (line 22); 2. ‘everything was 
decided for us’ (line 24); 3. ‘all our bottoms were wiped for us’ (line 25). Extreme case 
formulations ‘everything’ and ‘all’, and, further, ‘all sweat was cleaned’ (line 27) and 
‘everything was decided’ (line 31) maximise the degree of state involvement in people’s 
lives; they also make the account discernibly nonliteral, conveying the meaning of being 
‘essentially so’ (Edwards, 2000). Edwards suggests that nonliteral extreme case 
formulations are often used to perform irony, and the given account can also be understood 
in that way: social welfare is generally a positive thing, but P28 ridicules it by highlighting 
its pervasiveness, desire to control even the most private actions such as ‘wiping bottoms’ 
and ‘cleaning sweat’. In addition, P28 uses direct speech to orient to the paradox of the 
welfare system, with social benefits shown to be a type of reward for complying with the 
state: ‘you just (.) do like this, work like this and then you’ll have a flat and a kindergarten 
and um (.) all the rest’ (lines 34-35). These descriptions help P28 to establish the influence 
of the state as negative and powerful. In the final upshot in line 37, the interviewee 
reinforces the causal link between living under authoritative state and non-challenging and 
passive behaviour, emphasising that ‘that (.) led to people (.) stop fighting for their rights’. 
To reiterate, the extract explains inaction in terms of people’s past living 
environment and through acknowledging its overbearing effect on their current behaviour. 
P28’s account justifies the current lack of protest by taking responsibility for it away from 
the people and placing it instead on the historical system of government that inculcated 
inaction. In this way, the history itself becomes a kind of obstacle on the way to protesting.   
In summary, in this section I have shown how the interviewees can deal with the 
topic of others’ inaction through making references to the Soviet culture and its oppressive 
effect on the people. In so doing, he interviewees attend to and disregard the suggestion 





3. ‘It’s surely very important too’: justifying other ways of meaningful 
involvement 
 
In this last empirical section, I look at a slightly different way of addressing the 
issue of inaction — not by formulating various explanations for people’s passivity, but by 
arguing that people can be involved in other ways. In the following extract, the interviewee 
tells a story about having an argument with his friend, an actor in a children’s theatre, 
about protest involvement. The account is notable for its design: the explanation here is 
solicited not by the interviewer, but by the interviewee himself, through a reported 
dialogue he describes.  
 










































and there I am getting ready to go to yet another demonstration and I say ((name))↑  
(0.2) let’s g- after all you see what is happening (.) how’s that how can you 
mmhm 
he says ((P4 name))↑ at your age I was the same he’s like (.) older than me by ten years 
mmhm  
and he says I was completely the same and it’s normal you should go he says (0.2) 
but myself he says I understand everything I won’t go (.)  
I say but how so↑ (.) what kind of (.) indifference is that?  
mmhm 
he says (P4 name) I’m (0.2) glad for you I think that you going is right but as for me 
I can for example (0.5) well I say you’re no- um (.) you have to participate in some way 
mmhm 
and he says for example I (0.5) play as an actor in plays for children (0.2) 
I play in um fairy-tales for children where like honesty 
mmhm  
ethics (.) bravery are praised (0.5) he says I play for the children (.) what do you think 
this kind of my like (0.2) participation it is um (.) surely also important 
mmhm 
that I foster that in children (.) it’s surely very important too 













yeah yeah  
(0.5)  
well back then I didn’t £ agree with him £ 
hhhh                                                               [ hhh 
£ back then I was ecstatic (.) in oppositional [ ecstasy hh £  
 
In the beginning of the extract, the interviewee positions himself as a regular 
protester by saying that he was ‘getting ready to go to yet another demonstration’ (line 1). 
P4 also makes clear that his friend was unwilling to go even though P4 invited him. In the 
first part of the account, such unwillingness is displayed as problematic.  
Similar to some extracts above, this is done through the ‘assertion of knowledge’ 
claim, which the interviewee uses to aggravate the seriousness of protest inaction. 
Specifically, P4 points to the fact that his friend refused to join him despite being aware 
of issues taking place (‘after all you see what is happening’, line 2). An interesting twist 
here is that P4’s friend is shown to agree with him but still refuses to go: ‘he says I 
understand everything I won’t go’ (line 7). Watson (1978) suggested that excuses about 
one’s behaviour often deal with what he calls a ‘calculable choice model’ (p. 112), a way 
of reasoning about whether the actions are taken knowingly and in the absence of coercion 
or threat. As we saw in sections 1 and 2 above, speakers indeed address this, by claiming 
that people can be excused for their inaction because their behaviour is not intentional, 
being influenced by external obstacles or the ways in which they were brought up. Here, 
however, the interviewee does not negate having knowledge or intent — from the reported 
words it is inferred that his friend chooses not to join P4. The friend’s reported utterances 
also suggest that he supports and understands protesting overall (‘it’s normal you should 
go he says’, line 6; ‘I think that you going is right’, line 10) and used to protest himself 
(‘at your age I was the same’, line 4; ‘he says I was completely the same’, line 6). These 
two inferences — that inaction is intentional and is not due to lack of understanding — 
justify P4’s initial accusations and, at this point at least, make his story hearable as a 
complaint (Haakana, 2007). Moreover, in line 8 P4 describes his own reaction in such a 
way that his friend’s actions come across as puzzling and blameworthy (‘I say but how 
so↑ (.) what kind of (.) indifference is that?’). 
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While assumption of inaction as culpable is embedded in the first part of the 
account, P4 constructs the rest of the story so that his friend’s lack of protest action is seen 
as less problematic, in the light of other things he does. At line 11, the interviewee makes 
a reference to a different kind of involvement: he reports himself saying that people ‘have 
to participate in some way’. While this formulating presents participation as a normative 
expectation (‘have to’), it also seems to tacitly suggest that there might be other ways of 
being involved (‘in some way’). In so doing, P4 sets the scene for the defence account. 
This account is developed by orienting to the friend’s job: ‘I play in um fairy-tales for 
children where like honesty […] ethics (.) bravery are praised (0.5) he says I play for the 
children’ (lines 14-16). The utterance and the three-part list here invoke the significance 
of communicating moral principles to children. The significance is reinforced through 
reported evaluation, when the friend says ‘this kind of my like (0.2) participation it is um 
(.) surely also important’ (line 17) and ‘that I foster that in children (.) it’s surely very 
important too’ (line 19), with ‘also’ and ‘too’ displaying an understanding that people can 
make valuable contributions without taking to the streets. Note also how this 
understanding is further co-constructed in lines 20-21, where the interviewer displays her 
recognition of P4’s point, that his friend is not, indeed, inactive (‘so he does it too 
somehow (.) in his way’), and the interviewee corroborates this (‘yeah yeah’).   
The interviewee, however, seems to be sensitive to the possibility that such an 
‘ordinary’ contribution risks coming across as not important enough. In particular, he 
admits that initially he did not agree with his friend, but at the same time signals his 
recognition that the disagreement had been unjustified. First, disagreement is portrayed as 
a thing of the past (‘back then I didn’t £ agree with him’, line 23), thereby implying that 
now P4 understands and accepts his friend’s contribution. Second, disagreement is 
explained in terms of P4 being ‘ecstatic (.) in oppositional [ecstasy’ (line 25), which is 
said in a smiley voice. Formulated and delivered in that way, the utterance comes across 
as self-depreciation, implying that P4 was swept away by the protest frenzy and failed to 
recognise the actual value of his friend’s contribution. The interviewer also seems to treat 
it as humorous self-depreciation, as she laughs at line 22.  
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In effect, the behaviour that was initially cast as problematic and blame-worthy — 
unwillingness to join a demonstration — is accounted for, on the grounds of a jointly 
produced understanding that there are other, more ‘local’ and mundane ways of staying 
meaningfully involved.  
Instances of such accounting strategy are seen across the data, but as they tend to 
appear spontaneously, often in the middle of lengthy accounts, it is difficult to analyse 
them sequentially. As I have shown, in the majority of extracts in this chapter explanations 
are given against the backdrop of an explicit or implicit suggestion that non-involvement 
in protest is accountable and potentially blameworthy. While the following three extracts 
do not follow a suggestion of blame directly, there the participants make a very similar 
argument to the speaker in extract 11, that there are various ways for people to be involved. 
Moreover, the speakers in these extracts suggest that such alternative ways are, in fact, 
more meaningful than street protests. In extract 12, the interviewee talks about people who 
appear to be passive and non-involved, and gives an example. In extract 13, the speaker 
discusses the reasons for the decline of active street protest. In extract 14, the respondent 
answers the question ‘what’s opposition for you?’ and has just mentioned that for her ‘the 
opposition’ are not necessarily the people who are actively involved in protest.  
 




















there is one company I mean it’s also some communal well (.) sort of small communal  
association and so (0.5) um (.) they were planting um (.) they had an outing to plant  
(0.2) trees here at the Lenin avenue (.) with them I’d go happily (0.5) it’s just trees yeah (.) 
they’ve chipped in together whatever they had yeah (.) they bought some (.) some like  
ten or twelve trees (.) we planted them it’s great like (.) there are trees growing 
and it’s like real work (.) you know 
mmhm 
but (.) go to demonstrations (.) um wave like (.) a placard there (.) it’s- it’s (.)  

































people start to address slightly different issues (.) I mean they focus more on some personal 
(0.5) business and projects (.) that work for common goal rather than (0.2) um  
political activism per se 
((some lines omitted – he gives examples of local St Petersburg groups and talks about  
creating a newspaper for his local community)) 
we issue news (.) every day um (0.2) we tell what’s happening in the life of (.) the district 
mmhm  
um (.) highlight (0.2) some problems issues that the residents complain about (.) 
what makes them dissatisfied  
mmhm  
um that’s important (.) maybe we’ll be doing some (.) public actions about those matters 
mmhm  
but (.) all this it’s not um (.) like, we don’t run around with ‘down with Putin’ placards 
 


























people (can) um (.) very rarely go to protest actions um but they understand  
and they do something because of that 
mmhm  
they behave differently 
mmhm  
they don’t give bribes on principle  
mm mmhm it’s like (.) you’ve said with their own example [they do it 
                                                                                                [yes with they own example  
not because they go to demonstrations, shout with banners in hands and (.) so on  
but specifically (.) with their own quiet (.) it can be quiet 
mmhm mmhm  
example (.) with their life (.) with responsibility for their own lives, for (.) other people 
 
I would like to make two observations about extracts 12 to 14. First, all three 
interviewees describe activities that are not street protests but are portrayed as making a 
valuable contribution to society. Notably, the activities interviewees refer to are seen as 
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more ‘mundane’ in comparison to organised street protests, by placing an emphasis on 
local character of the work.  
P45 gives an example of a ‘small communal association’ (12:1-2) who was 
planting trees in his area; he invokes routine character of this activity (‘it’s just trees’, 
12:3) and points to the local scale of events (‘they’ve chipped in together whatever they 
had yeah (.) they bought some (.) some like ten or twelve trees’, 12:4-5). At the same time, 
he highlights the benefit the deed has brought (‘we planted them it’s great like (.) there 
are trees growing’, 12:5). P16 discusses importance of ‘personal (0.5) business and 
projects (.) that work for common goal’ (13:1-2) and gives example of his own 
contribution to ‘the life of (.) the district’ (13:4) through publishing a local newspaper. His 
account prioritises the ‘problems issues’ (13:6) that local residents have and describes 
attending to these as ‘important’ (13:9). P24 praises people who show ‘responsibility for 
their own lives, for (.) other people’ (14:12) and makes clear that commendable behaviour 
is not always public. Specifically, she suggests that meaningful actions can be ‘quiet’ 
(14:10) and more mundane, such as not giving bribes (14:6) and staying true to one’s 
principles even if it means behaving ‘differently’ (l4:4).   
All three speakers, then, display their understanding that people can be involved 
through ‘ordinary’ day-to-day actions, which aim to benefit their local communities. 
Second, such local/mundane actions are constructed as meaningful ‘real work’, by 
contrasting them with street protests. This is done by describing protest activity in such a 
way that it appears shallow and inefficient.  
In extract 12, the speaker says ‘go to demonstrations (.) um wave like (.) a placard 
there (.) it’s- it’s (.) well what (0.2) can it gain↑’ (lines 8-9). This formulation degrades 
the act of protesting in two ways: first, the verb ‘wave’ (mahat’) focuses attention on 
physical movement of one’s hands and as such implies that there is little meaning in 
protesting; second, via rhetorical question P45 makes a point that demonstrations cannot 
yield positive changes. The interviewee strengthens this view by proposing an ‘obvious’ 
answer (as it follows a clearly rhetorical question), that street protesting entails negative 
consequences such as ‘commotion and shattering of public opinion’ (line 9). This comes 
in stark contrast with an earlier example of planting trees, which P45 calls ‘real work’ 
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(line 6). In extract 13, the interviewee compares ‘work for common goal’ with ‘political 
activism per se’ (lines 2-3) and implies that people’s interest in the latter is decreasing. He 
also makes clear that he and his fellow newspaper publishers are not involved in public 
protest, saying ‘we don’t run around with ‘down with Putin’ placards’ (line 11). Here too, 
protesting is designed to appear meaningless by placing focus on its physical side (‘run 
around’) and stereotyping its demands (‘with ‘down with Putin’ placards’). Finally, in 
extract 14, the speaker claims that understanding does not need to manifest in active 
protest participation (line 1); rather, ‘it can be quiet’ (line 10). She also downplays the 
value of going to demonstrations, by portraying it as a purely physical exercise — ‘go to 
demonstrations, shout with banners in hands’ (line 9) — and contrasts it with behaviour 
done ‘on principle’ (line 6).  
It can be seen, then, how the speakers use descriptions to present street protests as 
less meaningful and less useful than some ‘mundane’ actions. In so doing, they strengthen 
the understanding that people can be involved in various ways and should not be held 
accountable simply on the basis of not protesting on the streets. 
This section has demonstrated how speakers can creatively address the topic of 
inaction, not by formulating reasons for it but by negotiating the meaning of inaction itself. 
The result of such negotiations is the alternative view of involvement, where people are 
considered active even though they do not participate in street demonstrations. Rather, the 
emphasis there is made on moral and meaningful personal acts, through which one is seen 




This chapter analysed interview extracts related to the topic of other people’s 
protest inaction. The general analytic finding of this chapter is that protesters tend not to 
blame other people for their protest inaction; on the contrary, interviewees formulated 
various explanations of why people might remain uninvolved. Specifically, the first 
section illustrated how, by referencing various practical obstacles, interviewees can reduce 
the deliberateness of protest-related indifference and portray not being involved in active 
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protest as reasonable behaviour. In the second section, I showed how interviewees 
accounted for people’s inaction by invoking national/generational Soviet characteristics 
and presenting them as responsible for the lack of protest. The third section demonstrated 
a slightly different accounting strategy, where speakers described more local and mundane 
forms of involvement, while simultaneously downplaying the value of overt street protest.  
These strategies appear particularly useful for managing the dilemma I described 
in the introduction to this chapter — that protest is portrayed as important, but it is not 
supported by the majority of people: through them, respondents attributed protest inaction 
to the reasons that went beyond simple lack of interest, thus preserving the value of protest 
up to a point. While the third section showed that street demonstrations could be 
characterised as comparatively less efficient and meaningful, speakers there did imply that 
being active itself is still important. As such, analysis in this section suggests that speakers 
are sensitive to potential contradictions that might result from their claims and organise 
their accounts in ways that prevent inconsistency and contradiction. 
In what follows, I would like to discuss three ideas related to the analysis.  
First, the analyses suggest that talking about others is an interactionally sensitive 
activity; specifically, that complaining about others and presenting them as being to blame 
for their behaviour is something that my participants avoided. In broader terms, this is in 
line with the research of other conversational analysts who have suggested that talk-in-
interaction is often designed to avoid conflict and advance solidarity and affiliation 
(Clayman, 2002; Grancea, 2010; Heritage, 1984; Stivers & Robinson, 2006; Stivers, 
Mondada & Steensig, 2011). More specifically, blaming may be a particularly significant 
and sensitive issue for my participants: in the interview context, they are seen as 
unaffiliated, ‘casual’ protesters, and thus arguably closer to ‘ordinary’ people rather than 
to devoted political activists. Due to such ordinariness, taking the perspective of the moral 
high ground and criticising others can be risky, as the criticism can be turned against the 
interviewees by suggesting that they themselves do not protest enough. By not blaming, 
speakers might be seen to inoculate themselves against such accusations; by pointing to 
various practical obstacles, job constraints and alternative ways of involvement, they 
display an awareness that becoming actively involved is not an easy task.  
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Second, talking about others in non-judgemental ways allows interviewees to put 
forward a message of similarity and thus manage issues of inclusion/exclusion (Gamson, 
1997). It has been argued in the literature on Russian protest that pro-governmental 
propaganda strives to segregate protesters and oppositional activists as members of a 
specific foreign-imposed (and thus also threatening) culture that has very little in common 
with ordinary ‘people’ (narod) of Russia (Kal’k, 2012; Pomerantsev, 2015). It can be 
suggested that by accounting for people’s inaction and constructing public inaction as 
intelligible, interviewees display their understanding of the issues that non-protesters 
might have, which in turn contests the idea that they are disconnected from the majority. 
Such a message of inclusion, that protesters are a part of the majority, might be useful in 
the promotion of the concept of the importance of social solidarity for any protest 
movement (cf. Gromov, 2012). Non-blaming through pointing to economic and work 
constraints is particularly robust here, as it gives the impression that protesters are very 
much aware of the issues that people in the regions have, and counters the image of 
protesters as rich ‘creacles’ (members of creative class) and carefree ‘hipsters’ from the 
capitals. Hence, interviewees’ constructions can be seen as resources for dealing with the 
moral sensitivities of blaming others, due to both general conversational orientations 
towards affiliation and interpersonal issues related to protesting in Russia. 
Finally, the findings have an important implication for social psychology of protest 
research, in particular for the social psychological model of politicised identity. Overall, 
the findings support previous research that suggests that protesters would try to affiliate 
with the wider public in order to mobilise public support (Simon & Klandermans, 1998). 
As I argued above, warranting practices enable protesters to make available the idea that 
they are included in society due to their sympathy to and knowledge of it. As part of the 
society, they are therefore entitled to its support. My analysis thus shows one of the 
potential ways through which affiliation can be done conversationally, through practices 
of accounting and non-blaming. My findings thus draw attention to the fact that 
inclusion/exclusion are not purely cognitive and automatic processes but are closely tied 
to the specific contexts and interpersonal issues at stake.  
243 
 
Next, in the final chapter of this thesis, I will bring together the findings of the four 
















































Chapter 7. General discussion and conclusions 
 
The aim of my study was to address questions about how protesters in Russia 
construct and negotiate their protest involvement in interaction. In order to do this, I used 
the approach of discursive social psychology to analyse conversational interviews with 
people who took part in the 2011-2012 wave of protests in Russia. Specifically, I 
examined how, through subtle use of language, people explained the following things: the 
way they became interested in politics and protest; how they justified the necessity of 
engaging in active protest; how they negotiated their oppositional selves, and at the same 
time, made accountable cases of not being involved. Overall, my research demonstrated 
that the phenomenon of protest behaviour could be fruitfully investigated as a product of 
orderly local social practices, in and through talk.  
In this final chapter, I summarise the main analytic findings. I discuss theoretical, 
methodological and practical implications of my research and provide some personal 
reflections on the work, focusing in particular on its limitations and potential ways to 
develop the research further. I finish the thesis with a brief conclusion that ties together 
the main ‘take-home’ messages of the study.  
 
Summary of the main findings 
 
In this section, I provide an overview of my empirical findings, without going too 
deeply into exploring concerns that potentially informed such findings. A detailed 
discussion of the variety of interpersonal and normative concerns that seem to inform 
protesters’ talk will be provided in the second section.  
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) focused on arguments relating to the 
protesters’ interest in politics and the socio-political situation in Russia. It demonstrated 
how respondents attend to and display political attitudes as accountable matters, by 
manufacturing various explanations as to why they became interested in the domains of 
politics and protest. In particular, political interest was portrayed as being fostered by the 
people who speakers considered to be their friends or loved ones; in other words, by 
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significant others. I argued that characterising such people as significant was strategic, in 
that it discursively normalised the very fact of being influenced, insofar as it is natural for 
people to be affected by those close to them. Alternatively, interest was presented as a 
direct but unintentional result of a problematic experience, a ‘key moment’ that made a 
speaker realise that something unfair and troublesome was going on. In these accounts, 
speakers used discursive devices, such as the formulation ‘I was just doing X … when Y’, 
to warrant the unintentional character of witnessing a disturbing situation and depicting 
such a situation as directly responsible for their turning political. Conversely, interviewees 
displayed their own political interest as an outcome of gradual learning about the political 
situation, often during professional development. These accounts were specifically 
designed to highlight the lack of initial intention to acquire political knowledge, thereby 
inoculating speakers against having personal stakes in it.  
Furthermore, the data evidenced that the topic of political interest was addressed 
with the reference to attitudinal change. In a number of accounts, talk of ‘change’ can be 
seen as solicited by the interviewer, due to her question providing the orientation to change 
(the question was formulated as ‘Can you tell me a bit about yourself, that is, have you 
been interested in the socio-political situation in Russia and have your views changed?’). 
On other occasions, however, respondents invoked the idea of change without being 
prompted by a question. Overall, the analysis showed that speakers made an effort to 
present themselves as not having been interested in the past, by orienting to a transition 
from this lack of interest in the past to becoming interested in the present. Moreover, 
interviewees mobilised various discursive resources to imply that they did not intend to 
become interested in politics. I argued that in so doing, respondents displayed their initial 
neutrality regarding the political, which in turn contributed to the construction of 
accountability. At the same time, I suggested that speakers’ defences of the unintentional 
nature of turning political indicated that they treated the topic of politics as problematic 
or sensitive. Supporting this was the observation that interviewees also attended to 
inferences concerning not having political interests in the past. I have shown how 
interviewees persuasively constructed their past lack of interest as convincing and justified, 
by using various discursive devices, such as extreme case formulations and references to 
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the cultural context. This finding additionally demonstrated that talking about politics on 
the whole seemed to be a sensitive business for my interviewees. 
Overall, the analysis supported the results of previous discursive research, which 
highlighted the important role descriptions of problematic situations might play in 
manufacturing the authenticity of protesters’ attitudes and interests (Benford, 1987; Hunt 
& Benford, 1993; Polletta, 2006). In my analysis, I suggested that the accounts of 
experiences that speakers identified as significant for the transformation of their attitudes 
and interests were designed to invite a conclusion that the change from apolitical to 
politically interested was natural and plausible, in the sense that it was brought about by 
specific events rather than appearing simply by itself. As such, accounts of interest 
acquisition functioned to present protesters as having strong grounds for turning political. 
At the same time, the analysis provided evidence that being apolitical in Russia is not as 
unproblematic an attitude as some scholars have suggested earlier.  
The findings of the first empirical chapter also offered further insight into the 
theoretical concepts of ‘mobilisation potential’ (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & 
Oegema, 1987) and ‘conscience adherents’ (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), which suggest that 
active protest is inherently and causally linked to having ‘appropriate’ political attitudes. 
My analysis drew attention to the active and situated nature of constructing and 
negotiating such attitudes. Importantly, it highlighted protesters’ concerns with 
accountability, through focusing on the functional nature of attitude talk. 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) continued to explore the facets of talk 
about protest mobilisation. In particular, it examined various ways in which people 
formulated motives for their active protest involvement. The analysis focused on the use 
of instrumentality and emotion arguments in accounting for why it was important for the 
speakers to take part in demonstrations and other overt protest actions.  
I identified two practices through which motive talk was formulated in the 
interviews. First, the motivation for joining active protest was explained through invoking 
the concept of duty; specifically, the duty to care for other people and for the wellbeing of 
the country in general. In developing such duty-centred accounts, interviewees made use 
of the categories, which, through orientations to category-bound features, were seen as 
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prescribing a certain degree of responsibility and action. For instance, interviewees 
portrayed themselves as ‘parents’ who were motivated by the need to ensure a better future 
for their children and thus became actively involved in protest, in order to deal with the 
issues that arguably prevented the better future from happening. Speakers also described 
situations in Russia as ‘objectively’ bad, and thus in dire need to be addressed. 
Constructing motive in terms of duty functioned to present protest as rational and 
necessary, and a direct means for fulfilling one’s responsibility. The instrumental 
character of participants’ motives was further shown through the use of various discursive 
devices, such as category entitlement, ‘if-then’ formulations and systematic vagueness.  
The second strategy of accounting for active protest involvement centred around 
formulations of negative experiences and the emotions that such experiences triggered. In 
contrast to the first strategy that displayed protest as motivated by considerations of duty 
and logical necessity, here speakers predominantly constructed accounts of hurt feelings, 
thereby emphasising a more self-centred reason for involvement. However, even in 
occasioning emotional grounds for protest, speakers attended to its rational character. 
They did so by providing descriptions of the circumstances that caused them to feel bad 
and by pointing to other people who experienced similar emotions to them. Subjective 
emotions were thus manufactured as plausible and significant experiences, thereby 
constituting them as an appropriate basis for action. The analysis of the second strategy 
also showed that speakers used category entitlement device, by making formulations that 
positioned them as witnesses to electoral misconduct. Such a device strengthened the 
facticity of respondents’ accounts, by portraying the misconduct as really happening, in 
turn warranting the need to address it. 
Overall, the second empirical chapter showed that participants routinely oriented 
to the ideas of duty and moral necessity when legitimating their decisions to join active 
protest. Protest was cast as an essentially rational act, even when it was presented as 
motivated by an emotional reaction. I suggested that the two strategies demonstrated 
speakers’ sensitivity to the negative cultural image of protesters disseminated by the pro-
governmental media (White, 2013), and sought to counter them rhetorically, by displaying 
active involvement as necessary and ethical. The analysis also offered some insights into 
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the dual pathway model of protest mobilisation (van Zomeren et al., 2004). In particular, 
I argued that the model’s focus on anger as the central emotion behind mobilisation can 
be broadened to include other emotional reactions.  
In the third empirical chapter (Chapter 5), I analysed the process of conversational 
negotiation of the frequently used protester identity label (Clément, 2013), that of ‘the 
opposition’. The analysis demonstrated that the constructions of protesters’ political 
attitudes and protest activities were constitutive of identity and functioned to accept or 
reject it. I identified four core patterns of identity negotiation: accepting oppositional 
membership by claiming possession of criterial attributes, accepting but delimiting 
oppositional membership by describing specific activities associated with that 
membership, rejecting oppositional belonging on the grounds of not possessing the ‘right’ 
attitudes and motives, and rejecting ‘the opposition’ as the wrong word.  
More specifically, acceptance strategies drew upon culturally available 
understanding of what it means to be ‘in opposition’; membership was then defended 
through acknowledging one’s own attitude as congruent with the conventional 
oppositional attitude of being dissatisfied with the regime. Such accounts warranted 
oppositional affiliation as a logical consequence of speaker’s views above anything else. 
I also observed that the claims of membership were muted in several ways, for example, 
by using hesitations and via indirect acceptance formulations. These observations showed 
that there was something problematic about the topic of opposition category membership, 
even though the affiliation itself was not denied.  
 Denials of oppositional self-categorisation were formulated, first, by addressing 
the topic of the criterial attributes. That is, interviewees first formulated what the ‘right’ 
attitudes and behaviours were, and then made claims about either not possessing them or 
not behaving in a category-appropriate way. The invocation of category-bounded features 
(Sacks, 1992) thus provided the grounds for rejecting ‘the opposition’ as an appropriate 
self-categorisation. Second, the bases for non-membership were established by 
discrediting the ‘opposition’ as a suitable word. For example, some respondents oriented 
to the political connotations of this word and claimed that they were highly damaging to 
the public image of protesters, thus displaying the inappropriateness of the opposition 
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category. Others argued that the word ‘opposition’ had too many meanings and was hence 
difficult to identify with.  
These findings were in line with Clément (2013), who argued that calling a 
movement ‘oppositional’ risks casting it as predominantly political, which can be 
inappropriate for the most civic-oriented protesters. However, my analysis went beyond 
that, in demonstrating that speakers could draw upon different facets of the ‘opposition’ 
label in carrying out their interactional business. In particular, I suggested that in their 
accounts my participants managed a dilemma of identification, that is, how to relate to the 
opposition category without appearing too extreme or ‘political’. Analysis showed how 
this dilemma was resolved in a number of ways, such as by accepting opposition based on 
a concrete (attitudinal) understanding and claiming membership in alternative categories 
that justify protest involvement. 
In addition, the analytic findings were consistent with the research looking at 
discursive protester identity building (Bliuc et al., 2012; Bobel, 2007; Stuart et al., 2013; 
Selivanova & Goncharov, 2013). Specifically, the analysis reinforced the idea that 
protesters might try to avoid inferentially challenging identity categories by defining their 
contents first or claiming alternative category membership.  
The last empirical chapter (Chapter 6) focused on the speakers’ accounts regarding 
people who appear to be uninvolved in protest. There, I found that respondents routinely 
offered mitigating explanations for non-involvement. Specifically, the analysis focused 
on the three ways in which speakers accounted for public passivity and presented others 
as not to blame for their lack of active protest involvement.  
First, respondents constructed accounts that attributed inaction to various practical 
obstacles that are difficult to control. For example, passive members of the public were 
portrayed as physically having no time to protest due to the need to earn a living. 
Alternatively, speakers oriented to fear and external pressure as the reasons why people 
remained uninvolved. In emphasising the effect of practical obstacles, respondents 
downplayed the agency of the non-involved, thereby resisting the idea that inaction was 
people’s rational choice. Interestingly, a number of respondents invoked the theory of 
hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943), using it to support their version of psychological 
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rationale behind the lack of public involvement. In particular, the theory was called upon 
to evidence the normatively prescribed character of people’s behaviour under harsh 
circumstances, and ground the argument that, by not taking part in political protests, 
people in fact behaved in ways appropriate to their environment.  
Second, the lack of protest involvement was explained by drawing upon the 
cultural context in which non-protesters lived their lives. Interviewees formulated inaction 
as the legacy of the Soviet era, where people were not accustomed to asserting their rights. 
In so doing, a number of interviewees invoked the culturally available image of the 
proverbial ‘Homo Soveticus’ (Boobbyer, 2000; Rose et al., 2011), a figure who, even if 
dissatisfied, is highly reluctant or even unable to openly criticise the regime. Suggesting 
that many non-protesters are essentially ‘Soviet’ and thus share the ‘Soviet’ attitude to 
protest was a way to normalise passive behaviour and make it appear not blameworthy. 
Formulations of the second discursive strategy thus similarly played down the personal 
responsibility of non-protesters, by presenting the culture itself as an obstacle to active 
protest involvement.  
The third strategy consisted in warranting the legitimacy of alternative ways of 
involvement. In particular, a number of interviewees suggested that even though other 
people did not protest on the streets, they could still make meaningful contributions, such 
as planting trees or publishing a newspaper. Such mundane and local actions were 
portrayed as ‘real’ work and contrasted with street demonstrations, the value of which was 
reduced through portraying it as shallow and useless activity. The third strategy thus 
warranted an understanding that people could be involved in other ways rather than overt 
protest, thereby making a case for a more ‘mundane’ and practical variety of activism.  
The analysis produced some insights relating to the literature. For instance, in 
contrast to studies reporting that protesters often condemned the broader public for not 
supporting the protest (Greene, 2014; Smyth et al., 2015; Volkov, 2012b), my data 
highlighted various ways in which non-participation was accounted for without blaming 
those uninvolved. Furthermore, the findings have implications for the theories of the social 
psychology of protest, specifically for the Politicised Identity Model (Klandermans, 1997) 
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and the idea that protesters would try to display their affiliation with the yet uninvolved 
public. 
Overall, one of the most salient findings from the last empirical chapter was that, 
notwithstanding that active protest involvement was described as imperative and ethical 
behaviour overall, as seen in the previous chapter, the lack of involvement was not 
condemned as immoral or blameworthy. In fact, non-protesters were portrayed as entitled 
to their behaviour due to circumstances that were largely shown to be out of their control. 
Indeed, some interviewees pointed to the need to take account of more subtle, local and 
mundane forms of involvement, which was displayed as more genuine and useful than 
overt street demonstrations.  
Tentatively, I suggested that such patterns of talk could be informed by a twofold 
concern. First, blaming and complaining can be seen as interactionally dispreferred 
actions (Heritage, 1984), perhaps even more so for my participants for whom the role of 
the accuser can be a risky one. Second, explaining other people’s lack of involvement in 
discernibly non-judgemental ways enabled interviewees to present themselves as 
reasonable and as understanding the multitude of issues other members of the public might 
have with protest. Such an image can be seen to assist accountability work, being in stark 
contrast to the media-promoted view of ‘hipster’ protesters who do not know or wish to 
know the economic struggles and attitudes of the ‘normal’ people (Pomerantsev, 2015).  
In the following section, I will discuss the nature of accountability and other 
concerns that can be seen to inform protesters’ talk in more detail. 
 
Synthesis of the main analytic findings 
 
In this section, I identify several concerns which seem to run through protesters’ 
talk irrespective of the specific topic they address. Specifically, I focus on the three 
overarching concerns, namely, sustaining the objectivity and severity of issues in Russia, 
attributing blame with the government/authorities and warranting impartiality through 
managing dilemmas of stake. As a result of scrutinising these as a whole, I would like to 
suggest that the best way to put them into a coherent analytic story is to view them under 
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the umbrella of a broader accountability concern; specifically, as contributing to making 
protest involvement accountable. The centrality of social action and accountability for DP 
analysis has been highlighted many times, not least by Edwards and Potter (2000) who 
suggested that the accountability of the speaker lies at the heart of conversation, and that 
the primary objective of discursive psychology should be to explore how various 
discursive strategies and practices evidence accountability concerns. Indeed, each of the 
three themes mentioned can be seen as in some way related to the issue of accountability. 
In what follows, I will discuss the three concerns separately, but it should be remembered 
that in an actual conversation these were closely intertwined and together contributed to 
building a ‘story’ of protesters’ lives. 
The first shared concern is with sustaining the objectivity and severity of issues in 
Russia. It is evident from various discursive practices that speakers attempt to portray the 
situation in Russia as objectively bad. They do so by demonstrating that the problems are 
directly observable by themselves and others (Chapters 3 and 4) and by displaying their 
own strong beliefs that the state of affairs is unsatisfactory in warranting their oppositional 
memberships (Chapter 5). As shown in chapter 3, for example, while describing various 
ways through which they acquired interest in politics, a number of interviewees specified 
that they had witnessed and realised transgressions on part of the government (extracts 3.5 
and 3.6) and the police (extract 3.7), thus displaying such transgressions as facts of reality. 
Others described their friends and loved ones as having been aware of the troublesome 
developments in the political life of the country, even before the speakers themselves had 
become aware of them. Such constructions functioned to demonstrate the observability of 
the issues, and manufactured them as true. Similarly, in Chapter 4 interviewees deployed 
the category of a ‘witness’ to justify their active protest against the fraudulent 2011 
elections. This category is a powerful device for suggesting that the described unjust 
events really took place (Potter, 1996). Moreover, some speakers (extracts 4.6 and 4.7) 
argued that someone other than them recognised that what had happened as an injustice. 
The claim of various witnesses worked to establish consensus, hence bolstering facticity 
of the described events by appealing to an external warrant (Potter & Edwards, 1990; 
Rapley, 1998).  
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The analysis of Chapter 5 pointed to similar facticity concerns. Recall how, in 
accepting oppositional membership on the grounds of having anti-government views, 
respondents used extreme-case formulations. For example, the speaker in extract 5.3 
argued that ‘all parts of our life here need a change’ (line 19). On the one hand, these 
constructions functioned to evidence speakers’ oppositional standpoint, and thereby 
provided legitimate grounds for self-identifying as ‘the opposition’. On the other hand, 
however, these formulations warranted the severity of the issues in Russia and provided a 
broad categorisation of the situation as unsatisfactory. Due to their extreme nature, such 
formulations were most fruitful to carry the work of objectifying the issues and presenting 
them as existing ‘out there’ (Pomerantz, 1986).   
The concern with justifying the existence of troubles in Russia can also be 
observed in the accounts explored in the last empirical chapter, where respondents 
provided explanations for the lack of public involvement in protest. As discussed earlier, 
this topic was problematic for the interviewees because it presented a dilemma — if 
protest is so important, then why is it that so many people are not involved? One of the 
implications of such a dilemma is that the troubles in the country were not ‘real’ or not 
significant enough, because they failed to mobilise the wider public (Volkov, 2012c). The 
social action of warding off such an inference was bound up in the action of sustaining 
the objectivity of issues in Russia. For example, speakers specifically provided for the 
understanding that the issues were objectively present regardless of whether or not this 
was ‘realised’ (extract 6.1) or ‘seen’ (extract 6.2) by the public. In so doing, the issues 
were displayed as things that existed beyond human agency, which constituted their 
objective nature (Latour & Woolgar, 2013). Furthermore, by depicting inaction as a 
typical Russian/Soviet trait, interviewees implied that some people, especially from the 
older generations, would not become involved, not because the situation was objectively 
good, but because of the strong cultural norm not to express protest openly in public. 
Rhetorically, this argument upholds the validity of issues in Russia by shifting the 
emphasis on the various ways of expressing dissatisfaction. Hence, the analysis 
demonstrated that the explanations of public passivity might be strategically used to attend 
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to the idea that even though some people do not act on them, the issues in Russia are no 
less present or serious. 
The second overarching concern is with attributing blame to the 
government/authorities. This concern is evident in a shared practice across the interviews 
to present the government as being directly responsible for the issues in the country, and 
to provide for the understanding that government irresponsibility in itself constitutes an 
issue that needs to be addressed.   
The first two empirical chapters offer clear evidence of how such practices are 
accomplished. In Chapter 3, the second of the three strategies of accounting for being 
interested in politics draws directly upon the idea of the government and the authorities 
being to blame for both the negative experiences the speakers had, and the issues in the 
country. In extract 3.5, for example, the interviewee portrayed the president as a liar who 
openly deluded the public, while in 3.7 the police inspectors were described as ‘conning’ 
the speaker. In Chapter 4, the second set of motive accounts can be seen to be structured 
around similar rhetoric, with speakers attending to the idea that certain actions of the 
election committee were not acceptable and exacerbated the falsifications rather than 
addressing them. In so doing, the speakers held the committee accountable for not 
fulfilling their duties and discursively undermined their ability to deal with the issues.  
Importantly, these accounts appealed to notions of honesty, responsibility and trust, 
thus occasioning the moral nature of the state’s misconduct. This is also done by orienting 
to the apparent discrepancy between the normative obligation of the government to 
address the country’s issues and its unwillingness to do so. As such, these types of 
formulations demonstrate the interplay of personal and institutional accountability: by 
discursively subverting the legitimacy of the state by means of presenting it as 
blameworthy and immoral, the speakers manage to cast as normative and rightful their 
own actions, such as becoming interested in politics and subsequently involved in active 
protest. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 offers further insight into the concern with discrediting 
the government. It is evident from the analysis that their dissatisfaction with the current 
regime was positioned as a critical attitude in warranting oppositional affiliation. In fact, 
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a number of the speakers who resisted being categorised as the opposition more generally 
provided additional descriptions of the circumstances when they could have been 
identified as the opposition, all of which were related to the anti-government stance 
(extracts 5.7, 5.9 and 5.13). Alternatively, the categories that were offered instead of ‘the 
opposition’, such as ‘civic activist’ and ‘active citizen/part of the society’ can also be seen 
in relation to the state, due to their reliance upon the idea of citizenry. Thus, portraying 
the state as blameworthy was vital for the integrity of participants’ identities.   
A similar portrayal was worked up in the accounts analysed in the last empirical 
chapter. In particular, the government was shown to be responsible for the widespread 
public inaction in the accounts invoking the issue of ‘traumatised generations’. In extracts 
6.6 and 6.7, speakers described the Russian state as routinely deceiving and humiliating 
its subjects; other interviewees provided more delicate formulations about the state being 
overly caring, resulting in Russian people losing the ability to stand up for themselves 
(extract 6.10). Such formulations evidence the speakers’ concern with presenting the state 
as extremely unhelpful, for both legitimising other people’s inaction, and for continuing 
the discursive work of persuading the listener that the state is responsible for many 
Russian woes.  
It is possible to see how such concern is interlaced with that discussed above in 
contributing to interviewees’ accountability. Presenting the issues in Russia as real and 
serious and holding the state responsible for them provide a powerful framework for 
building a case for moral discrepancy, that is, a normative breach between what should be 
and what is (Housley & Fitzgerald, 2009b). As such, this is a resource for making speakers’ 
own behaviour accountable: it whittles down the chance of governmental assistance, 
leaving the people to deal with the situation. In this context, active protest involvement is 
made justifiable as the speaker’s way of addressing the situation in the country. The shared 
discursive practice of undermining the status of the government and attributing blame on 
its part thus assists speakers in taking another step towards constructing their personal 
accountability.  
The third overarching concern I would like to discuss deals with warranting 
impartiality through managing dilemmas of stake. The nature of the ‘dilemma of stake’ 
257 
 
concept is best explained by Edwards and Potter (2000, p. 158), who link it to speakers’ 
struggles to ‘produce accounts which attend to interests without being undermined as 
interested’. My participants seem to join in such a struggle while talking about their 
political attitudes and beliefs.   
Instances of such concern are present in the first empirical chapter. There, the 
discursive strategies I discussed were used to demonstrate that the speakers were not 
initially interested in politics and developed such interests through a gradual process of 
attitudinal change. This was done by orienting to the initial lack of interest and by using 
non-agentic formulations, such as ‘it happened’. Such formulations displayed the absence 
of stake, which in turn contributed to warranting speakers’ neutrality on political matters. 
Likewise, in Chapter 4, motives for active protest participation were constructed to make 
available the inference that protest involvement was a rational reaction to the 
circumstances. For example, a number of protesters explicitly countered the idea that they 
were motivated by selfish interests and economic gains (extracts 4.2, 4.5). Instead, they 
portrayed their dissent as a duty and highlighted its instrumental role in achieving a better 
future for all. Those capitalising on ‘emotional’ vocabularies of motive displayed similar 
concerns. For instance, while saying that they were primarily motivated by subjective 
feelings of hurt and humiliation, they took care to display such feelings as rational, thereby 
protecting themselves from being seen as oversensitive or capricious. Through such 
practices, then, interviewees navigated the path to being seen as interested and involved 
but unbiased.  
In the third empirical chapter, stake confessions and stake inoculations became 
intertwined in discursive negotiation of oppositional identity. The analysis demonstrated 
that participants admitted having certain stakes, such as being ‘officially’ interested in 
removing Putin from power. Admission of such a stake was perhaps contextually 
occasioned, given that respondents were positioned as ‘protesters’ within the interview, a 
category conventionally associated with being invested in certain outcomes. At the same 
time, however, the interviewees worked hard to discount other types of stake, such as 
having political allegiances. This was done by suggesting the inappropriateness of 
political inferences of the term ‘opposition’ and affiliating with observably civic 
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categories. In the cultural context where politics are viewed with great suspicion (Lukin, 
2000), renouncing political allegiance can be seen as a strategy for displaying 
trustworthiness. In these accounts, then, discursive interplay of stakes shows that speakers 
are sensitive to matters of impartiality and cultural normativity. 
Overall, I suggest that the concerns with sustaining the objectivity of the issues in 
Russia, attributing blame with the government and warranting impartiality, can be seen as 
steps in ensuring personal accountability. These discursive actions make available the 
inferences that the situation is objectively bad and hence requires action. As one of the 
protesters from Moscow put it, ‘something is not right and I have to do something about 
it’9. One powerful argument regarding protest involvement that can be made in Russia is 
that people took to the streets for no ‘real’ reason at all; rather, they were doing it for 
money or for having nothing better to do. There are numerous examples of such rhetoric, 
one of the most (in)famous being perhaps the 2011 speech by Vladimir Putin. There, he 
insisted that the election results were fair and that protesters on the streets had no real 
cause to protest, all the while hinting that the opposition movement was organised and 
sponsored by the West to destabilise Russia (BBC Russia, 2011). Such rhetoric clearly 
has an extremely harmful effect on protesters’ accountability. It is perhaps not surprising, 
then, that protesters display critical concerns with accountability in talk. 
A coherent story can then be seen to emerge from the discussion of the overarching 
concerns. Simplified, the ‘lay’ summary of it would go as follows.  
 
Russia suffers from a number of real and serious problems. The government does 
not fulfil its role in dealing with such problems; in fact, it actively causes them. Due to 
various factors, the wider public often has no opportunity to address the issues. There are 
people, however, who understand the seriousness of the problems and see the state’s 
unwillingness to resolve them. These people recognise that actively addressing the issues 
is their duty, and they do so through active protest and more private and local actions. 
These people do not have anything to gain from protesting; they are driven by a 
                         
9 This extract is not shown in the thesis. . 
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commonsensical desire to make Russia a better country for everyone. We are these people 
and our protest is rightful.  
 
I would like to argue that, first of all, this is a story about accountability; 
specifically, accountability of being a protester in a cultural context where protest is not 
generally recognised as normative behaviour. Through working on various aspects of this 
story — sustaining the objectivity of issues in Russia, undermining the ability of the 
government to deal with the situation, displaying the altruistic nature of their actions, and 
so on — respondents build up an image of popular protest as a rational and much needed 
solution to the agglomeration of injustices that plague the country. They strategically 
design formulations of attitudes, motives and identities to portray the protest movement 
as a normative reaction to the disrespect of human rights, widespread corruption and 
governmental fraud. The construction of protest as expected and normative is defended 
even when the speakers address the question of why so many Russians remain uninvolved. 
The analysis demonstrates how, by carefully negotiating the agency of the non-protesters, 
respondents craft an image of them as either lacking the opportunity to become involved 
or as being involved in alternative ways. In so doing, speakers manage to preserve the 
generic legitimacy of protest as needed and ethical, despite its being the occupation of a 
minority. While it should be borne in mind that the interview setting in itself can be 
oriented to the production of accountability accounts — for example, specific questions 
might have directly solicited accountability talk (Potter & Hepburn, 2012) — there was 
no indication from the participants that they treated the interview situation any differently 
than any other ‘real life’ situation. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the interactional 
issue with accountability of protest involvement is largely the participants’ own concern. 
My study thus brings to light specific issues at stake for the protesters, to which they attend 
through talk. Analytic insights form the basis of a number of broader theoretical and 








My research makes several methodological contributions. First, it offers a new 
methodological lens on studying the topic of protest involvement in Russia as the 
participants’ own project. Specifically, my thesis demonstrates the value of paying close 
attention to people’s talk, by highlighting concerns that protesters themselves make 
relevant. The conceptual framework used in this thesis is a social constructionist approach; 
it views social reality as something that is performed by people. From this view, protest 
mobilisation, political attitudes and oppositional identity are social constructions that 
emerge in interactions between people. My study then sets a precedent for the 
respecification of those psychological phenomena as discursive practices, as resources 
that are available for use (Edwards & Potter, 2005). 
Second, my study makes a case for the use of the research interview as a viable 
method of discursive research. As such, it questions the validity of the recent move to 
abandon interviews and turn to a study of ‘naturally occurring’ talk among the DP scholars 
(Kent & Potter, 2014; Potter & Hepburn, 2005; 2012). I believe that my thesis highlights 
the utility of using interviews for the study of topics on which it would be difficult to 
obtain more naturalistic records. While my data certainly do not pass a ‘dead psychologist 
test’ (meaning that they would not exist without the effort of the researcher; Potter, 2002), 
these are still astonishingly rich and exhibit culturally shared patterns of reasoning and 
accounting practices (Wooffitt, 1992; Wooffitt & Widdicombe, 2006).  
Third, the analysis shows that my Russian participants use various discursive 
devices and strategies that have been observed in DP research carried out in Western 
contexts. This suggests that at least some of the devices, such as, for example, three-part 
lists, extreme case formulations and ‘if-then’ reasoning are relevant cross-culturally and 
retain their argumentative power in languages beyond these of the Germanic language 
branch. A related point here is that my study demonstrates that DP analysis can be 
fruitfully used to explore data from other cultural contexts and the data that have been 
translated, in line with the arguments made by other discourse-oriented scholars 






This study contributes to the discursive social psychological research on protest in 
contemporary Russia, which is still in its infancy. As I have argued, the 2011-2012 wave 
of protest in Russia is primarily studied in terms of the factors that caused popular 
mobilisation. For example, scholars discuss the effects of broad systemic factors, such as 
political opportunity structures, the nature of state-citizen relations, elite competition and 
so on (Gel’man, 2015; Koesel & Bunce, 2012; Robertson, 2011; 2013; Volkov, 2012a). 
Other researchers favour demographic explanations, such as the role of class in mobilising 
the people (Busygina & Filippov, 2015; de Vogel, 2013; Gontmakher & Ross, 2015). 
Finally, a handful of scholars have considered the role of psychological factors such as 
shared grievances (Hagemann & Kufenko, 2016) and oppositional attitudes (Shestopal, 
2012). All these studies, however, largely neglect the questions regarding the meanings 
that protest involvement can acquire for those who protest and regarding interpersonal and 
moral concerns that it might bring to life. Such unanswered questions demonstrate a gap 
in the literature that this study sought to address by taking a discursive DP approach.   
The strength of this approach is in offering an empirical way to study how the 
phenomenon of ‘protest involvement’ is talked into being by protesters themselves. It thus 
gave me an opportunity to catch a glimpse of the variability of meanings attributed to 
protest, and to trace how these were strategically drawn upon in dealing with the questions 
of motive, commitment, choice and morality. Most importantly, DP analysis presented 
these topics not as abstract theoretical variables, but as participants’ practical concerns. 
With regard to this, I would like to make a related theoretical observation.  
The observation relates to the potentially troublesome categorisation of the 2011-
2012 protest in Russia as ‘political’. Contemporary Russia has been viewed largely as an 
apolitical society, where ‘avoiding politics is a widespread rule of conduct’ (Clément, 
2015, p. 213; see also Shlapentokh & Woods, 2007). Due to this, the large-scale popular 
protests of late 2011 came as a surprise for many. A number of scholars were quick to 
discuss popular mobilisation as a primarily political phenomenon (Chuvashova; 2013; 
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Seleznev, 2013). Other authors, however, called for more caution. For instance, it has been 
argued that glossing popular dissent as ‘political’ fails to consider that the movements’ 
demands were predominantly civic (Clément, 2013). Along similar lines, Aron (2013, p. 
63) suggested that the dissent of 2011-2012 was motivated by moral concerns above all, 
and was primarily ‘rooted in the quest for dignity in democratic citizenship’ rather than 
political change. My own findings lend support to such arguments: interviewees display 
great sensitivity towards politically-related topics, which is especially evident in Chapters 
3 and 5. 
In saying this, I do not make any ontological argument about what the nature of 
the 2011-2012 protests really was. If anything, my study demonstrates the futility of the 
very attempt to find out the only correct description of these events. Moreover, it raises 
important epistemological questions about the differences between the political and the 
social. For example, how can we know whether something is ‘political’ or ‘social’ in 
abstracto, and what would that mean? As the interviewee in extract 5.15 rightly pointed 
out, labelling something as ‘political’ can in itself be a political act that has certain 
implications. As such, my research challenges the appropriateness of pre-existing 
distinctions between various kinds of protest, and specifically theoreticians’ attempts to 
categorise a protest as unambiguously political. It is important to remember, however, that 
people themselves constantly make such distinctions and put them to work; exploring 
these practices is a much more worthy objective of the research. 
As a concluding contribution, I believe my study to be of use for discursive social 
psychologists, as well as for the more cognitively-oriented colleagues from the discipline 
of social psychology, interested in contentious behaviour beyond the Russian context. For 
the former, my research offers a potentially interesting illustration of applying DP in the 
context of a relatively new speech community (Bolden, 2008). In addition, my analysis 
furthers research into the mechanisms of accountability practices carried out in particular 
contexts. For instance, my study highlights the relevance of constructing ‘out-there-ness’ 
of various phenomena in managing one’s accountability as a protester, and thus 
contributes to the broader research exploring the links between facticity, agency and 
accountability in talk (Potter, 1996; Potter & Edwards, 1990; Wooffitt, 1992).  
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For the more cognitively-oriented colleagues, my thesis offers a number of insights 
into the dominant models of collective behaviour, such as the dual pathway model of 
collective behaviour (Simon et al., 1998) and politicised collective identity model (Simon 
& Klandermans, 2001). For example, PCI generally assumes that contentious behaviour 
is rooted in collective identity: people protest because they recognise their membership in 
a collective and act upon it (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; Wright, 2001). My 
analyses of interactional management of opposition identity and motives for protest 
involvement urge a more nuanced interpretation of this argument, in evidencing that 
protesters do not necessarily treat their protest actions in close relation to their collective 
identities. Furthermore, the findings of the third analytic chapter give further insight into 
idea of opinion-based group membership, advocated by Bliuc, McGarty and colleagues 
(Bliuc et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2009; McGarty et al., 2014). My research thus 
demonstrates the value of insight that can come from the fine-grained analysis of talk 
about protest involvement.  
Finally, my analytic observations, especially those regarding the delicate nature of 
categorising oneself as a part of the ‘opposition’, can be used to inform experimental 
designs. For instance, because of the centrality of the social identity explanation in theory 
of collective action engagement, the survey research often includes measures of collective 
identification. It does so through asking participants to rate such statements as ‘I see 
myself as a member of X’ or ‘I identify with X’, X here being the name of the group or 
the movement. For example, in the landmark study by Simon et al. (1998) this is precisely 
how the strength of collective identity was conceptualised. In Russia, in the absence of a 
specific name for the protest movement, ‘the opposition’ seems to become adopted as the 
‘official’ protest category (Clément, 2013; Gel’man, 2015). Thus in theory, if a researcher 
considers conducting a survey about social protest in Russia, (s)he might use the label of 
‘the opposition’ in measuring the strength of collective identification. What my research 
demonstrates, however, is the highly sensitive nature of this label. The insights from the 
study of protesters’ talk can therefore be used to sensitise researchers of protest to the 




Overall then, my study is relevant as it demonstrates the variety of tacit ways in 
which language can be used to justify active protest involvement. Various interactional 
practices can be seen as discursive vehicles for generating one’s accountability as a 
protester and warranting the plausibility of the existence of protest. My findings can be 
used as a starting point for a further exploration of the meanings and understandings of 
protest actions in contemporary Russia, and, potentially, to make practical 
recommendations regarding the ‘working vocabularies’ of popular mobilisation. 
 
Reflections and future research suggestions 
 
In this section, I reflect briefly on the ways in which I, as the researcher, 
interviewer and analyst, might have influenced the research process and its results. I 
subsequently point to the ways in which my study can be developed for future research.  
In Chapter 2, I mentioned that one of the important methodological issues in 
discursive research is how researchers ‘shape’ their data and analyses. This issue offers a 
good starting point for reflection. On this point, Willig (2013) suggested that there are two 
kinds of reflexivity in qualitative research: the first includes being aware of the ways in 
which the researcher’s personality might have shaped a study (personal reflexivity) and 
the second involves reflecting upon how the design of the study and methods of analysis 
might have defined and limited the findings (epistemological reflexivity).  
In terms of personal reflexivity, I agree with Schenkein (1978, p. 62) who argued 
that ‘the kinds of phenomena we choose to mull over will depend on our own ‘identities’’. 
I am aware that my personal interests affected the focus of the empirical chapters to an 
extent. Analysts who have worked with qualitative data would be aware that even a short 
conversation might produce a multitude of potential topics for analysis, and one must 
make a choice. My choices were guided by the data but also, inevitably, by my own 
concerns: for example, being particularly interested in motives for active protest 
involvement and preoccupied with the question of whether the ‘opposition’ is an 
appropriate label for protesters, I included such topics in my interview schedule and 
conducted extended analyses of them in Chapters 4 and 5.     
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Another way in which my ‘identity’ might be seen as consequential for the 
research concerns the occasions when respondents appeared to treat me as a fellow 
Russian and as someone who supported the opposition and protests (I explicitly mentioned 
my positive attitude to protest before each interview). On such occasions, interviewees 
used phrases such as ‘you know’, ‘as a Russian you know this’ and so on, constructing 
and displaying common grounds between us. In other cases, people would tell me that 
there was no point in talking about why protest was important, because it should be self-
explanatory for someone like me10. 
It is possible to suggest that, because some interviewees treated me as ‘one of 
them’, certain explanations were not as extended or warranted as they might have been if 
I was treated as an outsider. As an illustration, in extract 6.9 the interviewee formulated a 
reason for inaction and said it was why ‘Moscow didn’t get that million’ (line 10), to 
which the interviewer replied ‘aha aha’ (line 11); after this, the interviewee moved on to 
producing an upshot. I would argue that the utterance ‘Moscow didn’t get that million’ 
was left unpacked because the interviewee displayed her understanding of it. Indeed, I 
closely followed discussions on the Internet about protests in Moscow at the time, and 
was aware of a particularly fierce ‘Million’ debate, that is, discussion of the reasons why 
the protests, although large-scale, did not attract the majority of people. It is difficult to be 
sure, but an interviewer less familiar with the situation might have requested an 
explanation of that utterance, or the interviewee might have offered it.     
Similarly, when respondents talked about Alexei Navalny being found guilty in 
court, they arguably did not need to unpack why such a verdict may be unfair and ‘too 
much’ (extract 5.12:12) or why it was a ‘pseudo-court’ (extract 4.9:20). This is so because 
the interviewees treated me as someone who already understood and accepted the 
illegitimacy of the court and the decision. It can therefore be argued that my status as 
‘Russian’ and ‘protest supporter’ had a certain impact on speakers’ accounts, in terms of 
minimising the need to account for claims.  
                         
10 This extract is not shown in the thesis. 
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Lastly, my fascination was with protesters who I considered ‘ordinary’, that is, 
who were not political activists or members of organised political movements. Although 
I recruited people who ‘fitted’ this description, I tried to avoid using the term ‘ordinary 
protester’ as a straightforward uncritical label, since that would go against my 
methodological commitment to study people’s own descriptions and categories. However, 
sometimes it appeared essential to use it in order to make my arguments easier to 
understand. In a somewhat similar way, I used the term ‘protester’ in this thesis, because 
I considered this to be the most ‘neutral’ label to refer to my participants. Strictly speaking, 
neither of these categories is analytically sound, since I did not study whether my 
participants invoked them. Nonetheless, I believe that my use of such labels was justified, 
on the grounds that they were used as a practical means for engaging with participants, 
rather than as ‘objective’ and legitimate analytic categories. 
My research also certainly changed me, as a person and a scholar. Together with 
increasing my knowledge about the social psychology of protest behaviour more generally, 
and on protest in Russia in particular, the study taught me the value of staying close to the 
data and demonstrated the power of analytic insight that the analysis of a single account 
can produce. This strengthened my belief in discursive psychology and its quest for the 
exploration of the concepts of social psychology in discursive terms, as situated, 
multifaceted and functional descriptions. In addition, while listening to the stories of my 
interviewees, I was often moved (and humbled) by the strength of their belief in the 
possibility of democracy in Russia, and by their desire to continue fighting against all the 
odds. Because of this, I am now even more certain that Russia will change for the better 
one day, provided that non-violent civic protest continues, in some way. This last 
stipulation is important, for I have also learnt that protest does not need to be overt or 
organised. Indeed, my participants taught me that people can work to improve the situation 
in the country in their own subtle ways, by behaving morally in daily life and refusing to 
participate in unjust practices, such as bribery. This ‘mundane activism’, I believe, is the 
main tool for the country’s positive social and political transformation. 
In terms of epistemological reflexivity, there are three points worth making.   
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First, I would like to reflect upon the ways in which the practice of interview might 
have shaped my data. Although I stand by my argument made in Chapter 2, that interviews 
should be treated as ordinary conversations unless we can empirically observe that they 
are treated otherwise by the interactants, it would be unhelpful to deny that some features 
of the interview setup might have given rise to certain constructions. For example, I 
recruited my respondents as ‘people who took part in protests’, and in Chapter 5, I showed 
how this might have produced an interactional problem for the speakers who rejected 
oppositional affiliation. Thus, the recruitment strategy itself became consequential for 
interviewees’ conversational conduct, by privileging specific understanding and 
prompting speakers to engage with it, for example, through claiming alternative category 
membership which had the potential to explain their contentious actions.  
In addition to this, my active position as the interviewer certainly shaped the data. 
The analysis demonstrated instances where my lack of uptake may have led interviewees 
to formulate further explanations and descriptions (in extracts 4.2, 5.10, 6.1). The phrasing 
of the questions too can have significant implications. In the analysis of extract 5.10, I 
pointed out that the interviewer’s question was designed to index her disbelief, and thus 
could be interpreted by the interviewee as a challenge to his earlier rejection of 
oppositional membership. Subsequently, the respondent worked to justify his rejection by 
formulating two more reasons for it. Similarly, in Chapter 6, I discussed how some of my 
questions depicted non-protesters as blameworthy, and how in their responses 
interviewees dealt with that accusation by downplaying the non-protester’s agency. 
Therefore, I was aware that my method of data collection and the assumptions that I made 
(for example, that respondents were ‘protesters’) must be treated as important elements of 
the research process and accordingly considered them in my analyses.  
The second reflection concerns the evaluation of the findings in terms of their 
representativeness. From the standpoint of mainstream social psychology, the sample size 
of 48 interviews is relatively small and would not be considered representative. However, 
it has been argued that in qualitative research, particularly in the research focused on social 
interaction, issues of representativeness and generalisability take a different form from 
‘traditional’ social science enquiries (Golafshani, 2003; Peräkylä, 2004). More 
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specifically, while my research may be not ‘representative’ in terms of its ability to 
extrapolate the findings from specific cases to general populations, it has more scope for 
analytic generalisability (Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995; Willig, 2013). In that sense, 
research is generalisable because it generates generalisable theoretical insights.  
For example, in my thesis I have identified a number of language strategies 
employed by respondents. However, such strategies are not unique to my interviewees, 
nor are they specific to a social group of protesters in Russia. Rather, they are part of the 
culturally available communicative skills and practices that people use to make their 
actions recognisable and claims justified. In principle, these language strategies are 
available to all members of culture/society, and in that way they are generalisable beyond 
the particular interactional context of a given interview. Hence, a stock of my analytic 
findings regarding the ways in which protesters deal with certain interactional and 
interpersonal issues and about the functional nature of their constructions can, at least 
potentially, be made relevant in other social situations and communities. 
The last point of epistemological reflection touches upon the issue of research 
design; specifically, the effect of studying retrospective accounts of protest produced in 
post hoc interviews, rather than, for example, contemporaneous accounts produced during 
protest events. Before carrying out my fieldwork in Russia, I decided against doing 
interviews during protests, for two reasons. First, I considered it to be a difficult task from 
a practical point of view. By the time I was collecting my interviews in 2013, the large-
scale protests were declining, and it was difficult to predict whether there would be a 
possibility for me to join demonstrations and collect enough data for research. In addition, 
my fieldwork time was limited, and strict organisation was a priority. Because of this, it 
was more feasible to schedule interviews with protesters in advance while I was still in 
Scotland, so that everything was in place when I arrived in Russia. Second, there were 
subjective reasons too: personally, I was not comfortable with collecting interviews with 
people during protest.  
It is reasonable to suggest that contemporaneous accounts would be different in 
nature and design. Asking people to take part in the interviews while on the street would 
almost certainly result in shorter question-answer accounts rather than in lengthy 
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discussions. Furthermore, the interview setting would be more informal, as there would 
little opportunity or time to conduct interviews according to a schedule. An interesting 
related point was made by Shotter (1981), who argued that contemporaneous and 
retrospective accounts were likely to have different justification strategies. Specifically, 
he suggested that contemporaneous accounts, because they are being formulated ‘now’, 
as a given event unfolds, describe a state of affairs that is already likely to be seen as 
existing in reality; in this way, such accounts need less justification through reference to 
‘facts’ or people having ‘proper’ motives for making them. On the other hand, 
retrospective accounts require more accounting work to prove their veracity, because they 
are reports of something that happened in the past, which by that token might or might not 
be ‘true’. Shotter therefore suggested that contemporaneous accounts could be expected 
to be justified differently from retrospective claims, by emphasising their sincerity, for 
instance, rather than their facticity. Lastly, it is possible to add to this a hypothesis that 
during a protest action, in the heat of the moment, people are more orientated towards 
certain discursive actions, such as, for instance, assigning blame, trouble-telling and 
constructing shared emotional and moral outrage (Reed, 2004). 
However, all this does not mean that retrospective accounts are in some way 
inferior. Here, it is important to remember one of the main premises of discursive 
psychology, that in talking about their past experiences, motives and so on, people do not 
merely report things as they were; rather, they actively construct situated versions of 
events and pragmatically use them in relation to the interactional business at hand. In this 
way, it would be wrong to say that retrospective accounts are ‘objectively’ less correct 
than contemporaneous ones. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that retrospective 
accounts are advantageous for respondents themselves, as they allow deep self-reflection 
and, in so doing, enable people to comprehend what happened to them (Smith, 1994). 
Indeed, several of my respondents said that they decided to participate in my study in 
order to make sense of their protest experiences and explain their behaviour first of all to 
themselves. This being said, collecting contemporaneous accounts might be a fruitful 
avenue for future research. If such research supported some of the findings of my study 
— for instance, if protesters resisted oppositional membership and downplayed the 
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political aspect of their protest — then there would be grounds to argue, for instance, that 
there is indeed a problem with being seen as ‘political’ in Russia.      
Together with collecting contemporaneous accounts, my study can be developed 
further in other ways. First, future research might include attempts to gather more 
‘naturalistic’ data. I have previously argued that due to the nature of the topic, it might be 
difficult to have access to more ‘mundane’ conversations that do not require the presence 
of the researcher; while this is indeed so, one may think of potential opportunities. For 
instance, during my fieldwork in Russia, participants told me about a number of places 
where protesters often gather to chat and relax. It is possible to collect direct records of 
interactions in such places; however, there is a certain risk that people would refuse to 
participate, as they might find the idea of being recorded uncomfortable or even suspicious. 
Another avenue for more ‘naturalistic’ research might be to observe and analyse official 
video debates between the leaders of the opposition and political activists (for instance, 
Dozhd’, 2012). This would provide an opportunity to explore how members of the higher 
protest ‘rank’ construct and use the notions of protest in interaction, thus complementing 
my focus on more ‘ordinary’ and unaffiliated protesters. Also, video recordings would 
provide more scope for the analysis. In discursive research, especially among conversation 
analytic studies, there has been a growing tendency to use video recordings, as these are 
believed to provide a fuller picture of interaction and enrich the understanding of the 
variety of paralinguistic resources that participants can draw on in accomplishing social 
actions (Heath, 2004; Kent & Potter, 2014; MacMartin & LeBaron, 2006). Given that 
‘artful’ forms of protest have been proliferating under Putin’s regime (Jonson, 2015), 
paralinguistic expressions and bodily practices might be particularly relevant and further 
exploration could offer a better understanding of the contemporary development of protest 
in Russia.  
Another potential for future research is to use my findings to develop an integrative 
analysis of protest construction; that is, explore the topic from both the local interactional 
perspective and the broader standpoint of critical discourse analysis. My methodology of 
choice, discursive psychology, is sometimes criticised by more critically oriented 
discursive scholars for its reluctance to go beyond the data and to take account of the 
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‘broader picture’ in the form of wider cultural, political and moral discourses (Burr, 2015; 
Kaposi, 2013). While such reluctance is understandable given DP’s close alliance with 
conversation analysis, there is no basis for rejecting the possibility of developing a 
dialogue between micro and macro-level approaches (Kaposi, 2013; Schegloff, 1997). 
Such research would include paying attention to local discursive practices identified 
through close reading of the data, as well as attempts to interpret the data in terms of 
broader socio-political and moral frameworks (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002; Wetherell, 
1998). Integrative analysis of protest might be particularly advantageous in the Russian 
context: due to the uneasy history of dissent and contemporary anti-protest propaganda, 
there appears to be considerable scope for studying how ‘broader’ historical and cultural 
understandings (for example, of the Soviet ‘norm’ of inaction or the media image of 
‘brainwashed’ protesters) are manifested in, and intertwined with, more local practices of 
accountability done by people in interactions. In addition, due to its integrative nature, 
such research would have the capacity to reach more scholars across multiple fields of 
study (Miller & Fox, 2004), which would also be beneficial for the burgeoning but still 
somewhat limited field of research on Russian protest.  
The last point of this discussion touches on the future possibility of including a 
greater variety of participants, in terms of sampling people from different geographical 
areas. There is a conceptual reason for such an approach, as it would increase variability 
in the data and help to see whether there are specific language strategies employed by 
people from specific contexts. While my research did not find evidence for such a claim, 
it still primarily focused on protesters from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. In future work, 
it will be valuable to enrol more participants from the regional cities, as there is some 
evidence that patterns of protest there might differ from the capitals (Il’chenko, 2015; 




My thesis is the first attempt to study popular protest in contemporary Russia as 
discursive construction manufactured in talk. I provided detailed analyses of interviews 
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conducted with people involved in protest in Russia, regarding their attitudes, motives and 
behaviour, and identities. Applying the analytic lens of discursive psychology to my data 
enabled empirical examination of the various ways in which protest realities were 
dynamically produced and negotiated in situ. Throughout the thesis, I identified several 
strategies used by my participants to discuss their political attitudes, formulate motives 
for active protests involvement, manage their oppositional identities and account for 
inaction of other people.   
Specifically, I showed that dealing with political interest attributions was 
problematic, and that such attributions were closely linked to constructions of attitudinal 
change, where transitions from being uninterested and uninvolved in the past to being 
interested in the present were carefully warranted, not as intentional acts but as something 
that inevitably took place in the circumstances. In contrast to this, active protest 
involvement was firmly established as a rational and deliberate choice, regardless of 
whether it was motivated by the awareness of a threatening situation or by subjective 
feelings of moral outrage. I found that respondents did not necessarily identify as members 
of the opposition, even though they were involved in active protest and hence could be 
seen as such. Both denials and avowals of oppositional membership appeared to be closely 
related to normative and interactional concerns, such as not appearing extreme or ‘political’ 
and defending one’s accountability as an interviewee. Finally, I showed that protesters did 
not blame others for not taking part in protests; on the contrary, they depicted such 
behaviour as accountable by drawing upon culturally available notions regarding people’s 
inaction, and specifically upon the idea that there are obstacles on the way to protesting 
that are beyond people’s control.     
Overall, my thesis demonstrates that people’s ways of speaking should be 
understood as actions through which they are able to construct versions of the world and 
explain themselves and others. In so doing, it reinforces the somewhat simple but powerful 
idea that in order to explain oneself, one needs to build a suitable version of the world, 
one that ‘fits’ with the initial claim and thus makes it justified (Edwards & Potter; 2000). 
In this way, my thesis has been an exploration of the worlds in which my participants live 
and act. Although performative, such worlds are no less real than ‘objective’ reality; one 
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may claim that they become realities once articulated (Melucci, 1996). They thus deserve 
to be studied with great diligence and attention. 
My focus on how talk manufactures protest realities represents a significant 
departure from the mainstream study of protest in social psychology. Thus, an important 
goal of my thesis was to open up a space for a post-cognitivist, discursive way of 
understanding phenomena related to protest behaviour within a predominantly cognitivist 
discipline. Discursive in nature, it is to be hoped that my study managed to demonstrate 
the extreme complexity and difficulty of addressing seemingly straightforward topics 
related to protest, especially in the cultural context where protest involvement is often 
seen as not normative. I believe that it is vital for social psychologists to be aware of such 
complexities and contextual specifics, especially if the discipline is willing to preserve its 
‘social’ status. Fortunately, there is already a greater awareness of the potential of 
discursive research for explaining and understanding how protest mobilises and develops; 
it is my sincere hope that both the awareness and the number of discursive studies of 
protest will continue to grow.  
As I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, my work began with fascination 
inspired by the Russian protest movement. After years of research, this fascination 
remains, and so does hope. The talk of hope is perhaps surprising, because as I write these 
concluding remarks in 2016, it seems that large-scale popular protest has all but died out 
in Russia once again. The famous oppositional politician Boris Nemtsov is dead, murdered 
in the centre of Moscow, just a stone’s throw from the Kremlin; opposition leader Alexei 
Navalny is prohibited from running in any election because of the fake criminal charges; 
Russian State Duma passes draconian laws one after another and even some of my 
participants, with whom I am still in touch, seem to be greatly disillusioned with protesting 
as such. The protest wave of 2011-2012, it seems, did not account for much. However, I 
strongly believe that all is not lost. My thesis offers evidence to suggest that in 
contemporary Russia, the very notions of state-society relations are being reworked, and 
understanding of protest as something extra-ordinary is being challenged by the new sets 
of meanings, which affirm that it is right to be interested in politics, feel responsible for 
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the fate of one’s country and act when one sees an injustice being committed. These are 
the very meanings that, I believe, will succeed in changing Russia for the better.  
I would like to end this thesis with a quote from one of my favourite scholars of 
protest, James Jasper (2008, p. 379), that captures my position on protest in Russia 
perfectly:  
 
‘Seeing social movements as a source of vision and voice, rather than the 
vanguard of a new world, I am not bothered by the fact that they accomplish so few of 
their stated goals. These goals are often overdrawn; the importance of protesters, I think, 
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Attitudes to oppositional activity in Russia 
 
 
I invite you to participate in this research, which I conduct as part of my PhD at 
the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Studies at the University of 
Edinburgh. I am interested in your views on opposition in Russia, and in your experience 
of taking part in oppositional activities. 
 
What will happen if you agree? 
If you decide to participate, I will ask you to take part in an informal interview that 
will last for up to 1 hour. I’d like to talk to you about your views on the opposition and 
your place in it, and about your personal experience of participating in protest. I will record 
the interview with your permission. Your interview recording will be transcribed and 
analysed; anonymised extracts from it may be cited in my PhD thesis and in professional 
journals. Audio recording and transcribed version will be securely stored on my PC, and 
treated with full confidentiality. The only personal information possibly mentioned about 
you will be your gender, age and occupation. The only people who will have access to the 
full interview will be me and my supervisors. 
 
Are there any benefits/potential risks to taking part? 
There are no serious risks associated with your participation. If during the 
interview you feel uncomfortable, please feel free to stop or ask for a change of subject. 
Hearing your views will help me to better understand how people relate to opposition in 






You are free to withdraw at any time without having to give an explanation. You 
do not have to answer a question if you do not want to. You can ask for your interview to 
be withdrawn, but please notify me before the 1st of January 2014 (please contact me on 
y.lukyanova@sms.ed.ac.uk).  
 
This research has been granted Ethical Approval from the University of Edinburgh 
Ethics Committee. It is designed in accordance with the University of Edinburgh's 
Research Ethics Framework and the BPS Ethical Principles for Conducting Research with 
Human Participants. 
 
If you have any questions, please ask me now. 
If you would like to find out more about the study, please contact me. 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in the study! 
 
Contact details: 
Yulia Lukyanova, y.lukyanova@sms.ed.ac.uk 


















Attitudes to oppositional activity in Russia 
 
I’d be grateful if you could sign this form to ensure that you are willing to 
participate in my research. Please remember that participation in the research is 
completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any stage. You can ask for your 
interview to be withdrawn, but please notify me before the 1st of January 2014 (please 
contact me on y.lukyanova@sms.ed.ac.uk). Signing this form does not commit you to 
anything you do not wish to do.  
By signing below, you are agreeing that: (1) you have read and understood the 
Participant Information Sheet, (2) questions about your participation in this study have 
been answered satisfactorily, (3) you are aware of the potential risks (if any), (4) you agree 
to the interview being tape-recorded, (5) you allow me to use (anonymised)  quotes from 
your interview in my research, and possibly in professional journals, and (6) you are taking 
part in this research study voluntarily, and without coercion.  
 
 
_______________________   
Participant’s Name (Printed)* 
 
 
_______________________                         ________________________ 
Participant’s signature*              Date 
 
 
____________________________                           ___________________________ 
Name of person obtaining consent (Printed)             Signature of person obtaining consent 
 
 
*If you wish to preserve your anonymity, you can use your initials.  
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Attitudes to oppositional activity in Russia 
 
 
This research is conducted as part of my PhD thesis at the School of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh. The main purpose of 
this project is to understand the views, identities and experiences of people who take part 
in various oppositional activities. Such understanding is important as it helps to gain a 
much better insight on the nature of the non-systemic opposition in Russia.  
 
Your interview recording will be transcribed and analysed by me; anonymised 
extracts from it may be cited in my PhD thesis and in professional journals. Audio 
recording and transcript will be securely stored on my PC. 
 
I would like to thank you for your time. I appreciate your participation. I 
understand that our discussion may have raised some difficult issues or memories for you; 
if you have any troubles or uncertainty regarding your participation in the research, please 
feel free to contact me (Yulia Lukyanova) on y.lukyanova@sms.ed.ac.uk and I will do my 
best to help you.  
 
If you would like to know more about the study and how your interview is used, 
please contact me and I will provide you with up-to-date information on the research. 




Thank you very much for taking part in the study! 
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1. Have you ever been involved in a political party or a social movement?  
- if yes – What party/movement? Why? Are you still a member? 
- if no – Have you ever been interested in politics or political situation in Russia? 
            - When did you become interested? Were there any events/situations that 
interested you? Please tell me more.  
 
2. What are your views on politics and political/social situation in Russia? 
Have your views changed in any way?  
- For example, in the light of recent political events (Putin’s third presidency, 
controversial Duma elections), would you say your views have changed?  
- For example, in the light of the recent protests, would you say your views have 
changed in any way? How and why? 
 
3. Would you call yourself a part of the opposition? 
- What is your relation to the opposition? 
- What does ‘opposition’ mean for you? 
 
Membership (for those who said ‘Yes, I am a part of the opposition’) 
 
4. Being a part of the opposition – what does it mean for you?  
- What do you feel/do that makes you a part of opposition? Can you give me an 
example? Why this quality/activities in particular? 
- Whom would you hesitate to call ‘a part of the opposition?’ What makes them 




5. Can you tell me about your protest experience? What have you done? 
- Have you been to a protest or a demonstration?  
- Have you done something you consider oppositional/a protest recently?  
- Do you do it often? Would you say it is a part of your ordinary life/daily routine? 
 
6. Why are you taking part in the activities you told me about? 
- Are these activities important for you? Why? What are your motives? 
- What is it you are hoping to achieve by taking part in the opposition? 
- Are you hoping to make a change? Influence political situation? Social situation? 
People themselves? Please tell me more.  
 
6.1. As a member of the opposition, what are your goals? 
- Is it easy to achieve these goals in today’s Russia? Why or why not? 
- Can you think of anything that might prevent you from achieving the goals you 
mentioned? Can you give me some examples? 
 
Support (for those who said ‘I’m not the opposition, but I support them’) 
 
4. Supporting the opposition/being [respondent’s category] – what does it 
mean for you?  
- How different is that from ‘being the opposition’? Whom would you call ‘the 
opposition’? What is the main difference? 
- What is it that makes you a ‘supporter’/‘sympathiser’/[respondent’s category]? 
 
5. Can you tell me about your protest experience? What have you done?  
- Have you been to a protest or a demonstration?  
- Have you done something you consider as ‘support of opposition’ recently?  





6. Why are you taking part in these activities you told me about? 
- Are these activities important for you? Why? What are your motives? 
- What is it you are hoping to achieve by supporting the opposition? 
- Are you hoping to make a change? Influence political situation? Social situation? 
People themselves? Please tell me more.  
 
6.1. As supporter of the opposition/[participant’s category], what are your 
goals? 
- Is it easy to achieve these goals in today’s Russia? Why or why not? 
- Can you think of anything that might prevent you from achieving the goals you 
mentioned? Can you give me some examples? 
 
Avoidance of category (for those who said ‘I have no relation to opposition’) 
 
4. How would you call what you are doing? Why? What does it involve? 
- How different is what you do from the ‘oppositional’ activity? 
- Whom would you call ‘a part of the opposition?’ What makes them different 
from you? What about ‘supporters’ of the opposition? 
 
5. Can you tell me about your protest experience? What have you done?  
- Have you been to a protest or a demonstration?  
- Have you done something you consider as ‘protest’ recently?  
- Do you do it often? Would you say it is a part of your ordinary life/daily routine? 
 
6. Why are you taking part in these activities you told me about? 
- Are these activities important for you? Why? What are your motives? 
- What is it you are hoping to achieve by doing them? 
- Are you hoping to make a change? Influence political situation? Social situation? 




6.1. Do you have any goals then?   
- Is it easy to achieve these goals in today’s Russia? Why or why not? 
- Can you think of anything that might prevent you from achieving the goals you 




7. Is you protest (or participant’s category) important for you as a Russian? 
Why? 
- Do you think it is important for the country?  
- Is your protest connected to your feelings of citizenship? 
- Do you think protesting is a matter of national importance?  
 
8. Do people around you know what you are doing? 
- Your friends or relatives? Maybe colleagues at work?  
- Do you tell other people about what you do? 
- Do you share what you do with other people? 
 
8.1 Do you think it is important to tell other people, to involve them? Why? 
 
8.2 How do people around you react to what you do? 
- Do they support/oppose you? What do they think about recent protests? 
- Do they share your views? Do they share ‘oppositional’ views? 
 
9. Is there anything else you’d like to mention that we haven’t talked about?   
 
10. Thank you very much, our interview has ended. Now I’d like to ask some 
information about you (in case they did not answer these during the interview) – age 
(or age group, 18-24/25-34/35-44/45-54/55-64/65-74/75 or higher) and occupation, if 
that is fine with you.  
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Numbers in round brackets indicate a pause in tenths of a second. 
A dot in parentheses indicates a micro pause (less than 2/10 of a second). 
Square brackets indicate beginning of overlapping talk. 
Equals sign indicates ‘latching’, where there is no pause between turns. 
Underlining indicates emphasis on words or syllables. 
Capital letters indicate words said noticeably louder than surrounding talk. 
Degree signs indicate noticeably quieter speech and whispering. 
The pound sterling sign indicates smiley voice or ‘suppressed’ laugher. 
Pointed arrows indicate increased a marked rising or falling intonation shift. 
Talk in brackets is pronounced noticeably quicker than surrounding talk. 
A dash indicates the sharp cut off of the prior word or sound. 
Question marks indicate a ‘questioning’ (i.e., rising) intonation. 
Voiced laughter; the more ‘hh’ the longer the laughter. 
An ‘h’ preceded by a dot indicates intake of breath/exhalation. 
Colons indicate elongation of the prior sound or letter; the more colons the 
greater the extent of the stretching. 
Double parentheses indicate non-verbal activity, describe words that have 
been removed to maintain anonymity or show transcriber’s annotations. 
 
 
 
